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ABSTRACT 
The Safi of Afghaniya, one of the tribal sections of the Safi Pakhtuns 
(Pathans) of Afghanistan, constitute the subject of study in the thesis. 
They number approximately 3,000 and occupy the lower part of the 
Pachoghan valley - one of the high mountain valleys of the eastern Hindu 
Kush. High summer temperatures and abundant water for irrigation make 
it possible for the inhabitants to pursue a two-crop, intensive agricultural 
economy. The majority of owner-cultivators can, however, only live at a 
subsistence level because of the high population density and land shortage 
in the valley. These two factors together with the increasing influence of 
the central government are fundamentally altering the Afghaniya Safi' s 
social structure and organization and bringing their identity as Pakhtuns 
into question. 
In the thesis this process of change is traced in a diachronic study start- 
ing with an outline of the Pakhtuns as a whole and with the Safi' s 
metamorphosis from what would seem to have been pagan Pashai/ 
Kohistani to muslim Pakhtuns. The thesis continues with a description of 
the economic and social conditions in Afghaniya and then deals with those 
elements of the social organization - descent, family and household 
relations, and marriage - which reveal most starkly the degree and 
extent of change per se and of the diminution of Pakhtun ideals and values. 
In the chapter on political organization, agnation, space and affinity are 
brought together as the factors primarily utilised by the members of the 
community for achieving group solidarity in the competition for resources. 
Finally, in the leadership chapter, they are also shown to play a part as 
some of those elements - together with traditional ideals and expectations 
and powers given them by the central government - which the leaders 
(maliks) manipulate to reduce autonomy and egalitarianism within the 
community and thereby to achieve a monopoly of power themselves. That 
these changes in the Afghaniya Safi' s social structure and organization 
have taken the form of a decline in the importance of the lineage organiza- 
tion and patriarchal authority (both essentials of the Pakhtun identity) and 
of a disregard and neglect of Pakhtun ideals and norms in general would 
seem to point to an inability of the Safi to maintain their identity as 
Pakhtuns. 
-2- 
In this latest Safi metamorphosis, however, it is still unclear what will 
result. It is possible because of the expanding powers of the central 
government in general that these Safi will not become non-Pakhtuns but 
will change that which is considered Pakhtun and so be the forerunners 
of change in Pakhtun society as a whole. 
11 
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PREFACE 
The field work on which this thesis is based was carried out from 
August 1970 to September 1971 among the Safi Pakhtuns of 
Afghanistan. 
It was self-financed apart from an award from the Emslie 
Horniman Scholarship Fund (1969) of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute for which I am very grateful. 
In transliterating Pakhto 
1) 
I have not used any accepted system 
but have been guided by two principles, firstly that each consonant 
should have an individual symbol and secondly, that these symbols 
should all be typable and not involve later insertion by hand. The 
result is shown on page viii . Whilst such a system solves the 
problems of re-identification and reproduction other problems 
could not be solved in this way. Firstly, apart from the long 
vowels 1 (and its variants), and 9 there are no letters 
or symbols in Pakhto for the short ones. I have therefore attempt- 
ed in my transliteration to use a standard pronunciation, however, 
some words, because there is no standard dictionary 
2) 
may have 
the dialect vowels of my area. Secondly, Pakhto is an inflected 
language with irregular plural forms. In those cases where I have 
used but one word then I have ignored the inflection and, where I 
have not used the plural form, have formed the plural - apart 
from words such as 'koranai' and ' para' which I made both 
singular and plural - in the English manner with an ' s' . For the 
1) Pakhto is the hard dialect of the eastern Pakhtuns to which the Safi 
belong. Most writers refer to Pashto, the pronunciation of the 
western Pashtuns, because this is considered by linguists to be the 
older or original pronunciation of the letter Ljo. . 2) I used throughout the following dictionaries; Raverty, H. G. 1867. 
A Dictionary of the Pukhto, 2nd ed. Williams and Norgate, London; 
Afgansko-Russkii Slovar (Pushtu) Akademiya Naik SSSR - Institut 
Narodov Azii - Institut Etnografii Moskva - 1966 and Russko- 
Afganskii Slovar Moskva - 1963. 
viii 
1. 
I 
The Pakhto Alphabet and Transliteration 
-- - -a 
ý sh 
Lý - -- b ( -- - kh 
C=3 -- -p (. )0 -- -s 
ü -- -t ýjo -- -z 
.. -- -t b -- -t 
Z 
-- -j t -- -'a 
-- - ch 
f 
-- - £h 
-- H - -- L9 - f (p) 
-- - is -- -q 
t 
-- - dz 
o 
-- -k 
-- -x -- -G 
.ý -- -d 
J 
-- -1 
J 
-- -z -- -n 
-- -r (' -- -n 
i 
-- -r , -- - u, o, w, au 
-- -z -- -h (a) 
- -- zh (ý -- - y, i 
ý, 
- -- g (ý) -- -i 
i 
f -- - ay, ai 
ix 
sentences where inflection occurred I have used an approximation of 
those vowel sounds which I heard used by the Safi. Thirdly, geo- 
graphical names and certain other proper nouns such as 'khan' and 
' mullah' have not been transliterated because I thought that this 
would only lead to confusion. Finally I have written throughout 
Pakhto and Pakhtun apart from places where I have referred 
specifically to tribes which I know speak Pashto and are therefore 
Pashtuns. Other dialectal differences which affect such letters as 
and (. ) and the Pakhtun practice of pronouncing CJ as - 
the Safi should in fact be the Sapi - have been ignored. 
" 
Where the present tense is used in the text this refers to the period 
of field work, i. e. 1970-1971. This is important because of the 
change occurring and because the great drought of that period 
reached its culmination in that year and undoubtedly was responsib- 
1) 
le for special responses on the part of the people . 
Measurements are given in terms of the metric system. Where I 
have used local terms then these have the following values: 1 jerib = 
1950 square metres, 1 pau = 442 grams, 1 ser =7 kilograms, 
1 man = 56,5 kilograms and one kharwar = 565,1 kilograms. The 
value of the Afghan currency, the Afghani, was at the time of my 
field work - 100 Afs. = 50p. 
That my field work was possible or in any way fruitful is the result 
of countless people's help only a few of whom I can thank by name 
here. Among these were the then Royal Afghan Ministeries of the 
Interior and Foreign Affairs who allowed me to work in Kapisa, the 
governor and waluswal of the province who showed me considerable 
hospitality and did all in their power to help me, and the Faculty of 
Letters and Humanities of the University of Kabul whose members 
were unfailing in their efforts to support my project and unstinting 
with their time. That my project got under way at all is due to 
1) For an account of the really appalling conditions which prevailed in 
some parts of Afghanistan during the drought (in this case Badghis 
province) see: Barry, M. 1972. Western Afghanistan' s Outback. 60 
pages. Duplicated by Communication Media. USAID/Afghanistan - 
Kabul. 
X 
Prof. Dr. Karl Jettmar of Heidelberg University, to thorn many 
thanks, who arranged, through the South Asia Institute's branch in 
Kabul, for my initial acceptance by the Afghan government. Once 
in Kabul Heidelberg continued to sponsor, help, feed, and aid me 
through the good offices of Dr. and Mrs. Peter Snoy to whom my 
most heartfelt thanks. 
During my field work I was accompanied by two ' counterparts' 
from the University of Kabul Messrs. Bayazid Atsak and Wazir 
Taniwal who, through their unfailing help and friendship, their 
aptitude with people and their considerable abilities made my work 
in Afghaniya possible. 
Finally my greatest thanks are due to my supervisor Mr. David 
Brooks for his encouragement, advice and unwearying interest. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The majority of anthropologists before they acquire or settle down 
to study 'their' particular tribe, village, or people are subject to 
forces which influence both the place and the nature of their field 
work. My case was no exception. However as this process of 
choosing a Pakhtun group for study modified my view of the people 
and my presentation of the material it is perhaps relevant to give 
a short account of events leading up to my choice of the Safi of 
Afghaniya. 
The Safi Pakhtuns of Afghaniya were certainly not the group which 
I had in mind on my arrival in Afghanistan. I wished to do work 
among' settled Pakhtuns, which the Safi were, but preferably in the 
province of Paktia (see map I p. 4). My reasons for choosing 
settled rather than nomadic Pakhtuns were the following: I had 
worked among nomads in north Africa and wished to experience by 
way of a contrast a settled agricultural economy. Also a certain 
amount of work had been done and was in the process of being 
done among Pakhtun nomads whereas apart from a short article by 
Sigrist 1) very little work had been done among Afghanistan's 
settled Pakhtuns since Elphinstone' s time 
2). Finally a certain 
challenge emanated from the general opinion that the settled 
Pakhtuns were unattractive and difficult to study. Penetration of the 
' mud curtain' was considered more problematical and time 
1) Sigrist, C. 1970. Pahtunvali. Das Stammesrecht der Pastunen. Ar- 
beitsgemeinschaft für Kulturanthropologie. Basel. 
2) A modern researcher goes so far as to say: 'The best single source 
on the Pashtun (i. e. both settled and nomadic) remains 
Elphinstone' s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, first published 
in 1815. ' (Brackets mine). In: Tribe and community among the 
Ghilzai Pashtun. p. 575. Anderson, J. 1975 Anthropos 70. pp. 575- 
601. 
-2- 
consuming than that of the 'hair' one 
1ý 
As far as an area for study Was concerned my initial hopes centred, 
as I have mentioned above, on the Paktia Pakhtuns who represented 
and still represent the most independent Pakhtun tribes living within 
the boundaries of Afghanistan. Unfortunately their very independence 
worked against my plans because the central government felt that it 
could not guarantee my safety in an area where so much anti-British 
sentiment still existed - the aftermath of the Anglo-Afghan Wars 
(1839-42,1878-81 and 1919). Other border areas, but especially 
those with Pakistan, were also excluded because of their political 
sensitivity. A sufficiently large area of Pakhtun settlement neverthe- 
less remained and I spent three weeks travelling around looking for 
a group and an area which would suit my purposes. Unfortunately 
two areas, in the provinces of Ghazni and Zabul, which would have 
been most interesting had to be abandoned because of the opposition 
of their governors. Finally however I was able to establish myself 
among the Safi of Afghaniya in the province of Kapisa to the east of 
Kabul (see map I p. 4 ). 
The two principal reasons for this choice were the following. Firstly 
Afghaniya gave the impression, as far as I was able to judge from 
the information received, of a community very dissimilar from that 
1) A view with which as far as the Safi of Afghaniya are concerned I can 
in retrospect only agree. Promises of help, lodging, support, 
information etc., given at the time of my survey (mentioned below) 
were disregarded on my return. The overt opposition experienced at 
the beginning of my field work remained with only a few exceptions at 
a covert level throughout my stay. The reasons why I nevertheless 
remained were the time already invested, the hope that conditions 
might change and the fear that other Safi communities would be no 
different. I feel that much interesting material nevertheless emerged 
but undoubtedly the difficulties experienced had the disadvantage of 
keeping me tied to one Safi community and thus incapable of making 
anything other than very rudimentary excursions into other Safi areas 
for complementary material, and general impressions. This 
expresses itself in Chapter 3 where I can only talk about THE Safi as 
a whole from literary sources and in the thesis in general where I 
write about the Safi of Afghaniya and not about the SAFI full stop. 
-3- 
described by Barth for the Swat Pathan. Afghaniya was politically 
and economically an egalitarian society with no non-Pakhtun subor- 
dinate population such as the Swati. There were leaders, the 'maliks', 
but these men were elected representatives and not like Barth' s 
khans, hereditary autocrats. There were also landowners with larger 
than average land holdings but these men were certainly not land- 
lords. The majority of adult males were, as a result, owner cultivators 
working at a subsistence level -a situation arising apparently from 
the density of the population and the fractionisation of holdings. Such 
a community would, therefore, provide different information from 
that collected by Barth and would broaden the knowledge of the 
Pakhtuns in general. 
Secondly these Afghaniya Safi situated as they were on the periphery 
of Safi settlement and administratively included in a non-Pakhtun 
province were increasingly being subjected to the controls and 
influence of the central government. Such a situation meant that the 
problem of the response and reaction in social and political terms of 
a particular Pakhtun group to external pressure could be studied and 
some light thrown onto the whole complex of the integration of 
Pakhtun tribes into the wider Afghan society: a problem which has 
been of central importance since the founding of the Afghan state. 
This is not, of course, to say that this was the only problem which 
was apparent or was responsible for change in the social structure. 
Overpopulation, drought, the division of land on inheritance, etc., 
were all playing and played a part but the question of the central 
government's influence on previously autonomous groups seemed at 
the time of the survey to be of particular interest. In the analysis 
itself the government's activities emerge as but one factor among 
a number in an aetiology of change. Together they have had 
considerable effect on the social structure of Afghaniya as is 
demonstrated in the thesis by the declining significance of the 
partrilineal organization and its partial, perhaps temporary replace- 
ment in certain spheres by affinal bonds and bonds of residential 
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proximity. The question whether this represents a trend to be follow- 
ed by other or all Pakhtun tribes or is merely a temporary decline 
or accomodation, lies of course in the realm of speculation. It is, 
however, a step in the direction of the non-tribal social organiza- 
tion characteristic of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. 
Both these reasons for ultimately choosing Afghaniya - working from 
particular problems in one Pakhtun group towards general 
conclusions about the whole ethnos - had been presaged by the 
impressions I received whilst searching for a satisfactory and 
permitted area for study. The relatively large cross-section of 
Pakhtun groups which I saw then made me aware of the considerable 
social and economic differences within and between tribes. It, how- 
ever, also made me aware of the common attributes e. g. patrilineal 
organization, customary law, code of honour etc., which exist among 
the tribes and which make them conscious not only of being, for 
example, Safi or Ghilzai but also of being Pakhtun. Such social 
factors furthering a Pakhtun identity have also been supported over a 
period of more than 200 years by the special political position of the 
Pakhtuns in Afghanistan. They, or at least one tribe, the Durrani, 
have provided all the kings of the country. The other Pakhtun tribes 
whilst rarely accepting the paramount position of the Durrani and 
constantly seeking to discomfort, and weaken if not replace them 
nevertheless acted as Pakhtuns in what Dupree has called the policy 
of 'internal imperialism' 
1) 
i. e. . in the conquest and 
Pakthunisation 
of non-Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan 
2). 
Thus the needs of a Pakhtun 
1) Dupree, L. 1973. Afghanistan. p. 417 f. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
2) In the north-west of the country this ' Pakhtunisation', at least during 
the reign of Abd ar-Rahman, resulted initially rather from the inad- 
equacy of the non-Pakhtuns to populate and hold this border area 
against Russian expansion than from a policy aimed at spreading 
Pakhtun control. Nevertheless this was the end result once the 
Pakhtuns (Ghilzai and Durrani) had established themselves there. See 
Nancy Tapper, 1973. The advent of Pashtun M_aldars in north-western 
Afghanistan, pp. 55-79. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies. No. 36. 
- s- 
monarchy in a multi-ethnic state (Pakhtuns, Hazara, Turkoman, 
Nuristani, Baluch, Tajik, Uzbak, etc. ) have furthered and strengthen- 
ed an already existing sense of being Pakhtun so that even today it is 
unthinkable, at least for Pakhtuns, that anybody other than a Pakhtun 
could be the head of state 
1), 
The Pakhtun tribal section, village or community must, therefore, be 
seen, if an analysis of the social structure is to be understandable 
and relevant, as embedded in a tribal and Pakhtun background and 
formed by historical processes. In the thesis this is given expression 
through a general description in chapter 2 of the Pakhtuns, their 
political significance, diversity and similarities. It then becomes clear 
in chapter 3, on the Safi themselves, how peculiarly relevant such a 
Pakhtun framework is because it appears, from literary sources, that 
the Safi were originally non-Pakhtuns and most probably an amalga- 
mation of Pashai and Kohistani groups. The actual processes involved 
in this metamorphosis can only be speculated upon because although the 
Safi were not the only non-Pakhtuns to become Pakhtuns there is no 
evidence to show how this was achieved at least for groups of this 
size. Nevertheless the end result is clear, i. e. that the non-Pakhtun 
Safi outsiders became insiders in terms of the Pakhtun ethnos. 
This binary opposition, outsider : insider, and the process from out- 
sider to insider in which the Safi as non-muslims and non-Pakhtuns 
were so much involved takes on a special emphasis as the thesis 
progresses and in fact becomes its central and continuing theme. In 
chapter 4 after a description of the occupation of Afghaniya by the 
Safi, settlement is shown to continue through the population increase 
1) An example of this may be given from my own field work. In my first 
week in Afghaniya I was reading a magazine on the cover of which was 
a portrait of Mao Tse Tung. A Safi Pakhtun sitting opposite to me 
asked who it was. When I replied that he was, in Afghan terms, the 
'king' of China he said, with obvious amusement at my naivete, 'that 
can't be so that's a Hazara' . In Afghanistan the mongoloid Hazara are 
at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy whose top is formed by the 
Pakhtuns. It was, therefore, impossible for this Safi Pakhtun to accept 
my statement. 
-7- 
of the original settlers (the taxti) and the arrival of newcomers, the 
outsider raghli. These outsiders become Safi through their integra- 
tion into and acceptance of the insider taxti' s order and ideals. Of 
course this adaptation was not as difficult as that undertaken by the 
Safi themselves because the raghli were also Pakhtuns or Pakhto- 
speakers and the social organization met with in Afghaniya was 
thoroughly familiar to them. Today this process of settlement and 
adaptation is still continuing with the settlement of strangers, the 
ajnabiyan (principally families of non-Safi Pakhtun nomads), in 
Afghaniya and with their aspirations for insidership. 
Chapter 5, the physical and social setting, provides the background 
for the later chapters and for the analysis of the Afghaniya Safi. 
Chapter 6 takes up the theme of outsider : insider by looking at the 
occupational activities of the Safi and the non-Safi ' kusubGar' or 
professionals. These kusubGar were, and still are, designated 
according to their profession i. e. blacksmith, carpenter and barber. 
They are thus contrasted to the Safi who refer to themselves in this 
context as ' siyal' , i. e. an equal or clansman, or 
Pakhtun. The 
kusubGar are also trying, with differing success, to change their 
status and ultimately their identity through the acquisition of land, 
one of the keys to passing, and through marriage with the Safi, the 
other, and principal, key. Thus they too are seeking insider status 
from an outsider position. 
Within the kusubGar the barbers constitute a special category because 
although they are, in relation to the Safi, outsiders their work - 
shaving, haircutting, nail-pairing, blood-letting and attendance at the 
Safi rites de passage - brings them into the sort of intimate contact 
with the Safi usually only granted to insiders. Thus the barbers are 
outsiders acting as special insiders trying to be normal insiders. 
A problem and process which is still continuing. 
The Afghaniya Safi, whilst being in comparison with the other groups 
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the high status insiders, are not themselves immune from change, 
nor are they without aspirations as far as their status is concerned. 
In chapters 7,8 and 9 one sees, in terms of descent, residential 
proximity, and marriage how what the Safi consider as fundamental 
aspects of their society are breaking down. Patrilineality, patrili- 
neal ideals and the patrilineal ideology, as well as patriarchal 
authority are being put under pressure, challenged and replaced by 
individual interests, a greater materialism and by ties based on 
affinity and proximity. This is perhaps surprising because one would 
expect the Safi, as the last group to take on the Pakhtun identity, to 
lay great stress on those characteristics which mark the insider i. e. 
' Pakhtuness' , patrilineal ideals etc., much in the same way as they 
have acquired a reputation for religious fanaticism as a result of 
their late conversion to Islam. But this is not the case. Whilst they 
may originally have been exemplary Pakhtuns now those very aspects 
of the identity which were considered essential are being neglected 
or disregarded. 
The external causes for the Safi' s difficulties are the extension of 
the central government's authority into the community, overpopulation, 
land shortage and, in the short term, drought. All these elements 
are given expression in chapter 10 which is concerned with the 
political groups and the competition for resources. Here the factors 
marriage, descent, and residential proximity, can be seen interact- 
ing and competing in the formation of political groups and the 
rewards, land and power, emerge as the primary interests of the 
Safi. This debilitating struggle for land is, however, only really 
being won by one group in Afghaniya, the maliks, or leaders. They, 
as is shown in chapter 11, are the only ones who have taken up the 
external challenge successfully apart perhaps from the Safi mullahs. 
They are proving to be the most adaptable to the government' s 
requirements and institutions, the most aggressive in their pursuit of 
land and power and the most effective as Pakhtuns. Thus they may 
turn out to be, although there are still mechanisms for impeding 
this, the fore-runners or instigators of a new Afghaniya society. 
-9- 
This would be one where distinctions would be based on the economic 
domination of the landless many by the landed and powerful few and 
where the maliks themselves would represent the 'maximal' insiders. 
In the light of the changes per se, the disappearance of many ideals 
and norms, the institutionalization and aristocratisation of leaders, 
and shortage of land etc., the question then left to answer is: what 
are the Safi becoming? Can they continue to be Pakhtuns or is 
another metamorphosis in progress or necessary? Some answers to 
these questions are given in the conclusion and it is through them 
that the deductive process beginning with the Pakhtuns and continuing 
with the Safi as a whole and the Afghaniya Safi in particular is 
finally reversed. It becomes an inductive one with the question of the 
Afghaniya Safi' s place in the Safi and Pakhtun societies and in the 
Afghan society at large. In Tambiah' s words it is "to use the 
particular to say something general' 
1 ). 
This revelation of the 
general in the particular was the guiding concept and is the ultimate 
aim of the thesis. 
1) Tambiah, S. J. 1975. Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-east 
Thailand. p. I. Cambridge University Press. 
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2. THE PAKHTUNS 
The Safi of Afghaniya are members of the largest ethnic group in 
Afghanistan, the Pakhtuns 
1). 
These Pakhtuns number approximately 
7 million -a further six million live in Pakistan - and occupy the 
south and east of the country (see map II p. 4). They are divided up 
into a number of tribes (ca. 15) whose size varies considerably. The 
two largest and for the history of the country most influential ones 
are the Durrani (ca. 2 million) and the Ghilzai 
2) 
(2.5-3 million) 
whose territories stretch from Farah in the west to Kabul in the east 
(see map II p. 4). The Ghilzai were the first in 1709 to obtain 
independence from the Persian Safavids but it was the Durrani 
(Abdali 
3)) 
who, under Ahmad Shah (1747), founded modern 
Afghanistan and members of the Popalzai and Barakzai clans of the 
Durrani 
4) 
who provided the kings of Afghanistan and the present 
founder of the new republic 
5). 
The other Pakhtun tribes to whom the 
Safi belong are mainly resident in the east of the country and were 
able to achieve varying degrees of independence from Durrani rule 
with the weakness or strength of the central government. 
External pressure, for example, from British-India was, however, 
usually sufficient to unite the tribes at least temporarily. This 
unity arose not out of national fervour but principally because the 
foreign forces, at least those coming from the south, needed in order to 
reach Kabul to penetrate and pass through Pakhtun areas. In the 
1) Also known as Pashtuns (see Preface), Pathans and Afghans. 
2) May also be, and according to some is more correctly written 
' Ghilji' . See, for example, Caroe, O. 1965. The Pathans 550 BC- AD 1957. p. 131. Macmillan, London., and Dupree, L. 1973. Op. cit. 
p. 322., footnote 7. 
3) The Durrani were known as the Abdali until 1747 when Ahmad Shah 
added to his name the title Durr-i-Durran and his tribe became the 
Durrani. 
4) The Popalzai Saddozai were in power from 1747-1818 and the 
Barakzai Mohammedzai from 1826 to the present. 
5) For an account of the change from kingdom to republic see: Dupree, 
1973. Op. cit. Epilogue. pp. 753-760., and Deutsch, K. 1975. Repu- 
blik Afghanistan. Zum Machtwechsel in einem Entwicklungsland des 
Orients. pp. 408-415. Geographische Rundschau, Jahrgang 27, 
Oktober 1975, Heft 10. 
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absence of a large and independent Afghan central army the Pakhtun 
tribes, because of their geographic position and warlike disposition, 
thus became essential in times of war for the defence of the country, 
the preservation of the reigning monarch and the existence of the 
state and were correspondingly courted by the various kings. This 
lead among other things to the conscious preservation of the tribal 
organization and the Pakhtun tribes acquired a position of influence 
and power in the state which only began to weaken after the Second 
World War. The other ethnic groups, apart from the Tajik and 
Qizilbash who were essential as craftsmen, tradesmen, shopkeepers, 
entrepreneurs, minor government officials, professional soldiers 
etc., had relatively little to say in the affairs of the country. It is 
only now that an attempt is being made to break the ethnic cons- 
ciousness and inequalities of the groups, and to substitute for them 
a national consciousness independent of external pressure, and 
equality. 
Social and Cultural Forms / Diversity 
The Pakhtuns as might be expected from an ethnic group which is 
so numerous and which covers a large and diverse - desert, 
mountain, and fertile valley floor- - geographical area exhibit a great 
range of social and cultural forms. This fact is well documented by 
Elphinstone 1) and Caroe 
2) but achieves its clearest expression in 
Barth' s analysis of 'Pathan Identity and its Maintenance' 
3). Barth 
divides Pakhtun communities into five major categories. 
In the first category are 'villages of mixed agriculturalists, organ- 
ized in egalitarian patrilineal descent segments with an acephalous 
political form' occupying a central belt of barren hills. 
1) Elphinstone, M. 1972. (reprint from 1815). An Account of the King- 
dom of Caubul. 2 vols. Oxford University Press, London. 
2) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. 
3) Barth, F. 1970. Pathan Identity and its Maintenance. pp. 117-134. 
In: Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. George Allen and Unwin, London. 
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The second category consists of 'Pakhtun landowners or owner culti- 
vators' with ' tenant Tajiks or servile tenant and menial castes' . 
These Pakhtuns and their tenants are politically organized on the 
basis of lineally structured segmentary systems which are either 
acephalous or quasi feudal. The latter are partially integrated with- 
in the state systems of Pakistan and Afghanistan and are 'increas- 
ingly subject to bureaucratic administration' . This category as a 
whole occupies ' favoured localities in the mountains, and in the 
broader valleys and plains' where 'more intensive agriculture is 
practised, based on artificial irrigation' . 
The third category is composed of Pakhtun administrators, traders, 
craftsmen or labourers in the towns of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Pakhtun nomads constitute the fourth category and are 'politically 
organized as tribes with, in part, very great autonomy'. 
Finally groups practising 'extensive labour or trading migrations 
which bring individuals and small groups periodically far outside 
the geographical boundaries of Pathan country' form the basis of 
the fifth category. 
Common Attributes 
In spite of this great diversity of social and cultural forms Pakhtuns 
possess attributes which are to be found represented to a greater or 
lesser extent within all the tribes. It is these attributes which 
according to Barth 
1) 
preserve and maintain the Pakhtun identity and 
which Pakhtuns themselves regard as indispensable to the Pakhtun 
ethos. These attributes are the Pakhto language 
2) 
patrilineal 
1) Barth, F. 1970. Op. cit. p. 119. 
2) Barth himself (1970. Op. cit. p. 119) regards Pakhto (Pashto) as but 
part of Pathan custom: ' it is a necessary and diacritical feature, but 
in itself not sufficient: we are not dealing with a linguistic group', I 
consider it to have more importance for the Pakhtun identity and, 
therefore, make it a separate and major attribute. 
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descent, orthodoxy of belief and the Pakhtun code or custom. The Pakhto 
language would seem to be a self-evident attribute requiring no further 
explanation but Barth 
1), 
as indicated in footnote 2 (p. 12), challenges 
this and also rightly comments that there are Pakhto speakers who 
possess no other Pakhtun attribute than that of language whereas 
Pakhtuns say, 'he is Pathan who does Pashto, not (merely) who speaks 
Pashto' . One should also add that there are Pakhtuns in Herat and 
Kabul whose language is Farsi-Dari 
2) 
and some of these are members 
of the royal/ruling Mohammedzai clan. Nevertheless I think that Pakhto 
must be included under the indispensable attributes of the Pakhtun 
identity 
3) because, apart from some extreme examples, Pakhtun and 
Pakhto are inextricable and also because modern trends will force more 
and more Pakhtuns into a twilight zone where only their mother tongue 
will remain as a symbol of their ethnic identity. 
The significance which patrilineal descent has for the Pakhtuns is 
apparent to anyone who has had anything to do with them. This fact is 
well documented in the works of Elphinstone, Raverty, Bellew, Caroe 
and Barth who all refer to the tribal genealogies which link all Pakhtuns 
to their eponym 'Qais' 
4). 
Thus ca. 13 million Pakhtuns in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan have their ethnic unity corroborated by an all embracing 
genealogy. However this ethnic genealogy is only one aspect of the 
concept of patrilineal descent as a Pakhtun attribute. For the majority 
of Pakhtuns patrilineality and agnation are elements which structure 
social and political organization and order ownership of land, residence 
and inheritance. As may be seen patrilineal descent is a central 
attribute of the Pakhtun identity. 
The third attribute, orthodoxy of belief, does not mean that the Pakhtuns 
1) Barth, F. 1970. Op. cit. p. 119. 
2) Farsi-Dari, or Dari is Afghan persian. 
3) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 65 considers Pakhto to be 'the most obvious 
symbol today of Pathan identity and the measure of Pathan pride' . 4) These writers draw for their information about the tribal genealogies 
and the eponymous ancestor Qais (Pathan) on ' Makhzan-i-Afghani' 
from Nematullah and the later 18th century re -issue of this wo rk 
entitled ' Khulasatul-Asab' . See Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. pp. 
4&8. 
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must be religious in the sense of being devoted to religion and piety. Nor 
does it mean that they constitute some puritanical islamic body such as 
the Wahabi. They must, however, be Sunni 
1) 
and are generally for legal 
matters Hanafi which is the official school both for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. In fact they generally know very little about their religion 
which is partly the fault of their Mullahs who are nearly all illiterate 
and themselves often ignorant of the true tenets of Islam and partly the 
result of their belief that Islam and Pakhtun customs are complementary 
thus obviating them of the need to learn something they already practice. 
Nevertheless the Pakhtuns more than make up for their nescience 
by religious fanaticism expressed in intolerance towards and 
repression of the Shias, and fervour in the Jihads 
2). 
This latter 
activity has been pursued by the Pakhtuns, at least according to 
their traditions, since the very initiation of Islam. They believe that 
Qais, their founding ancestor, was converted to Islam by the Prophet 
himself -a version of history probably obtained from Nematullah' s 
chronicle 
3) 
the contents of which were probably spread by word of 
mouth - and that from that time onwards Pakhtuns carried their 
faith into all the countries of the infidel. Other accounts, however, 
from what Caroe 
4) has described as ' reliable Muslim sources' 
indicate that the majority of Pakhtuns had not been converted in the 
11th century and even at the end of the 12th century 'infidel' 
Pakhtuns were fighting against their Muslim brothers. In spite of 
its historical inaccuracy this legend of Qais' s conversion is of 
considerable importance to the Pakhtuns because, as Barth notes, 
'thus, Pathans have no infidel past, nor do they carry in their 
5) history the blemish of defeat and forcible conversion' . Their 
orthodoxy of belief is, therefore, not only a question of being Sunni 
1) One Pakhtun tribe the Turi are, however, Shia. 
2) This characteristic is well illustrated in the Pakhtun involvement in 
the fighting between India and Pakistan for Kashmir, 1947-48. The 
tribes-people refer to it as the 'Kashmir Lakhar', or Kashmir Jihad' . 3) See also above p. 13 footnote 4. 
4) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 9. The 'sources' are Al-Biruni and Al-Utbi. 
5) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 119. 
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but of being bound up inextricably with Islam from the beginning of 
their history. Thus they consider themselves to have an exclusive 
purity not shared by the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. 
The Pakhtun code or custom constitutes the final attribute of the 
Pakhtun identity. This is not an attribute in itself but a complex of 
concepts of honour and justice which emanate from specific value 
orientations of the Pakhtuns. These value orientations may be sum- 
marised as autonomy, equality, contumacy, individuality and 
aggressiveness and find expression in the complex of concepts 
mentioned above which the Pakhtuns themselves call Pakhtunwali. 
Pakhtunwali has been variously translated as Pakhtun code, custom 
or way and is a body of customary law generally regarded as the 
epitome or yardstick of ' Pakhtuness' . The number of components 
considered to belong to this body of law varies from observer to 
observer 
1) 
and often from tribe to tribe. Similarly great variety 
is shown in the content, interpretation 
2), 
and execution of these 
'laws' . The Pakhtuns themselves, however, believe that there is 
an intertribal consistency in the components constituting their code 
and strongly reject any suggestion of variability. All would consider 
being a good i. e., lavish host, being hospitable, giving asylum, 
taking blood revenge, possessing manhood and chivalry, defending 
1) See for example, Spain, J. W. 1962. People of the Khyber. F. A. 
Praeger, New York; Klimburg, M. 1966, Afghanistan. Oesterreichi- 
scher Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst. Wien; 
Sigrist, C. 1970 Op. cit.; Barth, 1970 Op. cit.; Kieffer, C. M. 
1971/2. Über das Volk der Pa'stunen und seinen Pa'stunwali. pp. 614- 
624. In: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung. Akademie der 
Wissenschaften der DDR. Band XVII; Janata, A. & Hassas Reihanodin. 
1975. Ghairatman - Der gute Pashtune. Exkurs über die Grundlagen 
des Pashtunwali. Afghanistan Journal No. 2 pp. 83-97 and Khadim, Q. 
ad-D. 1931 (Islamic Calendar). Pakhtunwali. Pakhto Tolena, Kabul, 
No. 101 (in Pakhto), 
2) Confusion seems to reign as far as the interpretation of Pakhtunwali 
by external observers is concerned. ' Nanawati' , 
for example, is 
considered by Spain (p. 47) and Sigrist (p. 3) to be associated with 
' badal' (revenge) and is translated as ' conciliation' or ' conciliatory 
procession' . Caroe (p. 351) regards ' nanawatai' (translated as a 
verbal noun meaning 'coming in' ) as an extension of the idea of 
' melmastia' (hospitality). Barth (pp. 120 & 121) in his discussion of 
2 melmastia' does not mention 'nanawatai' at all. 
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property and honour and defending the honour of woman as indispens- 
able elements of their code. They would agree that there are some 
differences as to content and execution but these they regard as 
differences of degree rather than kind. The sanctions, for example, 
practised by Pakhtun tribes do vary from tribe to tribe and in some 
cases from section to section of the same tribe. Nevertheless the 
members of a particular tribe or section who regard their own 
sanctions as the ideal responses to the infringements of rights are 
also willing to consider the sanctions of other Pakhtun groups, 
providing they do not differ too radically from their own, as valid 
and permissable variants and thus in agreement with the general 
tenor of Pakhtunwali. There is, therefore, among the Pakhtuns a 
general concurrence of opinion as to what does constitute Pakhtun- 
wali and within this agreement there is room for the various 
localized differences of interpretation. 
I have shown above something of the dispersion and history of, as 
well as something of the diversity pertaining to, and the similarities 
or common attributes shared by all Pakhtuns. It is with this as an 
explanatory backcloth that I will now turn to one of these Pakhtun 
tribes, the Safi. 
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3. THE SAFI, A GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Present Area of Safi settlement 
The Safi with a total population of ca. 80,000 
1 ), 
of which the 
Afghaniya Safi number 3,000, belong in the category of the smaller 
Pakhtun tribes. Their territory stretches from the Pech valley 
2) 
in 
the east along the Kunar and Kabul rivers to the Nijrao and Panjshir 
3) 
valleys in the north-west and thus forms a sort of semi-circle around 
Nuristan (see map III p. 18). This is not, as may be seen in other 
Pakhtun areas, an uninterrupted band of Pakhtun settlement but rather 
an area in which the Safi population, numerically speaking has areas of 
dominance and some continuity. The two main concentrations of Safi 
settlement are the Tagao and Kunar valleys where perhaps more than 
half of the total Safi population is settled. Settlement otherwise occurs 
as groups of villages and single villages scattered among non-Safi and 
non-Pakhtun groups 
4) 
in all the valleys running down from Nuristan 
into the Kunar and Kabul rivers 
5). 
Thus Safi settlement appears rather 
like a cupped hand with the palm formed by the Kunar and Kabul river 
and the fingers by the valleys pushing up into the Nuristan massif. 
1) This figure of 80,000 is an approximation because there has never 
been a census in Afghanistan. It is based on an assessment by Bellew 
(H. W. 1880. The Races of Afghanistan. p. 70. Calcutta. ) who 
considered the Safi to number 12,000 families. The population will 
inevitably have increased since then but the very high infant mortality 
as well as the low life expectancy in Afghanistan must have meant 
that the population only increased slightly until very recently. This 
would seem to make an estimate for 1970-71 possible based on the 
1880 figure. I have, therefore, multiplied Bellew' s figure by six and 
rounded it off to 80,000. The result is in all probability conservative, 
especially in the light of the present population explosion. 
2) Humlum, J. 1959. La geographie de 1' Afghanistan. p. 159. Scandina- 
vian University Books. Copenhagen. He reports that the village of 
Gousalik (see map III p. 18) is the highest point of Afghan/Safi 
settlement in the Pech valley. 
3) See, The 1967 University of Tokyo Expedition to South-West Hindukush, 
1969. Water and Village Life in East Afghanistan. p. 105. University 
of Tokyo Press. 
4) See Bellew, 1880 Op. cit. p. 70. 
5) 'They also have villages in Laghman, both in the Alish. -ang and 
Alingar valley, and large numbers dwell in Tagao and the other valleys 
running down to the left bank of the Kabul river. ' In Gazetteer of 
Afghanistan. p. 448. Part 4. Kabul. 4th Ed. Calcutta. 1910. 
2 ýý 
i 
- 18 - 
E 
t 
.. tä 
`n ZO 
a 
W 
i 
Imo-"1 
I- 
2 
Qj ýc 
M 
Z% 
1ý 
LL 
A 
O 
H 
ro m 
to 
U, 
-. 
,c- 
ci 
- 19 - 
Apart from this area of relatively continuous settlement Safi are also 
mentioned by Caroe as being 'in the recesses of the Bajaur dales 
1) between the hill Mohmands and the Tarklanris of Bajaur' (Pakistan) 
(see map III p. 18). Strangely enough Caroe does not refer to the 
Afghan Safi at all although these would appear to be far more numer- 
ous than their Pakistan counterparts. 
Another area of settlement for groups and families of Safi was and 
is the plains of northern Afghanistan. Schurmann 
2), 
for example, 
refers to Safi in the region of Balkh; Dupree 
3) 
mentions a Safi 
family in the Tajik town of Aq Kupruk (near Mazar-i-Sharif); and 
Grötzbach 
4) lists ' Qandahariha' 5) Pakhtuns as being settled in towns 
and villages in north-east Afghanistan. It is clear that other Safi 
settlements could be found in northern Afghanistan if the necessary 
information were available and that families of Safi no doubt reside 
6) in all the major cities of Afghanistan . It is also reasonably clear 
1) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 19. Words in brackets mine. See also: Wylly, 
H. C. 1912. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. pp. 225 and 226. 
Macmillan, London., and Barton, Sir W. 1939. India's North-West 
Frontier. pp. 26,27,34 & 108. John Murray, London. 
2) Schurmann, H. F. 1962. The Mongols of Afghanistan. p. 48. Mouton 
& Co., 'S-Gravenhage. 
3) Dupree, L. 1970. Aq Kupruk: A town in North Afghanistan, pp. 348 
and 376. In: Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East. vol. 2. Ed. Sweet, 
L. The Natural History Press, New York. 
4) Grötzbach, E. 1972. Kulturgeographischer Wandel in Nordost-Afgha- 
nistan seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Afghanische Studien, Band 4. Verlag 
Anton Hain. 
_ 5) Grötzbach considers these ' Qandahariha' to be Durrani because the 
city of Qandahar, from which he presumes the name is drawn, is in a 
Durrani area of settlement, (see p. 94.1972 Op. cit. ). However it 
seems to me that these ' Qandahariha' are much more likely to be Safi 
because this is the name of one of the principal Safi clans and members 
of this clan when asked about their tribal membership refer to them- 
selves as Qandahari rather than Safi. Also I know from my own field 
research that Safi are settled in north-east Afghanistan as owner 
cultivators and labourers. 
6) Kakar. (Kakar, H. 1971. Afghanistan. A study in internal political 
development, 1880-1896. p. 14. Kabul. ), for example, refers to 
' Safays' as being among the Pakhtun population of Kabul in 1876. 
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how they came to be scattered in the towns and in the north of the 
country i. e. through forced settlements 
1) 
and migration for work. 
What, however, is not clear and by no means certain is who the 
Safi were and how they came to settle in their principal area of 
occupation between the Pech and Panjshir valleys. 
Origin of the Safi - Hypotheses 
From the very meagre material on the subject four hypotheses 
emerge which on closer examination cease to be mutually exclusive 
and seem to be complementary in many points. The first suggested 
by Raverty 
2) 
is that the Safi, or at least those settled in the 
Panjshir valley, are a clan of the Parnis (also referred to as Panri). 
These Parnis are according to Caroe 
3). Scythian nomads who were 
allied to the Saka. As the Saka were the tribe which ca. 97 B. C. 
overran Bactria and Gandhara it is possible that the Parnis moved 
south with them. Later overpopulation, according to Raverty, caused 
the Parnis during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605) to migrate from 
Gandhara and for one of their clans, the Safi, to settle in the 
Panjshir valley. This Parni/Panri origin of the Safi is only support- 
ed by very meagre evidence 
4) 
and would seem to me to be based 
on the Nematullah genealogies 
5) 
which show the Safi as descendants 
of ' Parni' . However should it be correct, and we shall see 
below 
some further possible connections with the Parni, it only gives some 
explanation for the Panjshir Safi which as far as I know now only 
consist of the village of Khodaidad-khel 
6) (near Jabal As-Saraj, 
see map III p. 18) and two small communities between Mahmud-i- 
Raqi (the provincial capital of Kapisa), and the Qul-i-Gharau gorge 
1) See, for example, Dupree. 1970. Op. cit. p. 348., and Dupree, 1973. 
Op. cit. p. 537. 
2) Raverty, H. G. 1880. Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan, 
geographical, ethnographical, and historical. p. 7. London. 
3) Caroe, 1965. Op. cit. p. 64 & 65. 
4) For example in the ' Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series', p. 61 
vol. 3. Sibi District. Bombay 1907. 
5) Caroe, 1965 Op. cit. pp. 4& 19. 
6) Studied by the University of Tokyo Expedition. 1969. Op. cit. pp. 101- 
133. 
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(to the south of Mahmud-i-Raqi). The principal Safi settlements in 
Tagao and Kunar are not mentioned and it, therefore, seems that 
an explanation which includes these two areas is more worthy of 
consideration. 
Such an explanation is provided by the second theory put forward 
in this case by Bellew 
1). 
He suggests that events leading to the 
establishment of the ancestors of the Safi in the territory which 
they now occupy were set in motion by the Yusufzai and Mohmand 
Pakhtuns. These two tribes having been forced out of their own 
territory near Kandahar by the Tarin Pakhtuns in the first half of 
the 15th century settled at the beginning of the 16th century on the 
edges of the Peshawar plain. Whilst the Yusufzai expanded onto the 
plain the Mohmand penetrated into the hill country between the Ka- 
bul and Swat rivers. Here they were attacked by the indigenous 
population, the Gandhari, a people composed of 'several distinct 
nations or tribes, of which the predominant Gandhari themselves 
occupied as their central seat the interfluvial tract enclosed by the 
Kabul, Swat, and Kunar rivers' 
2). 
The fighting proved to be fierce 
and prolonged but finally the Gandhari were defeated and the whole 
of their country came into the hands of the Mohmands. 'In their 
victorious war with the natives the Mohmand appear to have acted 
with such fierce barbarity that the majority (of Gandhari) fled the 
country, and, crossing the Kunar river, found refuge and escape, 
among an apparently kindred people, in the fastnesses of Kama and 
Katar (Kafiristan), and in the valleys opening from them upon the 
Kabul river as far west as Tagao' 
3) 
It is these people i. e. the Gandhari and related tribes who having 
settled in the area between the Tagao valley and the Kunar river 
1) The information which will follow is taken principally from Bellew' s 
publications of 1880 (cited above) and 1891. An Inquiry into the 
Ethnography of Afghanistan. Oriental University Institute. Woking. 
2) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 64. This is not the ancient Gandhara but 
a new Gandhara possibly settled by refugees from the old state. 
3) Bellew. 1880 Op. cit. p. 69. Brackets mine. 
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were to become the Safi. This metamorphosis was brought about, at 
least according to Bellew, by the slow but steady advance of Islam. 
The Gandhari although safe from the predatory Mohmand were never- 
theless on one of the frontiers of an expanding islamic world. Init- 
ially they, like all non-muslim tribes, were referred to by the 
muslims as 'kafirs' irrespective of origin and linguistic and geo- 
graphical differences 
1). 
But as those Gandhari with direct territorial 
and/or trade contacts with the muslims gradually began to accept 
Islam they became known as 'nimchas' or half and halves. This was 
the result of their geographical position between the muslims and 
the kafir, their personal and trade dealings with both groups and the 
jealousy of each for his own religion. Thus they were muslim for the 
muslims and kafir for the kafirs. This situation continued until the 
' nimchas' felt themselves strong enough to become full muslims with- 
out fearing the vengeance of their kafir neighbours. This was the 
decisive step because those who remained pagan were referred to as 
kafirs or nimchas whilst those who were converted 'were distinguish- 
ed by the original patronymics of their race ', i. e. they reverted to 
their old tribal names one of which was Safi. ' Thus the converted 
Gandhari are now divided into two great sections, named Safi and 
2 
Gandhari' 
The third hypothesis is that advanced by Masson 
3). He suggests 
that the Safi were ' Siaposh', i. e. one of the major divisions of the 
Kafirs. Masson seems to base his argument on two pieces of 
1) The term ' kafir', i. e. unbeliever, was a word used by the muslims 
to describe non-muslims. The 'kafirs' of course used their own 
tribal and village names for themselves. However the struggle which 
went on over a number of centuries between the muslims and kafirs 
lead the latter to adopt the name 'Kafir' as a sort of symbol of their 
common solidarity. Nowadays the term is used to designate the 
languages of the people occupying the province of Nuristan. 
2) Bellew 1880 Op. cit. p. 70. 
3) Masson, C. 1840. Papers on Afghanistan, containing the narrative of 
journeys performed in that and 'the adjacent countries, between 1827 
and 1830 etc. In: Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society 
from Sept. to Nov. 1840, Vol 5. pp. 54-61 Bombay. 
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evidence 
1). 
Firstly that the people of Tagao were reported by Babur 
(1482-1530) as being kafirs and secondly that the Safi of his 
(Masson' s) time (1830' s) spoke languages generally regarded as 
belonging to the kafir group, i. e. Kohistani and Pashai. This latter 
view is upheld by a report in the Gazetteer of Afghanistan 
2) 
which 
states that the Safi of Jelalabad ' speak among themselves a peculiar 
language which may be called the kohistani dialect. ' It is, however, 
possible that this report does not represent independent research but 
is merely a repetition at a later date of Masson' s material. 
Unlike Bellew, who traces the name 'Safi' to an original patronymic, 
Masson considers it to be either a' siaposh appolation' (see above) 
or to have been the result of their conversion to Islam. In the latter 
case those Siaposh, he says, who seceded from the Siaposh commun- 
ity because of their acceptance of Islam 
3) 
were given the name 'Safi' 
or 'pure' by the muslims. This was done both as an indication of 
merit and as a means of distinguishing them from their pagan 
cousins. Thus the 'pure' people became the Safi. 
The fourth and final hypothesis is not propounded by any single per- 
son but is a compilation of notes and comments from different 
sources. These state that the Safi or at least some of them used to 
be Pashai. We have already seen that Masson refers to the Siaposh 
as speaking Pashai and Bellew states elsewhere that the Pashai 
'formerly included a number of tribes around them of similar speech 
and of probably kindred stock, but who are now known by different 
names such as Safi, Lughmani, Dehgani, Dara Nuri etc. 
4) 
He also 
traces the Pashai back to the Pasiani 'mentioned by Strabo as one 
of those Skythian tribes who deprived the Greeks of Baktriana' 
5). 
This is particularly interesting because if we compare it with 
1) Masson' s arguments are often very unclear and although he was an 
excellent observer some of his information loses its value because 
of this lack of clarity. 
2) 1910. Op. cit. p. 448. 
3) They accepted Islam, Masson says, because of reasons of security 
or convenience. 
4) Bellew"1891. Op. cit. p. 143. 
5) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 142. 
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Raverty' s supposition that the Parnis/Safi were Scythian nomads then 
a link is established between the Parnis/Safi and the Pashai/Safi on 
the basis of their common Scythian origin. If they were not the same 
people they may well have been related tribes/peoples. Also as the 
Scythian/Sakas overran Gandhara and settled there a further 
connection is made with Bellew' s theory that the Safi or a section of 
them were Gandhari. 
Modern research would also seem to establish a connection between 
the Pashai and the Safi. Buddruss, for example, says that Pashai 
territory ' stretches from the Kunar valley in the east some two 
hundred kilometres along the southern slopes of Nuristan to the 
Panjshir valley" 
1) 
In other words Pashai settlement is in the same 
geographical area as that of the Safi 
2). And Snoy states that 'a group 
in the eastern Pashai territory use the Pakhtun tribal designation 
'Safi' and differentiate themselves consciously from the other Pashai 
who call themselves Sum' 
3) 
There, therefore, would seem to be 
good cause for believing that at least one section of the Safi were at 
one time part of the Pashai. 
General Conclusions 
It seems that there is a similar vein of argument running through all 
four theories which makes it possible to reach some general 
conclusions about the origins of the Safi. 
The first would be that the Safi settled in the area where they are 
now after having been ejected or having fled from an area or areas 
of previous settlement. Such an area could have been the Peshawar 
1) Buddruss, Georg. 1959. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Pasai-Dialekte. 
p. 22. D. M. G. Kommissionsverlag. Franz Steiner G. M. B. H. 
Wiesbaden. My translation. 
2) Pashai are, for example, to be found, together with Afghaniya Safi, 
in the Pachoghan valley. 
3) Snoy, Peter. 1972. Die ethnischen Gruppen. p. 177. In: Afghanistan. 
Herausgeber W. Kraus. Horst Erdmann Verlag. Tübingen und Basel. 
My translation. 
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plain and its surroundings because these have undoubtedly been for 
times immemorial areas of upheaval and movement principally 
because of their location at the gateway to India. Caroe 
1), 
for 
example, refers to the Peshawar valley as a 'boiling cauldron' where 
it would be hopeless to predict any purity of tribal stock. Under 
these circumstances Bellew- s theory that the Safi were Gandhari may 
not be very far from the truth. Certainly one of the Safi clans is 
called Qandhari. It is also true that the Mohmand whom Caroe says 
were responsible for driving the Gandhari to the borders of Nuristan 
were in and around Muqur in Babur' s time 
2) 
and are now settled 
between the Kabul and Swat rivers, i. e. the former Gandhara. Also 
information from Wylly 
3) 
states that the Safi of Bajaur were (1912), 
and probably still are, vassal clans of the Mohmand -a factor 
pointing to forcible subjugation. Finally large parts of Safi territory 
have the appearance of places of retreat and refuge a fact strengthen- 
ed by the late date of the Safi' s conversion to Islam. If, therefore, 
we can see the Peshawar plain as the centre of more or less 
incessant activity then it is not difficult to presume that 
descendants of peoples such as the Saka/Scythians who thrust out 
autochthonous people in the Gandhara area were themselves, as 
Gandhari, ejected, much as Bellew portrays, by following tribes, 
i. e. Mohmand and Yusufzai, and either subjugated (Bajaur) or forc- 
ed to flee. Whether they settled initially in the valleys leading up 
to Kafiristan, appropriated these areas by force themselves, or 
were thrust there by another or other waves of invaders is now 
impossible to say. 
Another conclusion is that the Safi were made up of a least two 
related tribes which had a common language but different dialects 
and whose major and dominating element was formed by the Pashai 
Safi. That they were not originally one tribe or group but a number 
1) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 192. 
2) Caroe. 196 5. Op. cit. p. 184. 
3) Wylly. 1912. Op. cit. pp. 225 & 226. 
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of tribes or groups is, I think, shown by the evidence. Firstly the 
utilisation of the name Qandhari often in preference to the name 
Safi by one of the largest Safi clans seems to indicate the attachment 
of a separate but related group whose size or unwillingness prohibit- 
ed the degree of assimilation achieved by other clans. Secondly 
Masson reports the Safi as speaking different languages in different 
areas of their territory, for example, an Afghan dialect and/or 
Pashai in Tagao, and Kohistani in the valleys opening upon the Kunar 
river. Whilst I am not prepared to accept the fact that they were 
different languages it seems probable that they were different dia- 
lects. Kohistani and Pashai belong to the same group of languages 
spoken by peoples in the mountainous areas of either Swat- or 
Indus-Kohistan. The comment, therefore, from a non-linguist that 
the Safi spoke Kohistani says very little i. e. it could just as easily 
have been a different Pashai dialect. This conclusion is supported 
by Buddruss' s research. He says that Pashai dialects can be so 
different from area to area that speakers of one dialect cannot 
understand speakers of another 
1 ). 
This would indicate as far as 
the Safi are concerned the existence of different but related peoples 
i. e. different through dialect but related through language. 
One of and presumably the most dominant of these peoples must 
have been the Pashai Safi. It cannot be accidental that Safi and 
Pashai are to be found in the same areas, that the Safi name is 
used by both and that the Safi were reported by different people as 
speaking Pashai. The Safi, therefore, must have been either a 
number of Pashai sections which came together under the Safi name 
or different tribes who became Safi because of the political and/or 
numerical dominance of the Pashai Safi 
2). 
The latter would seem 
more probable because of the existence of the Qandhari section and 
because of the multi-tribal and multi-linguistic status of the area 
from Tagao to the Pech valley. 
1) Buddruss. 1959. Op. cit. p. 30. 
2) Presumably in the way that the Yusufzai have taken the name of their 
dominant section as their tribal name. 
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Finally I think the conclusion may be reached that the Safi have 
always used and retained the name Safi. Bellew' s imputation that 
they reverted to the name Safi on becoming muslims and Masson' s 
contention that the Safi were given this name on the basis of their 
new found purity seem very unlikely. There was no reason for the 
Safi to give up their name just because they were referred to as 
kafir by the muslims. Of course seen from the view point of a non- 
Safi muslim the Safi would seem to have reverted to their old 
patronymic on becoming muslim because prior to that they would 
have been only kafir for him. Secondly Afghanistan would be full 
of 'Safi' if people had achieved this designation through conversion 
alone. Thirdly Masson' s conclusion hat the Safi are the 'pure' 
people seems to have little linguistic foundation because the word 
for pure is ' saf' whereas the saf of Safi is written ' saf' . 
The Metamorphosis: Safi to Pakhtuns 
Throughout the above discussion we have been concerned with ans- 
wering the two main questions as to whom the Safi were and how 
they came to settle in the territory they now occupy. Nowhere, 
however, have authors or reports considered the question which 
would also seem to be very relevant as to how the Safi came to be 
what they are now i. e. Pakhtuns. In the general obscurity surround- 
ing the Safi it is perhaps too much to expect that the ambiguity 
should be added to by a discussion of the ways and means by which 
the Safi could have become Pakhtuns. Nevertheless an answer to 
this question would be very valuable because of the light it would 
throw on the present structure and organization of the Safi. It is 
possible by utilising material which also deals with changes of 
identity to make some assessment of the processes which might have 
lead up to this second Safi metamorphosis. The procedure which I 
will follow will inevitably be speculative but I think that the 
speculation can be held within bounds and the greater understanding 
of the Safi which emerges makes the attempt worthwhile. 
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It is clear from the literature that the Safi were not the only people 
to have changed their ethnic identity and to have become Pakhtun. 
One of the best known examples 
1) 
is that of the Ghilzai who 
according to Schurmann were 'a tribal group built upon a Turkic 
ethnic base but subsequently Afghanized in language and perhaps 
culture' 
2). Other examples of groups who became Pakhtuns by in- 
corporation or adoptation into Pakhtun tribes are numerous as are 
reports about Pakhtuns who lost their status as such and were ex- 
cluded from the society 
3). 
All these examples provide informations 
as to some of the processes involved in either achieving or losing 
Pakhtun identity and may be used as a basis from which to work. 
It seems from what we know about the Safi and about changes of 
tribal and group identity in general that this change took time, was 
variably effective and most probably occurred step by step. A 
necessary first step for integration was that the Safi should have 
been in contact with Pakhtuns otherwise no sort of integration could 
have taken place. If we can presume that this process of change 
occurred when the Safi were settled in their present territory and 
not before then the Pakhtun tribes which would have influenced them 
would have been the Mohmand, Shinwari and the nomadic and settled 
Ghilzai of Tagao all of whom are now their neighbours. 
Another step or precondition, I feel sure, was the presence of some 
hostility between the Mohmand and Shinwari on one side and the Safi 
on the other. This was first of all inevitable because the Safi were 
in possession of land which the other tribes must have coveted 
4). 
1) Other examples would be, according to Bellew (1880. pp. 62 & 63), the 
Yusufzai and Mohmand. 
2) Schurmann. 1962. Op. cit. p. 43. By 'Afghanized' Schurmann means 
pakhtunized. Many authors and the non-Pakhtun Afghans themselves 
refer to the Pakhtuns as Afghans. A more complete analysis of the 
Ghilzai/Ghilji' s supposed Turkish origin is given by Fraser-Tytler 
in his book: Afghanistan. pp. 51-54. O. U. P. London. 1967. 
3) See for example Barth, Caroe, and Dumont. (cited below footnote 1 
p. 29) 
4) Some of the best rice land in Afghanistan is in the Jelalabad plain and 
Kunar and Tagao valleys. 
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Secondly it was necessary because in this way value orientations and 
ideals could be compared which would lead to change on the part of 
the Safi or acceptance on the part of the Mohmand and Shinwari. 
A further step or condition for integration must have been the simi- 
larity of value orientations and ideals which existed between the Safi 
and the Mohmand and Shinwari Pakhtuns. If we look at the material 
on groups which have taken on Pakhtun identity it is evident that all 
of them had similar values to those of the Pakhtuns prior to accep- 
tance and incorporation. Dumont 
1), for example, says that the 
number of Pathans (Pakhtuns) is constantly being increased by Rajput 
accretions and Caroe 
2) 
writes about the Rajputs and Pathans that 
only Islam and Brahmanism divided them, as far as their personali- 
ties are concerned they are identical. If this is true and necessary 
for groups to become integrated into tribes it must have been simi- 
larly applicable for tribes to 'pass' into ethnic groups. In the case 
of the Safi we have seen above that they were regarded as, confused 
with, and may well have been Kohistani 
3). 
It is, of course, 
impossible to know now what the values and ideals of the Kohistani 
were at the time of the Safi' s change of identity but it seemsreason- 
able to presume that they were not very different from those of the 
Kohistani of today. Barth has written about them that ' ... in general 
value orientation, Kohistanis are not unlike Pathans; and analogies 
to the institutional complexes (hospitality, councils, seclusion) I have 
described as fora for Pathan activities are also found' 
4). 
The 
'largely compatible basic value orientations' 
5) 
of both groups 
(Pathan and Kohistani) mean according to Barth that the impediments to 
1) Dumont, Louis. 1972. Homo Hierarchicus. p. 253. Paladin, London. 
2) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 87. 
3) I use the term ' kohistani' here in its widest possible sense just as 
Barth has done: e. g. ' ... a congeries of 
diverse tribes collectively 
referred to as Kohistanis. ' (Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 130). Also 
Dupree (1973. Op. cit. p. 63) lists the Pashai under the general 
heading ' kohistani' . 4) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. pp. 130 & 131. The brackets are mine. 
5) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 131. 
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passing, i. e. from one identity to another, are low 
1 ). 
Thus if the 
Safi were Kohistani there does not seem, as far as values and ideals 
are concerned, to have been any barrier to them becoming Pakhtuns. 
This does not mean that the social organization of the Safi and 
Pakhtuns in general was, or must have been, the same. The factors, 
for example, responsible for creating political groups among the Safi 
today bear more resemblance to those which are causative among the 
Kohistani - descent, alliances, co-residence, co-ownership, and 
standing friendships 
2) 
- than they do to those of the Yusufzai 
Pakhtuns. On the other hand the Kohistani have a rotation system of 
land ownership and land utilisation which seems from what Barth 
3) 
writes to be identical with that of the Yusufzai, i. e. the ' wesh' 
system. But both the Yusufzai and the Safi have all embracing tribal 
genealogies whereas the Kohistani only have lineages whose apical 
ancestors are not ordered into a single genealogy. There are thus 
differences and similarities in social organization between the Safi 
and other Pakhtun tribes but these were probably not critical for 
determining or deciding Pakhtun membership then, just as they are 
not today, although similar values and ideals seem always to have 
been essential. 
Opportunities for assessing the value orientations and ideals of the 
Safi on the one hand and the Mohmand, Shinwari and Ghilzai on the 
other must have been multitude. Trade between Kafiristan and the 
Muslim community would have provided contacts and the inevitable 
hostility between the Safi and the Pakhtuns must have lead to the 
clearest assessments of values and ideals. This hostility was inevi- 
table, as I have mentioned above, because the Safi were, and are, 
in possession of land which the Mohmand, Shinwari and Ghilzai 
Pakhtuns could just as well have exploited themselves. That the 
1) Barth is of course here working from the view point of Pathans 
becoming Kohistanis but what is possible in one direction should also 
be possible in the other. 
2) Barth, F. 1956. Indus and Swat Kohistan. An Ethnographic Survey, 
p. 28. Forenede Trykkerier. Oslo. 
3) Barth. 1956. Op. cit. p. 31. 
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Afghan Safi managed to survive as an independent tribe and generally 
to defend their lands points to the possession of characteristics - 
aggressiveness and independence - which are highly prized by the 
Pakhtuns themselves. The Safi' s later history, i. e. from the time 
onwards that they were recognised as Pakhtuns, is full of examples 
of contumacious activities that would gladden the heart of any 
Pakhtun 1). In fact in modern times (1956) the Safi are singled out 
by Wilber 
2) 
as being among the 'more vigorous pushtun tribes' 
where 'the royal prerogative (established by Abdur Rahman) of 
appointing and dismissing tribal chiefs' is 'either absent or 
ineffective, due to the internal democracy of the tribes in question. 
The more powerful tribes cannot be cowed or dictated to' . In other 
words if the Safi were not in full possession of those values so 
admired by the Pakhtuns from the beginning they soon acquired them 
and established themselves as the equals of any of the other Pakhtun 
tribes. 
If these were the small, preliminary steps to becoming Pakhtun one 
of the first major steps which the Safi took must have been to learn 
Pakhto. Initially Pakhto must have been the language of contact 
between the two communities exactly as it is the lingua franca of 
the area today. It was obviously easier for the non-Pakhtuns to 
learn Pakhto than for the Pakhtuns to learn the many languages and 
dialects spoken on the southern and western borders of Kafiristan. 
Also the Pakhtuns were politically, militarily and economically 
dominant 
3) 
As trade and contacts increased Pakhto must have 
1) Accounts, records and newspaper reports about the Safi show that 
from 1830-1949 hardly a year went by without a disturbance, rebellion 
or uprising in some part of their territory. Probably the best known 
rebellion was that of 1948-49 which on its, for the Safi, unsuccessful 
conclusion lead to the forcible settlement of many of them in Afghan 
Turkestan. 
2) Wilber, D. N. ed. 1956. Afghanistan. p. 103. Human Relations Area 
Files. Newhaven. 
3) In a similar situation of linguistic confrontation in Africa Tonkin (E. 
1971. Some Coastal Pidgins of West Africa. In: Social Anthropology 
and Language. pp. 137-139. ASA Monographs 10. Ed. Edwin Ardener. ) 
says that commercial exigency, the superior wealth and technology and 
the desire for the 'supernatural power' of the Europeans were 
responsible for the acceptance of the dominant (european) language by 
the Africans. 
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spread relatively rapidly first of all to the more accessible areas and 
then later to those less accessible. The speed and manner with which 
it was learnt may be ascertained from Buddruss' s research 
1). 
He 
shows that the vocabulary is learnt first in the sense that common 
Pakhto words are introduced and gradually replace those of the native 
language whilst the grammar and sentence structure is maintained. 
The latter is then also replaced, for example, by the substitution of 
Pakhto suffixes and finally the language is fully accepted. It is then 
only a matter of time before the native language itself disappears. 
This can apparently happen in one generation and men who spoke their 
own language in their youth have either forgotten it or have great 
difficulty in recalling it in old age. Women, however, who in all 
these societies have minimal or fewer contacts with the outside may 
well have retained their language the longest and the men may have 
spoken Pakhto in 'society' as it were and Pashai/Kohistani at 
home 
2) 
until Pakhto became the language for both 
3). 
These two 
factors of accessibility and sex-limited acceptance of Pakhto may 
have been responsible for some of the confusion which surrounded the 
Safi. Masson' s reports of the 1830' s show some Safi speaking Pashai, 
Kohistani and an 'Afghan dialect', the last of which may have been 
Pakhto and thus indicate that the Safi were still in a period of 
transition at least as far as the language is concerned. He may, of 
course, have confused the Pakhtun Safi with the non-Pakhtun Pashai 
Safi mentioned by Snoy because by the middle of the 19th century the 
Safi, if we are to believe Bellew, had had about 300 years contact 
1) Buddruss, Georg. 1960. Die Sprache von Wotapur und Katarquala. 
Bonner Orientalische Studien. Hrsg. von Otto Spies. Band 9. Selbst- 
verlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn. pp. 1-12. 
and 1967. Die Sprache von Sau in Ostafghanistan. Beiträge zur Kennt- 
nis des dardischen . Phalura. Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissen- 
schaft. Beiheft 14, in Kommission bei J. Kitzinger, München. pp. 7-10, 
2) Women in Afghanistan are, because of their seclusion and their ex- 
clusion from all forms of education, the carriers of tradition. It is my 
own experience that when questioning Pakhtuns who had lived for some 
time in Kabul about kinship terms they needed to resort to their wives 
for information about some of the more obscure ones. 
3) Compare Fishman' s concepts of 'H' and 'L-' languages and 'domains. 
in: Pride, J. B. 1971. Customs and Cases of Verbal Behaviour. Social 
Anthropology and Language. pp. 97 & 98. ASA Monographs 10. Ed. 
Edwin Ardener. 
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with the Pakhtuns. Whatever the case, and it would seem to me that 
Masson' s reports deal principally with the least accessible areas of 
the Safi territory Pakhto could and would seem to have been learnt 
quickly. Today the Safi are unable to speak Pashai and those who 
can speak Farsi-Dari do so in the manner typical of Pakhtuns. 
Another major step towards the change of identity and one which 
obviously took much longer to penetrate all Safi areas was conver- 
sion to Islam. Although the last Safi were only converted in 1896 
and were nevertheless regarded as Pakhtuns ever before this the 
acceptance of Islam by at least a majority of Safi must have been a 
prerequisite to achieving Pakhtun status. This is because Islam is 
one of the essential attributes of the Pakhtun identity. It was obvious- 
ly not so from the beginning but by the time the Safi came to change 
their identity, i. e. in the 16th century, it must have been indispens- 
able. The process by which conversion was achieved was most 
probably very similar to that described by Bellew, i. e. first passing 
from Kafir through an intermediate stage (nimcha) to full acceptance 
of Islam. By whatever means conversion occurred the Safi, typically, 
more than made up for being one of the last Pakhtun tribes to 
embrace Islam and now have the reputation of being among the most 
fervent and fanatic exponents of the faith 
1) 
The elements and processes which are outlined above - contact with 
Pakhtuns and hostility, similarity of value orientations and ideals, 
language and Islam - seem to be sufficient when taken together to 
at some point in time have altered the balance so that the Safi 
'passed' and became Pakhtuns. Of course it is impossible to say 
whether these processes and steps were the ones which were respon- 
sible but it seems most probable that they would have played a part 
in the change of identity and possible that they were also essential. 
1) See Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 20. 
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The final catalyst bringing about change may well have been one of 
the many raids or uprisings in which the Safi took part along with 
the Mohmand and Shinwari 
1 ). 
Certainly it seems to me that, as 
Barth says, ' .., ethnic groups are categories of ascription and 
identification by the actors themselves' 
2). 
Thus parallel processes 
leading to change would be at work. One would be the Safi' s reali- 
sation that their values and actions were basically and essentially 
those of the Pakhtuns and the other would be the Pakhtuns acceptance 
that their basic values and those of the Safi were identical or so 
similar as to be acceptable. Thus the cultural features that signalled 
the boundary between the two groups would have disappeared because 
' ... the identification of another person as a fellow member of an 
ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judge- 
ment. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally 
'playing the same game. ' 
3) 
As the Safi were most obviously 'play- 
ing the same game' and playing it extremely well then they became 
accepted by the Pakhtuns as Pakhtuns and were also seen by non- 
Pakhtuns as being Pakhtuns. Thus the Pashai/Kohistani Safi became 
Safi Pakhtuns 
4) 
and the area from the Pech valley in the east along 
the Kunar, Kabul and Tagao rivers to the Nijrao and Panjshir 
valleys in the north-west became an area of Pakhtun settlement. 
1) See for example 'Ekonomicheskaya zhizn' (Economic Life) No. 21/ 
26.1.1929. 
2) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 10- 
3) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 15. 
4) This is not to say that the Safi were identical with their Pakhtun 
neighbours. As I have indicated above there are among Pakhtuns many 
social and cultural forms but the essential attributes which are 
recognised and accepted by other Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns as 
indispensable to the Pakhtun identity were present among the Safi. 
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4. THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANIYA AND THE PROCESSES OF 
SETTLEMENT 
In the last chapter I was able to make some statement about the 
Safi' s origins, their occupation of their present tribal territory and 
the possible processes which lead to their change of ethnic identity. 
In this chapter I will be dealing with similar subjects but on the 
micro level of the tribal section, i. e. of the Afghaniya Safi who 
form the subject of the thesis. 
The questions as to when and how one small section or group of 
Safi came to occupy what was to become Afghaniya in the lower part 
of the Pachoghan valley are not quite as difficult to answer as the 
similar questions asked above about the whole tribe and its territory. 
This is because although there is a complete lack of historical 
information about the Pachoghan valley other sources of information 
are available which make an assessment possible. One such source, 
and the one used here as the basis for a reconstruction of settlement, 
is the Afghaniya Saft' s own account of events. This is supported 
firstly by linking the Safi' s narrative (a) with the actual topography 
of the Pachoghan valley and the surrounding valleys and (b) with the 
present distribution of tribes, ethnic groups and named groups within 
the community. Secondly it is complemented by drawing parallels 
with other Pakhtun areas where the processes of settlement are 
historically verified or where the nature and time of settlement have 
been retained in oral traditions. Taken together this information 
makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions which, I think, 
present an acceptable reconstruction of settlement in Afghaniya. 
Occupation 
The Safi' s own myth or tradition of settlement states that in the 
distant past the forefathers of the present settlers together with 
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their families moved up from Tagao into the Pachoghan valley (see 
maps IV &V pp. 37 & 38). There they were met by the determin- 
ed opposition of the kafir inhabitants. After a fierce struggle the 
Safi succeeded in driving them out and occupying their lands. 
This story is very short and very general nevertheless it provides 
most of the essentials necessary for a reconstruction when each 
element is analysed step by step. 
The Safi' s conclusion that the original settlement took place in the 
distant past comes, I am sure, from two factors. One is that 
most Afghans consider Islam to have been introduced into their 
country at the dawn of time and, therefore, any reference to con- 
flict with kafirs, apart from the conquest of Kafiristan which is 
still remembered vividly, must imply a date in the distant past. 
The other factor is that the Safi of Pachoghan have no more exact 
tradition of settlement, i. e. the version which they give is very 
short and notable for its lack of detail. As stories are usually 
passed on relatively accurately the simplicity of this story would 
suggest an ancient origin. This latter factor is supported by other 
origin stories from people in the Pachoghan valley who have settled 
recently. They know when they came and how, with whom and from 
where, and this is equally true of other recent Safi settlements 
elsewhere, for example, at Khodaidad Khil 
1 ý. The fact, therefore, 
that even the Safi' s elders, the ' greybeards' , do not 
know more 
exactly when settlement took place is sufficient for the Safi to 
conclude that' it must have taken place in the distant past. 
A more precise date of settlement than that given by the Safi may, 
1) See University of Tokyo Expedition to South-West Hindukush. 1969. 
Op. cit. Accounts from other areas of recent (1900-1910) Pakhtun 
settlement also indicate that the details of the movement and the 
persons involved are known accurately. See Glatzer, B. 1977. 
Nomaden von Gharjistan. pp. 26 & 27. Beiträge zur Siidasienfor- 
schung. Band 22. Franz Steiner Verlag. Wiesbaden. 
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however, be reached. According to the Safi genealogy the original 
settlers, the sons of musawad, i. e. saliH, ma hdud, piroz, bahadur, 
and Haji 'arab with their families and dependents, arrived in 
Afghaniya some nine generations ago 
1). 
Although genealogies are 
not always very reliable alterations over such a relatively small 
number of generations, i. e. nine, seem unlikely. Also genealogies 
if they are altered at all are usually shortened (telescoping) or 
broadened by the addition of collaterals and not lengthened. Nine 
generations would, therefore, seem if anything to be a conservative 
number. Nevertheless if we take it as correct this would place the 
date of the original settlement at about 1700. 
Such a date is supported by another factor indicating the age of 
settlement - the field shape. The central and lower areas of 
Afghaniya are divided up into fields whose small size and irregular 
shape indicate long usage and the parcelling of fields over a number 
of generations. Whilst this factor must not be conclusive - in some 
areas small, irregular shaped fields also result from topographical 
necessity - it does in the majority of cases where Pakhtuns are 
concerned denote long settlement and partition. This is because new 
settlement by Pakhtuns in areas such as the Pachoghan valley, i. e. 
on valley floors, is characterised by long strip fields 
2). These 
result from the principle of equality practised by Pakhtuns in the 
division of new land. All heads of households must be given equal 
shares of the acquired land in terms not only of area but also of 
quality and this is best achieved by a division into strips which 
enables each householder to have a share of all types of land. Thus 
long parallel strips have become the hall mark of recent Pakhtun 
settlement. 
1) See diag. 7 p. 121 and also Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 25. 
2) See Grötzbach (1972. Op. cit. pp. 192-199) and Wald (Hermann- 
Josef. 1969. Landnutzung und Siedlung der Pashtunen im Becken von 
Khost (östl. Afghanistan) pp. 66-81. C. W. Leske Verlag, Opladen). 
This is also supported by my own observations among Atsakzai 
Pashtuns of Uruzgan who settled in this area (Uruzgan) at the end of 
the 19th century. 
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How long it takes for inheritance, population growth and the sale of 
land to reduce these strips to irregular parcels it is impossible to 
say. The present complexity of field patterns in the central area of 
Afghaniya and the size of holdings would indicate that quite a few 
generations had passed since the original division and nine, as indi- 
cated by the Safi genealogy, could well have been the number 
necessary. Whilst 1700, as the approximate date for the initial 
settlement of Afghaniya, does not represent the 'distant past' for 
us it certainly would fall into the Safi' s conception of a distant 
past. Thus there is no real anachronism between the Safi' s account 
of events and what seems to have been a much later date of 
settlement. 
That the Safi came from Tagao, as their tradition relates, would 
also seem to be very probable. Tagao, the major valley to the 
south of the Pachoghan is, as we have seen, one of the two major 
centres of Safi settlement in Afghanistan. It is also reachable from 
the Pachoghan valley by way of a gorge which leads down to the 
wider plain of the Tagao river (see map IV p. 37). The Safi could 
therefore, without too much difficulty have advanced up the gorge 
from Tagao and settled in the Pachoghan valley. 
Why they did so is more difficult to answer but at least three 
reasons may be postulated. One is that the pressure of the 
expansionary Ghilzai Pakhtuns 
1) 
created a chain reaction through 
the Safi community which dislodged a group on the perimeter of 
Safi settlement and forced it to expand into the Pachoghan valley. 
Another is that population pressures in the Tagao valley lead to 
Safi expansion northwards. A final reason may have been population 
growth combined with drought. In these circumstances peripheral 
groups often take up a semi-nomadic existence and on one of their 
1) 'They (the Safi) then (1730-1747) inhabited a larger tract of country, 
and were in hostility with the Ghiljis (Ghilzai) who had previously 
expelled them from the lands to the south of Taghow and between 
Kabul and Jelalabad. ' Masson, 1840. Op. cit. pp. 58 & 59. 
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movements - the journey up the Tagao northwards and along the 
Panjshir towards Badakhshan is followed today by nomads and by 
semi-nomadic harvesters - they discovered and forcibly occupied the 
Pachoghan valley Whichever reason was responsible for their 
movement it seems most probable that it occurred from Tagao 
especially as the Safi of Tagao also refer to Afghaniya not as 
Afghaniya but as 'Sarboli' which literally means, 'head squad' or 
'top/highest detachment'. Thus the Safi of Afghaniya formed, as 
they do now, the head or furthest detachment of the Safi of Tagao. 
If the Safi moved up from Tagao round about the beginning of the 
18th century then the inhabitants of the Pachoghan valley at that 
time would in all probability have been 'kafirs' as the story of 
settlement suggests. The present population of the valley, apart 
from the Afghaniya Safi, is made up of Parachi (a mountain people 
speaking an East-Iranian dialect) in the middle and higher regions 
of both the Pachoghan and Ghain valleys, and Pashai in the highest 
and least accessible parts of these valleys 
2). 
From the present 
geographical position of the Parachi and Pashai and from the 
information mentioned above about the Pashai and Kohistani it would 
seem reasonable to assume that the ancestors of these Parachi and 
Pashai constituted the 'kafirs' against whom the Safi needed to 
struggle so fiercely. Such an assumption is supported by 
Morgenstierne' s work 
3) 
among the Pashai. He states that certain 
Pashai tribes remained pagans until 'modern times' and other 
authors have written that peripheral areas of Kafiristan, which must 
have been similar in terms of accessibility to Pachoghan, were held 
4) 
by kafirs until the conquest and conversion of that country in 1896 . 
1) Most of the new Pakhtun settlements result from nomadic or semi- 
nomadic expansion. 
2) There are also hamlets of settled Pakhtun nomads but these Pakhtuns 
came much later than the Safi, Parachi and Pashai and will be dealt 
with in greater detail below. 
3) Morgenstierne, G. 1932. Report on a Linguistic Mission to North- 
Western India. p. 24. Instituttet for Sammenlingnende Kulturforsk- 
ning. Serie C III -1 Oslo. 
4) See Kakar. 1971. Op. cit. pp. 101 & 102. 
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If this was the case for the 19th century then the Pashai and Parachi 
of the 18th century must almost certainly have been kafirs although 
influenced by Islam. This religious difference and the fanaticism of 
the Safi as new converts, as well as the fact that the Pashai and 
Parachi would have been fighting for their own lands may have been 
responsible for the reported fierceness of the fighting in the occupa- 
tion of the Pachoghan valley 
1 ). 
Whether these were the reasons or 
not, and they may really only have been introduced to dramatise the 
situation and glorify Safi arms, it seems most probable that the 
Pashai and Parachi were kafirs and 'the' kafirs mentioned in the 
tradition of Safi settlement. 
We have seen so far that this tradition seems to offer a very plaus- 
ible account of events when seen in terms of the historical, ethnic 
and topographical background of the area. It does not, however, 
provide the only possible method open to the Safi firstly for having 
settled in the valley, and secondly for having acquired the land. 
In the first case it is possible, in the light of what we know about 
the Safi as a whole, that the Pachoghan Safi constituted as Pashai - 
there are still Pashai in the valley - or a related people (Kohistani) 
the indigenous population of the valley and that their ethnic 'reincar- 
nation' as Pakhtuns lead them to appear, at least to the outside ob- 
server, as new settlers. This seems most unlikely principally 
because the present tripartite ethnic composition of the Pachoghan 
valley, i. e. Pakhtun, Parachi and Pashai and the geographical dis- 
tribution of these groups seems to exclude such a possibility. If the 
Safi were Pashai then it is strange that the predecessors of the 
present Pashai should not have become Safi as well. It is also 
unusual that these Pashai should have been separated from their 
1) This struggle would seem to be commemorated in the shrine of the 
holy man Baba Sangu (see map VI p. 50) who is supposed to have been 
killed whilst fighting against the kafir. None of the Safi, however, 
make a link between him and their own settlement in the valley. 
Perhaps this was, therefore, an earlier attempt at settlement and/or 
conversion. 
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fellows, the (Pashai) Safi, by an area of Parachi settlement, which 
is the case now, and that they should occupy the most infertile 
extremes of the valley whilst the dominant (Pashai) Safi should enjoy 
the richest land at the mouth of the valley. Finally the Parachi can- 
not be seen as providing a connecting link between the Safi and 
Pashai because they, the Parachi, are an entirely different people 
who speak an East-Iranian language unrelated to the Dardic Pashai. 
The possibility that the Safi might have constituted part of or the 
indigenous population would therefore seem to be remote and the 
three ethnic groups would appear to have arrived separately in the 
Pachoghan valley. 
If they did so then this would be further support for the Safi' s own 
account of events because the present position of the Pakhtun, Para- 
chi and Pashai settlements suggests occupation by at least two 
waves of conquest. The Pashai would appear to have been pushed 
into the highest and least fertile areas of the valley 
1) by the 
Parachi and the latter would in turn seem to have relinquished the 
lower and most fertile areas to the Pakhtun Safi. 
In the second case, i. e. of alternative ways of acquiring the land, 
the Safi could have gained possession by purchase and/or the repay- 
ment of debts. Such methods can be extremely effective as is well 
documented by Ferdinand 2) for the Hazarajat (central Afghanistan). 
1) Keiser (R. L. 1974. Social Structure in the Southeastern Hindu-Kush: 
Some Implications for Pashai Ethno-History. pp. 449 & 450. 
Anthropos. vol. 69. pp. 445-456. ) reports from other Pashai areas 
a reverse order of conquest; ' In both these valleys, according to 
local tradition, the latest inhabitants came from across major moun- 
tain divides and, after much fighting, forced the original inhabitants 
down the valley leaving the upper section to the invaders' . Whilst 
this was obviously the case it nevertheless seems strange in the light 
of the considerable difference which altitude makes to the number of 
crops and size of harvests that a superior force should voluntarily 
choose a higher and therefore less productive area. 
2) Ferdinand, K. 1969. Nomadism in Afghanistan. pp. 127-160. In: 
Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur. Ethnographische Studien, Ed. Laszlo 
Foeldes. Akademiai Kiado. Budapest. 
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The Pakhtuns involved in this case are not Safi but Ghilzai and 
Durrani trade and sheep nomads who move up into the Hazarajat in 
summer. In the normal process of trade a debt is created through 
the credit offered to the Hazara by the nomads, or through advance 
payment which the nomads give for the future deliveries of, for 
example, wheat. As the Hazara are in no position to acquire cash, 
repayments are more or less impossible to make and as crops may 
fail the purchased wheat cannot always be supplied. This means that 
either further credit is given or the wheat which could not be 
delivered becomes a debt whose repayment because of a special 
profit system used by the nomads 
1) 
results in the eventual loss of 
peasant's fields. Even an ordinary debt once it has started 
escalates extremely rapidly because of the 100-200 % interest 
charged by the nomads and it is only a matter of time before 
animals and then finally land is sold 
2) 
Similar processes may well have been at work in the Pachoghan 
valley because, as was mentioned above, one of the nomads' routes 
from Jelalabad to the Panjshir valley and Badakhshan passes the 
mouth of the valley. The Pashai and Parachi must have been just 
as dependent upon nomad traders for certain articles as the Hazara 
and as they also cannot have had access to money, credit and wheat 
sold in advance would have been the necessary methods to acquire 
such products as tea, cloth and metal goods. The slow purchase 
and acquisition of fields by the Safi could have provided the foothold 
necessary for the ultimate occupation of the whole of the lower sec- 
tion of the valley. 
1) ' Very often debt is converted to wheat to be delivered in the following 
year, and if a debt runs more than one year it is usually doubled or 
tripled every year, following the discrepancy between current and 
advance payment prices for wheat -a most profitable system for the 
nomads. ' Ferdinand. 1969. Op. cit. p. 142. 
2) Interestingly enough Wald (1969. Op. cit. p. 54) indicates that in 
Pakhtun areas (Khost) it is very difficult for the creditor to receive 
his money or the debtor's land in exchange because money lenders 
receive no support from their fellow tribesmen or the society. The 
political power and dominance of the Pakhtuns enables them to coerce 
the Hazara into redeeming their debts with land. The fact that 
Islamic law forbids interest on money lent whilst known both in the 
Hazarajat and Khost does not seem to play a role. 
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This method of settlement, however, seems unlikely principally 
because it would not have lead, in my opinion, to an exclusively 
Pakhtun community such as Afghaniya. Some Pashai or Parachi 
peasant farmers must have been able to resist falling into debt and 
thus an ethnic chequer board would have resulted similar to the 
situation which now exists higher up the valley and in Ghain, a side 
valley of the Pachoghan. In these areas Pakhtun nomads who have 
acquired land in the ways mentioned above have settled and the 
hamlets have Pakhtun, Pashai and Parachi inhabitants. There are, 
of course, hamlets in which only one ethnic group is represented 
but there is no community composed of a number of hamlets where 
all the members belong to one named ethnic group. This distinction 
is held by Afghaniya alone 
1) 
and it is proclaimed by the name 
2) 
Afghaxiiya which means place of the Afghans or Pakhtuns 
Another reason why the acquisition of land by purchase and/or re- 
payment of debts seems unlikely is because if Safi settlement took 
place in the 18th century the Pakhtuns were not, as in the Hazara- 
jat, dealing with a conquered population but one which was still 
independent and still very warlike. Added to this were the religious 
differences between the two groups which would not have made 
peaceful settlement easy if at all possible. It is difficult at the best 
of times for an outsider to purchase land in a community and the 
chances of doing so by way of claiming a debt in an ethnically and 
religiously alien community must have been very small. It would 
presuppose a force which the nomads cannot have constantly 
1) One of the thirty-four hamlets of Afghaniya is called T ajik and I 
presumed at the time that the founders of this hamlet would have been 
Tajiks who settled in this area from outside. Since my field work I 
have found out that Pakhtuns in the Kunar area refer, according to 
Buddruss (1960. Op. cit. pp. 2&3. ) to people who are not Nuristani 
(Jadidi) or persian speakers (Farsiwan) as ' Tajik". Thus this hamlet 
might be of Pashai or Parachi origin and have survived Safi 
acquisitions of land. 
2) Afghaniya is called Afghaniya by outsiders, but particularly by 
government officials and the non-Pakhtuns of the Pachoghan valley 
The Safi themselves refer to it as Sarboli. 
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exercised because they were nomads or an acceptance of laws by the 
Pashai and Parachi which no outside government was in a position to 
enforce. 
It, therefore, seems to me that the original settlement and the 
acquisition of land by the Safi in Afghaniya resulted from the use of 
force as the Safi' s history of settlement relates and was not the pro- 
duct of a protracted piece by piece acquisition as would be indicated 
by Pakhtun land procurement elsewhere. This is not to say that later 
settlement did not occur in the latter manner but that the original 
settlers acquired their land by conquest. 
Processes of Settlement 
So far then the Safi' s account of the settlement of Afghaniya and the 
interpretation of the individual elements involved have provided a 
relatively comprehensive picture of events. The account, however, 
stops at the conquest and occupation of Afghaniya and does not afford 
any information about the division of land among the new settlers, 
the establishment of hamlets or the processes of later settlement. 
These procedures may, nevertheless, be reconstructed by reference 
to the settlement traditions of later settlers, by parallels drawn with 
other Pakhtun areas, and, principally, from the existence in 
Afghaniya of groups whose names - the 'taxti' or original settlers, 
the ' raghli' or newcomers, and the ' ajnabiyan' or strangers 
1) 
- 
indicate the chronological nature of settlement. 
The 'taxti' 
The first stage of settlement, the division of land among the house- 
hold heads, would have been carried out at the instigation of the 
1) These are, of course, not only categories indicating the time of 
settlement but also social categories. The significance they have 
and the roles members play will be explained in greater detail below 
(see pp. 119,126,132 & 133). 
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original settlers, the forefathers of the present ' taxti' . Such a div- 
ision is customary among Pakhtuns on the acquisition of new lands 
as I have mentioned above. 
Initially a survey, as is usual among Pakhtuns, would have been 
made so that the quality of the land and the availability of water for 
irrigation could be assessed. The division itself would have been 
carried out by a neutral, i. e. non-tribal, person, generally a Pir 
(holy man) or Sheikh (descendant of the Prophet) 
1) 
who would have 
tried to ensure that each extended family head received not only an 
equal share in terms of area but also in terms of the quality of the 
land, i. e. irrigated and non-irrigated arable, and pasture. Thus a 
single share would be made up of one strip incorporating all types 
of land or a number of strips of land located in different areas but 
with a total area and overall quality identical to that of the other 
2) 
shares 
Once this division had taken place settlement could begin. It would 
(most probably) have taken the form of 'galas' or fortified houses 
3) 
placed in the middle of the valley on the most fertile areas of each 
household head's share of land. Such a house form and its location 
would have arisen for the following reasons. Firstly galas are the 
preferred form of residence for Pakhtuns wherever they are viable, 
i. e. where there is sufficient land, because they are excellent for 
defence and can house a number of families consisting ideally of a 
father and his married sons. The defensive aspect would have been 
especially relevant in an area which had just been conquered and 
1) This is similar, but on a much smaller scale, to the division of Swat 
among the Yusufzai Pakhtuns. The Swat division was carried out by 
Sheikh Malli, 'a prominent holy man' (Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 9. ) 
and took some five years to complete. 
2) Such a division is still visible in areas of new settlement e. g. among 
the Atsakzai Pashtuns of Uruzgan. 
3) See also Wald. 1969. Op. cit. pp. 76-79. 
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which was also open to attack from Kafiristan. Secondly the need to 
have the best fields close to the house both for the ease of access 
and for the establishment of 'palez' (vegetable gardens) and gardens 
(orchards with fruit and nut trees) would have meant that the qalas 
would have been built in the middle of the valley where generally 
the best land and the best possibilities for irrigation are located. 
Subsequent expansion triggered off by the death of the founding 
'fathers' would have lead the sons/brothers to build separate galas 
on their parts of the original shares. Finally, however, a point 
would be reached - according to the genealogies in the third or 
fourth descending generation from the founders - where there would 
have been insufficient space to expand, at least in the extensive 
form of individual qalas, because the land could not be sacrified for 
buildings when it could be used for crops. In this case the galas 
would have been divided and/or smaller ones would have been 
attached so that the net result would have been the establishment of 
hamlets or small villages. 
As the taxti population increased further more distant fields would 
have been cultivated, the fallow periods would have been reduced 
and the majority of the pasture turned into arable or sold. The last 
factor would probably have followed relatively soon after the 
settlement because both the desire and the need for sheep and goats 
-a relic of the nomadic or semi-nomadic invaders past - would 
have been reduced by sedentarisation and only those animals which 
were essential for an agricultural economy, e. g. oxen and milk 
cows, would have been retained. 
The ' rahli' 
At the same time as the taxti were expanding, establishing hamlets 
and utilising their fields more intensively newcomers, the ' ra hl*' 
must have been arriving in the valley. These were principally 
groups of Pakhtun nomads and semi-nomads, both probably of non- 
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Safi origin 
1), 
who had been able to buy or acquire fields from the 
taxti through the redemption of debts in the manner outlined above. 
These rahli settled mainly on the sides of the valley and in the 
less fertile areas because there the land was cheap and because the 
taxti were more willing to part with land which they had only used 
as pasture or which, through lack of irrigation, had hardly been 
exploited at all. This situation most probably suited the nomads as 
well because they were able, at least initially, to retain their herds. 
However as they too expanded then they began either to buy more and 
better land from the taxti or to improve that which they had by the 
extension and improvement of the irrigation system. There were also 
raLli who were able to acquire land in the main areas of taxti 
settlement either by the purchase of good land or by the exploitation 
of swampy or stony areas near the rivers. Thus the present eighteen 
raEhli hamlets are found both scattered among the sixteen taxti 
hamlets and as separate groups of hamlets on the edges of Afghaniya 
(see map VI p. 50). 
The ' ajnabiyan' 
The last stage of settlement, which is continuing today, was that of 
the ' ajnabiyan' or strangers. These men or families have acquired 
land either by purchase or marriage. 
Those who have purchased land, principally non-Safi Pakhtun (xaroti 
Ghilzai) nomads, have done so in the last remaining pastoral areas 
1) When asked today they say that they are Safi who came originally 
from what are now the provinces of Laghman and Wardak. Whereas 
Laghman is an area of Safi settlement Wardak is not as far as I know. 
Wardak and its capital, Maidap, are the principal areas of settle- 
ment for the ' Wardak' ,a group whose ethnogenesis 
is completely 
unknown. They are divided into three sub-tribes and speak Pakhto 
without, however, claiming Pakhtun identity or appearing in the 
Pakhtun genealogy. They could, if they wished, 'pass' easily 
especially amongst a tribe like the Safi with its relatively lax 
genealogy. See Kieffer, C. 1975. Wardak, toponyme et ethnique 
d' Afghanistan. In: Hommages Et Opera Minora Mounumentum. H. S. 
Nyberg, Acta Iranica. Teheran-Liege. pp. 475-483. 
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of the valley because there, as we have seen above, the land was 
cheap and also there was no competition from the other inhabitants 
of Afghaniya as there would have been for the more fertile, 
irrigated areas. They were also most able to cope with these 
marginal areas because they could leave parts of their flocks and 
herds with brothers or relatives in other areas and improve their 
own lands whilst still having an income from the animals. Many 
were and are satisfied with the amount and the nature of the land 
they have because they have retained their tents, and in spring and 
summer move up the mountain sides to exploit the spring pasture 
and to escape from the heat of the valley floor. They live generally 
in large qalas which are built on the purchased fields away from 
the taxti and ra hli hamlets. 
Those ' ajnabiyan' (mainly Tagao-Safi) who have married land, i. e. 
who have acquired it through their wives' inheritances 
1), 
are not 
restricted to the sides of the valley and the cheapest land but are 
to be found also in long established taxti and raghli hamlets Mo rking 
the best land. Nevertheless because of their origin they are refer- 
red to, at least in the first generation, as strangers and only later 
become fully or partially integrated depending upon the amount of 
bad will which has been created through their acquisition of the 
land. They normally live in their father-in-law's qalas and thus 
unlike those ajnabiyan who purchase fields are, as far as the settle- 
ment types are concerned, indistinguishable from their taxti or 
rajhli neighbours. 
In summary, therefore, the settlement of the Safi in Afghaniya began 
with the conquest of the lower section of the Pachoghan valley by a 
group of nomadic or semi-nomadic Safi who moved up from Tagao 
round about 1700. These men, after overcoming the indigenous 
Pashai and Parachi kafir population, divided the land among them- 
1) This will be explained more fully below p. 207. 
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selves and established houses in the most fertile and best watered 
areas of the valley. The settlement process was continued not only 
by the expansion of these original settlers, the later taxti, but 
also by the addition of newcomer groups, the raghli, who initially 
acquired land in the poorer areas of the valley but then later also 
purchased land within the areas of taxti settlement so that now 
their hamlets are indistinguishable from those of the original 
settlers. The final phase of settlement brought the ' ajnabiyan' into 
the Pachoghan valley. They either purchased or married land 
throughout the community or, if they were nomads - the majority 
of these 'strangers' -, they moved to the most marginal areas of 
the valley which were the cheapest and which they could most 
readily exploit with their mixed agricultural/ pastoral economy. 
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5. PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING 
Today these three groups, irrespective of their origins, constitute 
what is now known as the Safi of Afghaniya and occupy the lower 
section of the Pachoghan valley (see maps VI & VII). This valley 
is only 60 kms, north north-east of Kabul by air but due to the 
difficulties of the intermediary terrain some 210 kms. by road 
(see map III p. 18 ). The valley is some 19 kms. long and runs 
from north-east to south-west. In the north and east the valley is 
bounded by the mountains of Kohistan and Nuristan which reach 
heights of up to 5,000 metres and in the south-west by the hills 
(ca. 2,000 metres high) which form one side of the Panjshir valley 
(see maps IV &V pp. 37 and 38). 
The climate of the area varies according to the altitude. In the 
Pakhtun section of the Pachoghan valley, which lies at a height of 
ca. 1,500 metres 
1), 
summer temperatures are high - June, July 
and August all average about 30 degrees C. - and are increased by 
the sheltered nature of the valley and winter temperatures drop to 
freezing point (see diag. 2 p. 56). Precipitation occurs between 
November and April and is principally in the form of snow follow- 
ed by rain at the end of February and throughout March. Total 
annual precipitation is about 350 mms. There is no monsoon. 
The natural vegetation of the valley has more or less disappeared 
because of the intensive agricultural , utilisation of the area, the 
grazing of flocks and herds on the hill sides and the need for fire- 
wood. Nevertheless some low bushes of sage and juniper are to be 
found as well as dwarf and other varieties of pine. 
1) This height would support Barth' s hypothesis that the limit of Pakhtun 
settlement lies at about 5,000 ft., an altitude above which it is 
impossible to raise two cereal crops a year (Barth. 1965. Op. cit. 
p. 8). 
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Social Setting 
The Safi population numbers about 3,000 and is settled in an area 
i. e. Afghaniya, of some 14 sq. kms. The population density is thus 
very high at about 214 per sq. km. Settlement takes the form of 34 
(16 taxti and 18 rahli) nucleated hamlets (average population of 85 
inhabitants) which are scattered fairly evenly throughout Afghaniya 
with perhaps a slightly greater concentration in the western corner 
of the valley. The hamlets are readily distinguishable from their 
surroundings because they are the only places in the valley, apart 
from shrines and the mountain sides of the Ghain valley (see map 
V p. 38), where there are concentrations of trees. The trees plant- 
ed in gardens, in the middle of the hamlets and along the hamlet 
paths provide fruit - principally mulberries, but also apricots, 
apples and cherries, and wall nuts - and shade in the summer. This 
shade is utilised by all in the intense summer heat but there, where 
the trees are thickest and there is a natural or artificial mound 
commanding a view, are the men' s meeting places, the ' surf'. Here 
they come to talk, smoke, gossip and on occasion to hold their 
' jirgas' . Jirgas are deliberative assemblies where landed heads of 
households meet, or met, to settle disputes, reach compromises and 
work out the problems of the hamlet or of a number of hamlets 
1). 
The surf, or shady places, are replaced in winter by the ' petawi' . 
These are open places facing south usually sheltered from the winds 
by walls or buildings on two or three sides. 
Apart from a surf and a petawi each hamlet also has a mosque with 
an imam responsible for prayer and religious education. The 
mosques are generally built in the centre of the hamlet where the 
hamlet's paths come together. Some (3), however, are built near 
1) Jirgas now hardly come together because they are being steadily 
replaced firstly by a small jirga, the ' maraka' , formed from a small 
number of high status men from the community, secondly by the 
activities of the maliks and thirdly by the waluswal and the Depart- 
ment of Justice in Nijrao. 
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2. CLIMATIC CHART 
Mean 
Max. 
Temp. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
Mar. 
Apr. 
May 
June 
July 
Aug. 
Sept. 
30.1 
22.6 
16.3 
18.0 
18.0 
18.9 
23.6 
32.7 
38.7 
36.3 
37.6 
31.8 
Mean 
Min. 
Temp. 
13.0 
7.3 
0.9 
1.1 
7.1 
7.7 
11.5 
15.6 
22.5 
24.2 
24.4 
17.7 
Temperature in degrees centigrade 
Mean 
Temp. 
21.4 
14.1 
6.4 
8.6 
12.4 
13.1 
17.8 
25.4 
31.4 
31.5 
29.9 
25.2 
Rain- 
fall in 
mm. 
12.2 
24.1 
21.4 
0.7 
65.7 
142.6 
62.5 
5.8 
Tr 
Tr 
0 
0 
figures for the province of Laghman for the 
year from October 1965 to September 1966 
Source: The Kabul Times Annual, 1967. 
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'holy' trees which were, according to the Safi, the places where 
muslim martyrs were buried and where men, 'in the past' 
1), 
used 
to gather for prayer. Now the dead branches of these trees, once 
they have fallen to the ground, are collected and used for heating 
the mosques. 
Many hamlets also have 'shops' . These are mostly just rooms 
in 
galas where the little which is for sale is stored but a few are 
separate buildings with a relatively wide range of goods. If the 
villagers requirements cannot be met there, there is also a bazaar, 
held on Fridays, at the junction of Afghaniya with the rest of the 
Pachoghan valley and with Ghain. There members of hamlets buy 
and sell commodities and the shopkeepers also have stands. The two 
principal bazaars for the Safi are, however, those in Nijrao, near 
to the sub-province capital, and in Tagao. The former is more pop- 
ular than the latter because it is more easily reached. 
A few hamlets (5) have water driven mills and these are either col- 
lectively owned by the hamlet or are in the hands of two or three of 
its members. These mills do not have a monopoly because many 
cultivators, for whom the price in Afghaniya 
2) 
is too high, have 
their crops ground in the upper part of the Pachoghan valley or in 
Nijrao. 
Apart from these buildings hamlets of course consist primarily of a 
number of semi-fortified clay houses or small galas. These qalas 
have two or three rooms, a number of outhouses for the storage of 
crops, green fodder, hay etc., stalls for the milk cows and the 
oxen, and coops for the chickens and ducks. They also have a court- 
yard which is either planted with trees and vegetables or is of 
beaten clay. Surrounding the whole complex is a5 metre high wall. 
1) The men of the hamlet of kando xel still pray on occasion under their 
'holy' tree. 
2) Maize costs 1 pau per ser = 1/2 kilo for every 7 kgs. and wheat 3/4 
pau per ser = 372 gms. for every 7 kgs. 
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Some galas, but particularly those of the ajnabiyan nomads, which 
are built separately away from the hamlets, are very large and 
have towers at each corner where lookouts could be posted and 
from which, should it be necessary, a good field of fire could be 
obtained. All galas whether small or large have small channels 
from the irrigation ditches to the galas so that, when irrigation is 
in progress the gardens may be watered and the women do not have 
to leave the quala to collect water from the rivers. 
Paths exist only within the hamlets and communications between 
hamlets take place, with two exceptions, along the low mud walls 
which mark the boundaries of fields. The exceptions are the motor- 
able track constructed to facilitate exploratory mining running from 
the mouth of the valley to its head where the exploration is taking 
place and the path leading from the middle of Afghaniya over a low 
pass to the Nijrao valley and to the local government centre at 
Nijrao (see map VII p. 54). 
Sixteen of the thirty-four hamlets of Afghaniya are occupied by the 
present descendants of musawad (the taxti) whose five sons and their 
families are supposed, as we have seen in chap. 4, to have forcibly 
occupied the territory. Four of these sons subsequently became the 
founders of major lineages or 'khels' and their sons or grandsons 
in turn became the founders of minor lineages. Within these minor 
lineages are smaller local descent groups called ' koranai' . Thus all 
the musawad Safi are ordered into a descent system of decreasingly 
small units, i. e. musawad Safi, major lineage, minor lineage and 
local descent group. As members of descent groups also live 
proximately all the local descent groups of one minor lineage are to 
be found within one hamlet and the hamlet is seen, in descent terms, 
as being a minor lineage. Also all minor lineages/hamlets of a 
major lineage are to be found within the territory of the major 
lineage -a territory which is the summation of the minor lineages' 
/ 
hamlets' territories. This will be explained in much greater detail 
below and just serves here as an introduction. 
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The one non-musawad Safi major lineage in the community was 
founded by raEhhli and its three minor lineages also constitute hamlets 
and are divided into smaller local descent groups. None of these 
descent groups either at the koranai or minor lineage level are inte- 
grated into the musawad Safts lineages. The other fifteen rahli 
hamlets are also seen as being composed of men who are related to 
one another as members of one minor lineage but they cannot be and 
are not connected lineally to any of the five major lineages of the 
community. However as they live on the territory of the major 
lineages they are seen as being 'of' but not 'in' their respective 
major lineages. 
The non-Safi and non-Pakhtun professionals, the blacksmiths, barbers 
and carpenters who also live in Afghaniya do so either as families in 
taxi or raghli hamlets or as groups of families in their own hamlets. 
In the latter case they are also organised on a descent basis as 
minor lineages but they have no descent connection with one another 
nor, of course, with any of the Pakhtun taxti or raghli lineages. 
The majority of Safi are the owner-cultivators of the land which 
surrounds their hamlets. The fields are not owned or, with the 
exception of tasks which are too arduous for the owner alone, work- 
ed collectively but are in the hands of individual household heads. 
These men are generally referred to as elders, greybeards or 
' sping irai' and they pass the ownership of the fields on to their sons 
at an agreed division or, on their deaths, when the sons in turn 
become elders. Fields are also share-cropped by those who have 
insufficient land or by landless labourers who come from outside the 
community. 
The larger landowners have more say in the hamlet's affairs than 
do those with average holdings. As a result they usually constitute 
the members of the small jirga, the ' maraka' , and hold the 
largely 
honorific position of hamlet elder, the ' de kuli mashr' . 
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Some of those landowners with above average holdings who also 
possess leadership qualities and the confidence of others are elected 
to the office of 'malik' of which there are nine in Afghaniya. This 
position originally meant lineage head but has now, through govern- 
ment intervention, become largely disassociated from the lineage. 
It is a position which can bring considerable power to the holder and 
these maliks will probably, in the future, be responsible for intro- 
ducing major change in the community. 
One might think that the hamlet's imam could provide a counter- 
weight to the maliks but this is not the case. The imams' dependence 
on the hamlet's elders for their office and income and their enforced 
political neutrality ensure their acquiescence to the wishes of the 
hamlet's de kuli mashr, or to the malik himself. 
Not all Safi support themselves from the land or have positions of 
influence or power. Many hunt, are seasonal labourers outside the 
community, have shops or, are salesmen, and those who have also 
become mullahs, work, on occasion, as imam in areas outside the 
Pachoghan valley. 
Apart from the Safi there are also, as mentioned above, non-Safi, 
non-Pakhtun professionals living in Afghaniya. There are two fami- 
lies of blacksmiths, eighteen families of carpenters and seventeen 
families of barbers. Fifteen of the seventeen barber families live in 
their own hamlet, duman, as do ten of the eighteen carpenter 
families (see map VI p. 50). The blacksmiths' and carpenters' work 
is principally involved with the construction and repair of agri- 
cultural equipment but they also do work for the mills and in the 
galas. The work of the barbers is mainly barbering but they also 
take part in the rites de passage of the Safi. All these professionals 
are concerned to improve their status but so far only the black- 
smiths and carpenters have succeeded in any way. 
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Whilst these are the only professionals living permanently in 
Afghaniya there are other itinerant professionals who come to 
Afghaniya in the spring and summer months. These are individual 
salesmen who barter and sell guns, dried fruit, vegetable oil, 
jewellery and trinkets; weavers, potters, shoemakers and cotton- 
carders who spend some days or months in Afghaniya; harvesters 
who come for the harvesting; mendicants, the ' malanG' , who sell 
charms and amulets; and finally followers of Holy Men, the muridan, 
who collect offerings from the areas near to their shrines. 
Afghaniya and the whole of the Pachoghan valley are parts of the 
' waluswali' or sub-province of Nijrao 
1). 
This sub-province together 
with a number of others makes up the province of Kapisa whose 
capital, Mahmud-i-Raqi, is 33 kms. to the north-west of Nijrao. 
Nijrao' s sub-province capital, Nijrao, is a new foundation some two 
kilometres from the old centre of Nijrao at Badakshi 
2) 
(see map IV 
p. 37) and 15 kms. from Afghaniya. Nijrao consists of one large 
building for the administration which is divided up into offices for the 
various departments, the waluswal' s house, a barracks for the 
gendarmes, a number of small shops, two tea-houses and a bus- 
-'station' . One bus a day goes from Nijrao to Kabul stopping at 
Mahmud-i-Raqi, Gulbahar and Charikar on the way and another bus 
links Nijrao with Tagao and with Sarobi, an important settlement at 
the junction of the Tagao, Panjshir and Kabul rivers (see map III 
p. 18). The buses apart from bringing people to the provincial and 
1) The Afghan constitution of 1964 brought administrative changes which 
lead to the provinces being increased in number and the names of their 
divisions being altered. 'Waluswali' became the name for a sub- 
province of which there are four grades and 'alakadari' the name for 
a district. For an account of governmental and administrative changes 
following the constitutional changes of 1964 see: Gochenour, T. S. 
1965. A new try for Afghanistan. M. E. J. 19: 1 pp. 1-19, and 
Akhramovich, R. T. 1966 Outline History of Afghanistan after the 
Second World War. Moscow. Nauka Publishing House pp. 132-186. 
2) Governors of provinces and sub-provinces have a tendency in 
Afghanistan to change their provincial, sub-provincial, or district 
capitals when they come into office. In the case of the waluswali of 
Nijrao, Nijrao was the third sub-province capital in recent times 
although all the sites remained within the Nijrao valley. 
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state capital and enabling shop-keepers to purchase supplies in the 
main centres have ended the isolation of what was up to then a 
relatively inaaýessible region and have greatly increased the admini- 
strative control of the area. 
Local Government 
The chief executive of the waluswali is the waluswal or governor. 
He is appointed by the governor of the province and was, at the 
time of the field work, a wealthy Tajik 
1). 
The waluswal is 
responsible for law, order and the general administration of the 
sub-province. He is also the magistrate and all complaints and 
petitions are submitted in the first instance to him. The complaints 
are then dismissed as irregular, solved - in the sense that a 
compromise is found, although cases brought to the waluswal are 
usually so complex that no easy or ready solution can be given - or 
referred by the waluswal to the appropriate department or depart- 
ments of the administration. 
The most important of the departments is that of Taxation and 
Revenue (maliya). It is headed by a director of finance who is also 
the second in command in the waluswali and who acts for the walus- 
wal in his absence. The principal tasks of the department are the 
collection of taxes on land (irrigated, and non-irrigated, arable and 
orchards) and on mills, bazaars, shops and tradesmen, and the 
financing of public works i. e., roads, schools, bridges, public 
buildings etc. As might be expected all these activities impinge con- 
siderably on the lives of the people in Afghaniya and represent for 
the majority the most pervasive and obvious aspect of the admini- 
stration. 
Another major department is that of Security or Public Order 
1) The governor of the Province was a Pakhtun as are the majority of 
provincial governors in Afghanistan. 
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(amniya). Its head is the 'commandant', a police officer trained and 
educated at the police college in Kabul. Under his command are ten 
policemen or gendarmes all of whom are conscripts doing compulsory 
military service. They usually come from the province if not from 
the sub-province itself, i. e., they have a good local knowledge both 
of the people and the area. In Nijrao the gendarmes generally func- 
tion as the strong arm of the magistrate and the department of 
Justice being responsible for arrests and the delivery of summons, 
but they also protect the main bazaars, guard property and inhibit 
the activities of bandits and robbers 
1). 
A third large department and one which works closely with both the 
waluswal and the Security department is that of Justice (maHukma) 
2) 
It is headed by a 'qazi' or judge usually only trained in islamic law 
(shari' at) of the Hanafi school 
3). 
All those cases in Afghaniya which 
are not concerned with breaches of administrative law or regulation 
come before the qazi. These usually involve land, property, assault 
4) 
and homicide . 
1) Incidents of banditry increase whenever periods of drought, crop 
failure and famine occur. Such conditions existed in the summer of 
1971. 
2) Art. 97 of the 1964 Constitution places the judiciary as 'an independent 
organ of the State' which ' discharges its duties side by side with the 
Legislative and Executive Organs'. 
3) The Hanafi School is the official school for Afghanistan (see: Art. 2 of 
the 1964 Constitution: Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan. 
Religious rites performed by the State shall be according to the pro- 
visions of the Hanafi doctrine. Art. 69: Excepting the conditions for 
which specific provisions have been made in this Constitution, a law 
is a resolution passed by both Houses, and signed by the King. In the 
area where no such law exists, the provisions of the Hanafi Juris- 
prudence of the Shariaat of Islam shall be considered as law. 
4) After the promulgation of the 1964 Constitution all legal decisions were 
transferred (at least theoretically) to the qazi, but secular law has 
supremacy (See art. 102: ). Before that a case generally first went to 
a qazi who gave his judgement on the haq-ul-Allah (Rights of the State 
and Religion). The local provincial council, including the governor and 
his staff, however, could change the decision in accordance with the 
growing body of secular law (see: Dupree, 1973. Op. cit. p. 581). 
For an interesting analysis of the role and sphere of activity of the 
qazi in Andarab (observations made between 1959 and 1961) see Singh 
Uberoi, J. P. 1968. District Administration in the Northern Highlands 
of Afghanistan, in: Sociological Bulletin, Vol. XVII-I, March 1968. 
- 64 - 
The three other departments in the waluswali, Property (imlak), 
Actuarial Statistics (iHsalin) and Post (muxabirat) are the most minor 
of the departments as far as size is concerned but they nevertheless, 
with the exception of the Post whose services are only used by the 
members of the administration, play an important role in the lives 
of the people. The department of Property, for example, is respons- 
ible for the registration of land and for the registration of its division, 
its inheritance and its sale. It is thus concerned with one of the 
principal interests of the Pakhtuns of Afghaniya. They, however, seek 
wherever possible to avoid registering their land and do not notify 
the department of divisions of land or alterations in its ownership 
unless they are forced to do so by circumstances. In this way they 
evade the costs of registration and taxation but as will be shown 
below (p. 274 ) they may create difficulties for themselves which are 
out of all proportion to the considered impositions which they elude. 
The department of Actuarial Statistics is also of significance for the 
Safi because of the consequences its activities have on their lives. 
The department, as the name suggests, is principally concerned with 
the registration of births and deaths and this information is collected 
either from the maliks 
1) 
or from the identity cards of the adult 
males. Apart from providing useful census material this information 
enables the local authorities to elicit the names of boys for compulsory 
schooling 
2) 
and of young men for military service 
3). As both 
activities create disturbances and can lead in some cases to hardship 
for the families involved the Safi are very unwilling to give informa- 
tion and avoid registration wherever possible. 
This attitude, at least as far as schooling is concerned, may seem 
1) The definition, role and duties of the malik will be explained below in 
chapter 11 on leadership. 
2) There is no schooling for girls at least among the Pakhtuns. 
3) Compulsory military service was formerly considered to be a sort of 
death sentence and those affected have always tried to avoid it or to 
find a substitute. Present conditions in the army are very much better 
nevertheless all potential recruits try to avoid service. 
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surprising but it does not represent a rejection of education as such. 
The Safi fully appreciate how much can be achieved through school- 
ing and place occupations which require a high standard of education 
at the top of any list of occupational preferences 
l). 
At the same 
time they recognise the futility of their own or their children's par- 
ticipation in the educational system. 'What' , they say 
'can we do 
with our education here in Pachoghan? We can' t eat it and there is 
no other use to which we can put it. ' In fact for those fathers who 
do send their sons to the preparatory school in the Pachoghan 
valley 
2) 
it is a liability because not only do the children not gain 
anything from it but the parents also lose some of their available 
labour which could otherwise have been used in the household or on 
the land. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is not surprising 
that the educational facilities offered by the administration are 
generally regarded as an imposition which if possible is to be 
avoided. 
The local administration, i. e. the waluswali, is not responsible for 
this situation because educational matters, such as compulsory 
schooling, are in the hands of the Ministry of Education in Kabul. 
Also all the teachers are appointed by the ministry and their periods 
and places of employment are all determined by the minister. Should 
consultation be necessary between the teachers and the waluswal then 
the head master of the most senior school in the waluswali acts as 
the representative of all the teachers and indirectly of the ministry 
in the discussion. Such consultation became necessary, for example, 
when the Safi opposed the plan to establish a girls' school in the 
1) For example in the lists of occupational preferences which I collected 
the top three occupations - pilot, government official (governor, sub- 
governor etc. ) and judge - all require above average educational 
qualifications. 'Farmer' usually came in the fourth or fifth place. 
2) The ' school' which is situated by the track and on the border between 
Afghaniya and the rest of the valley has not yet been built although 
the foundations have been laid. Lessons take place in the open air near 
the teacher's house, a building which has also not been completed 
forcing the teacher to travel backwards and forwards between the 
Pachoghan and Nijrao valleys. 
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area. This opposition combined with the general agitation in other 
Pakhtun areas lead to the abandonment of female education at least 
in Afghaniya. We can thus see that should a large enough group come 
together for the purpose of opposing a governmental measure 
success can be achieved and that the people when faced by such 
measures are. not completely helpless but can apply a certain 
amount of pressure on the central government via the local 
authorities 
1 ). 
Such pressure, however, marks the limits of the Safi' s influence on 
the administration. The days when inaccessibility, the use of force 
or the weakness of the monarch in Kabul enabled them to evade tax- 
ation and military service are gone. Now the central government is 
firmly established and it is increasingly able to extend its influence 
into the more intractable Pakhtun areas. Nevertheless its actual 
interference in the affairs of the population, although growing, is still 
minimal in comparison with the ubiquity of european bureaucracy. 
Most Safi have come to terms with its presence in Nijrao and with 
its demands and, for those who have not, there always remains the 
possibility of eluding what they consider its more pernicious aspects. 
Nevertheless the administration represents an alien system which 
with its established hierarchy of officials and chain of commands in 
totally foreign to the social and political system of the Safi them- 
selves. Their principles of independence, egalitarianism, and self- 
help constitute the polar opposites of the system represented by the 
government. It is because of this that governmental institutions are 
only made use of in the last resort when a solution cannot be 
1) This 'pressure' takes the form of petitions, protests and ultimately 
disorders. As it is a major principle of the Afghan administration 
that law, order and quiet should be maintained at all costs disorders 
lead to the speedy removal and replacement of officials. They, the 
officials, are therefore vulnerable and consequently open to 
compromise on matters which the inhabitants of a district consider 
important and which is not in direct conflict with the administration' s 
principal interests. Thus a subject such as girls' schooling which in 
a traditional and conservative muslim country such as Afghanistan 
was a risky project anyway could be safely dropped or suspended in 
areas where opposition arose. 
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reached within the framework of the traditional system or when a 
solution can only be achieved by force. Already, however, this 
recognition of an outside arbitrator or external force is altering trad- 
itional kinship based institutions and the leadership. These aspects 
will be discussed in detail below but in general it may be said about 
the administration that it represents for the Safi a system whose 
disadvantages - registration of land, taxes, schooling, military 
service - far outweigh its advantages and whose influence is bringing 
structural and organizational change. 
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6. SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 
Subsistence Activities 
The Safi support themselves principally from the intensive cultivation of 
small irrigated fields. Although high yields (ten to fifteen fold) and two 
crops a year are usual overpopulation 
1), debt and inheritance have lead 
to the parcelling of the land into smaller and smaller lots so that 
now (1970-71) many owner-cultivators (ca. 25 %) 
2) 
cannot support 
themselves and their families from the products of their fields alone 
and a further 15 % of the population is landless. The situation is 
alleviated to some extent, at least for the men with some, if 
insufficient, land by the addition of products obtained by share- 
cropping the excess land of the larger landowners. For the landless, 
however, such a solution does not bring any amelioration because 
the special patron-client relationship which results from a contract 
between landless share-cropper and landowner is socially 
unacceptable for them (see below pp. 82-85 ). Even if it were 
acceptable it would bring no real improvement because if the total 
amount of arable in Afghaniya were divided among all the families 
each would only receive 4 'jerib' 
3) (ca. 2 acres) whereas the 
minimal area of irrigated land needed to support a family of four is 
4) 
5 jerib . It is obviously impossible, therefore, even for those 
1) Most Pakhtun areas but especially those in the east of Afghanistan 
are undergoing a population explosion caused by a greatly reduced 
death rate - newly available medical facilities and medicines - and a 
continuingly high birth rate -a response to the earlier very high infant 
mortality. It is probable, however, that these areas were always 
overpopulated but raids and subsidies from the British - Indian and 
Afghan governments for keeping quiet or causing disturbances made it 
possible to maintain a larger population than the land alone could 
support. 
2) I was only able to collect statistical material about the size of land- 
holdings from one hamlet but as conditions and processes are relative- 
ly uniform in Afghaniya I think the percentages may be used safely for 
purposes of generalization. 
3) Again this figure is obtained from only one of the ten hamlets from 
which I collected statistical material. 
4) See Grötzbach, E. 1972 Op. cit. p. 211. Grötzbach is referring to 
well-watered land in Badakhshan, i. e. an area physically comparable 
with Afghaniya. 
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sharecroppers with some land to always acquire sufficient extra land 
for their needs. Thus these cultivators and the landless men have to 
supplement their yearly requirements 
1) 
or obtain them entirely by 
other means than from the land. 
One of the principal methods of doing so is by hunting. This must 
originally just have been an enjoyable pursuit to which all Pakhtuns 
are addicted but it has become, at least in this area, an important 
economic activity without which many families could not exist. 
Another important source of income is the seasonal labour/work 
done by the younger men of the household either on roads or in 
mines in the province or in the rice fields to the north of the Hindu 
Kush. Some farmers also open ' shops' in their hamlets where they 
sell the few necessities which the people themselves cannot produce 
such as ' niswar' 
2), 
tea, sugar, soap, matches etc. There are, of 
course, other shops in Afghaniya but these are owned by men who 
have invested the profit which they have made from their land in the 
shop and thus are interested not in supplementing an inadequate 
income but increasing an above average one. Other men try by the 
sale of meat or flour which they purchase in the bazaars or from 
other farmers to support their families. Finally there are the men 
who migrate for a number of years to the rich rice and cotton areas 
of Baghlan and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan where they work as 
labourers and send part of their earnings back to Afghaniya. 
Not all non-farming activities in Afghaniya are, however, the result 
of inadequate land holdings. The carpenters and blacksmiths, for 
example, are or were primarily dependent upon carpentry and black- 
smithing for their livelihood and not on farming. Now they are 
1) The amount of grain considered necessary to support a family of four 
for one year is 3 kharwar, or ca. 1,700 kgs. 
2) A sort of finely ground, moist snuff which instead of being inhaled is 
placed in small quantities under the tongue and behind the lower front 
teeth. 
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nearly all landowners as well but their original starting off point was 
that of their specialist activity. Similarly the barbers came to and 
settled in Afghaniya as barbers and it was only after a number of 
generations that they were able to purchase land so that nowmne are 
alone dependent upon barbering for their livelihood. 
Finally there are the mullahs. They occupy a somewhat intermediary 
position because in Afghaniya there are two kinds: the imam, the 
leader of prayer in the mosque and the mullah who has received a 
priestly education but who does not practice. In the first case these 
are non-Pakhtuns coming from outside Afghaniya who take up posts 
as imams in the various hamlets of the community. They do not own 
land and are entirely dependent for their livelihood on the payments 
of the villagers. In the second case, that of the mullahs, these are 
Afghaniya Safi who have undergone a religious training at the 
instigation of their fathers and carry the title of mullah. They gener- 
ally come from families of mullahs or Hajis who have sufficient land 
and thus only practice their office in times of economic difficulty and 
in areas, for reasons which will be explained below, where they are 
unknown. 
In spite of the variety of these non-farming activities only about 15 0/6 
of the population of Afghaniya is involved with them exclusively. 60 % 
on the other hand are able to support themselves and their families 
from their land alone and 25 % must share-crop additional land or act 
as part-time hunters, salesmen, shopkeepers and labourers to secure 
their families livelihoods. The dominant activity, therefore, in 
Afghaniya is, in spite of an ever-increasing percentage of Safi who 
seek employment elsewhere, agriculture. 
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Agricultural Activities 
Distribution of Land and Water 
Land 
The basis of the agriculture is the land and the water. The land, as 
shown above, was initially divided among the original settlers so 
that each had an equal share. Subsequent divisions of the land took 
place either as the result of inheritance among the descendants of 
these men or as the result of purchase and sale both among the 
original settlers and the newcomers and strangers. This, however, 
has not lead to a chaotic land situation with bits and pieces being 
owned in all parts of the valley. 
1) 
adjoining fields, the ' shaf' a' 
The rights of those men with 
to first purchase and the 
difficulties of cultivating fields which are part of another hamlet' s 
land - i. e. different irrigation system, distance to the fields, 
difficulty of countering the expansionary tendencies of neighbours 
etc., - have inhibited the uncontrolled splintering of holdings. Instead 
alterations in hamlet ownership have been confined to the peripheries 
of hamlet lands where fields are often purchased and worked by men 
from other hamlets or may be share-cropped by men whose fields are 
contiguous or close. Generally speaking, however, the land which 
surrounds a hamlet is owned and worked by the hamlet's inhabitants. 
As land cannot be sold or share-cropped without the rights to the 
water which irrigates it the ownership of water should reflect that of 
the land. That it does not results principally from the existence in 
Afghaniya of two water sources, the rivers and the springs, which 
together and separately feed the irrigation system. 
1) Shaf' a are 'pre-emptors". For a more detailed explanation see below 
chap. 10. p. 268. 
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Water 
River Water 
The river water comes from the two rivers, the Pachoghan and its 
tributary, the Ghain (see maps V p. 38 & VII p. 54). The Ghain 
flows into the Pachoghan at two points the second of which marks the 
division of the Pachoghan river itself into two major channels. These 
two channels then run more or less parallel to one another and divide 
Afghaniya lengthways into three large sections. Together, therefore, 
the Ghain and the Pachoghan provide a water network which covers 
the whole valley floor. The water for these rivers comes principally 
from snow which falling between December and March builds a 
reservoir on the high mountain peaks. This reservoir is tapped, 
sometimes well into the summer months, by the sun's heat which 
melting the snow sends down small daily floods called ' chala' . It is 
because of these daily floods that the river water is referred to as 
' chala' water by the inhabitants. All the hamlets of Afghaniya have 
dams on the rivers to channel the water on to their lands where it 
is lead by myriad ditches to each individual field. All members of 
the community who own land have access to this river water and the 
right to use it. However these rights, in times of inadequate pre- 
cipitation, tend to be relative to the geographical position of the 
hamlets i. e. whether they are closer or further away from the 
source of water. 
In years of normal precipitation this river water flows in quantities 
and over a period of time which are sufficient to satisfy the require- 
ments of all the villagers and to ensure the growth of two crops a 
year. During such times hamlets and cultivators channel off water 
from the river whenever they wish. When, however, the snow 
reservoir is smaller than usual because of insufficient precipitation 
and the flow of water is correspondingly reduced the upstream 
hamlets, who have the right of first usage because of their position 
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nearest to the source, divert so much water onto their fields that none IN 
flows downstream during this time. The downstream hamlets have to 
wait and whilst this is not so important for the first crop it can mean 
that the second crop of hamlets which are totally dependent on river 
water is planted late or that it is impossible to plant rice. 
In times of drought caused by consecutive years of inadequate pre- 
cipitation, such as 1970-71, the situation is initially worse for the 
downstream hamlets than for the upstream ones because again they 
have to wait for water. The final consequences, however, for both 
the downstream and upstream hamlets if these are totally or princi- 
pally dependent on river water are the same: they can only plant and 
harvest one crop and rice cultivation, because of its excessive water 
demands, is abandoned altogether. The economic repercussions, 
because of the subsistence level size of most land-holdings, are 
considerable and such families are only able to survive by temporary 
migration for work and/or the complete utilisation of other sources 
of income. 
In the light of the economic consequences which geographical position 
has for some hamlets it is surprising, at least for the outside 
observer, that there is no supra-hamlet mechanism in Afghaniya to 
regulate the situation and to organize a more egalitarian distribution 
of water. The villagers themselves say that there is no need for 
l) 
such an institution because it is a general principle that 'sardahana' 
hamlets have the first right to the water because it flows past their 
hamlets first. This does not mean that they do not get impatient about 
delays but generally speaking as there is either plenty of water for 
all, or, sufficient for one crop and then nothing both for upstream 
and downstream hamlets this impatience does not generally escalate 
into conflict between hamlets. The absence of a regulative body is, 
however, also due to the fact that individual hamlets in Afghaniya are 
1) Sar = head, dahana = inlet, = head inlet, i. e. those who have inlets for 
cha melling off the water at the head of the river. 
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incapable, apart from the repair of major irrigation ditches, of co- 
operating with one another because they are interested in the fate of 
other hamlets only in so far as their difficulties offer potential 
advantages for themselves. They are also suspicious of power and 
authority in general except when they wield it themselves and could 
not possibly call into being a supra-hamlet authority which was 
neutral because neutrality for them is a relative concept. There is, 
for example, either less neutrality which means that an arbitrator 
decides against their party or more neutrality which means that he 
decides forthem. 
The Safi are nevertheless capable of regulating the division of water 
within a hamlet. Once the water supply decreases or members of a 
downstream hamlet have to wait for water tensions arise. Each feels 
that he has a prior right to and a greater need for the water. In 
some cases the problem is solved by the politically strongest taking 
it but generally members of hamlets come together and choose a 
' mirau' , or water master. These men are usually respected elders 
with average sized holdings but with strong political support. They 
are given the authority to decide which fields are in the greatest 
need of water, the succession of water users and how long the irrig- 
ation should last. Whilst no villager is completely satisfied with this 
solution nobody feels particularly discriminated against and tensions 
are diminished. 
Spring Water 
Hamlets with spring water in addition to river water are in a much 
better position because they can always supplement or replace the 
river water with their own spring water and thus ensure the growth 
of a second crop. The springs which are found near the rivers and 
on the sides of the valley do not provide large quantities of water, 
on the other hand they flow throughout the year and are not subject 
to daily fluctuations. The water is either lead onto the fields via 
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artificial channels or, when the flow is small, is allowed to accumu- 
late in ponds (dand) from which it is released once the volume is 
sufficient. 
As these springs are unevenly distributed throughout the valley not 
all hamlets have them on their lands and the rights to use them in 
hamlets that do are invested, with a very few exceptions, only in the 
descendants of the original founders of the descent group, i. e. the 
taxti, among whom the shares to the water like those of the land 
were originally divided. It is in these hamlets that ownership of 
land and water become separated from one another. If land is sold 
to outsiders the purchaser only receives the right to the ' chala' 
water which irrigates it and not to the spring water which remains 
in the hands of the original owner. In this way a separate group of 
people has been created who rent the use of their water or use it to 
share-crop other people's land. 
It is nevertheless possible for hamlets without springs to participate 
in other ways in the use of this water. As it is impossible for spring 
water owners to irrigate their fields continually without ruining the 
crops or producing a swamp, and as the water cannot be turned off or 
stored in a reservoir, once irrigation is completed the water is turn- 
ed into the main channel and descends to other, lower, hamlets. 
These hamlets and that hamlet which owns the spring water thus form 
what might be called a water community the members being united by 
the common channel from which they draw their water. These other 
hamlets have acquired, with time, what might almost be termed a 
' right' to- the water and the spring owning hamlets have accepted a 
certain obligation to allow this water to flow down to them. This is 
reflected in the division of the water in some of these water 
' communities' into parts i. e. one day and a night for village ' X', 
three days and nights for village ' Y' etc., portions which correspond 
to the size of the land to be irrigated. Once, however, there is a 
drought and springs begin to produce a small flow of water then only 
the owners have the right to irrigate their fields thoroughly and the 
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lower hamlets like the downstream hamlets of the river water system 
must wait their turn until the water comes down to them. 
The system presented so far has, for purposes of clarity, been 
simplified. In reality, however, it is more complex. Firstly some of 
what have been termed the 'lower' hamlets also have springs but 
these are generally of an unreliable type which easily fail and which 
produce little water. Nevertheless they give a certain independence 
to their owners. Secondly some families in other, lower, hamlets 
have purchased shares in the spring water of the head hamlet and 
thus participate equally with the owners in its use. Finally links, 
principally marriage ones, can lead to spring water owning hamlets 
allowing water in times of difficulty to flow to families which 
previously were not members of the water community. 
The division of water within the spring water hamlets themselves is 
also complex and variable. Those hamlets which possess the springs, 
for example, often divide the water according to the various 'fathers' 
of the hamlet. These fathers are the sons of the hamlet founder and 
the descendants of these men receive a portion of the water, 
irrespective of their numbers and the area of land owned, in 
accordance with the original division. Thus if there were four 'sons' 
then each group of descendants (the ' koranai') whatever its size will 
receive a quarter of the total water. In other owner hamlets the 
water is divided according to the area of land owned by each family, 
i. e. the larger the area the larger the amount of water -a practice 
also utilised by the 'lower' non-owner hamlets. It is also possible 
that the strongest political group - often the economically most power- 
ful and thus with the largest land-holdings - will just take as much 
water as it wishes when it wishes. The others must just wait for 
a change in political fortunes. 
In the process of what has been written it has become clear, I hope, 
that this spring water has very considerable economic and by impli- 
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cation political and social significance -a situation which has been 
furthered by overpopulation and the subsistence level size of holdings. 
In times of sufficient snowfall and precipitation in general the river 
or ' chala' water is more than adequate for the needs of the whole 
community. Once, however, there is a decrease in the amount of 
snowfall so that the flow and duration of the river water is affected 
those downstream hamlets without spring water, or access to it, run 
the risk of having reduced harvests or perhaps no second crop at all. 
Thus hamlets with spring water, apart from times of extreme drought 
when their springs can be reduced in volume or fail completely, have 
a certain guarantee for their second crop and usually for a good rice 
harvest as well. It is, therefore, not surprising that the boundaries 
of these springs are fixed by dams, that the sources are constantly 
checked and that apart from a few exceptions spring water remains 
in the hands of the hamlet descent groups 
1 ý. 
Crop System, Ploughing and Threshing 
Generally speaking, however, water from whatever source, high 
summer temperatures, and the sheltered nature of the valley enable 
all the villagers to work a two crop system of agriculture and to 
produce a wide variety of crops. The two crop system is based on 
a three field rotation of crops which is considered to begin in 
autumn (see diag. 3 p. 78). In one field wheat is seeded, in another 
clover, and the third is left fallow, i. e. it is cross ploughed and 
left unseeded. The fallow field is seeded in spring with ' dunya' ,a 
kind of spice, or with barley or potatoes and onions, or it is made 
into ' palez'. ' Palez' is an intensely worked and watered field used 
for the production of melons, cucumbers, squash etc. The fallow 
field may also be planted with early maize, that is maize planted in 
April, or with cotton. The field which was seeded with clover is 
later seeded with June maize or rice. The third field, that which 
1) For a good, comprehensive and legally grounded analysis of water 
rights, access to water and water distribution in Afghanistan as a 
whole see: Rives, Georges. 1963. Les Problemes Fondamentaux Du 
Droit Rural Afghan. pp. 63-84. In: Revue Internationale De Droit 
Compare 1963. 
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was seeded with wheat is, after the harvest in June, sown with maize, 
or rice, or ' mai' ,a kind of pulse, or may be left fallow. 
(For a 
complete time-table of agricultural activities see diag. 4 p. 80). 
All these crops require water but the number of times a field is 
irrigated varies from the three times for maize or the six times for 
' palez' to the constant watering of clover and rice. Rice because of 
the large amounts of water needed tends to be a luxury crop and 
wheat, m aize and barley form the staples for the whole valley. 
Afghaniya is not entirely dependent upon field crops because a wide 
range of garden and tree crops are also grown. Tomatoes, carrots, 
pepper, tobacco, hashish and opium form the majority of garden 
crops, and walnuts, mulberries, apricots, grapes, cherries and 
apples the most usual tree crops. Both garden and tree crops are 
grown in walled gardens in the hamlets or in gardens attached to the 
houses. Not all villagers have gardens and they tend to be owned by 
the wealthier families who have excess labour and water. The poorer 
families often have one or two mulberry trees 
1) 
and these are 
planted on the sides of the irrigation ditches which separate the 
fields or by the rivers. Other trees, whose leaves provide fodder 
for the oxen and sheep and whose branches are broken off for fuel in 
winter, are planted on the ' pulas' or low walls which divide fields. 
These 'pulas' demarcate the boundaries of fields and when stones 
are placed in them the limits of ownership. The stones, one at each 
end of the 'puls' are there to prevent the common Pakhtun practice 
of acquiring land by ploughing an extra furrow in the 'pula' and thus 
moving it over a period of time further and further into a neighbour's 
field. 
Ploughing is done with a team of oxen and an iron tipped wooden 
1) Mulberries eaten fresh, dried or ground into a flour which keeps over 
the winter, provide an important contribution to the diet of poor 
families. So close in fact is this association that in Afghaniya the term 
' mulberry eater' is a metaphor for a poor man, without land and with- 
out power. 
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plough. This plough can only break open and loosen the surface of the 
soil but, as the fields are cross-ploughed, this is not only sufficient 
but also beneficial because the capillary action of the soil is not 
disturbed. The seed is then sown broadcast. The plough cannot, 
however, cope with water and sun hardened surfaces which occur, for 
example, when fields have been used for growing rice. These must 
be turned over by hand. Even the strongest pair of oxen cannot force 
the plough share into the ground and generally in spring the oxen are 
weak from the lack of winter fodder and in summer overworked. 
Most households only possess one ox and, therefore, need to make 
an agreement with another household for the use of its ox. Such an 
agreement termed 'pora' is made in spring and is valid until 
autumn when the agricultural work is finished. It is generally made 
with neighbours but the most important consideration for the parties 
is to match the oxen for size, strength and weight. When this is not 
possible within the hamlet then the villagers try further afield. 
Wealthy cultivators generally have a team of oxen themselves 
1) 
and, 
therefore, do not participate in 'pora' agreements whereas the 
poorer people who own no oxen at all have to make use of the day 
or two when other people's oxen are free and may be borrowed. 
However continually asking for oxen creates embarassment and bad 
feelings and is generally avoided where possible. 
Once , threshing starts all the cultivators need oxen and borrowing is 
common because a pair of oxen is not sufficient and young oxen, 
donkies and even cows are forced into service. The harvested corn, 
whether wheat or barley, is piled up in a field or in the courtyard. 
of the house where it is then threshed by the animals walking round 
and round in circles over it. Once it is ready for winnowing the 
kernels and chaff are separated by throwing them up into the air and 
allowing the wind and gravity to separate them. The chaff is stored 
1) One exception was a rich and powerful malik who, as he had 
share-croppers for all his land, did not need oxen of his own. 
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for winter fodder and the kernels, after being thoroughly cleaned by 
the women of the households, are piled up on the threshing floor for 
the division or ' rasha' 
1). 
This division involves the payment of the 
debts which have accumulated for a household over the year or since 
the last ' rasha' took place and all the creditors who will accept 
corn rather than money will be there for their share of the harvest. 
Share-cropping 
Should the cultivator have a share-cropper then the largest single 
payment will be made to him. The amount or share which the share- 
cropper receives from the landowner varies according to the nature 
of the original agreement made between them. This agreement may 
take many forms and the difference between these forms is indicated 
by that share of the crop which the share-cropper receives, e. g. ,a 
half, a seventh, an eighth, etc. 
2) 
There are in Afghaniya seven 
forms or systems of share-cropping ranging from one half to one 
eigth of the harvest. However these seven forms may be and are 
generally divided into two groups one involving the half, third and 
quarter shares and the other the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
shares. One reason for these groupings is that the shares in the first 
group, the half to one-quarter group, vary according to the contribu- 
tions of commodities which the tenant and owner make. These 
'commodities' are land, labour, seed, oxen and equipment 
3). 
In the 
1) ' rasha' means in fact a heap or mound of grain but its association with 
the division results in it being used synonymously. 
2) All agreements between landowner and tenant in Afghaniya are on the 
basis of a share of the harvest. Agreements whereby the tenant provid- 
es a fixed quantity, i. e. 'x" kilograms, of the crop yearly to the land- 
owner although occurring elsewhere in Afghanistan do not occur here. 
Such agreements would seem to result from absentee landlordism a 
condition not present in Afghaniya. 
3) Water is of course also a commodity but in the majority of share- 
cropping agreements it is not looked upon as such because firstly all 
the land in Afghaniya apart from the pasture is irrigated and secondly 
land and (river) water are regarded as indivisible, i. e. the landowner 
is the water owner. In those cases, however, where land and (spring) 
water are in separate hands then the type of agreement reached is 
dependent upon the water situation. If water is very scarce then the 
water owner' s water may be regarded as equivalent to the (p. t. 0. ) 
- 83 - 
half share, for example, the share-cropper contributes his labour, 
the seed, the oxen and the equipment and the landowner provides the 
land. As the shares become smaller, that is one-third and one- 
quarter, so too does the share-cropper's contribution of commodities. 
In the second group, the fifth to an eighth, the share-cropper only 
provides his labour for the agricultural process and the landowner 
contributes land, seed, oxen, and equipment as well as some 
additional benefits for the share-cropper such as a room or house, 
bedding, clothing and food. As the contribution of commodities from 
both sides is constant whether the share-cropper receives a fifth, 
sixth, seventh, or eighth share the difference in share proportions 
must be based on another factor or other factors than those for the 
half to one-quarter grouping. The principle factor is the estimated 
production from the owner's fields. If this estimate is high then the 
tenant's share of the crop will be low, i. e. one-eighth, if it is low 
then the tenant's share will be correspondingly high, I. e. increased 
to a maximum of one-fifth. The decision whether an estimate is 
'high' or 'low' is based on a tenant's minimum requirement of 
grain for a season's work, i. e. from 'Hamel' (March/April) to 
' gaus' (November/December) 
1). 
If this minimum requirement is, 
let us say, 80 ' ser' 
2) 
and the estimated harvest from the fields is 
700 ser then an eighth share of the crop would bring the tenant 
87.5 ser which would be a satisfactory share. On the other hand an 
eighth share of fields producing 400 ser would be totally unsatisfact- 
ory because the tenant's portion of 50 ser would be inadequate being 
below his minimum requirement. The tenant, therefore, would press 
the owner for a fifth share which would bring him his required 80 
ownership of the land because without the water the land is useless. 
In this case the water owner would receive a half of the crop and the 
unusual situation arises where the land owner works his own land as 
a share-cropper. Generally, however, the water owner works the 
land and receives a third of the crop. 
1) It is a season and not a year because when the new tenant starts his 
work the winter wheat has already been sown by the old tenant. The 
new tenant seeds the maize and summer wheat, plants the rice and 
completes the agreement in autumn by sowing the winter wheat. 
2) 80 ser = 560 kgs., an amount which would be sufficient for one 
man for a year. 
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ser. The bargaining between the tenant and landowner can be bitter and 
protracted. The owner, for example, using the additional benefits 
mentioned above to tempt the tenant into accepting a lower share and 
the tenant complaining bitterly about the infertility of the soil, the 
unfavourable distribution of the fields and the inadequate water in 
order to force the landowner into giving him a larger share. The 
nature of the final agreement depends to a large extent on the 
generosity or lack of generosity of the landowner and the supply and 
demand situation of land and labour. In 1971, for example, there was 
excess labour because of the successive years of drought and tenants 
had to accept what they could get which often was very little indeed. 
The Afghaniya Safi themselves, however, do not have to accept what 
they can get because the share-cropping agreements which they make 
are not in the fifth to one-eighth category but in the half to one- 
quarter. This is because as owner-cultivators they usually can 
contribute all or some of the 'commodities' i. e. seed, oxen and 
equipment, which are necessary to obtain a half or one third share 
of the crop. But even if they were landless, which some 15 % of 
them are, and would only have their labour to offer they would not 
and do not share-crop land for a fifth to an eighth share. The reason 
is that in Afghaniya they would work the land of their fellow villagers 
or neighbour villagers and the nature of the fifth to one-eighth share 
agreements is incommensurate with the sort of relationships which 
should exist between fellow villagers, friends and acquaintances as 
well as with the pride, independence and considered status of 
Pakhtuns. In the fifth to an eighth share contracts the tenant makes 
an agreement to work the land for one year in return for a share of 
the crop and a house, clothing, food, etc. No Pakhtun, at least in 
his home area, would accept food and clothing as part of a payment 
from a relative or fellow villager. Food is associated with 
hospitality or dependence 
1) 
and accepting clothing apart from the 
1) Ruth Newman in her book 'Pathan Tribal Patterns' (1965. pp. 17-19. 
Prentice-Hall. India. ) contrary to all other opinion also regards 
hospitality (' mailmastia') as characterised by ' ascension' on the 
part of the host and ' submission' on the part of the guest. 
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turban which is an honoured gift 
1) 
places the recipient in the position 
of a subordinate. They, therefore, cannot be accepted as part of a 
share-cropping agreement from people who are considered their 
equals without complete loss of prestige and ultimately of status as a 
Pakhtun. Also this fifth to one-eighth contract involves the share- 
cropper in extra tasks such as helping the landowner with the 
building of his house, collecting steppe grass for the fires, bringing 
flour from the mill etc., etc. These, however, are tasks which involve 
taking orders and being a servant and no Pakhtun is willing to be 
treated as a subordinate in an area where he is known or to accept 
orders from relatives, neighbours or acquaintances 
2) The two share 
cropping categories, a half to a quarter and one-fifth to one-eighth 
are, therefore, not only distinct on the basis of commodities or 
labour, as I have indicated above, but they are also different on the 
basis of the sets of relationships established. One, the half to one- 
quarter contract, is made between owner and related, landed, share- 
cropper and the other between landowner and unrelated, landless, 
labourer. In Afghaniya, as in other Pakhtun areas, the share- 
croppers are drawn from the ranks of the indigenous owner- 
cultivators and the landless tenants from strangers and outsiders. 
Harvesting 
Outsiders and strangers are also responsible for harvesting. These 
harvesters, the ' lauGuri' , are either seminomadic Pakhtuns who 
move with the crops as they ripen at different altitudes or they are 
former farmers who having little or no land seek to supplement their 
1) A turban cloth is traditionally given at weddings, at sporting contests 
or to successful mediators in conflicts. 
2) Pakhtuns are extremely sensitive to anything which approximates to 
an order. A suggestion is about the limit they will accept from 
people other than their fathers or elder brothers. One Safi, for 
example, was told by his paternal cousin -a relationship of some 
tension at the best of times - whose land he was share cropping to 
leave his work on one field and to work on another. The share-cropper 
cousin refused and broke off the contract although this involved him - 
a very poor man - in considerable loss. 
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livelihood in this manner. Generally both groups come from the 
provinces of Nangrahar and Laghman or from the Tagao valley. 
When they arrive in Afghaniya, at the beginning of June, they pitch 
their small white tents on the land besides the rivers and streams 
1) 
There they can graze their animals, usually donkeys and cows, and 
later thresh their share of the crop. The 'lauGuri' make individual 
agreements with the landowners for a share of the crop. This share 
varies between one-twentieth and one-thirty-sixth of the cut crop, 
i. e. stalks and grains 
2). 
As the crop is harvested it is laid out in 
bundles or ' sutri' on the ground and each twentieth or thirty-sixth of 
these bundles belongs to the harvesters. The variety in the shares 
depends upon the yield, size and density of the crop, the generosity 
of the owner and the availability of labour 
3). 
Harvesting is usually 
completed after two or three weeks and the harvesters move on to 
other, higher valleys. 
Co-operative Work 
Harvesting is not the only agricultural task which is not carried out 
by the owner-cultivators or tenants. In fact there are a number of 
1) This land, although it may be regarded by those farmers with adjoin- 
ing fields as belonging to them is, because of the danger of flooding, 
not planted but used as the common pasture land of the hamlet. 
2) A twentieth, at least according to my own information and to that of 
Ferdinand (1969. Op. cit. p. 144) was the ordinary rate for harvesters 
throughout Afghanistan. That they should have only received between 
one-thirtieth and one -thirty- sixth in Afghaniya at the time of my field 
work is indicative of the generally catastrophic agricultural conditions 
in Afghanistan in that year. 
3) It may seem surprising that in an area where the majority of the 
farmers are living at a subsistence level a portion of the crop whether 
it should be for harvesting or, for that matter, for share-cropping 
should be lost for a task or tasks which could often easily be managed 
with the labour available in the family i. e. wives and children. The 
reason for this would seem to be that having a harvester or a tenant 
increases a man's social prestige. The economic loss is outweighed 
by the social gain. See also Wald. 1969. Op. cit. p. 63 and Hahn 'Die 
traditionellen Lebensformen' . p. 227. In: Kraus. 1972. Op. cit. 
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agricultural activities which are beyond the combined forces of owner 
and tenant. Turning over rice fields or fields where clover was plant- 
ed, levelling wheat fields for rice, or planting rice, are activities all 
of which must be completed quickly and with extra labour. In these 
cases the people of Afghaniya make ' ashar' or cooperative work. The 
eldest male of the household informs those people of the hamlet whom 
he requires for the work that on such and such a day he will be 
having an ashar in order, for example, to plant his rice fields. These 
people, the asharGuri, are generally chosen from among both agnatic 
and affinal relatives and fellow villagers. If the task requires even 
more labour than that which can be provided by the hamlet then the 
elder will seek help in other hamlets where he has affines or he will 
make more than one ashar. 
Normally the situation is such that once the elder has obtained 
sufficient people for his ashar then they gather at his fields on the 
appointed day at dawn and start to work. The ashar giver directs and 
encourages them and sometimes music may be provided to add an 
extra incentive to their labours. At 8 a. m. they are given milk tea 
(a luxury) with bread, at noon they receive soup, meat (also a 
luxury) and tea and, generally at 1 p. m., the ashar is completed. 
The food provides the only 'payment' for the asharGuri although it is 
not looked upon as a payment but as part of the festive character of this 
work. As all owner-cultivators will at some time or other need to make 
an ashar then payment consists in the return of labour at the next ashar 
1). 
Sometimes harvesters, the lauGuri, will participate in ashar as will 
barbers. The harvesters explain this participation, as do the Safi 
when commenting on the lauGuri' s actions, in terms of the 
obligations attached to neighbourliness. As we have seen above the 
1) There are also hamlet or community ' ashar' when the work needed to 
be done, for example, the repair of irrigation ditches or canals 
destroyed by floods, involves the whole hamlet or community. In such 
cases the maliks or elders choose a day when the work should be 
carried out and inform the people through their dependents. Musicians 
are provided by large landowners and each household sends a repre- 
sentative for the work. No food or payment is given. 
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harvesters pitch their tents on common pasture land and thus become 
the neighbours (hamsaya) of those Safi with adjoining fields or those 
whose houses are proximate. One of the obligations this neighbourli- 
ness involves is help and this may be expressed through participation 
in ashar. Whilst this explanation undoubtedly has some validity other 
factors are also operative. Two which were of special significance at 
the time of my field work were the following. The harvesters were 
receiving only a half (a 36th. instead of a 20th. ) of their normal 
share as payment for their work and thus any extra payment such as 
the food which is given at an ashar was of considerable interest to them. 
Secondly they were making use of the reciprocity which characterises 
the ashar. Through their work these harvesters were providing them- 
selves with a future claim to the harvesting work of the cultivator 
whose ashar they were supporting. A final factor and one independent 
of the economic situation emerged from a study of those men who 
utilised lauGuri. These were men whose relations within their 
hamlets were strained and thus men who usually had difficulties in 
finding asharGuri from among their relatives and fellow villagers. 
Other Activities 
So far I have been concerned with farming as the principal economic 
activity of Afghaniya but, as I have mentioned above, some 40 % 
(15 % landless and 25 % with insufficient land) of the males are 
partly or totally involved in other activities. The most important of 
these are hunting, seasonal labour, trade - in the form of shops and 
salesmen - and the specialist activities of the carpenters, black- 
smiths, barbers and mullahs/imam. 
Hunting 
Hunting, as may be seen from diag. 5 p. 89, starts in the second 
half of January and continues until the end of April. It is thus an activity 
which to a certain extent complements farming because it occurs in 
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the dead season. Later, in March, however, it tends to conflict with 
ploughing and seeding and becomes for the full-time cultivators and 
share-croppers a very subsidiary activity. For the others who have 
no or too little land it remains important right up until the end of 
April. 
Only birds are hunted and these are either netted or shot. Netting is 
carried out in a number of ways but there are two principal forms. 
One is where caged birds are used as decoys to bring other members 
of their species down on to the fields where they can be netted. This 
type of netting is usually carried out by boys or by the economically 
weakest members of the community. 
The other form of netting is practised on a much larger scale and 
can be very lucrative at least in Afghan terms. In this case the 
hunters net the birds in flight as they pass up the gorge leading from 
Tagao to the Nijrao and Panjshir valleys. The Tagao-Nijrao gorge is 
on one of the main migratory routes for birds which have spent the 
winter in India and are passing through to Central Asia. In February 
they start moving in huge flocks, flying close to the ground, up from 
Nangrahar province. The fore-fathers of those Safi who now live in 
the south-west corner of Afghaniya obviously recognised the implica- 
tions of these movements and built, all the way up their part of the 
gorge 
1) ' kundai' 
, or pairs of small, squat, stone pillars which 
are used as hide-outs or screens for the hunters. Since then new 
kundai have been added so that now each family in these hamlets has 
one and these are inherited in the same way as land or other 
property. When the birds are sighted ascending from Tagao a shout 
goes up and two members of the kundai take up positions one each 
behind a pillar with the net stretched between them. In the split 
second when the birds pass between and above the two pillars the 
men stand up and casting the net in an arc net the birds. Not all the 
kundai are equally favourably situated - the birds follow definite 
1) The other section of the gorge is occupied by the ' kundai' of men 
from Tagao. 
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lines up the gorge - and the returns, in terms of birds caught, can 
vary considerably from kundai to kundai. The income from the best 
ones is about 2,500 Afs. for three months netting whereas that 
from a poor one will only be a few hundred Afs. The better kundai 
are also sold sometimes for as much as 20,000 Afs. and 'graued' 
-a sort of pawning or usufruct - for between 6 and 8,000 Afs. They 
thus often represent a considerable portion of a family's total pro- 
perty. In spite of the considerable discrepancy in the earnings and in 
the value of kundai all families like to have them whether or not 
they are favourably or unfavourably placed. It is not only the money 
to be earned but also the excitement and uncertainty of the hunt 
which attracts the owners and causes them to sit by their hide-outs 
for as much as ten or twelve hours a day during the season. 
No such permanent hide-outs are available for those hunters who 
shoot their quarry. Some, however, erect temporary screens besides 
the rivers or make artificial ponds with decoys to facilitate duck 
hunting. Others, usually the more professional hunters - i. e. those 
who are totally dependent on hunting -, do not remain in Afghaniya 
but go to Garmawa and Bad Asiya 
1) 
where the flocks are most 
numerous. There they remain for one or two months and if they are 
fortunate will return with one or two thousand Afghanis. If they are 
unfortunate they may only manage to earn some 200 or 300 Afs. 
Whatever they earn the fact that they are away from Afghaniya and 
support themselves means that their families at least live better 
during the last difficult months of winter and spring when grain 
stocks are running short. 
The birds whether netted or shot are brought to the various bazaars 
in Tagao, Nijrao, and to a lesser extent Pachoghan. There they are 
either sold directly to interested people or to shop-keepers who 
2) 
specialise in the sale of birds . The prices they acquire vary 
(see 
1) These are two areas in the Panjshir valley which are famous for their 
hunting. 
2) Some of these men have connections with Charikar and Kabul and take 
the birds to the bazaars there where they bring a much better price. 
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diag. 5 p. 89) principally according to size - the smallest are 
cheapest - and edibility/taste. Some birds, however, are caught and 
sold because of their singing qualities and others because, when 
trained, they can be used for fighting. Many men have song birds in 
Afghaniya and they often take them to the fields so that they can 
listen whilst working. Also people who are ill will have their favourite 
song birds near their beds so that they can be distracted both by the 
birds' movements and their song. Men who have fighting birds - 
usually the red-legged partridge - also receive pleasure from observ- 
ing them and it is not unusual to come across men who have placed 
their caged fighting birds near to where they are working or take them 
with them when visiting 
1). 
The prices offered for song or fighting 
birds are very much higher than those for species captured or shot 
for the table and in many cases it is impossible to buy them whatever 
the sum proffered. Generally, however, the people who keep birds of 
these kinds are hunters themselves so that the exclusive pursuit of 
song or fighting birds would not provide a better paying alternative. 
Seasonal Labour 
Seasonal labour by contrast can be much more lucrative and it is not 
unusual for men to return with 10,000 Afs. for work which they have 
done in the cotton and rice areas of northern Afghanistan. The need 
to do such work arises, as has already been indicated, because of the 
inadequacy of landholdings or the total loss of land in Afghaniya. Thus 
seasonal labour and the more permanent labour outside the community 
usually represent the last stages of a cycle which begins with the 
inheritance of land and ends with its total loss (see diag. 6 p. 93). 
1) It is clear to me that these are very superficial explanations for the 
obvious attraction which these birds have for their owners. The 
therapeutic qualities of the birds, for example, is fascinating and would 
reward investigation along the lines suggested by Levi-Strauss. 
Unfortunately I did not concern myself with this phenomenon even though 
other non-Safi Pakhtuns found the Safi' s concern with birds remarkable. 
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The majority of holdings acquired on inheritance in Afghaniya are 
still, in spite of their reduced size, adequate for subsistence. They 
can, however, only remain so if the owner-cultivator leads a 
frugal life and keeps those expenses - marriages, funerals, shop 
and gambling debts - down which because of their size could imperil 
his holding. 
Once debts have been made it is the size of them and the urgency 
and political strength of the debtee which determines whether they 
have to be paid. Gambling debts seem to be the most pernicious in 
Afghaniya because gambling must be done in secret (it is condemned 
by the mullahs), is responsible for the largest debts, is usually 
addictive, and has the most hardhearted, persistent and well-armed 
collectors. 
Such debtors usually sell the usufruct rights of one or more of their 
fields. Once this is done, because the holdings are only subsistence 
ones, it means that harvests from the remaining fields are inadequate 
and. more debts have to be made to make up the missing quantities. 
A temporary palliative is provided by share-cropping the fields of 
relatives and neighbours but the competition for such fields is very 
great and often the products are insufficient for the cropper's needs. 
The decline that then follows is normally rapid: the sale of more 
land, the pursuit of the professions of meat and flour salesman (see 
below) and finally the sale of all the fields or of the rights to their 
products (see diag. 6 p. 93). 
At some time during this process the heads or the younger men of 
the households start taking up temporary or seasonal work preferably 
in the north of the country because there wages are high and there 
are many other Afghaniya Safi who have established homes there. 
The presence of such people and the final loss of all their fields 
cause the new migrants to take up permanent residence there on the 
huge new estates created through the extension of the irrigated areas. 
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The situation for these labourers, as far as the possession of land is 
concerned, is not completely hopeless. Cases w ere reported to me 
of Safi who because of the 'high' wages offered on these estates 
were able to save money, then to buy a shop or a truck and finally 
to purchase land. The cycle of the loss of land may, therefo re, also 
be reversed through the new acquisition of land (see diag. 6 p. 93). 
Those men who continue to be seasonal migrants largely because they 
still possess some land in Afghaniya not only increase their 
families' incomes through their earnings but also enable those who 
stay behind to share-crop these small parcels and generally alleviate 
the land situation in the community. 
Salesmen and Shopkeepers 
Salesmen and shopkeepers do not relieve the pressure on land but 
they are able to supplement their families' incomes by their activities. 
The extent to which they need to be successful varies not only from 
individual to individual but also and principally from one occupation to 
the other, i. e. from salesman to shopkeeper. 
The salesmen are men generally on the edge of poverty with no land 
or with fields which are so small as to be totally inadequate for their 
needs. The sale of meat and flour - the only products for which the 
Pakhtuns of Afghaniya act as salesmen - often represents for them 
the last attempt to save themselves from landlessness and/or 
permanent migration. The shopkeepers on the other hand are all 
landed men whose shops provide an extra but not always principal 
part of their income. Some shopkeepers in fact are very wealthy 
whereas others just manage to subsist on the products of their land 
and their earnings in the shops. Generally speaking, however, the 
shopkeepers are only partly dependent on the income they receive 
from their shops whereas the salesmen are totally dependent on their 
earnings from sales. 
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The salesmen, of which there are twenty-nine families in Afghaniya 
support their families from the profit they make by buying in the 
areas where meat and flour are cheapest and selling in the areas 
where they are most expensive. Meat, for example, is cheapest in 
the main bazaars of Nijrao and Tagao and most expensive in the 
smaller and more distant valleys. The meat salesmen, therefore, are 
principally concerned with the transport of meat and/or animals from 
one place to another. The flour salesmen on the other hand have a 
number of factors to take into consideration. Firstly the yield from 
harvests in the areas where they operate - Nijrao, Tagao and Koh-i- 
Daman 
2)_can 
vary considerably from year to year. Secondly getting 
the grain which they have purchased ground as cheaply as possible 
involves, as the majority of mills are water driven, going to those 
areas where water is plentiful or in periods of heavy precipitation to 
those mills whose shares of the milled grain are the smallest 
3). It 
can, therefore, happen that flour salesmen buy grain in one valley, 
have it ground in another and sell it in a third. For this sort of 
movement they need pack animals and the majority have either 
donkeys or horses. Those salesmen who do not have their own 
animals utilise the services of the settled nomads who still have 
camels. 
The initiative required, the relative independence of decision and 
movement and the uncertainty of the profit to be made are all factors 
which appeal to Pakhtuns. They are. in fact those elements which 
compensate them for pursuing tasks which had and still have a 
certain amount of social stigma attached to them. Elphinstone, for 
example, wrote 'No Afghaun ever keeps a shop or exercises any 
handicraft trade' 
4), 
and Bellew writing some fifty years later said 
1) Of these twenty-nine families twenty-four sold flour and only five meat 
the sale of which is generally considered less prestigious. The numbers. 
at least of the meat salesmen, vary considerably according to the 
availability of more lucrative jobs. 
2) East of the Pachoghan valley. 
3) In Afghaniya, at a time when water was very short, wheat was ground 
for one ser in fourteen or in twenty which even at the time of drought 
would seem to be a very high share. 
4) Elphinstone. 1972. Op. cit. p. 333. vol. I. 
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' .., no Afghan, unless, indeed the very poorest of the poor, will 
ever engage in any retail trade, keep a shop, or pursue any 
mechanical trade or handicraft' 
1). 
These Safi Pakhtuns are the 
'poorest of the poor' but Pakhtuns in general have been forced to 
take up jobs which would not have been considered prior to govern- 
ment control, population increases and land shortage. 
Shopkeeping is today generally considered by the Safi a more 
prestigious activity than that of the sale of meat or flour. This is 
largely because, as I have mentioned above, shopkeepers have land 
and some of them are relatively wealthy men. This combination of 
wealth and land brings power and respect especially at a time when 
the traditional values 
2) 
are losing their meaning and relevance in 
the face of increasing poverty and social change. Nevertheless 
certain reservations about shopkeepers and shopkeeping continue to 
exist among the population and this, as will be shown below, is 
reflected in the success of the non-Pakhtun shopkeepers. 
There are thirty-three shops serving Afghaniya of which two are 
owned by Parachis and thirty-one by Pakhtuns. They vary considerab- 
ly in size and in the amount and variety of goods offered but all are 
referred to by the inhabitants as ' dukan' , shop, and 
fall under the 
general category of ' banjara' or general merchandise shop 
3). 
This 
means that they sell a wide range of articles such as niswar, cigarettes, 
matches, tea and sugar, soap, tooth-paste, rubber shoes, plastic sandles, 
shoe-laces, combs, needles, buttons and zippers, penknives, contra- 
1) Bellew, H. W. 1862. Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan 
1857. p. 24. London. 
2) For example: ' : that wealth is not for amassing, but for use and is 
basically without importance, that only the weak man is attached to 
property and makes himself dependent on it, that the strong man bases 
his position on qualities within himself and people's recognition of 
these qualities, and not on the control of people by the control of 
objects. ' Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 121. The destruction of traditional 
values is discussed in greater detail in chap. 8. 
3)This is a systematization suggested by Charpentier in his book 
' Bazaar-e-Tashqurgan, Ethnographical Studies in an Afghan Traditional 
Bazaar' . 
1972. Studia Ethonographica. Uppsala. pp. 142-149. 
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ceptives 
1), 
aspirin, penicillin, etc., as well as paraffin and 
imported biscuits and sweets. Some shops also sell cloth but as the 
rolls cost a great deal of money only the wealthiest shopkeepers 
can afford to buy them. All of these articles are bought in the main 
bazaars of Nijrao and Tagao or in Kabul by the shopkeepers them- 
selves and then sold for a small profit in Afghaniya. Some goods, 
however, a nd these usually include white paraffin, cigarettes and 
cloth are bought through smugglers who bring them over the border 
from Pakistan. This sort of trade used to be very popular and is 
still very profitable but now because of controls by the army and 
the increased efficacy of the custom's officials has become a little 
too harzardous for most shopkeepers. Only those who are starting 
at the bottom or who need to make a large profit quickly are willing 
to take the risk of selling smuggled goods. 
Generally speaking, however, a shopkeeper's earnings come from 
three sources. One is the profit made from the difference between 
the price at which the shopkeeper buys the article and the price at 
which he sells it in Afghaniya. This price difference the shopkeeper 
justifies by explaining it as the cost of transport from the bazaars 
or Kabul to the Pachoghan valley. The customers, unless they are 
very poor, accept this explanation. They do so not only because it 
seems credible but because of the convenience of a shop which is 
close and which opens when the customer wishes compared with the 
inconvenience of a bazaar which is open only once a week (Friday) 
and is at least three hours walking distance away i. e. Nijrao. Also 
customers acquiesce because the majority buy things on credit from 
the shop and the additional cost which arises from buying at the 
shop instead of at the bazaar appears in comparison with the 
total debt to be very small. 
This system of credit provides the shopkeeper with his second source 
of income. Credit which is extended becomes debts which have to be 
1) They would seem to be used exclusively as balloons by the children. 
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repaid either at the harvest or when some member of the family 
returns from work outside the valley. Shopkeepers generally prefer 
a repayment in wheat because shortly after the harvest wheat is 
very cheap and the amount which the shopkeepers receive for the 
credit they gave can be very large. When this wheat is stored and 
then sold in the winter when it is most expensive the profit thus 
acquired can be considerable. 
A profit can also be made by money-lending and this provides the 
shopkeepers with their third source of income. As they are the only 
members of the community who have supplies of ready-cash it 
follows relatively naturally that they should be the ones who function 
as money-lenders. Although lending money for a profit is forbidden 
by Islam the shopkeepers can and do circumvent this difficulty by 
making an agreement to receive the debt in wheat and thus obtain a 
profit in the manner outlined above 
1). 
Although money lending and the giving of credit are expected and in 
some cases demanded these activities do not endear the shopkeepers 
to those customers who make use of them. The principal reason for 
this is the implication of inequality which results from the 
customer' s dependence. Unfortunately most cultivators have to ask 
for credit or have to borrow money because of the nature of the 
agricultural system which brings a surplus only at one period of the 
year and because of the inadequate size of many of the holdings. 
Cultivators are, therefore, faced with the problem of having to 
acquire loans and credit and having to do so without too great a loss 
of independence and prestige. As they have nothing against making 
debts per se but only against making them, or at least overly large 
1) The economic importance of money-lending for the shopkeepers may 
be seen from Hahn' s figures for Kabul and its surroundings where 
57 % of the families were in debt. See Hahn. 1972. Op. cit. p. 230. 
For amounts of interest (usury) see also Hahn. 1972. Op. cit. p. 234. 
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ones, with their Pakhtun cousins 
1) 
one solution is to borrow money 
and to accept credit from non-Pakhtun shops 
2). 
This they can do 
because non-Pakhtuns, in this case the two Parachi shopkeepers who 
serve Afghaniya, are as Parachi not subject to the same norms or 
competing in the same system as the Pakhtuns. To be dependent on 
a Parachi has no meaning because the Parachi are not 'playing the 
3) 
same game' 
The Parachi are also dependent on the Pakhtuns for their existence 
both in terms of goods bought and protection given. Any dependence, 
therefore, which might be considered to exist through the debts is 
more than compensated for by the political dependence of the 
Parachi in fact the Pakhtuns can even feel that the credit and money 
they have received is the just payment for the protection given. In 
practice this lack of political support or their political neutrality is 
a benefit to the Parachi because of the extra custom which it brings 
them. 
Pakhtun shops are not just the possessions of their owners but the 
centres of group interests. When a Pakhtun sets up shop then he 
does so usually with the financial and physical assistance of his 
closest relatives who thus have a vested interest in the success of 
the venture. Also they expect and require, as far as they are able, 
all their relatives, i. e. both agnates and affines, to utilise the 
1) The Safi use this term to refer both to their real and their putative 
' cousins", i. e. members of the same village and community. A man's 
prestige, as I have mentioned elswhere (above p. 85), is obviously of 
primary importance in those areas where he is known. In other, 
generally non-Pakhtun, areas Pakhtun norms lose their validity or at 
least are seen as being in abeyance because they only affect the 
individual and not his family and descent group. 
2) The incompatability of Pakhtun ideals and capitalist laws was presum- 
ably responsible for the rejection, at least up to modern times, of all 
trading activities by the Pakhtuns. 
3) This may be most clearly seen in cases where menials or non-Pakhtuns 
insult Pakhtuns. The Pakhtun does not himself respond because his 
honour has not been affected. He rather orders his servants to kill or 
beat up the offender. 
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facilities of the shop to the exclusion of others 
1). 
Acquiescence is 
then honoured by the extension of long term credit and interest free 
debts. However other shops offer similar facilities and often the 
spheres of influence of two shops overlap, for example, when they 
are situated in the same hamlet so that part of the kinship group of 
one is also part of the kinship group of another. The rivalry thus 
engendered operates to the detriment of the Pakhtun shops because 
many customers then seek the neutrality of the Parachi. Also 
Pakhtuns who wish to express their disagreement with the actions 
of, or the personalities in, their interest/ political groups without 
supporting another opposed Pakhtun group can do so by shopping in 
the Parachi shops. Thus the social and political neutrality of the 
Parachi has lead to their two shops being by far the most success- 
ful in Afghaniya. The Pakhtun shopkeepers by contrast, caught within 
the bonds of their own social system, are doomed to a limited success. 
KusubGar (carpenters, blacksmiths, and barbers) and the Mullahs 
The advantages of political neutrality were or are shared by the 
'kusubGar' 2), the professionals or craftsmen. They are able to 
pursue their work throughout the whole community irrespective of 
political struggles because they too are outside the power structure 
of the Pakhtuns. These professionals the carpenters, blacksmiths 
and barbers 
3) 
- the mullahs are also professionals but not kusubGar 
and will, therefore, be dealt with separately - together constitute the 
last group involved in non-farming activities 
4). 
They, however, 
unlike the hunters, labourers, salesmen and shopkeepers are not Safi 
1) My servant for example was constantly upbraided by his cousin, a 
shopkeeper, for not using his influence on me to buy exclusively in his 
shop. 
2) kusub = trade, occupation, employment. Gar = suffix of person or actor. 
3) There are, of course, other craftsmen such as potters, silver- and 
coppersmiths, weavers, etc., but these men no longer live permanent- 
ly in Afghaniya. They move from area to area and stay only as long ss 
it is necessary to complete the work required of them. 
4) The carpenters and blacksmiths are, of course, involved in farming 
because th@y provide the implements for cultivation. What I mean is 
that their profession or trades are non-farming in the sense of not 
being directely involved with the tilling of the soil. 
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or Pakhtuns 
1) 
who have sought these occupations to supplement an 
inadequate income but people who have been for at least three 
generations full-time carpenters, smiths and barbers 
2 ). 
They are not 
members of tribes but of trades or, as Barth has argued, 'castes' 
whose integrity or corporality was and in the case of the barbers still 
is preserved by endogamous marriage . 
3) 
This distinctiveness and the difference in status which it involves is 
explained by most Safi as the result of fate or destiny - 'God sent 
them' 
4). Others are capable of more complex explanations although 
these too do not escape from a belief in a predetermined, Godly 
order. One informant, for example, sought to achieve clarity through 
an analogy. 'A felt carpet and a knotted carpet are both made from 
the same stuff - wool. But they are different and have a different 
value. The same is true of the human kind they are made of the 
same material but are nevertheless different. So it is with the Pakh- 
tuns and the kusubGar. ' 
This very illuminating explanation is applied, however, only to the 
distinction between carpenters and blacksmiths or smiths in general 
and the Safi and not to the barbers and the Safi. The carpenters, 
blacksmiths and barbers may be grouped together under the term 
kusubGar but such a grouping is not tenable under any other criterion. 
The barbers constitute a special group not only because their work as 
such is not connected in any way with agriculture but because they 
fall into the special category of the 'unclean' or ' impure' . Although 
generally speaking among Pakhtuns and indeed among all muslims no 
1) They may be the descendants of landless Pakhtuns but this is not 
known and not claimed. 
2) See Barth, F. 1960. The System of Social Stratification in Swat, north 
Pakistan. p. 136. In: Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and 
North-west Pakistan. Ed. Leach, E. R. Cambridge University Press. 
3) Barth. 1959. Op. cit. p. 16. 
4) See also Charpentier. 1972. Op. cit. p. 177. 
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complicated religious or ritual hierarchy exists 
1) 
three categories are 
distinguishable. These are the sacred and pure, i. e. the holy men and 
descendants of the Prophet, the profane and impure i. e. the barbers 
and possibly musicians 
2), 
and the rest, the secular, worldly etc., i. e. 
those between the two extremes. The barbers of Afghaniya provide no 
exception and are ordered into the profane category but they have 
achieved a greater degree of self-sufficiency than is usual by living 
together in one hamlet, duman, instead of being scattered as families 
in all the hamlets of the community and by owning land. These two 
factors together with the general poverty of the area and the social 
change caused by government intervention have improved their status. 
They nevertheless do not and probably will never enjoy the social 
mobility of the carpenters and blacksmiths who through their owner- 
ship of land have achieved in most things equality with the Safi. 
Carpenters 
The carpenters of which there are eighteen families in Afghaniya live 
in four separate hamlets. In one hamlet where there are ten families 
they are the only inhabitants and the hamlet is known, not surprising- 
ly, as ' najaran' or the carpenters. The other eight families live in 
three separate hamlets together with Safi, a distribution which is 
more typical for Pakhtun areas at least according to the literature 
3). 
None of the carpenters whether in najaran or in the other hamlets 
are, as would seem to be the case in Swat, attached to specific 
landlords or political patrons. They are free to make or terminate 
contracts with thorn they wish and those which they make with owner- 
1) The Koran in fact propagates equality: 'Surely the noblest among you 
in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you. ' 49: 13 Apartments. 
In: Arberry, A. J. 1964. The Koran Interpreted. p. 538. Oxford 
University Press, London. 
2) Barbers are often also musicians. The word ' dum' used for barber in 
Afghaniya means musician in Swat (Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 17. ) As 
onomatopoeia is especially common in Pakhto it would seem most likely 
to me that the original meaning of dum - taken from the sound of a 
drum beat - was musician. Thus the activities of some barbers as 
musicians - drummers - resulted in them being referred to as such in_ 
some Pakhtun areas. In Swat, among the Yusufzai, they are called' nai'. 
3) Barth. 1965. Op. Cit. P. 103. 
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cultivators, share-croppers and landowners are all of a dyadic nature. 
The carpenters in Afghaniya, therefore, are not part of a cooperating 
team of specialists such as tenant, carpenter, smith, muleteer etc., 
headed by a landlord. This is principally because here land holdings 
are very small and the needs of the owner-cultivators or share- 
croppers are consequently modest. 
Contracts are made by the employer seeking out the carpenter and 
when agreement is reached shaking hands with him after which the 
carpenter says 'this has become my work'. The contract lasts from 
one autumn to the next and involves on the carpenter's side the 
making and repair of tools and agricultural equipment as well as 
doors, windows and beds in the house and the construction of the 
wooden implements used by women. The owner-cultivator or land 
owner for his part supplies or buys all the wood necessary for the 
work, provides occasional meals and, after the harvest, hands over 
the 'dodi' or 'girdai' payment agreed upon in the contract. The dodi 
payment consists of two ser of wheat and two ser of maize whereas 
the ' girdai' is that amount of unthreshed wheat or maize which one 
man can carry away on his back. It is, however, not necessary to 
make a yearly contract and landless men who work as share- 
croppers can make agreements with the carpenters for the supply of 
specific implements in return for money payments. Also millers who 
require water shoots or water 'turbines' for their mills make indi- 
vidual agreements and pay either in cash or kind. Generally speaking 
the carpenters now prefer money for their work or when this is not 
obtainable fixed amounts of wheat or maize. They feel, at least those 
of them who possess land, that it is incongruous that they should be 
the subordinates of landowners in their role as carpenters but super- 
ordinates of others in their role as landowners. They, therefore, 
would prefer because they do not wish to lose their income as 
carpenters a more ' business like' attitude and this they feel can be 
more readily achieved through the exchange of work for money and 
the elimination of the dodi and girdai payments. 
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Blacksmiths 
The blacksmiths are similarly concerned to improve their status and 
in fact three families ceased working as smiths two years ago and 
have become shopkeepers and salesmen both occupations with greater 
prestige and ones also pursued by Safi. The two remaining families 
who still carry on with their work find it difficult to subsist on 
smithing alone and work as share-croppers as well. In spite of their 
dependence they will only make yearly contracts for the dodi payment 
and not for the girdai. They feel that the latter payment although 
generally larger than the dodi is denigrating because it demonstrates 
their dependence on the goodwill and genero, -sity of the landowner 
and thus perpetuates their lower status. Instead of the dodi payment 
they would also accept cash. 
Again, as in the case of the carpenters, the agreements which are 
made between the smiths and their customers are dyadic. The 
cultivators and share-croppers go to the smiths and order what they 
want there or they bring those implements which need to be repaired 
to the smithy. One might think that the smiths would be overburdened 
with work considering how few of them there are but this is not the 
case, largely because the bazaars also offer the blacksmiths' traditional 
wares as well as cheap, foreign manufactured goods from the 
U. S. S. R. and China which are enjoying increasing popularity. The 
movement from smithing to shopkeeping, therefore, which three 
families have made may be seen not only as an attempt to improve 
their social status but also as a response to the increasing external 
competition and to the impossibility of living from repairs alone. The 
two remaining families should, however, be able to continue with 
their profession as they must represent the absolute minimum 
requirement of smiths for an agricultural community of this size. 
Barbers 
The barbers unlike the blacksmiths are not troubled by external 
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competition nor by a decline in the need for their services. This is 
largely because the services which they offer, shaving, hair-cutting 
and nail paring and their functions in the various rites de passage 
cannot be replaced by different methods or different people. Their 
immunity from economic difficulties, however, does not bring 
immunity in the social field where discrimination ensures that their 
low status in the community is perpetuated and has become part of 
the social order itself, but to this below. 
The barbers came, according to their own tradition of settlement 
together with a Pakhtun, Kando (the later founder of the hamlet of 
kando xel), from Wardak. The barbers, two brothers, purchased some 
land in Afghaniya and founded their own hamlet, duman (barbers), 
where now 15 of the total 17 barber families live. The other two 
families reside in two hamlets where their co-villagers are all 
Pakhtuns. The latter situation is typical for other Pakhtun areas where 
barbers are dispersed among the hamlets according to the villagers' 
needs, the former situation, however, where a large group of barbers 
have their own hamlet, would seem to be unique in Afghanistan and is 
reminiscent of Indian caste villages. 
In spite of being concentrated in one hamlet the barbers nevertheless 
serve the needs of all the Pakhtun hamlets and in this way each 
hamlet has its own, though non-resident, barber. The barbers were 
originally chosen by the inhabitants but are now the descendants of 
these men. The office has thus become hereditary and there is no 
competition between barbers for customers. Shaving and hair-cutting 
are carried out on Tuesdays and Thursdays when the barbers travel 
from their hamlet to their customers' hamlets and spend the day 
there going from house to house. When a Pakhtun for some reason 
requires a shave on another day than those set aside for this purpose 
then he will request it but he will not always acquire his barber 
should he be otherwise engaged. 
The payment which the barbers receive for barbering is an annual 
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one and is either one ser of maize and one ser of wheat or, the 
girdai payment mentioned above. Both types of payment are accepted 
by the barbers and they do not seek, as have the blacksmiths, to 
limit their payment to a fixed amount of grain or money. They make 
use of their right to accept the highest payment in whatever form 
that occurs and this is usually the girdai. They also receive money 
for their services in the rites de passage, i. e. birth, circumcision, 
and marriage, in the ' xerat' festivities for example, to celebrate a 
good harvest or a recovery from an illness and for blood-letting. 
Together these payments have been sufficient not only to support the 
barbers and their families but also to enable them to purchase fields 
from their Pakhtun neighbours. 
The ownership of land, bought piece by piece and over long periods 
of time, is but one of the externals which give the impression that 
the barbers are, in all but their work, indistinguishable from the 
Safi Pakhtuns. Others are the possession of gardens, fruit trees, 
and the usual draught and milking animals. They also have, like the 
Safi, a hamlet, a genealogy, political groups based on descent (the 
koranai) and personal interest (the para. ), and the usual struggles 
and conflicts over land, women and possessions. Below the surface, 
however, there are differences which reveal their true position and 
status in the community. 
One such difference is the barbers' inability to acquire the rights to 
the (river)water for the fields which they purchased in spite of the 
fact that this was and is normally a condition of sale. They, there- 
fore, did not even obtain full rights to their fields and were not in 
a position through numerical and political weakness to obtain these 
by force. Although the central government now has the power to 
support the rights of individuals against the malpractices of groups 
the situation has not changed and the barbers are still totally 
dependent on the goodwill of their Pakhtun neighbours for water and 
thus for their agricultural existence. 
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However the Safi have until now always allowed their water to be 
channelled on to the barbers' fields and have not misused their power 
which is probably one of the principal reasons why the barbers have 
not appealed to the government to terminate this inequality. Another 
is, of course, that the barbers do not wish, or are not prepared, to 
disturb or alter their relations with the Pakhtuns at least as long as 
water is freely available. Nevertheless it is clear to all that the 
barbers are in the position of clients and that the difference in status 
between the two groups is one of political dominance and subordination 
resulting from the barbers' peculiar situation in the society. 
Another difference is that the barbers' marriages are 'caste' 
endogamous with occasional hypergamy, i. e. barber women given to 
Pakhtun males 
1ý. 
Generally, however, they prefer to marry among 
themselves because the skills that they require from their women are 
only taught to their women. A non-barber woman is, therefore, only 
married for prestige reasons otherwise she is a liability. In this they 
are very different from the Pakhtuns who take women from all 
classes and ethnic groups but are very reluctant to give their own 
women to non-Pakhtuns. 
Barber women also do not use their veils 
2) 
with the frequency and 
alacrity which is usual of Pakhtun women a difference which is 
indicative of the barbers lower prestige. They, the women, also have 
a greater degree of freedom in their movements, i. e. they do not only 
emerge from the house to fetch water but are often underway as 
midwives and as helpers of their husbands. Finally they often gather 
in their hamlet, near groups of men, to hear the discussion and some- 
times make asides. All of these activities, at least in terms of the 
dominant cultural form, i. e. that of the Safi Pakhtuns, externalise the 
fact that their honour or the honour of their men, whether fathers or 
1) See also Charpentier. 1972. Op. cit. p. 138. 
_ 2) None of the women in Afghaniya wear veils or 'tsadari' as such but 
when unexpectedly confronted by unrelated males they will turn away 
and cover their faces with their headscarves. 
- 109 - 
husbands, is not held very highly and is or was thus in marked con- 
trast to that of the Pakhtuns 
1) 
. 
Fourthly their lower status is further indicated by the lack of reci- 
procity which exists between Pakhtuns and barbers. The barbers, for 
example, will participate voluntarily in the ashar of their Pakhtun 
neighbours but the latter will never work with the barbers when they 
need aid for their ashar. 
Finally the relationship which exists between the barbers and the 
Pakhtuns is very different from that between the Pakhtuns and any 
other professional group. Hair-cutting, nail paring and shaving bring 
the barbers into contact, in Mary Douglas's terms, with 'bodily 
refuse', with dirt, with 'matter out of place' and thus with dis- 
order 
2). 
This does not mean that they are polluted or capable of 
polluting others but Hindu ideas are known sufficiently well here for 
the Pakhtuns to place the barbers in a special if not polluted then 
impure category. It is this impurity or contact with disorder which 
places them outside the normal order of the society and enables 
them both to pursue their barbering activities and to be in contact 
with people in 'transitional states' i. e. during the rites de passage. 
It also allows them unhindered access to the domestic Aphere of the 
Safi families and thus they cross internal lines which normally are 
barriers to all but the closest relatives. Whilst such conditions 
1) There has also been a decline in the Pakhtuns' standard3 (see p. 97) 
nevertheless the difference between the two groups is still very 
noticeable. 
2) See Douglas, Mary. 1970. Purity and Danger. p. 48. Penguin Books. 
Middlesex. The barbers would be, in terms of Mary Douglas' s 
argument, classical 'interstitial persons' both because of their work 
and their relations to the Safi. They are not, however, accused or 
even suspected of possessing 'formless' or ' uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable' power even though the influence of the evil eye, the 
efficacy of charms and formulas, and the presence of djins and 
spirits constitute part and parcel of daily life in Afghaniya. Mary 
Douglas herself writes that 'this three-fo13 scheme for investigating 
primitive cosmologies unfortunately comes to grief over exceptions 
which are too important to brush aside' . (p. 126). Perhaps these barbers also provide an exception. 
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permit barbers to work at their profession and to fulfil other func- 
tions within Safi families which would otherwise be closed to them 
it also means that as in the case of land they are only allowed to 
acquire wealth but not power because powe r is inextricably linked 
with manliness an attribute which would place them on a level with 
Pakhtuns and prohibit their activities as barbers. Similarly their 
women cannot be controlled and confined in the same way and to the 
same extent that Safi women are because this would also imply on 
the barbers' part an assertive masculinity which is inappropriate 
with and inexpedient to their office as barbers. Logically, therefore, 
barber women, as indicated above, cannot wear veils, have greater 
personal freedom and generally act in ways which indicate that they 
are outside the order applicable to Safi women. Thus barber men are 
emasculated and dependent and they are denied the social mobility 
which, for example, the carpenters and blacksmiths enjoy. 
It is, of course, possible for groups to change their identity by 
moving away to other areas and by practising other professions. 
However in the case of the Afghaniya barbers this would involve the 
loss of their land and an established livelihood in exchange for an 
uncertain future. Some barber families, therefore, are trying within 
the limits set for them in Afghaniya to change their status. As the 
greatest impediment to their plans is their barbering two households 
have now stopped doing it and replace the lost income by buying and 
selling animals in the neighbouring valleys and one family from these 
households has even managed to acquire a Pakhtun daughter-in-law 
possibly the only case of its kind in Afghanistan 
1 ). 
They have, 
however, been unable through these actions to alter their status in 
any way so far. The Pakhtuns ignore their pretensions or regard 
them as ridiculous, rather like trying to make a horse out of a 
donkey and among the other barbers they have only managed to 
excite their opposition, an understandable reaction born from the fear 
1) This marriage and its implications will be discussed in greater detail 
below p. 210). 
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that they might succeed. Some sort of success could, however, accrue 
from their efforts if the government succeeds in the future in furthering 
its educational programme and providing job possibilities which would 
enable the barbers to escape from their caste-like role. 
Mullahs 
The mullahs of Afghaniya whether imams, the last group of the 
professionals, or non-practising Safi mullahs do not constitute with 
the barbers binary oppositions of the kind 'pure : impure' or 'sacred: 
profane' . This is because the concepts of purity and sacredness are 
reserved for or are associated with, in the Safi' s mind, not the 
mullahs but the holy men, the Pirs and Sheikhs or Sayyids. Although 
there are no such men in Afghaniya the sphere of influence of one Pir, 
miya Gul saHib, extends into the Pachoghan valley. This influence is 
expressed in the collection of offerings, the ' niyaz' , 
by the Pir' s 
followers (muridan) from among the inhabitants of the valley. The 
Pir' s ability to collect these offerings (money, crops or animals) 
comes firstly from his spiritual power (baraka 
1)) 
obtained by 
removing himself through seclusion, silence or fasting from the 
' confines of the society' 
2). 
Secondly and additionally it results from 
what Mary Douglas has called 'post hoc empirical identification' 
3) 
i. e., the discovery by neighbours, fellow villagers, or visitors that, 
for example, wishes have been granted or male children born or healed 
through association with the Pir or his house. The acquisition of follow- 
ers attracted by his fame is the final step and these supporters bring the 
Pir secular power as well 
4). It is such men who have purity and sacred- 
ness and constitute the opposite pole to the impure and profane barbers. 
1) See Douglas. 1970. Op. cit. pp. 132 & 133. 
2) See Douglas. 1970. Op. cit. p. 115. 
3) Douglas. 1970. Op. cit. p. 133. 
4) See Barth. 1965. Op. cit. pp. 56-63 for a short survey of the 
acquisition and utilisation of followers by these holy men. 
- 112 - 
The position of the Afghaniya mullahs both as f¬r as power is 
1) 
concerned and the qualities attributed to them is very different 
perhaps because they unlike the Pirs remain 'in the control of them- 
selves and of society' 
2). 
There are, however, in Afghaniya, as I 
have mentioned above (p. 70 ), two categories of mullah those who 
practise their calling, the imam, and those who have received a 
religious training but who normally pursue other activities, the Safi 
mullahs. 
The imam 
The majority of imams in Afghaniya come from the Parachi and 
Pashai areas of the Pachoghan valley and the others from neigh- 
bouring valleys. They are without exception non-Pakhtuns. This is 
not the result of a prohibition on Pakhtun imams because theoreti- 
cally any person who is qualified as a mullah may apply for and 
receive the post of an imam in Afghaniya. In practice, however, 
Pakhtuns are not accepted. This is a consequence of the qualities 
required of an imam by the villagers, the nature of the office itself 
and the character of Pakhtuns in general - all elements which will 
become clear as the discussion progresses. 
When the post of imam becomes vacant in a hamlet either through 
the departure or death of the previous imam then the elders of the 
hamlet are responsible for finding a new imam. The news that such 
and such a hamlet is looking for an imam spreads quickly and 
sometimes there are mullahs in the area seeking positions as 
imams. Applicants come to the hamlet and there meet members in 
1) Whilst the present Safi mullahs have very little power it is always 
possible for an outstanding individual to come forward. Mullahs and 
holy men in general in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had and still 
have very considerable influence not only in their 'congregations' 
but also in the wider political field. In Pakhtun areas their significance 
lay principally in their ability, because of their non-tribal origins, 
to unite otherwise competing or warring groups -a quality not shared 
by the Pakhtun khans or maliks. 
2) Douglas. 1970. Op. cit. p. 115. 
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the mosque. The most basic requirements of the villagers are that 
the potential imam should be a good person with an excellent character 
and this, the Safi say, may be established through talking with him 
and observing him when he leads the prayer. Decisive for them, how- 
ever, is that all heads of households and all the political factions 
within the hamlet are in agreement with the choice. Should one 
individual object then that imam will not be given the position. 
Unanimity among the factions usually only results when the imam is 
an outsider and a non-Pakhtun because outsiders cannot be the secret 
proteges of any person or group and non-Pakhtuns are less liable to 
involve themselves in the political affairs of the hamlet and are 
temperamentally more able to accept the dependence and neutrality 
of the position. Such a situation condemns the imam to political 
impotency because even when in office he cannot develop leadership 
qualities or attempt to acquire political power without putting his job 
at risk. Some compensation, however, emanates from his position 
as a neutral person and thus as a unifying factor in the hamlet and 
from the prestige accorded to him for his education and knowledge 
of Islam. Also those imams who provide amulets and charms (see 
below p. 114) have additional prestige from this activity but not all 
imam engage in it and from those that do not all are equally 
successful or called upon. 
Once appointed the imam is expected to lead the prayer in the 
hamlet's mosque and to supervise the islamic education of the 
children. The latter involves the imam in teaching the children how 
to wash for prayer and to pray, to memorise parts of the Koran, 
and to understand extracts from certain religious books. He also 
visits the sick and the dying, leads the funeral prayer, attends to 
the burials 
1), 
is responsible for marriages and weddings and the 
1) He does not wash the bodies of the dead villagers because this is 
considered to be a task which would be detrimental to his status and 
so other mullahs, usually from outside the community, do this and 
receive as payments trousers and a shirt from the dead man' s 
property. 
- 114 - 
naming of male children 
1), 
and leads the prayer on days of religious 
festivals. 
Some imams, although this is not part of their duties, provide charms 
and amulets - against unfaithfulness, infertility, maltreatment, 
premature births, various illnesses, the evil eye, etc. - for those in 
need whilst others just rely for their therapy on blowing on the 
affected area or person and reciting from the Koran. The efficacy of 
such actions and amulets is rarely questioned and nearly all the 
inhabitants of Afghaniya have amulets around their necks or wrists or 
attached to their clothes. Young children are particularly liable to 
have them strung around their necks or pinned to their caps - the 
evidence of anxious mothers - but even animals 
2) 
and fields have 
them as do prominent men as protection from bullets and knives. The 
manufacture of such charms and amulets, however, is not a monopoly 
of the imams although those of the imams are generally considered to 
be the most efficacious and are therefore the most called upon. 
Laymen also may acquire 'permission' (ijaza) to pass on the protection 
guaranteed in specific charms and formulas to those who require them. 
In the Pachoghan valley, for example, scorpions, snakes and hornets 
are considered to be especially prolific and formulas against 
poisonous bites in general, therefore, especially necessary. 
Descendants of those holy men whose shrines have proved particularly 
effective against scorpions and snakes etc. come to the Pachoghan 
valley and there either cure people who have been bitten or give 
others the permission, for a small sum (20-50 Afs. ), to memorise 
and subsequently utilise the formulas (mantar) to heal other members 
1) Boys receive their names from their parents but these have to be 
approved by the imams as beinILgood muslim ones. The imam also 
recites the call to prayer, the ' azan', into the boy' s ear on three 
successive days after his birth. Girls neither have the azan recited 
nor do the imams concern themselves with the islamic content of the 
girls' names. 
2) With the exception of donkeys which are considered unclean! 
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of the community 
1) 
Amulets or charms which contain quotations from 
the Koran, however, remain the monopoly of the imams. 
In return for the charms and amulets separate payments are given by 
the individuals concerned whereas for the official services, outlined 
above, the imam receives quantities of grain and money. In the case 
of food if the imam is single or without his family then he is given a 
room in the mosque and the families in the hamlet take turns in 
providing him with three meals daily. If he comes with his wife and 
children then they are usually given rooms in one of the qalas and 
their food requirements are met by the members of the hamlet. In the 
case of grain payments these are given to the imam on two occasions 
in the year - after Ramadan and on the completion of the harvest. 
The Ramadan payment is called ' sarsaya' and consists of one 
' charak' (ca. 2 kgs) of wheat from each man, woman and child in the 
hamlet. After the harvest the imam receives from each household 
2-5 charak (4-10 kgs) from every xarwar (560 kgs) of wheat, barley, 
maize and rice harvested. As may be seen this is very much less 
than the ' tenth' (' ashur') which is usual and which is generally given 
in other Pakhtun areas for the imams and the poor 
2). 
This was in its 
extreme form, i. e. 2 charak, the result of the drought and the poor 
harvests but as it had been practised on the more generous but still 
small level prior to this period it was undoubtedly a long term 
consequence of the overpopulation and minimal size of holdings. 
Finally money is given to the imams on the occasion of circumcisions, 
weddings and funerals. Taken together the money and natural products 
provide the imam and his family with sufficient both to live on and to 
purchase extras. Whilst imams in Afghaniya earn less than imams 
1) I recorded a 'mantar' against poisons on my tape-recorder and as it 
had thus received 'permission' to cure people I also had to pay. No 
one, however, subsequently asked that my tape-recorder should cure 
them from a bite. In terms of 'post hoc empirical Identification' the 
mantar was nevertheless a complete success because although my 
house, which had not been lived in for three years, had become a 
paradise for hornets and scorpions I was not bitten once. 
2) In Uruzgan among the Atsakzai the imams go into the fields and harvest 
their portion of the crop themselves without hinderance from the 
owners. This is not permitted or possible in Afghaniya. 
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elsewhere for an area where overpopulation is endemic they are better 
off than the average owner-cultivator and thus generally satisfied with 
their lot. 
What I have described in the last paragraph is the normal yearly 
payment for an imam. The agreement reached between the imam and 
the elders of a hamlet on the imam's appointment is however not a 
yearly one which must be renewed but a contract which lasts as long 
as both parties are satisfied with it. In many cases it becomes a 
hereditary office which is the preferred form and in accordance with 
the patrilineal ideology of the Pakhtuns. Some imam, however, are not 
able to balance on the fence of neutrality and are forced to depart 
whilst others are considered to be poor teachers or are suspected of 
being too familiar with some man's wife. They too are dismissed 
usually after the harvest when the yearly payment has been handed 
over. The number however of such cases is small and most imams 
carry out their duties in a way which is to everybody's satisfaction. 
Such accomodation and acquiescence o the wishes of others has 
coloured and formed the Safi' s conception of the imams. They look 
up to them as educated and knowledgable men but look down upon 
them because of their economic dependence and political impotence 
although the latter is forced upon them as a condition of appointment. 
They also consider them to be sexually inadequate the result, they 
say, of the mullahs spending too much time praying and too little 
carrying out their marital obligations. This does not prevent the Safi 
from, and is not seen as a contradiction in terms when, dismissing 
them for misusing their office to gain illicit access to Safi women. 
This anomaly is partly explainable by reference to the Safi' s 
conception of political power. Power is primarily an expression of 
masculinity, of the successful show of manhood. The imams because 
of their economic dependence and their enforced political neutrality 
are placed from the very beginning in a position where it is 
impossible to gain power. Lack of power means lack of masculinity 
and lack of masculinity carries with it the stigma of sexual 
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inadquacy. The reality of successful escapades with other men's wives, 
a cause for dismissal, cannot alter this picture in any way because it 
is not a demonstration of power but an indication of the opportunities 
granted by the office. Thus the imam is in the anomalous position of 
being judged on different occasions as both impotent and sexually too 
active. 
The Safi Mullahs 
The general situation of the Safi mullahs is quite different from that of 
the imams because they, the mullahs, combine both education and 
intelligence with economic independence and the possibility for the 
achievement of political power. In spite of their obvious potential and 
the surprisingly large number of such mullahs in the community - 
every hamlet has at least two of them and in the hamlet where I lived, 
admittedly a small one, four from nine household heads were mullahs 
- their political effectivity does not normally extend beyond the hamlet 
boundaries and the real positions of influence are occupied by the 
maliks (elected leaders 
1)) 
and the few large landowners when these 
are not one and the same men. This would seem to be the result of 
the very few leading positions available in the community and the more 
advantageous starting off point of the mullahs' main competitors, the 
maliks. Within the hamlets, however, mullahs who are also elders 
usually exercise more influence than do the non-mullah Safi elders 
because of their greater fluency, self-confidence and broader 
horizons 
2). 
They are active in disputes but less likely than the other 
Safi to utilise the customary procedures for reaching a settlement or 
bringing a conflict to an end. They prefer to make use of the 
facilities offered by the government representatives in Nijrao and are 
more willing to bear the costs and considerable inconvenience of such 
litigation. They nevertheless uphold traditional values in other spheres 
for example being good cultivators and extremely frugal. As a 
1) See below chap. 11 on Leadership. 
2) This does not prevent them from being extremely bigoted in their 
beliefs and reactionary in their exegesis of the Koran. 
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consequence they usually have above average sized holdings and in 
times of drought and shortage do not have to reduce them through the 
sale of fields because they always have the possibility of working as 
imams and acquiring a substitute income. 
This they do, however, only in villages outside the community in 
areas where they are unknown. The economic dependence and sub- 
ordination necessary for such a position would they say be unbearable 
in their own community and would lead, were they to be accepted, 
which as I have shown would be very unlikely, to a complete loss of 
face. They, therefore, are only willing to take up the position of 
imam in times of economic difficulty and then in villages away from 
the community and for limited periods of time. That they do not lose 
sight of the positive aspects of their education, for example, the 
ability to live through periods of hardship better than most members 
of the community, is evidenced by them always ensuring that at least 
one son goes away to become a pupil (talib) of a mullah or Pir and 
subsequently to acquire the title of mullah himself. This must not 
mean that in future periods of shortage they will automatically 
become imams. The modern trend seems to be for them to become 
truck drivers -a very prestigious occupation - or officials in Islamic 
courts. Whatever the case those Safi who acquire a mullah's training 
are generally more alert, more receptive to change and more able to 
make use of it than those Safi who remain within the physical and 
intellectual boundaries of Afghaniya. 
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7. RELATIONS AND DESCENT - GENEALOGY AND LINEAGE 
In the last two chapters the various social categories and groups 
which are present in Afghaniya have emerged firstly in the presenta- 
tion of the chronology of settlement and the acquisition of land and, 
secondly, in the outline of the agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities of the Safi and of those non-Safi professionals whose work 
is complementary to, or whose livelihood is dependent on agriculture. 
The varieties of such categories, the different relations which result 
from membership in them, the implications for economic success and 
social standing which stem from birth into them, etc., present a 
picture of diversity and some complexity. The thread which binds 
these diverse groups and categories together, which provides a 
certain corporality for the community, a certain order for relation- 
ships and a certain logic for the society is, however, neither time 
nor economics but is the descent and lineage structure. In Afghaniya 
the basis for this structure is provided by the largest single group 
in the community, the musawad Safi. These Safi are the descendants 
of the original founders of the community i. e. the taxti and see 
themselves as being related to one another through their common 
descent from musawad the founding ancestor of one of the subsections 
of the Safi tribe (see diag. 7 p. 121). Together these musawad Safi 
constitute a little less than half of the total population of Afghaniya 
(16 from 34 hamlets), are embraced by a common genealogy and 
are divided up into a number of major lineages (khels) and minor 
lineages. The eighteen non-founding Safi hamlets (the raghli) have 
integrated themselves into the musawad Safi structure by conforming 
to the, for them, thoroughly familiar patrilineal ideology and lineage 
organization and by residing on the territory of the musawad Safi 
major lineages. Thus it is possible both to see the musawad Safi' s 
structure as the model for the society and to speak about Afghaniya, 
however tentatively, as a community. We Shall see in the succeeding 
chapters how other facts are necessary to complement and complete 
an analysis of the Afghaniya Safi' s structure and organization but this 
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model provides one level of understanding and is used by the Safi 
themselves for explaining their society. In this chapter then the 
genealogy and lineages in Afghaniya will be considered in terms of 
their content and function and their ordering properties. 
Genealogy and Lineage Structure 
Elements and Content. 
The Safi genealogy (see diag. 7 p. 121) has a depth of twelve to 
thirteen generations from the founding ancestor saf to the present 
living adult males. The origin of the name Safi is, as I have 
indicated in chap. 3, open to speculation. The popularly held belief 
in Afghaniya is that it comes from the arabic word ' saf meaning 
religiously pure' . Such an interpretation in a community where so 
many of its male inhabitants are mullahs is probably not surprising 
but this belief is also held by outsiders who point to the Safi' s 
religious fanaticism 
1) 
as proof of its pertinence. Apart from the 
objections presented above (see chap. 3) to such a theory an inter- 
esting-and somewhat profane alternative for the cause of the purity 
was put forward to me by one Safi. He said that xalid baba, the 
real founder of the Safi tribe, had two wives with one of whom he 
did not wish to have sexual intercourse. This rejected and unloved 
wife nevertheless became pregnant by touching the cloth which 
xalid baba used for washing himself after intercourse. xalid was 
greatly enraged by her pregnancy because he thought that his wife 
had had an adulterous relationship. She prayed to God to help her 
which he did by sending the Prophet to tell xalid baba that his wife 
was 'clean' or 'pure' , i. e. saf. As a result the sons of 
this son 
became the Safi tribe. 
1) Exactly how this reputation arose I am not sure but it is a spontaneous 
opinion which outsiders have when the Safi are mentioned. It would 
seem to me to be based on experiences within Safi territory where the 
religiosity of the people is immediately apparent and on the large 
numbers of Safi mullahs both within and outside their tribal territory. 
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7. SAFI GENEALOGY 
s äf 12 
Gurbaz wadir 11 
qandahari musawad sinzai barizai 10 
, qa1iH maghdud piroz bahadur Häji 'arab 
nazr 8 
'asmän 7 
manäp dali wali Jan zäkir ziarat ö 
bäz 
xän Gul 4 
maHi ad-din 3 
xudai dad 2 
äHib däd 1 
tribe 12 major lineage 
major division 'IT minor lineage 
minor division 77 koranai 
- 122 - 
This story of an immaculate conception is particularly interesting in 
the light of the Safi' s uncertain origin and may well represent an 
attempt to explain or to cover the tribal graft onto the Pakhtun 
ancestral tree. The Safi were not alone in this and the story 
compares favourably with that of the Ghilzai/Ghilji Pakhtuns whose 
progenitor was, according to tradition, not only a foreigner but also 
the seducer of a Pakhtun woman and the father of a child conceived 
1) 
prior to marriage 
Whatever the uncertainty surrounding sal there is none involving his 
sons Gurbaz and wadir (see diag. 7 p. 121) who are the eponymous 
ancestors of the t No major divisions of the tribe. Both these divi- 
sions have four minor divisions and in the case of the wadir, which 
is of relevance here, these divisions are the gandahari, barizai, 
sinzai and musawad. This last son of wadir, musawad, ist the 
ancestor from whom four of the five major lineages or ' khels' of 
Afghaniya claim descent. 
In spite of this real or alleged descent the community, as I have 
shown, is not named after this ancestor preferring to use sarboli 
or Afghaniya. Of course there is no cultural compulsion to take a 
lineage rather than a place name and other sections of other tribes 
also use place names to designate tribal segments. Nevertheless at 
this level of segmentation it is perhaps unusual and may be the 
result, although this was not discoverable, of the mixed nature of 
the population - probably more than 50 % of the inhabitants are not 
descended from musawad - and Afghaniya/sarboli' s geographical 
position in relation to the non-Pakhtuns and to the Satt of Tagao. 
Whatever the reason the name musawad is not applied to the 
community and thus as far as Afghaniya is concerned the names of 
1) Such stories are not only confined in Afghanistan to the Pakhtuns. 
Jones (Jones, S. 1974. Men of Influence in Nuristan. pp. 129-133. 
Seminar Press. London. ) presents an interesting one from Nuristan, 
the ' man who had no father". He suggest that because the genealogi- 
cal reality is not in tune with social reality a myth was necessary 
to achieve the desired social effect. 
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the major lineages or 'khels' are the first ones on the genEalogy 
which also have a territorial significance (see map VII for khel 
boundaries). 
These major lineages are piroz, bahadur, Haji 'crab, saliH and 
maghdud. They are seen as being the sons of musawad although only 
four of them piroz, bahadur, saliH and ma hdud have become the 
founders of khels 
1 ). 
This is because Haji 'arab with only one 
surviving son - represented today by the hamlet of nizam xel - 
merged with bahadur to become the major lineage of Haidar khel. 
Why this happened it is impossible to say but such mergers are not 
unusual among Pakhtun tribes 
2) 
and may have been in this case the 
result of an attempt to contain the expanding pirozai. What is inter- 
esting is that the union of bahadur and Haji 'arab was not followed 
by alterations on the genealogy to make nizam appear as a 
descendant of bahadur. These unions of numerically weak khels with 
stronger ones are not, however, prescribed as is shown by the case 
of saliH kh. el. This khel, although like Haji 'arab only represented 
today by one hamlet, saliH kuli, nevertheless has not merged with 
another major lineage but has remained independent - again no 
answer as to the cause was forthcoming. Both these cases would 
seem to indicate that the Safi genealogy is not changed or reorganised, 
at least at this level, as are patrilineal genealogies elsewhere to 
express contemporary social distance between groups but seeks to be 
a true reflection of historical events. 
Such intentions are also evidenced by the existence in Afghaniya of a 
fifth khel which has not, as might have been expected, been integrat- 
ed into the Safi genealogy as a sixth son of musawad. This khel, 
1) The term ' khel' is used very loosely by Pakhtuns to refer to agnatic 
descent groups varying in size from tribes to families. I have given it 
a specific meaning here for reasons of convenience but it must not be 
thought that this represents the only meaning of the term. The suffix 
' -zai', son of, may also be applied to such 'khel' groups but the fact 
that only one of the five khels in Afghaniya, pirozzai, uses the suffix 
-zai made ' khel seem preferable. 
2) See Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 29. 
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audel khel, has a different origin a situation also indicated by their 
designation as rayhli. The khel' s founding ancestor, 'abdul, was a 
Safi nomad 
1) 
who purchased and settled on land in the south-west 
corner of the community (see maps VI & VII). He is said to have 
had seven sons of whom four died. The remaining three sons akbar, 
spin and tor became the founders of the three minor lineages in the 
khel. 
Whilst the sons of 'abdul became the founders of the three minor 
lineages in audel khel, among the musawad Safi such founders were, 
according to the genalogy, Brea grandsons. There is, however, un-4 
certainty concerning the exact identity and order of the two men 
intervening between the major and minor lineage heads among the 
musawad-Safi, e. g. in diag. 7 p. 121 nazr and 'asman, and it is 
possible that this represents what Peters has called an 'area of 
ambiguity' 
2) 
i. e. an area where shortening of the genealogy could 
take place. There is also another area of uncertainty involving the 
minor lineage head and the ancestor immediately below him. How- 
ever such shortenings seem unlikely in the light of the exactitude 
observed elsewhere and the differences in generational depths 
between audel khel and the musawad khels may just reflect the later 
date of arrival of the former. 
All khels, therefore, are made up of a number of minor lineages 
whose founding ancestors are at a distance of one to three genera- 
tions from the founding ancestor of the khel. pirozai has five minor 
lineages, Haidar khel three, saliH khel one, ma hdud khel seven 
3) 
and audel khel, as I have mentioned above, three (see diag. 8 
p. 125). These nineteen minor lineages have a depth of between five 
and six generations, a difference in length of genealogies which does 
1) In the province of Laghman and also in this area Pakhtuns who 
become detached from their tribal background but have Pakhto as 
their mother tongue tend, as I have indicated above, to claim member- 
ship of the Safi tribe. ' abdul' s claim, therefore, may be disputed. 
2) Peters, E. L. 1960. The proliferation of segments in the lineage of 
the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. pp. 40 & 41. JRAI. vol. 90. 
3) 1 am uncertain about the correctness of this figure. 
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not, I feel certain, come from the need to maintain, as in 
Cyrenaica 1 
), 
the fixed shape of the genealogy or to provide a place 
on the genealogy for the attachment and incorporation of proliferating 
segments. It results rather from the uncertainty surrounding the 
name and the exact position of the founding ancestors of the minor 
lineages and possibly from uncertainties about the generations 
between the founders of the minor and the founders of the major 
lineages. 
This uncertainty, at least at the minor lineage level of Afghaniya 
genealogies, may be explained firstly by the practice of referring to 
some lineages not by the name of their founding ancestor but by the 
name of the hamlet where they are now settled. Such hamlets 
although founded by lineage members, and where they still form the 
majority of the population, have taken place names (for example in 
diag. 7 p. 121 ' ziarat') rather than lineage names. This practice, 
interestingly enough, is more noticeable among the non-musawad Safi 
hamlets, i. e. the ra hli hamlets, than the musawad ones and 
possibly reflects the ra hli' s weaker genealogical position. In such 
cases ancestors' names have been forgotten and are, therefore, not 
included in the genealogy. Secondly the existence within the lineages 
of local descent groups, ' koranai' , has meant that the men 
directly 
below the lineage ancestor, when these were not heads of local 
descent groups, have lost importance and the heads of these 'koranai' 
are often shown and considered as being the sons of the lineage 
ancestor whereas in reality they are the grandsons. 
Finally interest in maintaining the accuracy of the genealogy in 
general has been lost by all but the elders. Younger men, by 
contrast, have difficulty in naming correctly those generations 
prece.. ding their grandfathers. This inability arises from the general 
decline in importance of descent formed groups and their replacement 
by groups whose formative mechanisms are marriage, self-interest 
1) Peters, E. L. 1960. Op. cit. pp. 35-42. 
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and propinquity. 
These nineteen khel minor lineages are, of course, not the only ones 
in Afghaniya. There are at least fifteen others and these generally, 
like the musawad Safi lineages, form the core groups in the 
remaining fifteen hamlets of the community. I have written ' at least' 
fifteen lineages because most of these hamlets are composed of a 
number of lineages although one is usually numerically dominant. 
These lineages have a depth of four to six generations and would 
seem, therefore, to have modelled themselves on the dominant 
musawad Safi form because if they had not, and as they came later, 
then the number of generations between living members and the 
hamlet founder would be less. 
Thus, in conclusion, all i. e. musawad and non-musawad minor 
lineages have a depth of four to six generations, generally constitute 
the majority of a hamlet's inhabitants and have a spatial expression 
which is the hamlet. 
Forming parts of, and sometimes independent from and unrelated to 
these lineages are 'koranai' 
1) 
or local descent groups. These 
groups take their names from the apical ancestors e. g. baz etc. 
(see diag. 7, generation 5) who are between two and five generations 
from the living male adults. As a result of the different generation 
depths koranai vary considerably in size from the most elementary 
unit i. e. father and sons or groups of brothers to groups of twenty 
to thirty men (see diag. 9 p. 128). All hamlets have such varying 
sized koranai but the musawad and audel khel minor lineages general- 
ly have more extensive and, therefore, larger koranai groups than do 
other minor lineages. 
1) This is variously translated as 'family; dynasty, kind, generation; 
group, division, section' and is, like most Pakhto names for groups 
a very general designation. It can, however, have a very specific 
meaning according to the context. 
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The eponymous ancestors of koranai are referred to as 'babas' or 
fathers and the babas of one minor lineage are usually talked about 
as being brothers and thus the sons of the founding ancestor of the 
minor lineage. Whilst some babas are according to the genealogies 
the sons of the minor lineage ancestor the majority are not. This 
is indicated firstly by the varying generation range between 
members and ancestors from koranai to koranai which is not only 
to be found within different minor lineages but also within the 
same minor lineage. Secondly many hamlets have attached groups 
and fathilies - attached here in the sense of living in the same 
hamlet - and these too have their babas who cannot biologically or 
historically be seen as the brothers of the other babas or the sons 
of the principal minor lineage ancestor in the hamlet. 
The reason why these babas should nevertheless be seen as brothers 
is, I feel, due to the continuing use of the patrilineal descent 
ideology to explain the relations which exist within and between 
koranai and within and between groups per se. The term brothers 
within Pakhtun society expresses unity, unity of interests, of 
possessions and unity when faced by external opposition. Thus the 
hamlet is visualised as being united through its babas. At the same 
time brothers represent division. Brothers on the death of their 
father usually divide the inherited property and land which formerly 
was owned and worked collectively. The division within the hamlet 
can, therefore, also be indicated by the same term which expresses 
unity. Finally the sons of brothers are cousins and it is at this 
level that the opposition which was suppressed between brothers is 
socially permissable. Koranai are, therefore, also groups which 
oppose each other when their interests or members are threatened. 
Thus when villagers refer to the koranai ancestors as brothers and 
the sons of one ancestor they are not expressing a biological reality 
but a structural equality i. e. the level of segmentation is different 
but koranai are of the same order, and are implying that the 
behaviour and interaction of these groups is determined by the 
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strictures associated with groups founded by brothers and based on 
descent. Now the koranai are no longer the only groups in opposition 
because other groups formed by other mechanisms, as I will show 
below, are equally involved in this function. Nevertheless most 
people of the community still continue to see and explain conflict 
in terms of the opposition of descent groups. 
Summary 
In summary the genealogy and lineage structure in Afghaniya may be 
said to consist of the following elements. Firstly there are the 
descendants of musawad. These men are grouped into four major 
lineages or khels whose heads are considered to be brothers and 
the sons of musawad. Each of these major lineages is in turn made 
up of a number of minor lineages the eponymous ancestors of which 
are seen as being the great grandsons of the khel heads. These 
minor lineage ancestors have, in the majority of cases, given their 
names to the hamlets in which their descendants now live and where 
they, the descendants, usually form the largest section of the 
inhabitants. Within these minor lineages are local descent groups or 
koranai whose ancestors or babas are at varying (two to five) 
generational distances from the living adult members. These baba 
are in turn regarded as being brothers and the sons of the minor 
lineage ancestor. 
Secondly there are non-musawad Safi 
1) 
who have either adopted the 
organizational form of the dominant musawad Safi or, as such an 
organization represents the Pakhtun cultural norm, have integrated 
themselves into a system which was from the very beginning 
completely familiar to them. The largest single group of such 
people is represented by the audel khel. They have three minor 
lineages formed from the descendants of the three sons of 'abdul. 
1) Whether they were originally Safi or not is not clear as we have seen 
above in Chap. 4. Now at least they are considered as such. 
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Another although unrelated group is formed by people who arriving at 
different times settled down in various parts of Afghaniya on the land 
which they had bought from individual musawad Safi. These people 
are also organized into minor lineages which in most cases are 
indistinguishable from their musawad-Safi counterparts except that 
they do not belong as far as descent is concerned to a larger 
inclusive major lineage. They too have founded hamlets and some have 
taken the name of the lineage ancestor as the hamlet name whereas 
others have taken place names. Some of these hamlets are made up 
of a number of minor lineages the result of simultaneous or later 
settlement. This, however, does not represent an innovation as some 
musawad Safi hamlets also have attached non-musawad Safi lineages 
within their boundaries. All these minor lineages have, as do those 
of audel khel, koranai groups and thus one may see the musawad- 
Safi organization with its koranai, minor and major lineages reflected 
at each level by similar groups formed from people who settled in 
Afghaniya at later dates. 
Finally nearly all hamlets have attached groups and families who have 
either purchased or married into land. Some of these groups are 
numerous and strong enough to form independent koranai and others 
are not. Whatever the case they also are integrated into a system 
whose blue-print is the musawad-Safi genealogy with its variously 
sized descent groups. 
Genealogy and lineage functions 
Genealogy 
One function, therefore, of the musawad genealogy is that it acts as 
a descent charter which organizes all the inhabitants of Afghaniya 
into a series of descent groups. Whilst this function has remained 
unchanged other functions have been affected by, among other things, 
the impingement of the central government on the community's affairs 
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although it is more than probable that Afghaniya' s lineages have never 
fulfilled those functions which lineages have performed in segmentary 
societies elsewhere. Nevertheless certain functions still remain which 
are of vital importance to Afghaniya society. 
One such function is to give a 'relative chronology for migration and 
conquest history' 
1). 
I have already discussed this aspect above 
(chap. 4 p. 39 ) and will, therefore, only mention it briefly here. 
The musawad Safi genealogy indicates that the original settlement of 
Afghaniya occurred some nine generations ago, i. e. at the level of 
the major lineages. All the men who are descended from these five 
ancestors are, as we have seen, referred to today as the 'taxti', or 
original settlers. The other members of the population who do not 
appear on this genealogy, i. e. audel khel and the other fifteen 
hamlets, are spoken of as the ' rajhli' (newcomers) and the groups 
and families attached to hamlets as the ' ajnabiyan' (strangers). 
Whilst such a distinction does not bring any material advantages for 
the taxti it does imbue its holders with a certain prestige as the 
2) founders of the community 
The genealogy also indisputably links the musawad Safi with the rest 
of the Safi tribe whereas other members of the community although 
claiming Safi identity cannot prove their links. This again increases 
the status of those men included in the genealogy and gives them the 
prestige of belonging to a famous tribe 
3). 
They have the feeling of 
historical continuity and of having taken part in great events 
4). 
This greater prestige and status expresses itself - although cause 
1) Barth. 1965. p. 25. 
2) Analogous perhaps with Evans-Pritchard's ' aristocratic clan' among 
the Nuer whose 'predominance gives prestige rather than privilege". 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. & Fortes, M. 1946. African Political 
Systems. p. 287. Oxford University Press. London. 
3) Here I mean famous in a Pakhtun sense of participating in innumerable 
disturbances, uprisings and rebellions. 
4) Two of the more recent 'great events' in which the Safi played an 
important part where the deposition of Amanullah (1929) and the Safi 
revolt (1947-1949). 
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and effect are here very difficult to identify with certainty because of 
the other factors involved - in their more frequent functioning as 
arbitrators and in their place at the top of a community ranking 
system (see diag. 10 p. 134). Seen separately this attribute of 
genealogical membership would seem to have little significance. Its 
importance emerges, however, when looked at in conjunction with the 
prestige which accrues from being the descendants of the original 
settlers as mentioned above and the descendants of the original owners 
of the land and water in the community as will be shown below. 
The land and water in Afghaniya as we have seen were originally 
divided among the ancestors of the musawad Safi so that each house- 
hold head received an equal share of the total land and water. On the 
deaths of these men their shares were divided equally among their 
sons, a principle which continues to be followed, so that today each 
adult male has a part of the original share given to his major 
lineage ancestor. As brothers divide the land of their fathers the 
fields of brothers are closer to each other than they are to the fields 
of other agnates (see map IX p. 242 ). Similarly the fields of 
members of one koranai will be closer than those of two individual 
koranai. This will also be true at the minor lineage and the major 
lineage level at least theoretically. Thus lineage groups of different 
sizes are associated with differently sized territories and the lineage 
structure of society also involves a lineage structure of space. 
Such a system, however, can only exist under ideal conditions and in 
the absence of land sales. As we have seen the ra hli and the 
ajnabiyan obtained land in Afghaniya through purchase and marriage 
and they also established themselves in independent hamlets or 
attached themselves to taxti hamlets. Thus hamlet lands ceased to be 
owned exclusively by one lineage and became the property of a 
number of lineages or groups, and khel lands became the summation 
of taxti and raLhhli hamlet lands. A process was set in motion which 
removed the emphasis, at least in terms of land ownership, from the 
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10. COMMUNITY RANKING SYSTEM 
owner-cultivators musawad Safi (taxti) 1 
share-croppers other Safi (ra hli) 2 
.. 
_ (äjnabiyan) 2 
priest mullah (mulls) 3 
craftsmen carpenter (naj_är) 4 
(kusubGar) smith (lobar) 4 
weaver (jol) 4 
potter (kulal) 4 
cotton-carder (nadaf) 4 
barber barber (dum) 5 
The weaver, potter and cotton-carder are only temporary 
residents in Afghaniya. The weavers are Parachi from the upper 
Pachoghan valley, the potter is an itinerant who arrives in 
Afghaniya at the beginning of June and stays for about two months, 
and the cotton-carders come from Tagao in autumn. 
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minor lineage to the hamlet community and thus from descent to 
propinquity. Nevertheless people still tend to explain ownership in 
lineage terms and to support their arguments by pointing to 
the inclusiveness of the khel concept which incorporates all hamlet 
lands and not just those of the taxti. Thus a certain prejudice in 
favour of lineages remains as does the descent ordering of space. 
The spatial representation of descent is also observable in the 
hamlets of the community where galas are ordered generally 
according to the closeness of agnatic relations. Such a situation 
arises from the necessity to build new galas on land belonging to 
the new quala owner. Thus, for example, if a son builds a new 
gala after the division of the land between himself and his father, 
then he does so on to, or close to, the old qala from which he 
has segmented himself and where he also has a portion of land. 
Subsequent expansion follows a similar pattern so that brother builds 
next to brother and cousin to cousin, etc., and the galas of a 
koranai form a group as do those of a minor lineage (see map VIII 
p. 136). Thus theoretically at least one's closest neighbours are 
also one's closest agnates and within the hamlet the greater the 
physical distance between neighbours the greater is the structural 
distance on the genealogy. 
In practice the situation is not quite as clear cut. In the larger and 
older hamlets the lack of space in the centre of the hamlet has 
forced some men to build on the outskirts and thus away from their 
closest relatives. In such cases physical proximity and closeness 
of relationship are not one and the same thing. Such a movement, 
i. e. away from the hamlet centre, however, can also lead to the 
creation of proto-hamlets because expansion there is unrestricted. 
This will inevitably produce hamlets whose buildings are also 
distributed according to the closeness of agnatic ties. 
More significant numerically and for the descent composition of 
i56 
El 
El 
El 
El 
El 
Fý 
El 
El 
El 
EB 
Fýl p N 
D 
S 
E 
E 
NS 
Gutzar 
toranal blrz 
wall xln 
stranger 
O 
milt 
mosque 
path 
p Petawi 
s surf 
Not to Scale 
11 
N 
N 
VIII Relationship between galä Location and koranai Membership 
- 137 - 
hamlets are the galas of strangers. Strangers who buy land in 
Afghaniya also construct, as I have indicated above, new qalas there 
and whilst some build on their newly acquired fields away from the 
hamlets the majority prefer to erect their homes within the hamlets. 
This means that the indigenous villagers acquire neighbours who are 
not only not agnates but are usually in no way related to them (see 
map VIII p. 136). 
Finally alterations in the spatial/ genealogical syndrome may occur 
when, for example, the course and width of irrigation ditches are 
changed or when shops or mills are built. In map VIII , the mill 
was moved from the western end of the hamlet to the east because 
of difficulties and disputes over the water which had to be lead 
through the centre of the hamlet. The mill also ceased at the time 
of the move to be a hamlet owned one and became privately owned. 
The new owners, members of the wali xan koranai, subsequently 
built new galas near their mill and thus isolated themselves from 
their koranai. Their nearest neighbours, as may be seen from 
map VIII , are not their nearest agnates but consist of two 
strangers and one gala from the baz koranai. 
Such changes to what might be called a basic design of hamlet 
composition have not altered the Safis conception of their hamlets. 
They see them as being composed of the descendants of one man 
or of his sons, the heads of koranai, and consisting of a number 
of galas so placed that the closest neighbours are also the closest 
agnates. The consequences of such a view, i. e. of one based on a 
patrilineal ideology have been that the concepts 'neighbour' and 
agnate' have become interchangeable 
1 ). 
Thus strangers who settle 
down in the hamlets become neighbours and as a result are treated 
in certain respects like agnates. 
1) I am not referring here to the term ' hamsaya' (neighbour) because 
this implies quite a different relationship i. e. one of subordination. 
I mean the general category 'xpulwan' (like oneself, one's own, 
cousins etc. ) which is used by a member of a hamlet about other 
members. 
0 
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The genealogy, of course, does not only order qalas and large blocks 
of land but is primarily used as a record of land ownership and land 
inheritance with all that this involves in economic and social terms. 
Claims to land and disputes over land, for example, can generally 
only be made and solved by a thorough knowledge of genealogical 
relationships. This is particularly so in the absence of accurate land 
surveys. and the only partial registration of land holdings. A common 
complaint heard from men who returned to Afghaniya after working 
for some years elsewhere was that they had had land but that it had 
become 'lost among our cousins' . This usually meant that the 
cousins claimed it, legally or illegally, as their own. When 
complaints were made to the judge in Nijrao then the investigation 
always began with a discussion of the genealogical relationship of 
the claimants and the divisions of land which had taken place since 
their separation from the ancestor who united them all. 
Also as the ownership of land represents economic and political 
power the function which a genealogy fulfills as a charter of owner- 
ship is of vital importance for the political and economic 
aspirations of community members. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that men who have lost, i. e. sold, all their land, even though they 
may still live in Afghaniya, are not automatically included in the 
genealogies 
1 ). 
Similarly only men who have land and, therefore, 
by definition are placed on genealogies have the right to speak at 
jirgas whilst landless men although allowed to attend just listen to 
debates. Finally only men who have long genealogies are chosen as 
maliks, or leaders in the community and are sought out as 
arbitrators and members of marakas. Prestigious work, therefore, 
is closed to men who among other things are not placed on the 
recognised genealogies of the community. 
1) This became apparent to me when I asked about men whom I knew 
but who were not given by my informants as members of the 
genealogies. 
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Lineages 
I have written so far more about functions which the genealogy 
fulfils and about rights or advantages which accrue from being 
represented on these genealogies than about the functions of lineages. 
This is principally because in the case of the larger descent groups, 
i. e. major lineage and minor division, they have rarely if ever 
acted as corporate groups in political action. It is clear from 
historical sources that the Safi used to come together in their 
thousands when occasion demanded 
1) 
and it is probable although 
there is unfortunately no evidence to support this, that the units of 
these 'lakhkar' (tribal armies) were lineage based. Today there seems 
to be no occasion or reason for major lineages or minor divisions of 
tribes to unite in this way. This is largely because the presence of a 
modern, well-equipped and well-organised national army prohibits 
inter or intra-tribal warfare as a method of achieving political or 
economic ends 
2). 
It is also the result of the government's conscious 
efforts to reduce the powers of descent groups by dealing in 
administrative and legal matters with individuals rather than groups 
or, when the latter cannot be avoided, with maliks who because of 
administrative reform (see chap. 11) now represent electors and not, 
as in the past, lineages. 
Whilst the minor division i. e. the musawad Safi level may not have 
acted corporately in the past, just as it does not today, it has a 
function in that it defines the social boundaries of the community. 
1) 'Macpherson, before returning to Cabul, made a short 
reconnaissance north of the Cabul river toward the Lughman valley 
and into the Tagao country inhabited by the fanatic tribe of the Safts. 
... 
The little detachment on its march was suddenly met by the fire 
of about 1000 Safi tribesmen. ' In: Forbes, A. 1892. The Afghan Wars 
1839-1842 and 1878-80. p. 215. Seeley and Co. Ltd. London. See also 
above chap. 3. p. 31. 
2) An exception is formed by the Pakhtun tribes in Paktia who still 
continue to fight among themselves. Government troops however now 
intercede when allowed to do so. 
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From the beginning of the thesis all references to Afghaniya have been 
to it as a community. This was, and is, justifiable for two reasons. 
Firstly the musawad Safi genealogy and lineage organization, the 
elements of the minor division, are utilised by the non-musawad Safi 
as the means by which they integrate themselves into the community. 
That was the established order which they found on their arrival and 
which they either married into or duplicated. One is, therefore, able 
to define the members of the community in terms of the minor 
division represented by the descendants of musawad and those who 
integrated themselves into this order of things. This is one communal 
boundary. 
Secondly all descent groups in Afghaniya are associated with land and 
the more inclusive these groups become, i. e. a number of koranai 
constitute a minor lineage, the more inclusive is the territory owned 
by and considered to belong to them. Thus all the khel lands taken 
together represent the total land of the minor division/ community and 
Afghaniya is given a territorial expression and boundaries. Such 
boundaries, i. e. those of membership and territory, are supported by 
the non-Pakhtuns and the government referring to the community as 
Afghaniya and the Tagao Safi referring to it as Sarboli. Otherwise the 
community is, of course, linked and divided by a multitude of 
relations and transactions with the 'outside world' so that 
administrative, economic, tribal etc., boundaries run through, over- 
lap and criss-cross in Afghaniya. The community, however, remains. 
In the case of the smaller descent units the minor lineage could and 
most probably did act as a corporate group in the past. Today, 
however, its functions have been taken over by the hamlet which, as 
I have indicated above, is not only formed from minor lineage 
members but is in some cases a combination of minor lineages, and 
in others, minor lineages plus groups and families. Thus the 
principal factor which now holds ari members of a hamlet together is 
common residence and not common descent although this of course 
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continues to be of importance. Even in those hamlets where all the 
members are descendants of one eponymous ancestor the bonds 
formed by propinquity are just as important for purposes of solidarity 
as those of descent. The occasions when hamlet members need to 
unite as a group to protect their interests or members are rare and 
arise generally from disputes over water. In spite of the paucity of 
these political functions the significance of the hamlet for the Pakhtuns 
is very great and it forms in a number of areas the main focus of 
their attentions and loyalties as will be shown in greater detail below 
(see chap. 10 pp. 254-261). 
The smallest descent group of all, the koranai, fulfilled very definite 
functions in the past the most important of which were the 
obligations to exact vengeance, to engage in common defence, and to 
accept the possibility of death in vengeance. As I will discuss this 
group in greater detail below (see chap 10) it is perhaps sufficient to 
say here that the extension of the central government's power into 
Afghaniya has through its partial elimination of revenge killings 
removed the principal bond which held the koranai together. Its 
significance today, therefore, is waning and some of its secondary 
functions are being carried out by other groups formed on other 
principles. Nevertheless because it is still linked in the minds of 
most Pakhtuns with the defence of honour and thus with the highest 
attributes of the Pakhtun culture in general its decline is very 
gradual and, therefore, of all descent groups it still has functions 
and political significance. 
Value as judged by the Safi 
Finally the genealogy and lineages function as a system of 
organization which is used by the members of the community to 
explain and, to a certain extent, to judge their society. They see 
their society as being organised in this way because firstly, as I 
have shown above, the genealogy and lineages act as charters of 
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settlement and of the ownership of land and water, as well as 
transmitting property and jural, political and social status. Secondly 
they are the basis of what might be termed a patrilineal ideology 
something which is not only shared, although to a lesser extent, by 
the Safi' s non-Pakhtun neighbours but is also stressed and upheld 
by Islam. To a certain extent, therefore, the genealogy and lineages 
are a system which has been called a 'native' or 'folk' model but 
which also has elements of what Ward has termed an 'ideological 
model' i. e. elements of an ideal form of behaviour or organization 
which are used as yardsticks for measuring actual behaviour and 
organization. In the case of the Safi this ideological model is not 
based on Safi but on Pakhtun ideals which place the greatest emphasis 
on agnation and its attributes and the Pakhtun code or custom. Thus 
when people are asked to explain a situation to an outsider they will 
usually do so in terms of these ideals and then perhaps later concede 
that in fact the persons or groups were acting on different principles. 
When talking about or discussing a problem among themselves they 
will refer to how a person should have acted using generally 
accepted Pakhtun norms and then how he did in fact act in terms of 
a changed state of affairs brought about in their own society by 
agricultural shortages, government intervention etc. As the latter 
behaviour is perfectly understandable to them they do not condemn it, 
on the other hand they do not regard it as especially honourable and 
a man who in spite of these changed circumstances acts in 
accordance with Pakhtun ideals is assured of considerable prestige in 
the community even if he should face difficulties outside it. 
Such attitudes would seem to benefit the musawad Safi the most 
because they are the group which most nearly approximates to the 
ideal. Whilst this is true within limits the rahli and ajnabiyan also 
accept the values of a patrilineal culture and all that that involves. 
1) Ward, B. 1968. Varieties of the conscious model. p. 135. In: The 
Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology. Ed. Michael Banton. 
A. S. A. Monographs 1. Tavistock Publications. London. 
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They, therefore, cannot deny the significance of something which they 
themselves value in spite of their reluctance to imply that the taxti 
are in any way ' better' . 
Thus the genealogy and lineages represent 
for all the members of the community an ideological model of worth 
which is used to explain their society, to measure the activities of 
its members, and to define its boundaries. 
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8. RELATIONS AND SPACE - THE FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD 
The patrilineal ideology also influences and impinges upon many other 
elements of Safi society. Concepts which are present in the order 
represented by the genealogy and lineages are also to be found in the 
familial and economic fields so that both the form and the content of 
the family and household are affected. This may be seen in the 
association which the Safi make between the elementary family and 
the fireplace (naharai) and the extended patrilineal family and the 
q, ala. Thus the propensity among them, as we have seen in the last 
chapter, to see the lineage structure of society reflected in a lineage 
structure of space is paralleled by their placement of kinship groups 
in spatial frameworks. The destruction of these physical boundaries 
would or should represent a rejection of their conceptual content, 
i. e., the repudiation of the patrilineal ideals and order. This is, to 
a certain extent, what is now happening in Afghaniya. The patrilineal 
extended families are breaking up and their physical setting the large, 
many roomed gala is splitting and segmenting - processes which 
admittedly have always been taking place but not on the same scale 
and with the present frequency. The elementary family has become 
the most prevalent family form and the fireplace the centre of 
individual rather than group interests. Thus there is a reduction of 
both space and relations towards a minimum represented by the 
elementary family and the one fireplace house. In this chapter, 
therefore, I will be concerned with the activities and the relations 
within family groups and with the repercussions these relations have 
on the groups' physical surroundings. 
The Elementary Family / Household 
The 'ideal' family in terms of the patrilineal ideology and Pakhtun 
thought in general is the 'patrilineal extended family' and is made 
up of the head, his wife or wives and their children plus adult sons, 
their wives and their children (see diag. 11 p. 145). This type of 
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family constitutes in Afghaniya, as one may see from diag. 11, only 
10 % of the 193 families in the ten hamlets from which I collected 
statistical information. The most usual family form in terms of 
frequency of occurrence is the 'elementary family', i. e. husband, 
wife/-es and children, with 64 % of all families and if the 
'elementary families with additional members' are added they constitute 
together 81 % of the total. This would seem to indicate a very wide 
dichotomy between actual Safi practice and the Pakhtun ideal. The picture 
is somewhat "ameliorated' by the statistics for household composition 
(see diag. 12 p. 149) which show that some 47 % of the families live 
together as groups of families in the same house and thus preserve 
to varying degrees - depending upon the degree and extent of political 
solidarity and economic cooperation etc. - the ideal of an extended 
family. Nevertheless even when this is taken into consideration 50 % 
of the households are elementary family ones and the trend is towards 
the creation of more independent elementary families in economic, 
social and spatial terms. This is caused principally, as I will show 
below (see p. 150), by the poverty of the area and the consequent 
loss of authority by the patriarch. As a result only a rapidly 
diminishing number of men are still able to hold their extended 
families together whereas the majority are helpless to prevent the 
splintering of their extended families into a series of nuclear ones. 
The Typical Family Form 
The typical Afghaniya family form, therefore, is made up of groups 
whose members consist of husband and wife (14 %) with children 
(50 %) and the husband's mother (8 %) and/or father (1 %), i. e. all 
in all 73 % of the families. This family form is not referred to by 
the Safi as 'family' (koranai) because, as I have indicated above, 
this word is used for descent and/or revenge groups. Instead they 
speak of such and such a man, i. e. the family head, as having a 
separate 'fireplace' (na harai). Thus they see the family as that 
group which gathers around a fireplace, or hearth, and place more 
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emphasis, at least semantically, on location than on the relations 
between members. Such a view of the family seems to have arisen 
for the following reasons. 
One is that in the past the normal form of residence for Pakhtuns 
was the gala, the fortified house, where the extended family made 
up of a father, his sons and their families or, a group of brothers 
and their sons lived. In either case the families were dominated 
and presided over by the eldest living male. This group was and 
may still be called 'koranai' 
1) 
i. e. agnatic descent group, and 
its members formed a social, political and economic entity. The 
smaller units, the elementary families, within the koranai were 
only, or principally, distinguishable by their separate fireplaces 
where food was prepared and cooked. As the 'family' was the 
koranai these elementary units could only be termed 'hearths' or 
'fireplaces' i. e. named after the places where they had a spatial 
if not a social expression. Today in spite of the decline of the 
extended family household form (46 % of the households) and the 
increase in the numbers of elementary family households (50 %) 
the term 'nagharai' has been retained and is also used both for 
the elementary family household and for the elementary families in 
extended family households. 
Another reason for emphasizing the location rather than the relations 
between members is that food is not only prepared and cooked. at the 
fireplace but is, in the absence of guests 
2), 
also consumed there. 
Such an activity would not be of significance were it not one of the 
few performed by all the members of a family. Economically there 
is a sexual division of labour in public and private, politically the 
1) The ' koranai' is not of course only restricted to extended families 
living in galas but, as I have shown above, can and does include groups 
formed from a number of extended families and galas whose members 
are united through a common eponymous ancestor. 
2) Male or female guests are entertained separately, the women eating 
in the kitchen and the men in the guestroom. 
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family's functions are confined to the adult males alone, socially its 
activities never involve all its members, daughters never belong to 
it but are the 'ash of another' s fireplace' and the sons are the 
potential founders of new and separate families. Thus commensuality, 
even if the wife and young children eat after the husband and adult 
sons, is one of the principal characteristics of the family and the 
fireplace is the expression of this commensuality. 
According therefore to my interpretation of the material the term 
fireplace/na harai came, as a result of these various processes, to 
be associated with the elementary family. Such an association has of 
course the further implication that the woman as the preparer and 
cook of the food and the mistress of the fireplace is located 
unequivocably at the centre of the elementary family. 
Thus within the family it is the woman who is its focus and its 
symbol 
1). Within the household, i. e. within the productive unit, on 
the other hand her position is somewhat different as will be shown 
below. First, however, it is necessary to look at the household in 
general. 
The Household 
The statistics for household composition (see diag. 12 p. 149) show 
1) This attitude became clear to me at the very beginning of my field 
work when I proposed to rent a house. Whilst the Safi considered the 
actual renting to involve no problems as long as it was in somebody 
else's hamlet the project of living in the house seemed to them to be 
doomed to failure as I had no woman with me. Without a woman they 
said the house would be cold and dirty and there would be no warm 
food or tea. In fact a worthwhile existence would be impossible. To a 
large extent they were right especially as far as bread and water were 
concerned. Only women know how to bake bread well, or at least bake 
it at all, and as this is the staple food such an activity is of 
considerable importance, and only women bring water. As a result 
until I could find a family to bake bread for me I was forced to do 
without it and until I could get somebody else to fetch water I had to 
bring it myself much to the amusement of the men of the hamlet. 
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12. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
1. Hu & Wi & Chi + Hu Mo + HuB r 
+ incomplete families 
2. Fa + Sons 
3. Fa + Da 
4. Brots 
5. Brots + Sons 
6. Brots + FaBrSo 
7. Brots + FaBrSo + FaBrSoSo 
8. Brots + FaBrSoSo 
9. Brots + FaBr 
10. Head + FaBrSos 
11. Head + BrSo 
12. Head + WiBr 
13. Head + FaBr 
14. Head + SiSo 
No. 
56 
13 
2 
19 
8 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
111 
Developmental Cycle of Household Forms 
elementary family households 
fraternal Brots + Sons paternal 
extended family extended 
households family 
_ households 
r 
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that 50 % of the households are made up of elementary and incomplete 
families, 46 % of patrilineal extended families and 4% do not fall 
into either category. What is surprising about these percentages, as I 
have indicated above, is that the ideal Pakhtun household consisting 
of a number of elementary families living in a single qala and headed 
by a patriarch, what I have termed, the paternal or fraternal extended 
family, now constitutes the minority household form. This form has 
been replaced, at least in popularity, by the elementary family house- 
hold, a development which according to my older informants and to 
the information which I collected elsewhere is relatively new but one 
which is steadily gaining ground. 
The major reason for this would seem to be the diminishing authority 
of those household heads who have little land and who are no longer 
capable of holding their extended families together. As a result new 
elementary families instead of remaining within the father's household/ 
gala have set up separate households themselves. This situation has 
been created by the poverty resulting from overpopulation and the 
fragmentation of landholdings into segments too small to provide 
sufficient for a family's subsistence. As patriarchs of extended 
families, apart from having ascribed status from their positions as 
family heads, also have prestige from their possession and control of 
property and land the decline in their wealth has also brought with it 
a decline in their status and prestige. This deterioration is not confin- 
ed to external relations but is also an aspect of relations within the 
family. Sons become discontented because their fathers cannot find 
wives for them or because they have to wait longer than their 
contemporaries before they can marry. They are also dissatisfied 
because they know that their inheritances will be even smaller than 
those their fathers' received and their future status will be prejudiced. 
This can lead to quarrelling and disputes especially if the fathers 
seek to better their own fortunes through gambling or sell land to pay 
debts. 'Poverty, as Mayer says, 'weakens the authority of the head 
of the household. - and the reciprocal obligations of obedience and 
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respect fall away' 
1) 
Parallel to this development is the increasing independence of those 
sons who have sought paid labour outside the valley and it is of 
course the sons of impoverished fathers with minimal holdings who 
seek such work. This new independence combined with their fathers' 
loss of authority has not only meant that they are able to have some 
say in both the date of their marriage and in the person of their 
future spouse - both formerly prerogatives of the father - but they 
are also able to demand and ultimately to finance a greater degree 
of spatial freedom. This has resulted either in the division of the 
father's gala so that an exclusive section is available for the son 
and his family, the addition of a new section onto the existing 
building, or the construction of a new gala. In all these cases an 
impoverished father is usually in no position to prevent the fragmen- 
tation of his extended family. A wealthy father on the other hand 
retains his control and the obedience and respect of his sons 
because he has the prestige and the means to enforce his wishes 
and to preserve the ideal of an extended family household. 
This does not mean, of course, that in the 46 % of what I have 
termed patrilineal extended family households complete harmony 
reigns. In many of these households there are tensions between the 
elementary family units and between individual members which 
create not only social divisions but also physical ones. I will go into 
this subject in greater detail below (p. 156 f) but perhaps it is 
sufficient to say here that the plasticity of the construction material 
in galas 
2) 
has meant that these social differences can have 
1) Mayer, P. 1970. In: Introduction p. XXV of Socialization - the Approach 
from Social Anthropology. Ed. P. Mayer. Tavistock Publications. 
A. S. A. Monographs 8. 
2) Qalas are made of mud mixed with chaff for the walls, floors and roof, 
and wood for the doors, window frames and roof supports. The ease 
with which the material can be made and its cheapness mean that once 
the original costs for the qala have been met (small qala 7-10,000 Afs., 
large one 20-25,000 Afs. ) alterations, in the form of new walls, 
partitions, extra rooms and enlargements in general, can be under- 
taken without difficulty. Social distance therefore may be very readily 
converted into physical distance. 
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a physical expression and that there is, as a result, considerable 
congruence between the social relationships in, and the physical 
structure of, glalas. Even in those galas, therefore, where an ideal 
situation is considered to exist there are tensions which given a 
sufficiently strong impulse can lead to division and to the establish- 
ment of new households. 
Such tensions do not seem to exist in the majority of newly founded 
elementary family households because, as I will show below, reason- 
able treatment by the man of his wife and his absolute authority mean 
that relations among all family members, at least until the sons 
become of marriageable age, are normatively ordered and stable. 
Contributing to this stability is the sexual division of labour and of 
responsibilities where both husband and wife are generally sovereign 
in their respective domains. 
The Division of Labour and Authority 
The man is involved with the work in his fields, i. e. with ploughing, 
seeding, harvesting, threshing and winnowing etc. as well as 
maintaining and using the irrigation system. If he has insufficient 
land himself then he will also be busy share-cropping the fields of 
his neighbours. In the winter and early spring when agricultural 
work is non-existent or slack the man usually hunts or spends most 
of his time sitting in the sunny and sheltered spaces (the petawi) 
which are the meeting places for the men of the hamlet. There dis- 
cussions are held, problems touched upon, stories told, the actions 
of absent villagers criticised and card playing takes place. This is 
the Safi' s equivalent of the Yusufzai' s' hujra' , or men's house 
1), 
with the difference that here the territory is neutral ground and 
membership does not reflect political groupings or fractions but only 
membership in the hamlet. 
1) See Barth. 1965. Op. cit. pp. 52-56. 
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Work and meetings do not however represent the limits of a house- 
hold head's activities. He is also responsible for the settlement of 
debts, - paid principally after the harvest, - and for the purchase 
and sale of goods. Generally he sells grain or other agriculture 
products or exchanges them for household needs, for products he 
cannot produce himself (tea, sugar, sweets, cloth, shoes etc. ), for 
farming equipment and for animals i. e. oxen, cows, sheep, donkeys, 
etc. Finally he can make debts and buy, sell or pawn his land. All 
of those activities are, with the exception of harvesting when the 
wives of poor men will also help, the sole responsibility of the 
heads of households. 
Wives can and sometimes do criticise the decisions of their husbands. 
If, for example, a husband exchanges too much wheat for an inferior 
cow then the wife might be successful in getting this decision 
changed. She cannot, however, work her own fields nor can she 
make any kind of a contract without the consent of her husband. As 
far as her own activities are concerned she is more or less 
sovereign. She prepares the food, bakes bread twice a day, makes 
tea, cleans the gala and the yard and washes dishes and clothes. She 
also feeds the animals, makes curds, whey, joghurt and ghi, collects 
fruit and nuts from the garden and makes clothes, cushions, pillows, 
blankets etc. for her family. Like her husband she too can make 
ashar (cooperative work) for those tasks which require a lot of labour, 
for example, separating the maize kernels from the cobs, cleaning 
the wheat and barley of stones or clay, and smoothing the floors of 
galas with mud. She usually receives the help of her female neighbours 
for such jobs and repays them by working at their ashar and also by 
providing food-and sweets at her own. Such occasions are of course 
also ideal for gossip and the exchange of news and represent the more 
pleasurable side of work. 
Harvesting, threshing and winnowing on the other hand are not 
considered enjoyable because the wife's participation is an indication 
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of the poverty of the household and thus brings with it a loss of 
prestige. Finally the women as mothers are responsible for looking 
after the male children until they are old enough to run about them- 
selves and for educating their daughters. This last task is particular- 
ly important because prospective spouses, or their walis, are 
interested in having ' well-educated' wives or daughters-in-law. A 
girl whose mother has died young and, therefore, has received little 
or no domestic education may have difficulty, unless she has other 
attributes, in finding a husband. Mothers, therefore, try to ensure 
thät their daughters are proficient in all a woman' s tasks. This is 
not too difficult because daughters are integrated into the household 
affairs and economy at a very early age. They look after the younger 
children and then start helping their mothers with those tasks which 
require extra labour. Daughters do not only learn how best to carry 
out those tasks assigned to women they also learn from their 
mothers what decisions women can make independently of their 
husbands. Wives are allowed to sell theirsurplus milk products as 
well as excess eggs, hens 
1 ), 
fruit and that wheat which they have 
found on the fields after harvesting for jewelry and cloth. In other 
words in those areas of the economy where they alone are 
responsible they are given a certain latitude in the disposition of 
products providing that the household does not suffer through these 
activities. 
The Patrilineal Extended Family Household 
In the extended family households (46 % of the total) the sexual 
division of tasks (and responsibilities) remains generally the same 
but the existence of a number of families or fireplaces within the 
same household brings problems of competence and compatibility. 
The question of competence, i. e. as to which of the married adult 
males should make the decisionsfor the whole household, is usually 
1) All wives have one cow and a number of hens and/or ducks. In poly- 
gynous households each wife has her own cow and hens and a certain 
competitiveness arises between the wives aided by their respective 
daughters to produce and sell as much milk products and as many 
eggs as possible. 
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solved by the presence in the gala of a' kandidar' 
1), 
an elder or group 
elder - the person referred to so far as the 'patriarch' . This person 
is either the father or the eldest brother although in the sense in 
which I will use this term initially it will be confined to the father 
because an eldest brother only in exceptional cases 
2) has the power 
over his brothers that a father has over his sons. 
The Paternal Extended Family Household 
The Division of Labour and Authority 
In such a household, i. e. where the father as kandidar has absolute 
authority, his sons work for him and thus the household is a produc- 
tive unit. The sons receive in return, food, clothing - they must 
even ask for money for their wives' and children's clothing - and 
whatever extras they may need. They cannot themselves sell land, 
animals, or agricultural products nor can they purchase these 
things. They cannot make debts, arrange share-cropping agreements, 
nor invite guests to the house without the patriarch' s prior 
permission. This, however, represents one extreme of a continuum 
of authority and although it constitutes the Pakhtun ideal form 
3) 
it 
has become increasingly rare in Afghaniya. 
More usual is a form of shared authority where the kandidar has the 
ultimate say in things but where the sons may nevertheless make 
decisions of their own, for example, when to plough or seed the 
fields and whether grain should be sold or not. The major decisions 
such as the sale of land still remain the prerogative of the fathers. 
Also when sons buy animals or sell grain it is usual for the seller 
1) Kandidar may also be spelt kandidar or kandi dar. ' Dar' is a verbal 
noun meaning: possessor, lord, or master; and 'kandi' means: part, 
division, splinter, piece. 
2) Such an exception would be where the younger brothers as half 
brothers, come from a different generation and are very dependent. 
3) Newman (1965 op. cit. p. 15) writing about Pakhtuns of the Tribal 
Territories of Pakistan considers this not an ideal but a norm. ' It is 
thus possible that during his (the Pathan' s son) life, at no time, until 
his father dies, perhaps not then, that he may ever once exert what 
he considers his own will in matters that concern himself or those he 
considers his. ' 
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or buyer to seek out the kandidar afterwards to see whether the con- 
tract was made with his knowledge and to ratify the agreement. Thus 
kandidars who give greater freedom of choice and independence to 
their dependents nevertheless retain, as I have indicated above, the 
power of decision themselves and can always overrule a contract or 
decision made by their sons. Generally, however, as fathers and 
sons sit together after meals it is not difficult to know what the other 
is planning to do and unnecessary to alter or overrule decisions. 
This range of authority from absolute to shared is to varying degrees 
reflected in the construction of galas. An absolute kandidar eats 
together with his sons around one ' da star xan' (bread cloth) and the 
food is prepared in one kitchen by one of the wives - they take turns 
in planning, preparing and cooking the food - of the men. The 
number of rooms in this type of gala is, therefore, limited but their 
size is greater than in other qalas because they need to cope with 
the larger numbers of members who use them. In qalas where 
authority is shared the men usually eat separately and the wives have 
separate kitchens and fireplaces. The gala, as a result, is divided up 
into a number of rooms which reflect the increased independence of 
the various elementary family units. In some galas the division may 
go so far that the only area which is held in common is the yard 
(see diag. 13 section 2 p. 161) and the unity of the whole, at least 
for the outside world, is expressed by the retention of a single main 
door through which all enter and egress. 
Separatist Tendencies 
Some sons and dependents find even this degree of unity unbearable 
and pressures build up, not only in those households where the 
patriarch has absolute power but also in those where power is 
delegated, for complete separation. Working against such pressures 
are first of all the social and legal powers which a father has. There 
is nothing in islamic law (shari' at) which compels the father to give 
his married sons greater freedom or to provide them with property 
- 157 - 
and land should they set up separate households against the father' s 
wishes. However without such aid it is impossible for a son to 
finance the building of a gala or to acquire land for his subsistence 
and so he is forced to obtain his father's permission. This he can 
only do through the good offices of his father's brother or mother' s 
brother who act as intermediaries for him because a son is not 
allowed, by custom, to ask for separation. Should his request be 
refused then he can only seek to implement his plan by forcing his 
father to realise that separation is the only solution. This he does 
by taking up work elsewhere, by eating separately, by causing 
trouble, by fighting, by gambling etc. Some sons manage to achieve 
their ends in these ways but if the father is determined to keep his 
household united then nothing the son can do will force him to 
change his mind. 
There are, of course, fathers who are prepared to grant their sons 
wishes, especially if they have other sons capable of looking after 
them, not because they have been put under pressure to do so but 
usually because they feel this would be the best for their sons. In 
such cases the separatist son receives a fraction of his household' s 
land and property. If the family, for example, consists of a father 
and three sons, he would receive a quarter of the total money, 
household goods, animals and land. Once this division has taken 
place the son has, at least according to customary law, no further 
claim to his father's land and property even if this should subse- 
quently increase in size and value. I was only able to record one 
case where this principle was not completely followed. This was 
because of the very considerable difference in the size of the 
property at its division and on the much later death of the owner 
and because the people affected appealed to the government's 
representatives in Nijrao. 
Haji A, who felt that he had not long to live and whose six sons were 
intent on separation, divided what little land and property he had into 
seven parts. Five sons established new households and the sixth and 
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youngest remained, as is the custom, with his father to work and 
provide for him in what all thought would be his last few years. 
After this division Haji A had a run of good fortune, bought new 
land, obtained the usufruct rights to other fields, made a Haj and 
generally became, in Afghaniya terms, a wealthy and propertied 
man. At a very advanced age he quite suddenly collapsed and died 
and his youngest son after seeing to the funeral and burying his 
father in a manner concomitant with his father's newly acquired 
wealth and status inherited everything. The other five brothers 
being unable to acquire anything from him and, feeling that they had 
justifiable cause to make a complaint, formally did so to the 
Waluswal in Nijrao. After many difficulties they also received a 
little more land. The youngest brother, nevertheless, retained the 
lion's share. 
The custom, therefore, that nothing more may be inherited after a 
division which takes place during the father's lifetime may be 
overcome but as this was the only case I was able to discover and 
one which was not completely satisfactory for the complainants then 
this stipulation may well also act as a brake to separatist activities 
on the part of sons. 
Secondly another factor working against pressures for division and 
separation of the household is the political advantages accruing from 
household solidarity. Large extended family households are politically 
much stronger than elementary family ones because the latter can 
only form blocks when other households are also willing whereas an 
extended family household controlled as it is by one patriarch has a 
continuing and unvaried strength. This is particularly important in a 
community where political influence is still directly related to the 
number of persons a party can assemble at a time of confrontation. 
The creation of new households, therefore, leads to political decline 
which both the patriarch and other members are usually unwilling to 
countenance. 
Thirdly separatist tendencies are often hindered by the realization 
that the division of the land which is a consequence of separation can 
bring economic phthisis especially , if the original holding is only of 
medium size. In this case the division of the land would lead to the 
uneconomic working of the resulting small portions whereas the un- 
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divided land may be worked by that labour force which is necessary 
for its cultivation and excess labour can be employed to the benefit 
of the household elsewhere, for example, in Afghan Turkestan. 
Finally the patrilineal ideology works to a certain extent against the 
fragmentation of extended family households. Islamic and Pakhtun 
ideals uphold the extended family and gossip and criticism are used 
against those members of the household who wish to be independent. 
The strength of such appeals, however, as I have indicated else- 
where, is rapidly diminishing. 
Such factors ensuring unity during the life of the patriarch lose 
much of their strength on his death because their main support, the 
person of the kandidar, is gone. Sons who were willing to bow to 
the dictates of their fathers are not always willing to do so to the 
orders of their brothers. Segmentary forces, therefore, which were 
containable in the paternal extended family households become much 
less so in households of brothers and it is normally only a question 
of time before the fraternal extended family household splits to 
form a number of elementary family ones 
1ý. 
The Fraternal Extended Family Household 
Nevertheless as may be seen from the statistics on household 
composition 29 % of the households are willing to stay together when 
1) Pakhtuns are of course not alone in this. Cohen (1965. Arab Border 
Villages in Israel, p. 50, Manchester University Press) for example 
writes ' In the past men continued to live in their father's household, 
even after they had been married, because the main source of 
livelihood, land, remained under the control of their father during all 
of his lifetime. But when the father died, it became increasingly 
difficult to observe equality as to duties and rights, between the 
constituent elementary families in maintaining a joint economy, and 
soon the household split. ' Stirling (1965. A Turkish Village. p. 131. 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London. ) aleD writes of Turkish villages: 
'On the death of a household head, his sons are expected within a 
reasonable period to divide up the property between them and 
establish separate independent households. ' 
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the father is replaced by an elder brother as kandidar. One of the 
reasons for this is undoubtedly to be found in the political, economic 
and social advantages, mentioned above, which accrue from the 
continued solidarity and unity of the household. Another is that the 
fraternal extended family household represents an interim or 
transitory stage of development through which households pass between 
the paternal extended family form and the elementary family one 
(see diag. 12 p. 149 ). There is, therefore, generally no clean break 
on the death of the father but rather a period, often lasting a number 
of years, during which the cohesive and devisive forces within the 
household seek supremacy. 
The existence and progress of this struggle are obvious to all those 
who have access to the gala in spite of the attempts of members to 
disguise it. This is because as relations deteriorate the heads of the 
elementary family units try to reduce the numbers of contacts 
between the families. Such attempts, however, are doomed to failure 
within the restricted space of the gala unless they also involve a 
physical reordering' of space. Initially the brothers feel that the 
construction of walls, the division of rooms and the building of new 
doors will suffice to reduce both contacts and tensions. Sometimes 
they do but the lack of contact also leads to the diminution of 
solidarity and to the strengtiEning of isolationist tendencies among the 
families. Thus social distance leads to physical distance and finally 
to total separation expressed by the division of the land and the 
construction of new elementary family galas. The stages and 
processes briefly outlined here may, I think, be most adequately 
shown by reference to a case study which contains almost all the 
elements leading to division and which will show both the reasons for 
and the consequences of division. 
Case Study 
The gala in question (see diag. 13 p. 161 ) belonged to 
_A 
and B, the 
sons of X. On the death of X they had divided the gala so that each 
had a living/bed room, a kitchen and a fodder/store room (see diag. 
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13. Relations in Space and Time : The Segmentation of Household, 
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13 sect. 1). A small dividing wall, an extension of the wall dividing 
A and Bs quarters, had been put up in the yard and in the summer 
the women cooked there. There was, therefore, in the 'common' 
land of the yard a place where some privacy could be achieved but 
also where meetings could take place without them having an official 
character. Two main doors lead from the gala one to the nearby hill 
pasture and the other to the spring where the animals were watered. 
The animals of both brothers were driven out of whichever door was 
appropriate. 
The first major change (see diag. 13 sect. 2) in terms of relations 
and of construction occurred on the death of A when his three sons 
Al, A2, and A3 divided their section of the qala so that instead of 
having one living/bed room and a kitchen each had a separate living/ 
bed room. The common kitchen shared by their wives, however, was 
retained but built anew on to the strengthened wall dividing Al, A2, 
and A3 from their father's brother B. Thus the three brothers 
achieved a degree of independence from one another, expressed their 
wish for continuing solidarity through the common preparation and 
consumption of food and increased the social distance between them- 
selves and_ their paternal uncle B. B was still alive and his section 
of the gala remained unchanged. 
This situation altered on his, i. e. Bs death (see sect. 3). B1, and 
B2, the sons of different mothers, knocked down the wall between the 
kitchen and the living/bed room and erected two new ones so that 
each could have a living room with underfloor heating. A common 
kitchen where their wives took turns in cooking remained. The death 
of B, however, had not only altered the relations between B1 and 
B2, it had also removed the last living link between the two sets of 
cousins. A desire for greater privacy lead to the yard wall being 
lengthened and to a gate being inserted so that communications were 
possible but not uncontrolled. Relations between the cousins continued 
to deteriorate and finally the door was removed and the aperture 
walled over. The occasion for this change was the accusation by Al, 
A2, and A3 that the animals of B1 and B2, when they were on the 
way to the hill pasture, were fouling their section of the yard with 
their droppings and, because of the inattention of B1 and B2' s 
children, were stealing hay from the fodder room when they passed. 
B1 and B2 replied much in the same vein and with additional 
reproaches. regarding Al, A2 and A3' s children. The gateway was 
blocked up and the brothers Al, A2 and A3 had a new exterior gate 
built so that their animals had access to the spring water. Both 
sides agreed to allow the other to use his 'gulkan' (the area around 
the walls of a gala from which clay for the building is taken) so that 
new paths which would have diminished the area of agricultural land 
would not have to be made. 
The brothers Al, A2, and A3 who had been united in their opposition 
to their cousins B1 and B2 now found that their own problems, which 
had been in no way diminished but merely suppressed during the 
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period of opposition, came to the surface once more. The underlying 
cause for these problems was in the desire for greater autonomy but 
as this could not be openly expressed struggles took place over very 
minor events. Finally the situation was considered to be impossible and 
the brothers decided to divide their land which up to that time had been 
held and worked jointly. A3, the youngest brother, used the occasion of 
the division to become completely independent and built a separate gala 
at some distance. from Dis broýher See di Q''a 1 sect. 4). Al and A2 PG rpplut rn %1lurstt re ff the cl 
j ea 
pia `Ccti ja 
then redivided^a separate living room and kitchen. The relatively 
amicable period which followed did not last long. A2 who was also a 
mullah began increasingly to have difficulties with Al and as he had little 
interest in his land he finally left his fields to be share-cropped by his 
brother Al and went to work as an imam in another community. After a 
year, however, he returned because he said he was upset about the dis- 
cord among the brothers. He then took up residence once more with Al. 
As he, A2, was prepared to accept Al as kandidar a degree of harmony 
returned which persuaded them to reunify their land holdings and to 
share whatever income they received. A2 also sought a reconciliation 
with A3 and tried to bring him back into the gala 'L 
1but he refused and 
even withstood their later public criticism of his action and their 
mockery 
2). 
In the meantime the brothers B1 and B2 who had never been on the best 
of terms because of what B2 felt was Bl' s autocratic attitude quarrelled 
with one another about the behaviour of their respective children. B1, 
the elder brother, said that his wife had complained to him about B2' s 
children urinating in the yard. B2 said that Bl' s children were inatten- 
tive and careless with the animals. The brothers, therefore, decided to 
erect a dividing wall in the kitchen so that each wife would have a 
separate kitchen for herself (see diag. 13 sect. 4). The wives, who felt 
themselves to be blameless, were greatly inconvenienced by this 
change because the individual kitchens were like passageways where, they 
said, one could hardly turn round. The alterations, however, did not stop 
there. As relations deteriorated and no occasion arose for the brothers 
to form a united front the devisive forces achieved the upper hand. A 
wall was built to divide the yard, the fodder and store room were divided, 
a new store house was built on to the gala and finally the land was 
divided 3. 
Shortly after this division Bl became ill and was unable to leave his 
bed for many months. In the spring when he was at last able to walk 
again he spent much of the time sitting on the hillside warming him- 
self in the sun. From there he could contemplate_ his gala and he 
compared the warmth of the hillside with the gala where he had been 
ill and which depressed him. He, therefore, proposed to B2 that they 
1) Al and A2 were rather embarrassed by the split because it not only 
weakened them politically but it was also, through A3' s small and 
rather ridiculous qala, obvious to all. 
2) These three brothers are well educated and avid radio listeners. When 
A3 separated from them and built a new qala they dubbed him 'Ian 
Smith' because of his ' unilateral declaration of independence' . This 
nickname stuck and caused other members of the hamlet considerable 
amusement. 
3) p. t. o. 
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should build a new gala on the hillside. This they did and in the 
process destroyed their section of the old gala and used it for clay 
for the new one (see diag. 13 sect. 5). Thus from the original 
household of the two brothers there emerged four separate households 
consisting of three elementary families and one fraternal extended 
family. Also instead of one qala three new ones were constructed. In 
one the family head, A3, is alone with his wife and children, in the 
second there are two brothers Al and A2 who eat separately but who 
nevertheless share their combined income and the products of their 
joint land holding, and finally in the third there are two brothers Bl 
and B2 who still live in the same qala but whose intercourse is 
reduced to a minimum and whose property and land are divided. 
From the above case study a number of conclusions may be drawn 
about households based on brothers. The first is that in the absence 
of external pressures devisive tendencies are stronger than cohesive 
ones, although just in this case there was the unusual situation of a 
brother reversing a separatist decision and reunifying the extended 
family and household. Secondly the principal motive for division and 
separation, the desire for autonomy, is never expressed instead 
struggles between wives or trouble with the children, i. e. between 
affines or minors, are presented as the reasons 
1) 
so that agnatic 
solidarity may be preserved. Finally the internal structure of the 
gala is a relatively accurate reflection of the nature of the relations 
between the inhabitants. 
The progression or cycle from elementary family household to 
paternal extended family household, to fraternal extended family 
household portrayed in this chapter is completed when the fraternal 
extended family household segments into a number of elementary 
3) B1, the elder brother, also felt that he was contributing more to the 
joint economy than B2. Division is, therefore, not only a question of 
satisfying a need for autonomy but it is also often a question of seek- 
ing economic advantage. 
1) A situation not only confined to Afghaniya: 'Disagreements among 
women' and 'mistreatment of one another' s children' are 'more often 
the occasion and excuse for fission rather than the cause' . Antoun, R. 
T. 1972. Arab Village. A social structural study of a Transjordanian 
peasant community. Indiana University Press, London. Similarly Mair 
(L. 1971. Marriage. p. 125. Penguin Books Litd., London) writes that 
wives are often used in patrilineal societies as the scapegoats for seg- 
mentation so that the pretence of agnatic solidarity may be upheld. 
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family households. Once the conflicting parties establish new and 
separate qalas the devisive or segmentary process stops, temporarily 
at least, until the competition between the fathers and sons or 
brothers in the individual qalas once more becomes overt and acute. 
Prior to this stage, however, the physical and social distance between 
galas is sufficient to allow individual development and to maintain and 
restore ties and contacts between the families of brothers. Thus the 
original competition and desire for division which was fostered within 
the confines of the paternal or fraternal extended family qala is in 
the establishment of separate but neighbouring elementary family 
galas replaced by ease of relations and solidarity. This is furthered 
by the requirements of mutual help - lending, borrowing, visiting, 
attending rites de passage, etc. - and whilst these may be demanding 
during times of economic difficulty (see below p. 256) they are also 
avoidable because of the physical barriers provided by the separate 
qala. 
Probably for this reason neighbourliness is regarded as a very positive 
relationship and is utilised, apart from strengthening agnatic 
obligations, to bind and integrate strangers and newcomers into the 
hamlet. These stranger neighbours are also categorised, as are 
agnates generally, as 'xpulwan' and will be supported in their 
disputes and struggles with members of other hamlets by men who are 
genealogically closer to their opponents than to their neighbours. The 
obligations of propinquity have in these cases become stronger than 
those of more distant agnation or descent. Thus the hamlet in terms 
of its components, the proximate galas, achieves solidarity and its 
physical expression has a social expression. Also its physical 
boundaries mark social boundaries beyond which social obligations 
usually do not operate. However as the hamlet is also viewed as 
being a descent group, the minor lineage, it is difficult to assess, at 
times of opposition within the hamlet, which claims and which ties, 
i. e. those of descent or proximity, are, in any one particular case, 
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primarily responsible for solidarity. Generally, in disputes, both 
are utilised and the stress that is laid on one or the other depends 
upon the requirements of the moment and the assessment of whether 
an individual's support will be acquired more readily by an appeal 
to his agnatic or to his neighbourly obligations. 
Hamlets are, of course, not only united by descent and proximity 
but also by ties of marriage so that a third element, that of affinity, 
enters into decisions made by individuals to support, oppose, or to 
remain neutral when conflict arises. This third element constitutes 
the content of the next chapter. 
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9. RELATIONS AND MARRIAGE - PROCEDURES, TRENDS AND 
FORMS 
'Women are like the stones of a stream' , i. e. they are without 
number and without value, and 'a daughter is the 'kuda' (transport- 
able equipment of a household) of another person'. These sayings and 
similar ones always crop up when Safi discuss marriage in the 
' petawi' or ' surf' . The superficial implications of these comments 
are clear: the supply of women is considered to exceed that of 
demand so that women are, materially and socially, without value; 
and women, as daughters, can never belong to their natal families 
because they are but temporary residents in transit, as it were, to 
their true destinations which are their conjugal families. The deeper 
significance of these statements is, however, much more difficult to 
uncover because when what the Safi say is compared with the social 
reality it is clear that they are contradictions. Women are never 
treated as if they were valueless but are confined, controlled and 
hidden and few activities are pursued and planned so carefully and 
few decisions made with such attention and weighty discussion as the 
giving of daughters and the taking of daughters-in-law. Also few 
objects which the Safi male possesses have as much monetary value 
as daughters and the acquisition of a good bride-wealth can never 
displease a rich man and can alter the fortunes of a poor man 
fundamentally. Finally men, as fathers, are just as interested, 
alt hough there are exceptions, in the well-being and welfare of their 
daughters as are mothers - it is just expressed differently. 
A possible explanation for the content of the comments about women, 
lies in disappointment: disappointment in losing a woman from the 
family, disappointment in the temporary nature of the relationship 
and perhaps also resignation that the daughter's ultimate allegiance 
belongs not to her agnates but to her future husband and sons. But 
it is also a product or response of a male dominated society. In 
Afghaniya, but probably in Pakhtun society as a whole, women 
remain a paradox to the men because in spite of their (the mens' ) 
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absolute authority, their possibilities for control and confinement, 
women continue to be in the last instance uncontrollable, unpredict- 
able and the principal danger to agnation and to male dominated 
order. Perhaps it is because they wish to belie or belittle this danger 
that men comment so disparagingly about women in general and 
accentuate the outsider status or destiny of their daughters. 
In this chapter on marriage and relations all these elements will 
emerge in the course of a discussion which covers marriage proced- 
ures, marriage preferences, marriage choices, advantages to be 
gained from marriage, marriage forms and finally dyadic relations 
resulting from marriage. 
The Marriage Procedure 
Islam itself places very few restrictions on possible marriage 
partners for a man or woman. Marriage is lawful between any 
muslim male and any muslim or 'kitabiya' 
1) female of whatever age 
unless '(a) the man has four wives living, or (b) the woman has a 
husband living, or (c) the woman is in an 'iddat' 
2) 
period after a 
previous marriage, or (d) they are within the prohibited degrees of 
relationship' 
3). 
These prohibited degrees may be summarised as 
follows: any ascendant or descendant to the third generation, any 
sibling of the father or father's father, any ascendant or descendant 
of a wife, and any ascendant or descendant of a divorced wife. Also 
a man may not have intercourse with and, therefore, not marry two 
women so related that if one were a male they could not have 
married. All other women are marriageable. 
These prohibitions on marriage are comparable with those in the 
Old Testament 4) with one or two exceptions. Major differences 
1) A follower of a religion promulgated by a Prophet acknowledged in 
the Koran, i. e. Jew, Christian, Samaritan or some Sabaens. 
2) A period of continence imposed on a woman on the termination of 
marriage in the interests of certainty of paternity. 
3) Vesey-Fitzgerald, S. 1931. Muhammedan Law. p. 40. Oxford 
University Press. London. 
4) See Leviticus XVIII 7-18. 
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arise between Islamic and Christian prohibitions through the stipula- 
tions in Islam that the partner can be of any age and that it is 
possible for men to have up to and including four partners at the 
same time. Thus the range of possible choices in Islam is 
considerable. However in spite of, or because of, this range of 
choice definite preferences are shown. This is not only true in my 
area of field work but muslim sentiment in general encourages both 
parallel and cross cousin marriage. In Afghaniya preferences are 
expressed both by those who will arrange the marriages and by 
those who will be the subjects of them. 
Marriage Preferences 
Senior Males 
The senior males of households prefer to give their daughters to 
close agnatic relatives i. e. to the father's brother's son or failing 
this individual to other agnates or fellow villagers. One of the 
principles behind this is expressed in their saying "the soil of the 
bridegroom comes from the father-in-law's fireplace", i. e. the 
bridegroom's character is the same as his father's. If the father 
is one's own brother, another agnate, or even a fellow villager his 
character is known and trusted and in terms of their conception 
that 'blood and bone', i. e. agnation, is all important and heritable 
the son or bridegroom must be similarly endowed. The daughter is 
therefore passing into known and good hands. 
Another principle is that of physical proximity. Both parents, but 
especially the mother, want to be able to see their daughter 
frequently, to be in a position to help her and to ensure that the 
life she is leading is not too hard or unhappy. If the daughter, therefore, 
is married within the hamlet visiting between her conjugal and natal 
houses can be easy and frequent. But as a woman's movements are 
very restricted - apart from fetching water she is hardly allowed 
to go anywhere without the permission of the male, i. e. father, 
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brother, husband etc., responsible for her - visiting from a hamlet 
or village which is distant from her natal one is difficult for her, 
troublesome for the men and, therefore, infrequent. 
When taking a woman for a son the preference of the senior males 
i. e. for the physical proximity of the partner is the same as that 
for giving a daughter but the reasons for choosing her are different. 
They prefer a close agnatic relative, i. e. the father's brother' s 
daughter, the daughter of another agnate, or in the absence of these 
the daughter of a fellow villager. One reason they give for this 
preference is the desire to make the relations between agnates or at 
least fellow villagers stronger. This is a principle generally follow- 
ed by patrilineal societies where the inherent opposition and potential 
conflict of close agnates is to be countered by additional, affinal, 
connections. 
Another reason given is the need to reduce possible problems over 
inheritance. They ensure by choosing a girl from within the hamlet 
that any land which she might inherit. on the death of her father or 
husband will remain within the hamlet and not be alienated. Also 
the possibility of the loss of a male agnate from the hamlet is red- 
uced by the principle of endogamous marriage because the groom 
would not follow his wife to her hamlet were she to inherit there. 
Although patrilocality - residence on the first marriage in the 
groom's father's house - is the rule in Afghaniya a man who 
acquires sufficient land through his wife's inheritence to make it 
worthwhile for him to move will take up residence in her hamlet. 
These are the outward public reasons for preferring endogamy but 
there are also inward, private ones which emerge in Levi-Strauss's 
terms from th e logical order of the society. The Safi like all the 
Pakhtun tribes have taken over from Islam the central concept of 
the opposition between knowledge and feeling, between the mind or 
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soul and the body 
1) 
This distinction, expressed here extremely 
simply, has become - probably inevitably in a patrilineal society - 
associated with the oppositions male: female and thus the homology 
knowledge, rationality, mind etc., is male; and feeling, irrationality, 
body is female. The potential danger which this female, irrational 
sexuality represents for the males, for their honour, the legitimacy 
of their sons, their society at large etc., forces them to counteract 
it and to reserve its potency for their own uses through controls. 
Thus women in Pakhtun society and to a certain extent in islamic 
society generally are from the moment of their birth until their 
deaths or the achievement of asexuality in old age veiled, enclosed, 
confined and controlled by a series of men. This begins with the 
father, passes to the husband and descends to the son. In Afghaniya 
the situation is no different and the controls find their physical 
expression in the qala where the women are confined and from where 
they really only emerge to exchange their fathers' qalas for those of 
their husbands. The woman's domain is thus the fireplace, house or 
gala, i. e. the inside and the enclosed, whereas that of the men is the 
outside, the fields, the meeting places etc. and therefore we may see, 
in symbolic terms, the female as the centre and the male as the 
periphery or boundary. 
Access is, of course, allowed to the centre but only to those who are 
insiders, who are known and who present no risk. Such people are 
close agnates, women in general, barbers and to a limited extent 
and because of their low status and implied lack of masculinity 
" travelling salesmen. Such persons and groups are controllable and 
because they generally observe the order of the society are controlled. 
The situation, however, only remains stable as long as marriages do 
not take place. Once this occurs the males are forced to remove the 
2) boundaries and to allow the outsider access . This situation can be 
1) Ideas put forward and parallels made by Mr. D. H. M. Brooks in his 
'Religion' lectures at the University of Durham (1975-1976). 
2) 'In a patrilineal system of descent women are the door of entry to the 
group. ' Douglas. 1970. Op. cit. p. 150 
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overcome if the choice of a husband is confined to a close agnate 
such as the father's brother's son because he is not an outsider 
but an insider. As such men are not always available then choices 
have to be made in ever increasing circles (see diag. 14). 
distance 
centre inside variable inside total outside 
relationship 
centre Fa. Br. So. agnate/villager stranger 
marriage preference 
totally ideal less ideal least ideal 
forbidden 
(after D. H. M. Brooks) 
14. Circles of Marriage Choices 
Nevertheless the principle of the protection of the centre is manifest- 
ed by the expressed preferences of the senior males for close 
agnates as marriage partners. 
Subjects of the Marriages 
As may be imagined the preferences expressed by the subjects of any 
possible marriage, the boys and girls 
1) 
of the hamlet, are somewhat 
different. Both would prefer their partners to come from hamlets 
other than their own even if this meant for the girl that some 
distance separated her conjugal from her natal home thus making 
visiting difficult. One reason for this preference is, they say, that 
they would not like any future wife or husband to know about their child- 
hood and background. If bride and groom come from the same hamlet 
there are always rumours and gossip that 'she kissed such and such 
a boy' or that 'he was seen down by the river with such and such a 
girl'. They want to start afresh and they want some sort of romance. 
1) I am using ' boy' and 'girl' here in the sense of dependents and not in 
the sense of physical immaturity. 
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How, they say, is it possible to have fun as a husband or wife with a 
boy or girl who prior to marriage was just like a brother or a sister 
which would be the case if they married a cousin. There is no 
excitement, there is no enjoyment and there is no love 
1). 
Also they say why should one marry an agnate with whom one already 
has a relationship and one which, should it be added to by marriage, 
would only 'put a shadow on' i. e. darken or dominate in a negative 
way, the marriage one. It is, therefore, preferable and more 
enjoyable to make a marriage relationship, ' xekhi' , with a new group 
with whom one has up to then had no more permanent contact. 
The boys or young men have a peculiar reason of their own for 
preferring marriage with girls from other hamlets. The period of 
time which elapses eýtween the consummation of marriage, i. e. after 
the marriage, andAthe wedding - anything from some months to a 
couple of years - is potentially for the boys the most enjoyable so far 
in their lives. The major reason for this, apart from the company of 
his wife, is the treatment which the young man receives in his wife' s 
home. When he arrives he is treated affectionately and honourably by 
his mother and father-in-law and respectfully by the younger members 
of the household. The mother-in-law and sisters-in-law prepare good 
meals for him, ensure that he is comforitable and generally make his 
life more pleasant than it has ever been before. The degree of 
intensity to which this is carried out, however, varies proportionally 
with the distance which separates the boy's and girl's homes. Should 
he, for example, be married to his paternal uncle's daughter then his 
mother-in-law will be his father's brother's wife, a person who since 
childhood has been in a position of authority over him. The womp-n, 
1) Interestingly enough similar reasons for not preferring parallel cousin 
marriage ('cannot love him or her as a spouse' and 'need for change) 
were given by students at the American University of Beirut in a survey 
conducted by Prof. Levon Melikian. See Table 5, p. 605 and footnote 4 
p. 617. In: Khuri, F. I. 1970. Parallel Cousin Marriage Reconsidered. 
pp. 597-618. Man vol. 5. no. 4. 
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therefore, who should treat him honourably and hospitably is the same 
woman who before marriage would have been scolding him and order- 
ing him about. The traditional roles of mother-in-law and paternal 
uncle' s wife are not compatible and lead to the marked preference 
expressed by male suitors for marriages with unrelated girls from 
the same hamlet or with women from other hamlets. 
Generally we can see that the preferences of the two generations are, 
at least as far as the physical proximity of the spouse is concerned, 
diametrically opposed. As the decision is considered by the senior 
males of households far too important to be left in the hands of the 
young and inexperienced because it is not merely a question of 
acquiring a compatible wife or mother-in-law or of having children 
but of furthering political, economic and social ends or of acquiring 
material benefit the selection of a marriage partner is made by them 
and not by the boy or girl concerned 
1). 
As long as the father' s 
generation controls the sources - land and property - of independence 
then the right or duty of the father or senior male to choose or to 
accept the suit of a particular partner for his son, daughter, or ward 
will remain socially unopposed 
2). 
At the moment with the exception 
of sons who have acquired work and thus independence outside the 
community and who can influence the choices made (see above chap 8 
p. 151 ) this is still the case. Such a situation is also upheld by Islam 
although this right, according to the Hanafite School of law, 
terminates with puberty 
3). Thus for all the girls and for the majority 
1) ' Marriage is a matter of serious concern to a much larger number of 
people than the spouses themselves' . Mair. 1971. Op. cit. p. 
19. 
2) I am here, of course, talking about those marriages where both 
partners are young and dependent and not those where the man is 
contracting his second marriage or in the cases of women who have 
been divorced or widowed. 
3) ' The distinguishing feature of Islamic Jurisprudence is that it empow- 
ers a father to impose the status of marriage on his minor children. 
This power of imposition is called jabr; the abstract right of guardian- 
ship wilayat (or wilaya), and the guardian so empowered is known as 
wali. ... under the Muhammadan law of all schools, the father has the 
power to give his children of both sexes in marriage without their 
consent, until they reach the age of puberty - known as bulughiyya. ' 
Fyzee, A. A. A. 1964. (3rd. Ed. ) Outlines of Muhammadan Law. 
pp. 179 & 180. Oxford University Press. London. 
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of boys the father or senior male, generally referred to as the 
guardian or ' wali' , still makes a decision which serves his, the 
household's and the group's best interests and not one which respects 
the boys' or girls' preferences. 
One would expect from the above that the preferences of the senior 
males would be reflected in the marriages actually contracted, i. e. 
that hamlet endogamy 
1) 
would prevail. In fact the reverse is true. 
82 % of marriages in the ten hamlets where statistical material was 
collected were hamlet exogamous and only 18 % took place between 
members of the same hamlet (see diag. 15 p. 176). The situation in 
the individual hamlets is not, of course, as extreme as the figure of 
82 % would suggest because this is an average. In one hamlet, for 
example, 31 % of the marriages were hamlet endogamous. However the 
percentages of hamlet endogamy in the other hamlets were all smaller 
and thus support the initial assertion that hamlet exogamy preponderat- 
es. Obviously there are factors at work which generally affect the 
choices made by senior males and which influence and outweigh their 
stated preferences. It is my intention now to outline the marriage 
patterns and trends observable in the ten hamlets and to try to 
explain the predominant hamlet exogamy by a) reference to theories 
relating to exogamy and endogamy and by b) considering the interests 
of the senior males to see whether these can best be satisfied through 
hamlet exogamy. 
Statistical Material 
The ten hamlets utilised for statistical purposes, although being 
principally situated in the middle of the community, were nevertheless 
1) I am not using the term 'endogamy' here, or below, in the sense of a 
rule prescribing marriage within particular groups but merely as a 
paraphrase for marriages occurring between members of a defined 
group, in this case 'hamlet' endogamy. Similarly 'exogamy' does not 
involve a prescription for out-marriages but merely those marriages 
contracted outside named groups, e. g. ' hamlet' exogamy. 
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824 population 
477 males 
347 females 
406 marriages recorded 
18 To hamlet endogamous marriages 
82 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
100 % 
31 % hamlet endogamy 
women, given 
69 To hamlet exogamy 
100 % 
23 To hamlet endogamy 
women taken 
77 % hamlet exogamy 
100 % 
15. Totals and Averages for all ten Hamlets 
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representative of the whole (see map VII. p. 54 where the numbered 
hamlets represent those used for the statistics). My main reason for 
thinking this is that their distribution covers most of the special 
factors which might emerge from geographical locality. For example 
one of these hamlets, s' aadat xel (1) (see map VII), is located on the 
border of the non-Safi section of the valley and three hamlets dali 
xel (8), zakir (7) and batan (4) are situated close to the putative khel 
boundaries, thus it is possible to receive some idea of marriages 
made by border hamlets and to see how far khel membership affects 
marriage links. 
Unfortunately, however, these ten hamlets are located in only two of 
the four major khels 
1) 
and my information from the other two khels 
is very limited. This is disadvantageous principally because I have 
thus no detailed information about marriages in those hamlets which 
border on the two major valleys of Nijrao and Tagao. However it 
would seem from the comments of villagers in these areas that 
marriages were made predominantly with the hamlets of neighbouring 
khels and that the numbers of affinal bonds created with Tagao and 
Nijrao were not above the general average for the community as a 
whole. If these comments are correct then marriage connections 
made in the other two khels would conform, generally speaking, with 
those made in those khels where I was able to collect detailed 
information and the representative quality of the ten hamlets would 
seem to be justified. 
Although the hamlets may be representative there are often 
considerable variations between them in the percentages of marriages 
made with, for example, other hamlets of their own khels. The 
marriage patterns therefore - by 'patterns' I mean the flow of 
1) There is a fifth khel, saliH khel, but as this khel only has one hamlet, 
saliH kuli, within its boundaries it hardly plays a role in the present 
'discussion. 
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marriages measured in percentages 
1) 
from one hamlet to another 
hamlet, to another khel, area, etc. - which are observable are 
not always as convincing and illustrative as the researcher might 
have hoped. Also the hamlet of duman (barbers) cannot be considered 
in general terms along with the other hamlets because of the special 
factors (caste-like endogamy etc. ) which influence choices. It, there- 
fore, will be dealt with separately. Nevertheless general trends do 
emerge which provide a basis for analysis and set some limit on 
speculation. 
Patterns and Trends 
One such trend is hamlet exogamy. In all ten hamlets inter-hamlet 
marriage constitutes, as we have seen, 82 % of the marriages and 
intra-hamlet only 18 %. These. figures, however, represent all 
marriages undertaken by the villagers and not just those contracted 
by the male residents. The percentages for the latter are somewhat 
different. 77 % of the women taken as wives by the hamlet members 
were from other hamlets whilst 23 % were from their own hamlets 
(see diag. 15 p. 176 ). If we then look at the statistics for hamlet 
women given to men from other hamlets (also diag. 15) the 
percentage of hamlet exogamy is further reduced to 69 %. The 
overall picture of hamlet exogamy nevertheless remains 
2). 
There 
are variations from hamlet to hamlet but only one hamlet, manap xel 
(9) (diag. 24 p. 187), has a larger percentage of endogamous 
1) As the size of the hamlets varied considerably - from 44 to 141 - it 
was necessary for comparitive purposes to use percentages instead 
of numbers when referring to marriages. They do, however, have 
the drawback that, for example, two marriages made by a small 
hamlet may represent 15 % of its total marriages whereas the same 
number of marriages for a larger hamlet will only represent 2% of 
its marriages. This can lead to some confusion especially when 
comparing symmetrical and asymmetrical exchanges of women. 
2) It is difficult to say how typical this hamlet exogamy is for Pakhtuns 
in Afghanistan because there is no comparable material. The inform- 
ation presented by Barth (1965. Op. cit. p. 41) for Swat (Pakistan) 
is unfortunately not comparable because although the percentages 
(70 % village exogamy, 30 % village endogamy) are similar the multi- 
caste nature of Swat villages and caste endogamy lead automatically 
to high percentages of inter-village marriage. 
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16. (1) s'aadat xel 
46 
26 
20 
(rahli) pirozai khel 
population 
males 
females 
26 recorded marriages 
0 parallel cousin marriages 
0 cross cousin marriages 
0 polygynous marriages 
0 divorces 
12 % hamlet endogamous marriages 
88 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
14 % hamlet endogamy women 
86 % hamlet exogamy ) given 
15 % hamlet endogamy women 
85 % hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
29 % pirozai w. g. 
15 % .. W. 
t. 
29 % Haidär Khel w. g. 
40 % .. w. t. 
0 % audel khel w. g. 
0 % .. W. 
t. 
0 % hdud khel ma w. g. 
0 % .. w. 
t. 
0 % _ sa1iH khel w. g. 
0 % .. w. 
t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
13 % Pachoghan w. g. 
5 % w. t. 
0 % Ghain w. g. 
25 % w. t. 
29 % Tagao w. g. 
5 % .. W. 
t. 
0 % Nijrao w. g. 
0 % W. t. 
0 % Elsewhere w. g. 
10 % W. t. 
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17. (2) Hajian (taxti) Haidar khel 
87 
50 
37 
37 
6 (16 %) 
0 
4 (14 %) 
0 
24 % 
76 % 
38 % 
62 % 
33 % 
67 % 
population 
males 
females 
recorded marriages 
parallel cousin marriages 
cross cousin marriages 
polygynous marriages 
divorces 
hamlet endogamous marriages 
hamlet exogamous marriages 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
19 % pirozai w. g. 
14 % 
., W. t. 75 % Haidar Khel w. g. 
67 w. t. 
0 % audel khel w. g. 
0 % 
 w. t. 0 % maahdud khel w. g. 
7 % 
.. w. t. 0 % saliH khel w. g. 
4 % 0, W. t. 
marriages outside AfEhaniva 
0 % Pachoghan w. g. 
0 % . w. to 0 % Ghain w. g. 
4 % .. wo to 0 % Tagao w. g. 
0 % 
.. w. to 
6 % Nijrao w. g. 
4 % w. t. 
0 % Elsewhere w. g. 
0 
/0 .. w. 
t. 
100 % 100 % 
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18. (3) amam xel (raghli) Haidar khel 
100 population 
58 males 
42 females 
46 recorded marriages 
1 (2 %) parallel cousin marriages 
1 (2 %) cross cousin marriages 
2 (7 %) polygynous marriages 
0 divorces 
11 % hamlet endogamous marriages 
89 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
21 % hamlet endogamy) women 
79 % hamlet exogamy ) given 
13 % hamlet endogamy) women 
87 % hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
21 % pirozai w. g. 
14 % w. t. 
47 % Haidar khel w. g. 
57 % ., w. t. 
5 To audel khel w. g. 
6 % .. W. t. 
0% maghdud khel w. g. 
3 % ., w. 
t. 
0% _ saliH khel w. g. 
0 % .. W. t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
5 % Pachoghan w. g. 
3 % W. t. 
0 % Ghain w. g. 
0 % W. t. 
17 % Tagao w. g. 
11 % w. t. 
0 % Nijrao w. g. 
3 % W. t. 
5 % Elsewhere w. g. 
3 % w. t. 
100 % 100 % 
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(rahli) Haidar khel 
19. (4) bata. n 
58 population 
28 males 
30 females 
26 recorded marriages 
0 parallel cousin marriages 
0 cross cousin marriages 
0 polygynous marriages 
2 (8 %) divorces 
12 % hamlet endogamous marriages 
88 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
18 % hamlet endogamy women 
82 % hamlet exogamy ) given 
18 % hamlet endogamy 
women 
82 % hamlet exogamy )' taken 
khel marriages 
18 % pirozai w. g. 
12 % ., W. 
t. 
35 % Haidar khel w. g. 
47 % .. W. t. 0 % audel khel w. g. 
6 % .. w. 
t. 
27 % mayhdud khel w. g. 
17 % W. t. 
0 % saliH khel w. g. 
0 % ., w. t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
0 % Pachoghan w. g. 
0 % .. W. 
t. 
0 % Ghain w. g. 
6 % .. W. 
t. 
0 % Tagao w. g. 
6 % W. t. 
9 To Nijrao w. g. 
0 % w. t. 
9 % Elsewhere w. g. 
6 % w. t. 
100 % 100 % 
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20. (5) maidani 
102 
61 
41 
66 
1 (1,5 %) 
2(3%) 
1 (2 %) 
5 (7.5 %) 
30 % 
70 % 
35 % 
65 % 
33 % 
67 % 
(raýhli) 
4% 
48 % 
4% 
13 %. 
0% 
15 % 
52 % 
4% 
4% 
0% 
Haidar khel 
population 
males 
females 
recorded marriages 
parallel cousin marriages 
cross cousin marriages 
polygynous marriages 
divorces 
hamlet endogamous marriages 
hamlet exogamous marriages 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
pirozai w. g. 
w. t. 
Haidar khel w. g. 
W. t. 
audel khel w. g. 
 w. t. 
maghdud khel w. g. 
,, 
w. t. 
sa1iH khel w. g. 
W. t. 
marriages outside Afghani-va 
4% 
0% 
9% 
9% 
9% 
7% 
0% 
7% 
0% 
10 % 
Pachoghan w. g. 
. W. 
t. 
Ghain w. g. 
W. t. 
Tagao w. g. 
.. W. t. Ni j rao W. g. 
., W. 
t. 
Elsewhere w. g. 
.. W. t. 
100 % 100 % 
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21. (6) duman (ra 1i) pirozai 
51 population 
30 males 
21 females 
17 recorded marriages 
4 (23 %) parallel cousin marriages 
1 (5 %) cross cousin marriages 
0 polygynous marriages 
0 divorces 
23 % hamlet endogamous marriages 
77 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
40 % hamlet endogamy women 
60 % hamlet exogamy ) given 
29 % hamlet endogamy women 
71 % hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriage 
0 % pirozai w. g. 
7 % .. w. 
t. 
0 % Haidar khel w. g. 
0 % .. w. t. 
20 % audel khel w. g. 
7 % ., w. 
t. 
0 % maýhdud khel w. g. 
14 % W. t. 
0 % saliH khel w. g. 
0 % w. t. 
marriages outside Afghani-va 
0% Pachoghan w. g. 
0 % W. t. 
0% Ghain w. g. 
0 % W. t. 
40 % Tagao w. g. 
29 % ., w. t. 
0% Nijrao w. g. 
14 % 
.. W. 
t. 
0% Elsewhere w. g. 
0 % w. t. 
100 % 100 % 
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22. (7) zakir xel 
58 
36 
22 
(taxti) pirozai 
population 
males 
females 
17 recorded marriages 
1 (4 %) parallel cousin marriages 
0 cross cousin marriages 
2 (12 %) polygynous marriages 
0 divorces 
12 % hamlet endogamous marriages 
88 % hamlet exogamous marriages 
33 % hamlet endogamy women 
67 % hamlet exogamy ) given 
13 % hamlet endogamy women 
87 % hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
67 To pirozai w. g. 
20 % ., W. t. 33 % Haidar khel w. g. 
54 % W. t. 
0 % audel khel w. g. 
13 W. t. 
0 % mayhdud khel w. g. 
13 W. t. 
0 % sa1iH khel w. g. 
0 % .. w. t. 
marriages outside Afahaniya 
0 % Pachoghan w. g. 
0 % .. w. t. 
0 % Ghain w. g. 
0 % w. t. 
0 % Tagao w. g. 
0 % W. t. 
0 % Nijrao w. g. 
0 % 
.. w. t. 
0 % Elsewhere w. g. 
0 % .. w. t. 
100 % 100 % 
- 186 - 
23. (8) dali xel 
44 
29 
15 
26 
0 
0 
2 (12 %) 
1 (4 
0% 
100 % 
0 0/0 
100 % 
0 TO 
100 % 
(taxti) 
33 % 
22 % 
33 % 
0% 
0% 
12 % 
18 % 
29 % 
0% 
0. % 
pirozai 
population 
males 
females 
recorded marriages 
parallel cousin marriages 
cross cousin marriages 
polygynous marriages 
divorces 
hamlet endogamous marriages 
hamlet exogamous marriages 
hamlet endogamy ) women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
pirozal w. g. 
W. t. 
Haidar khel w. g. 
W. t. 
audel khel w. g. 
.. 
W. t. 
mayhdud khel w. g. 
w. t. 
sa1iH khel w. g. 
W. t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
0% 
0% 
12 % 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
41 % 
0% 
0% 
Pachoghan w. g. 
W. t. 
Ghain w. g. 
*0 W. 
t. 
Tagao w. g, 
W. t. 
Nijrao w. g. 
.. w. t. Elsewhere w. g. 
.. w. t. 
100 % 100% 
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24. (9) manap xel 
137 
80 
. 57 
68 
7 (10 %) 
1 (1 %) 
5 (8 %) 
1 (1 %) 
31 % 
69 % 
65 % 
35 % 
33 % 
67 % 
(taxti) pirozai 
population 
males 
females 
recorded marriages 
parallel cousin marriages 
cross cousin marriages 
polygynous marriages 
divorces 
hamlet endogamous marriages 
hamlet exogamous marriages 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) taken 
khel marriages 
80 % 
56 % 
5 % 
10 % 
0 % 
13 To 
0 % 
10 % 
0 % 
0 % 
pirozai w. g. 
w. t. 
Haidar khel w. g. 
 w. t. 
audel khel w. g. 
w. t. 
mayhdud khel w. g. 
w. t. 
saliH khel w. g. 
 w. 
t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
0 % 
5 % 
0 0/0 
0 % 
5 % 
3 % 
5 % 
0 0/0 
5 
3 % 
100 % 100 % 
Pachoghan w. g. 
W. t. 
Ghain w. g. 
., w. t. 
Tagao w. g. 
.. W. t. 
Nijrao w. g. 
W. t. 
Elsewhere w. g. 
.. W. t. 
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25. (10) wali xan xel (taxti) 
141 
79 
62 
77 
3 (4 %) 
1 (1 %) 
10 (17 %) 
5 (6 %) 
26 % 
74 % 
48 % 
52 % 
38 % 
62 % 
53 % 
57 % 
17 % 
21 % 
5 % 
5 % 
5 
3 % 
3 % 
2 % 
0 % 
0% 
0 % 
0% 
10 % 
9 10 
0 % 
0% 
7 % 
3% 
100 % 100 % 
pirozai 
population 
males 
females 
recorded marriages 
parallel cousin marriages 
cross cousin marriages 
polygynous marriages 
divorces 
hamlet endogamous marriages 
4 
hamlet exogamous marriages 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
hamlet endogamy women 
hamlet exogamy ) given 
khel marriages 
pirozal w. g. 
 w. t. 
Haidar khel w. g. 
W. t. 
audel khel w. g. 
, 
W. t. 
mahdud khel j w. g. 
W. t. 
sa1iH khel w. g. 
,, w. t. 
marriages outside Afghaniya 
Pachoghan w. g. 
 w. t. Ghain w. g. 
w. t. 
Tagao w. g. 
W. t. 
Nijrao w. g. 
 w. t. 
Elsewhere w. g. 
W. t. 
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marriages than exogamous ones (65 % to 35 %) and this occurs only 
in the sector of hamlet women given to male fellow villagers. The 
male residents by contrast took only 33 % of their wives from their 
own hamlet preferring to take 67 % of their wives from other 
hamlets (see diag. 24 p. 187 ). Interestingly enough in all hamlets 
the percentages of hamlet women married endogamously (31 %) is 
greater than that of hamlet men married within the hamlet (23 %) 
(see diag. 15 p. 176 ). There would, therefore, seem to be a 
preference to give daughters to agnates and fellow villagers rather 
than to take daughters-in-law from them. This is perhaps not 
surprising because the status of a woman-giving group is, unless 
there is an exchange of women, generally considered lower than 
that of the wife-taking one. Marriage among agnates or fellow 
villagers would not usually involve such questions of status and 
would thus be a preferred form for the wife-givers. 
Other conclusions are possible if one looks a little more closely at 
hamlet endogamy. Of the nine hamlets (excluding duman for reasons 
mentioned above) only one, dali xel (8), has made no hamlet in- 
marriages at least over the last two or three generations (see diag. 
23 p. 186 ). The other eight hamlets have contracted between 11 % 
and 31 % of their marriages within the hamlet. As dali xel is the 
smallest (44 inhabitants) of all the hamlets the availability of suitable 
marriage partners may have played a role in producing this situation 
(see also below p. 192 ). This is supported by the fact that three of 
the four largest hamlets all with populations over 100 have the 
highest percentages (26 %, 31 % and 30 %) of hamlet endogamy. The 
exceptions are amam xel (3) which, with a population of 100, only has 
11 % hamlet endogamous marriages (see diag. 18) and Hajian (2) 
whose population of 87 should, bring with it a smaller percentage of 
hamlet endogamy than in fact it does i. e. 24 % (see diag. 17 p. 180). 
Nevertheless a relationship between population size and the availability 
of partners would seem to be established. 
Hajiän (2) also has, with 16 %, the highest percentage of parallel 
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cousin marriages. This is not surprising as the hamlet has a high 
percentage of hamlet endogamy and is made up of one minor lineage 
with only two attached ajnabiyan households. The chances, therefore, 
of hamlet internal marriages being also parallel cousin ones are 
very high. This situation is reflected in those hamlets with a single 
lineage and only small attached groups, i. e. wali xan xel (10) and 
zakir xel (7) both with 4% (see diags. 25 and 22). The exception 
this time is provided by manap xel (9) (diag. 24). Although this 
hamlet has three separate minor lineages it has made 10 % of its 
marriages with parallel cousins. This may be explainable by its 
size, i. e. it is one of the largest hamlets, and, therefore, it would 
fall under the generalization made above about hamlet size and 
available partners. The three smallest dali xel (8), batan (4) and 
s' aadat xel (1) have made no parallel or cross cousin marriages 
and thus give added support to this argument. In summary, if these 
arguments are correct, then the statistics for hamlet endogamy show 
firstly that the frequency of endogamous marriages is affected by 
hamlet size i. e. partner availability and secondly that the frequency 
of parallel cousin marriages is influenced by both hamlet size and 
the inclusiveness of the hamlet minor lineage. 
Another trend would seem to be the preference to take and give 
women within their own khels. Thus six of the nine hamlets have 
higher percentages of marriages, in terms of women given and 
women taken, with hamlets of their own khels than with those of 
any other khel. One of the six, wali xan xel (10) (diag. 25) for 
example, gave 53 % of its marriageable women and took 57 % of its 
wives from hamlets within its own khel, pirozai. In the three 
hamlets, where khel endogamy was not predominant, two, dali xel 
(8) and zakir xel (7), took a larger percentage of their wives (29 % 
and 54%respectively) from other khels and s' aadat xel (1) gave an 
equal percentage (29 %) of its daughters to its own khel, to pirozai 
and to Tagao (see diags. 23,22 & 16). As these three hamlets are 
located close to khel boundaries and s' aadat xel (1) is near 
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Afghaniya' s border with the rest of the Pachoghan valley such 
preferences may be a consequence of geographical location. In 
general, however, the clear preference for khel endogamy in six of 
the nine hamlets would seem to indicate that the senior males are 
satisfying their wishes for marriages with agnates or fellow 
villagers (seen in these cases as lineage members) at the level of 
the major lineage. 
A further trend visible is the wide dispersal of marriage connections 
made by most of the hamlets. The extent of these connections is 
indicated by the fact that the four largest hamlets - wali xan xel (10), 
manap xel (9), maidani (5) and amam xel (3) - have links which 
extend in each case to almost half of the total hamlets of Afghaniya 
(see diags. 26 & 27 pp. 189 & 190 ) as well as to numerous hamlets 
and villages in Tagao and Nijrao. The smaller hamlets have 
correspondingly less connections nevertheless the smallest hamlet, 
dali xel (8), with only 44 inhabitants has made marriage links with 
ten other hamlets nine of which are in Afghaniya and one outside. 
There would, therefore, seem to be some preference for, or interest 
in, dispersed ties although, as we have seen above, the dispersion 
takes place principally with proximate hamlets within the respective 
hamlet's own khel. 
These dispersed inter-hamlet ties would seem generally to be based 
on reciprocity. In cases where a number of marriages take place 
between hamlets there is usually some sort of balance in terms of 
women given and women taken. This fact is somewhat disguised 
firstly by the considerable discrepancy in all ten hamlets between the 
numbers of women reported to me as having been given and those 
reported as having been taken 
1) 
and secondly by my use of percent- 
1) See also Randolph and Coult (R. R. & A. D. 1968. A Computer 
Analysis of Bedouin Marriage. p. 94. S. W. J. A. vol. 24. no. 1) who 
observed the same discrepancy among the Hawaashleh. They put this 
down to the asymmetrical exchange of women between the Hawaashleh 
and other descent groups based on the higher status and political 
(p. t. o. ) 
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ages in the statistical material instead of numbers (see also above 
footnote 1 p. 178 ). Nevertheless marriages, for example, between 
wali xan xel (10) and nizam xel, and dali xel (8) and bada xel (diags. 
26 & 27) are more or less balanced and the picture may be repeated 
for a number of other hamlets. This reciprocal inter-hamlet marriage 
is, according to case histories, often the result of an inter-family 
exchange of daughters but it also occurs in different generations, i. e. 
a woman being taken in one generation and her daughter being return- 
ed in the next, and between families whose members have met on the 
occasion of another marriage 
1). 
It is clear that not all hamlets have 
this balanced reciprocity but in the majority of the cases where there 
is an imbalance the percentages represent only one or two marriages. 
Where, however, a considerable imbalance is indicated, for example, 
between maidani (5) and jar kuli (see diag. 26) there may be some 
implicit recognition of the superiority of the women taker's hamlet 
2) 
There is also generally a balanced exchange of women in the case of 
marriages made with Tagao. Only two hamlets, zakir xel (7) and Hajiari 
(2), have no links (see diags. 22 & 17). All other hamlets have 
connections of varying strengths (3 % to 41 %). By contrast links with 
Nijrao, the other major valley, are much weaker both in terms of 
numbers and percentages of the total marriages of hamlets. This 
strength of the Hawaashleh. In Afghaniya, however, this cannot be the 
case because all hamlets provided similar statistics and somewhere 
there must be a hamlet or hamlets which are giving more women than 
they are taking. It would seem, therefore, that either the evidence was 
being altered in order to give the impression in each case that that 
hamlet had a high status or evidence concerning women was being with- 
held. 
1) A marriage sets forces in motion which lead to reciprocity because the 
girl giving group then have a 'claim' to a woman from the girl takers. 
See also Marx, E. 1967. Bedouin of the Negev. p. 120. Manchester 
University Press, Manchester. 
2) In a society where women are only given to equals or superiors a 
hamlet which gives a considerably larger number of its women to 
another hamlet than it receives from that hamlet should, one would 
think, regard itself as possessing lower status. See also Randolph and 
Coult. 1968. Op. cit. p. 94. 
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preference for Tagao may be the result of the Afghaniya Pakhtuns 
considered Tagao origins and their desire to marry, where possible, 
within the Pakhtun community. It is also partly the result of those 
' ajnabiyan' living in Afghaniya who continue to maintain marriage 
links with their villages of origin in Tagao. Whatever the reasons 
they have proved strong enough to, in general, offset the advantages 
of Nijrao - proximity to and accessability for Afghaniya, local 
government centre etc. - as a potential area for marriage connections. 
A factor influencing the overall picture but not apparent from the 
statistics are the groups and families of ajnabiyan who are attached 
through marriages to the core members of their hamlets. In four 
hamlets marriage connections have provided the reasons for the 
ajnabiyan settling or have strengthened the political position of these 
groups after the purchase of land. Thus in these hamlets the 
percentages of hamlet endogamy have been artificially highered by the 
temporary needs of newly attached groups. This means that the actual 
percentages of hamlet endogamy among the taxti and ragh1i are 
smaller than the statistics would indicate. 
So far we have looked at trends observable in nine of the ten hamlets 
from which material was collected. The tenth hamlet, duman, was 
considered too atypical to be utilised for generalizations because of 
the constraints on marriage choices. This is particularly apparent in 
terms of khel endogamy. Although duman (6) is geographically located 
in the khel of pirozai it has only made one marriage connection (7 %) 
with this khel. Marriages with hamlets in other khels have been made, 
with one exception, with other barber families living in these Safi 
hamlets or with low 'caste' people such as weavers. The majority of 
their marriage links have been made within the hamlet (40 % women 
given and 29 % women taken) or with Tagao (40 % w. g. and 29 % 
w. t. see diag. 21 p. 184 ). The reasons for these trends are the low 
status of the barbers, explained above, and the resulting reluctance of 
other groups to intermarry with them. It is also, however, a 
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consequence of the special needs of the barbers themselves because 
they prefer to have wives capable of fulfilling those duties expected 
of barber's wives. The result is a caste-like endogamy with 
occasional hypergamy. 
Excluding the case of the barbers six general trends emerge from 
the statistical material. Firstly hamlet exogamy constitutes the vast 
majority of marriages made in all nine hamlets. Secondly hamlet 
endogamy and parallel cousin marriage occur with the greatest 
frequency in those hamlets which have the largest populations and 
therefore there would seem to be some relationship between the 
availability of partners and hamlet in-marriages. Thirdly khel 
endogamous marriages are preferred to khel exogamous ones. 
Fourthly marriage connections generally lead to reciprocal marriage 
ties, i. e. there is approximate parity in numbers of women being 
given and taken between any two hamlets. Fifthly marriage links are 
widely dispersed both within and outside Afghaniya. Sixthly and 
finally Tagao, the Pakhtun and Safi centre of the region, is 
Afghaniya' s principal external source and recipient of wives. 
This hamlet exogamy and the wide dispersion of marriage links are 
the opposite of what one might expect from the preferences expressed 
by the senior males of Afghaniya. It is true that there is a high 
percentage of khel endogamy and it would seem that the senior males 
are fulfilling their preferences in this way, i. e. through marriages 
in the major lineage. But such an intention was never expressed by 
them and marriages made within the khel are not always with major 
lineage members but with families and hamlets which merely reside 
within the khel' s boundaries. Whilst khel endogamy may function as 
an 'alibi', or represent a compromise between preference and 
practice, it certainly does not explain the predominant hamlet exogamy 
or provide answers as to why the senior males take the majority of 
their daughters -in-law from, and give the majority of their daughters 
to, men from other hamlets. It is, therefore, necessary to provide 
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some explanations and answers for these phenomena. 
Explanations for Exogamous Marriage 
One of the classical explanations for exogamy, at least for its func- 
tion in unilineal societies is 'to bind together, through affinal - and 
later kinship - links, the separate groups which taken together make 
up the social aggregate. ' 
1) 
Were these groups, it is argued, not to 
be linked by marriages then the 'society' as such could no longer 
be said to exist because there would be nothing to bind the isolates 
together. In Afghaniya the social aggregate consists of a number of 
nucleated hamlets the members of which are considered as being 
united through their common patrilineal descent. The tenuousness of 
ties above the hamlet/minor lineage level have become clear from 
what has been written so far and thus one might expect that the 
political structure could be strengthened by exogamous inter-hamlet 
marriages. Also the integrity and identity of the community could 
best be upheld by such ties. One might, therefore, expect the 
exogamous marriages to be at least in part due to the desire to 
unite the community politically and to preserve its identity in the 
face of the contiguous non-Pakhtun communities. If this is the case 
it certainly is not the result of a conscious process on the part of 
the senior males of hamlets or a societal norm established to 
preserve the community. As we have seen there is no expressed 
preference for exogamy in fact the reverse and no organization or 
leadership complex exists within Afghaniya which could induce the 
heads of households. to make marital links which would serve the 
community's interests rather than those of the senior males. It is 
also questionable whether the Pakhtuns of Afghaniya would consider 
it important or necessary to unite or strengthen the community 
politically or socially through marriage. Certainly at the moment 
Afghaniya does not, and perhaps since its foundation has not, 
1) Beattie, J. 1964. Other Cultures. p. 122. Cohen and West. London. 
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required larger political groupings than those which could be provided 
by the hamlet 
1 ). 
It would, therefore, seem that although exogamous 
ties and the network of affinal and kinship links which they create do 
strengthen and integrate the community this function, at least in 
Afghaniya, has taken place accidentally as a side product of other 
interests. 
Another explanation for the preponderance of exogamous marriages in 
Afghaniya could be the dearth of suitable partners within the hamlets 
themselves. Thus exogamy would result not from preference but from 
necessity and would be judged by the villagers themselves more as a 
negative aspect of endogamy than as a positive alternative to it. This 
explanation corresponds with the expressed preferences of the senior 
agnates for endogamous marriage as well as with the low percentages 
of intra-hamlet marriages among the small hamlets. Among the 
smaller hamlets, as we have seen, dali xel (8), zakir xel (7), batan 
(4), and s' aadat xel (1) all have lower percentages of endogamous 
marriages than the larger ones thus indicating that where only a few 
partners are available more suitable choices may be made outside 
the hamlet. This information might seem to be conclusive were it 
not for duman (6) which with a population of 51 may be considered 
as belonging to the smaller hamlets (populations between 44 and 58) 
but whose percentage of endogamy (23 %) equates it clearly with the 
larger ones. However it is clear for reasons given above that 
duman is an exception within the community and that 'unsuitable' 
partners may be chosen within this hamlet because of the lack of 
alternatives outside a situation which would not be accepted or 
applicable to the other small hamlets. On the other hand one might 
argue that with the external and internal pressure exerted on duman 
to marry endogamously 23 % endogamy is a relatively low figure and 
1) It is possible, however, that men from Afghaniya took part in the 
foray between Safi tribesmen and British soldiers in 1879 (see above 
p. 139 footnote 1) and they may well, therefore, have organised them- 
selves on a supra-hamlet level: Unfortunately there is no evidence to 
say whether they took part or not. 
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that the advantages of exogamy must be considerable for them to 
provide 77 % of the total marriages of that hamlet. Whichever way it 
is argued, I think, one may draw the conclusion that inspite of the 
senior males expressed preferences for endogamy the suitability 
1) 
of 
the available partners both within and outside the hamlet plays a 
considerable role in choice. Thus within a small hamlet the range of 
choice is obviously more limited and where more is to be gained 
from an external link than an internal one then it is not surprising 
that an external marriage should be made. This would be considered 
sensible and logical by the villagers themselves and would not be seen 
as in opposition to their preference for endogamy. It is after all a 
preference and not an imperative. I think, therefore, that one can 
safely say that the relative availability of partners within the hamlet 
both in a demographic sense and in the sense of suitability for the 
interests of the household heads explains to a certain extent the 
preponderant exogamy. 
Exogamy may also be preferred in practice because the advantages of 
endogamy, or at least of parallel cousin marriage 
2), 
are insignificant 
in, or irrelevant to, the Afghaniya situation. One example of this is 
the case of inheritance. Throughout the islamic world, and Afghanistan 
provides no exception, one of the major arguments for parallel cousin 
marriage is that it keeps property within the family. However, this 
argument is only relevant when daughters inherit and this, at least as 
far as land is concerned, occurs very rarely in any islamic country. 
In Afghaniya women can and do inherit land 
3) 
and thus it would seem 
that there would be some incentive for endogamy. However if 
daughters can inherit so too can daughters-in-law, i. e. from their 
fathers, and thus exogamous marriages may equally enhance family 
fortunes not by the retention of existing land but by the acquisition of 
1) Suitability not only in terms of age and physical maturity but also in 
social, political and economic terms. 
2) I use parallel cousin marriage here in its broadest connotation, i. e. as 
in Rudolph and Coult' s article (1968. Op. cit. p. 92) where they write: 
'In a simple sense, descent group endogamy implies parallel cousin 
marriage. ' 
3) See also below pp. 264-266. 
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new. Also if women can inherit land then marriage among cousins 
brings a further threat 
1) 
to their land through the claim that the 
women as sisters can make to it. They become so to speak Trojan 
horses which must be kept out at all costs. Although such a reason 
was never given a marriage between cousins can only strengthen the 
potential claim to fields which cousins already have through their 
relationships of descent and neighbourship. 
Another example may be seen in Barth' s suggestion that parallel 
cousin marriage ' ... plays a 
prominent role in solidifying the 
minimal lineage as a corporate group in factional struggle. ' 
2) In 
Afghaniya it is true that parallel cousin marriage strengthens the 
immediate group concerned by multiplying the ties between members 
but it is also clear as we have seen that only a small percentage of 
such marriages take place. One reason for this is that armed 
factional struggles or cases of extreme physical violence both of 
which would unite the local descent groups (koranai) now occur 
relatively rarely. Another reason may be that the government, to a 
large extent in such cases, interposes itself between conflicting 
parties and as a result the direct physical support of agnates which 
was formerly of vital importance is no longer as decisive as it used 
to be. Thus marriage links which previously were reserved for strengthen- 
ing the immediate agnatic group are relieved for other purposes and 
utilised to meet the demands of changing circumstances. This is not to 
say that parallel cousin marriage as a means of uniting and strengthening 
the agnatic group is no longer valid but that the decline of the koranai has 
lead to a reduction in the number of marriages made to solidify it for 
factional struggle. 
A final example for the relative insignificance of endogamy for Afgha- 
niya is that of Murphy and Kasdan 
3) 
who suggest that parallel 
1) The others are inheritance in general and having adjoining fields, the 
shaf' a. 
2) Barth, F. 1954. Father's Brother's Daughter's Marriage in Kurdi- 
stan. SWJA. No. 10 p. 171. 
3) Murphy, R. F. & Kasdan, L. 1959. The Structure of Parallel Cousin 
Marriage. A. A. vol. 61. pp. 17-29. 
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cousin marriage underlies an extreme fissional process one function 
of which is to promote segmentation. This segmentation they say is 
necessary for the persistance and viability of, in their case, Bedouin 
society because it integrates larger social units vertically, through 
patrilineal descent, but at the same time allows them to fractionate 
into microsections giving the whole resilience and adaptability. As 
we have seen the percentages of parallel cousin marriage in the 
hamlets of Afghaniya are small nevertheless segmentation occurs and 
the Safi tribe as a whole although split up into a number of geogra- 
phically separate units maintains its identity. It would seem, there- 
fore, that other mechanisms are at work here or that those created 
by parallel cousin marriage are not necessary in, the Afghan situation. 
As the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan play a significantly different role in 
their society than do the Bedouin in theirs the latter suggestion may 
be the most relevant. 
It is evident from the above that the lack of suitable partners in the 
hamlets themselves and the relative unsuitability or irrelevance of 
hamlet endogamy for Afghaniya provide only part of the answer for 
the proponderant hamlet exogamy. The other and perhaps major part 
of the answer is, I feel, to be found in an analysis of the interests 
pursued by the heads of households when contracting marriages for 
their sons or daughters. If these interests can best be satisfied by 
inter-hamlet rather than intra-hamlet connections the dominance of 
exogamy in Afghaniya would, I think, be explained. I propose, there- 
fore, to portray the possible advantages to be gained through affinal 
connections and to see whether these may best be achieved through 
exogamy or endogamy. 
Interests pursued by Senior Males 
In Afghaniya, as I have shown above, both partners to a marriage 
have 'walis' or guardians who are responsible for them. These men 
are generally the senior agnates of households and in the majority of 
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cases the fathers of the boys and girls concerned. As islamic 
jurisprudence 'empowers a father to impose the state of marriage on 
his minor children' 
1), 
the decision as to whom the future marriage 
partner will be is firmly in the hands of the senior males of hamlets. 
This is also upheld by custom and tradition and by sanctions which 
inhibit independent marital activity on the part of sons and 
daughters 2). The almost total exclusion of the wishes of the subjects 
of 'marriages - the exceptions being the economically independent 
sons - enables the senior males to pursue their interests undisturbed 
and to create and manipulate relationships by the monopoly which 
they have in choosing wives for sons and accepting sons-in-law for 
daughters 3). The potential gains to be made from marriage 
connections which are carefully and judicially created are considerable. 
But much depends upon the skill and abilities of the senior males to 
make the correct choices and these choices, in turn, are based on a 
careful calculation of the advantages which will accrue from one 
particular connection rather than from another. Of course the 
advantages which the senior agnates hope to gain through marriage 
connections will vary to some extent from household to household 
according to the needs or interests being pursued. Also differences 
in status, wealth, and political strength do exist among the families 
of Afghaniya and these are reflected in the choices being made. 
However in comparison with other Pakhtun areas (Swat, Uruzgan) 
these differences are small because the majority of the heads of 
families are owner-cultivators and generally speaking the interests 
or gains which I will present below are applicable to and attainable 
by most households. This is not to say that they are always realised 
because competition between households does exist and circumstances 
change but in general the motivation for finally choosing a bride or 
accepting a groom is to be found among the interests listed below. 
1) See above p. 174 footnote 3. 
2) It is, however, not totally excluded because forms of marriage 
contracted without the consent of the walis do exist. See below pp. 223- 
226. 
3) See also Marx. 1967. Op. cit. p. 102. 
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xekhi 
The minimal gains which both groups involved in a marriage expect 
from the relationship are expressed on the day of the 'final 
decision' or prekruh by the ruibar. In order to open the discussion 
he says to the girl's father: 'these people (the boy's father and two 
or three other senior males) have come for a purpose, namely for 
the purpose of 'xekhi' and ' dosti' .'' xekhi' may be translated 
generally as 'marriage relationship' but it also refers specifically 
to a series of obligations which, at least initially, are to be 
fulfilled by both agnatic groups involved in the marriage. These 
obligations are complementary visiting and reciprocal attendance at 
the births, circumcision ceremonies, deaths and religious festivities 
of the two families. 
1) 
These obligatory activities start after the 
'final decision' has been made, continue through the various 
marriage proceedings - kozda, wada, etc. - and are pursued for 
an obligatory period of some three years after the bride has taken 
up residence in her conjugal home. Because of the obligatory nature 
of these activities ' xekhi' forces both agnatic groups to abandon a 
little of their independence and to allow, even if only for a short 
time, representatives of another group access into their internal 
affairs. They are forced to get to know each other and given the 
opportunity to assess the potential benefits which might acrue from 
the relationship. Whether the relationship continues on the same 
level of intensity after this obligatory period is over depends 
principally on the willingness of the senior agnates to propogate and 
further it. Every ceremony or festivity of the two groups is a 
testing point and should one side not be invited or having been 
invited fail to attend then the relationship is in danger. But to keep 
1) This is similar to the obligations which arise from ' teltole' 
associations mentioned by Barth among the Swat Pathan, see Barth. 
1965. Op. cit. pp. 31-35. However in Afghaniya there are no 
associations' as such but the presence of affines and cognates at 
rites de passage' is more or less obligatory and the demands of 
neighbourliness usually mean that neighbours are there also. The 
actors' therefore at births, marriages or deaths in both Swat and 
Afghaniya are the same but in Afghaniya they have no corporate 
identity as members of a named association. 
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on inviting and visiting is to keep the tie alive and thus they say 'the 
marriage relationship is an unspun thread, if you spin it it will 
become stronger if you let it go it will break' . If the senior males 
of both groups have found it to their advantage, i. e., in terms of aid 
or help received 
1) 
from the other group, or should the element of 
friendship have entered into it, then the bond will be strengthened 
and pursued. Otherwise the tie will be loosened and, allowed to 
gradually wither. Generally speaking however 'xekhi' acts as a bond 
between the two families or groups and enables both sides to assess 
the possibilities of the relationship and to utilise it to an extent which 
is agreeable to both. 
' dosti' 
Should the frequency of visiting be maintained beyond the initial, 
obligatory period then it is evident that the relationship has turned 
into something stronger and more stable. One reason for this 
stability may be the element of ' dosti' or friendship which has 
converted the affinal link into something else. ' Dosti' is a word used 
both for the marriage relationship or an aspect of that relationship 
and, for friendship in general. Unlike ' xekhi' , however, it is not 
obligatory or prescribed but is an element which it is hoped, or 
presumed, will enter into the relationship with the passage of time. 
' Dosti', as the concept which arises from marriage, results 
generally from personal attachment between members of both families 
or emanates from the realisation of the mutual benefits to be gained 
from the relationship. Both parties therefore have a genuine desire 
for its continuance and the resulting friendship may be and often is 
held more dearly than agnatic connections. Generally this is because 
one can choose one's friends but not one's agnates, secondly the 
support of one's friends is usually more whole-hearted and thirdly 
the demands of one's friends are, unlike those of one's agnates, not 
associated with a right or an obligation. A marriage which results 
1) Both these elements will be discussed below. 
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in friendship either between the fathers of the subjects involved or 
between the husband and his wife's brother(s) ensures the continuance 
of the marriage relationship and leads generally to co-operation 
between the two families at what ever level necessary or desirable. 
This is the second or other minimal gain which both parties to a 
marriage hope to acquire. It is of course difficult for senior males 
to plan for the element of friendship prior to the marriage but it is 
clear that common interests or activities which can be assessed 
beforehand provide some indication of what may be expected after the 
marriage. Once the marriage has taken place then it is up to the 
participants themselves to initiate the friendship, although this has 
usually been set in motion during the exchanges attached to the 
various ceremonies of kozda, wada and the transference of the bride 
to her conjugal home etc. 
' Dosti' as the concept for friendship in general may also, and often 
does, result from contacts other than those of a marital nature. These 
contacts may be brought about through work, through contact in the 
bazaar or tea-shops, through seasonal labour or travels etc. The 
friendship that is thus established may lead to a marriage which is 
then seen as a deepening and strengthening of the existing relationship 
by the added tie of affinity. Although in this case the marriage stems 
from the friendship and not the friendship from the marriage the ex- 
pected gains or advantages from the relationship usually have instigated 
it and influence its continuation. Where, for example, one partner is 
a shop-keeper and the other a buyer or merchant and there is an 
exchange of services such that one supplies the other at cheaper 
rates or with smuggled goods and the other provides certain and 
continuing custom then the relationship is assured and may bring with 
it further marriage connections. 
One of the principal uses to which affinal links are put is the 
creation, maintenance and consolidation of political groupings. In 
Afghaniya two forms of political grouping are the 'koranai' and the 
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' para' , the interest group or faction. Both groups have in common 
the need, for reasons which will be given in detail in the next 
chapter, to overcome internal difficulties and to strengthen the ties 
between members. In the case of the koranai the internal friction 
between members caused by proximity of residence and competition 
for resources and the unreliability of support in other than the 
most extreme cases, i. e. physical violence or murder, forces 
those koranai members who feel that something is to be gained 
from the organisation to increase the cohesion of the group through 
internal marriages. The bonds between members are multiplied in 
this way and the tone of the relationship is changed from obligation 
to inclination by the aspects of dosti and xekhi. Similarly within the 
para where the members are only tied to each other by temporary 
mutual interest the added bond of marriage between members brings 
a degree of permanence and cohesion otherwise unobtainable. 
As koranai membership does not extend outside the hamlet and para 
rarely ramify beyond neighbouring hamlets those senior males who 
wish to strengthen their koranai or para ties can only do so by 
hamlet endogamous marriages or marriages with proximate hamlets. 
Although the effectiveness of such ties is constantly demonstrated in 
the struggles over fields, debts, etc., (see below chap. 10 pp. 263 f. ) 
their numbers, at least those made within the hamlet, are small. 
This would seem to indicate that the number of marriage links being 
made at present is sufficient for the senior males' needs, the result, 
as tentatively suggested above, of the koranai being replaced in some 
of its functions by the para, the maliks and the local government. 
This does not mean that political links are only made with or within 
groups. Heads of families and households also seek political 
support by contracting marriages with other families or individuals 
where these have political power or authority. For example marriages 
with maliks, clerks, policemen etc., do occur and these secure both 
temporary political help and long term benefits. In these cases 
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proximity of residence, although desired, does not play such an 
important role - the rapid gathering of forces in times of need 
typical for koranai and para is in such cases excluded by the fact 
that the connection is on an individual rather than a group basis - 
and more distant marriages are contracted. 
Economic Interests 
Proximate marriages but not necessarily hamlet endogamous ones 
would occur if fathers were to place economic interests at the head 
of possible gains to be made from marriage. This is because 
economic support in whatever form and aid and help can best be 
given when both households are geographically close to each other. 
That economic advantages do play a part in the choice of partners 
is evidenced by case studies which indicate that prior to, during 
and after marriages money, goods and services are being exchanged 
between the two parties. The actual weight given to economic inter- 
ests by the fathers of marriageable boys and girls when choosing 
partners is difficult to assess especially as decisions are made on 
the basis of a number of factors. In some cases, however, it is 
clear that economic advantages were paramount. In two, for 
example, of the ten hamlets mentioned above senior males have 
presented their sons-in-law with land on marriage. This is not 
unusual but results generally from situations where the fathers-in- 
law have no sons and often no brothers, and can expect no sons 
from additional marriages 
1 ). 
The presentation of land binds the 
son-in-law to his father-in-law in the way that a son is bound to 
his father. In order that this bond may be as strong as possible 
fathers-in-law without male children often choose strangers or 
landless men from other hamlets as husbands for their daughters. 
Landed men or men from the hamlet would have other interests and 
1) See also E. Friedl. 1971. Dowry, Inheritance and Land Tenure. 
p. 135. In: Kinship. ed. J. Goody. Penguin Modern Sociology 
Readings. Penguin Books. 
- 208 - 
be independent of their fathers-in-law whereas strangers and landless 
men would live in their wives' hamlets where the fathers can ensure 
that they, i. e. the daughters, are treated well and where the 
uxorilocal residence would lead to complete integration. The economic 
advantages for the landless men are of course considerable and their 
material advancement more than compensates them for the economic 
and social dependence on their fathers-in-law. 
Not all marriages have such clear economic advantages but the 
majority do serve economic interests at one stage or another. Sons- 
in-law, for example, are often given monetary support for the 
purchase of household goods or agricultural stock or equipment by 
their fathers-in-law and the former are usually engaged in helping 
the latter when extra hands are needed for ploughing, harvesting, etc. 
Marriage generally also facilitates borrowing of animals, equipment, 
radios, pots and pans etc., and jobs requiring additional labour such 
as house building, harvesting and ' ashar' call heavily upon affinal 
links. More specifically marriages enable affines, in periods of 
drought, to make a claim to water from an affinally related hamlet 
where spring water, i. e. constant water, is available. Also an 
owner cultivator with insufficient land for his own purposes may well 
be able to use his affinal connections to lay first claim to share 
crop the extra land of a father-in-law, son-in-law, or brother-in- 
law. Finally alliances between shopkeepers or between shopkeepers 
and buyers or truck drivers play an important role in improving the 
economic situation of both in the sense that I have mentioned above 
(see p. 205 ). 
Monetary Gains 
The monetary gain to be made from marriage, i. e. from the bride- 
wealth payment, does not, by contrast, benefit both sides or at least 
does not satisfy all parties to the contract. This is largely because 
there is a certain amount of shame and embarrassement attached to 
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both trying to obtain a wife as cheaply as possible and to trying to 
give away a daughter as expensively as possible. The fathers or 
guardians would of course never openly admit to trying to do either 
at least if such actions could be construed as an attempt to further 
monetary interests. To demand a large bride-wealth for a daughter 
is not shameful in itself but is rather indicative of the high prestige 
of the family and the honour of the girl. However to ask for too high 
a bride-wealth payment or to give the girl to social inferiors is 
dishonourable because it indicates that pecuniary interests are being 
placed above those of honour. Nevertheless a certain number of 
such marriages have taken place in Afghaniya and will continue to 
take place. This is understandable, given the economic conditions in 
Afghaniya. 
The valley, as we have seen, is overpopulated, holdings are too 
small and job alternatives outside the community are largely in- 
adquate. Many men are, therefore, in Afghan terms "hungry, and 
it is not surprising that when the opportunity arises to acquire what 
is for them a very considerable sum of money and goods, i. e. the 
bride-wealth, that they should seek to obtain the maximum possible 
amount even if this should be considered dishonourable. Similarly 
when sons have to be married it is understandable that the fathers 
should, in some cases, choose non-Pakhtun girls because, as the 
bride-wealth payment is smaller, these can be acquired more cheaply. 
In practice the monetary interests. of the fathers or guardians can be 
pursued in a number of ways. If the ' walis' require money urgently 
and no other possibility for acquiring it is open to them then they 
will try to obtain it through the bride-wealth for their daughters. This 
means that the amount of the bride-wealth will play a superordinate 
role in the 'final decision' and that all other factors which normally 
would be considered, such as economic and political support, status 
etc., will be subordinated. This often leads to marriages between 
families of differing social status because those families with lower 
status see an opportunity in such marriages for increasing their 
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standing in the community and as they are prepared to sacrifice more, 
1. e. pay a higher bride-wealth or give a higher proportion than is 
usual of the bride-wealth payment in money 
1) 
they are often success- 
ful in their suit. Similarly the girl' s family' s need for money and 
for its acquisition in a relatively short period of time make the 
courtship of lower status families acceptable and break down the 
usual inhibitions of the girl' s father. The actual percentage of such 
marriages which take place is understandably difficult to assess 
because of a certain reluctance to talk about them but also because 
the status difference between the two families need not be and often 
is not so very great. The most notable exception to this was the 
marriage between a Pakhtun girl and a barber boy. This would seem 
to be the only recorded case of its kind in Afghanistan but I should 
think that it will not long remain so. Drought, overpopulation, and 
migration to cities have already begun to alter attitudes especially 
in areas which are not so remote and where the tribal structure is 
breaking down or already has broken down. In Afghaniya the marriage 
of a Pakhtun girl to a barber although unthinkable in other Pakhtun 
areas (Swat, Uruzgan, Paktia) received little public sanction, at least 
from the reports I received, and now (1970) there is even under- 
standing for the Pakhtun' s position, ' the barber was wealthy and 
allmad Gul needed money. ' In spite of this outward indifference and 
the attempts by some Safi to excuse or justify the Pakhtun' s action 
by pointing to the economic imperatives of the situation - the barbers 
paid twice the normal amount of bride-wealth - the marriage of a 
Safi woman, a' siyala' , 
2) 
to a barber man involves the destruction 
of one of the most significant social boundaries in Pakhtun society. 
1) A bride-wealth payment usually consists of money and goods and the 
' wife givers' always try to obtain as large a proportion of the bride- 
wealth as possible in money whereas the 'wife-takers' seek to give 
as small a proportion as possible in cash. This is because the non- 
cash part of the bride-wealth has a subjective value which may be 
raised or lowered according to need. See also below p. 235. 
2) ' siyal' (f. -a) means an equal, peer; clansman, kin; like, resembling; 
and is used by Safi to distinguish themselves from the non-Safi 
professionals. 
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I have indicated above (p. 194 footnote 2) that women among Pakhtuns 
are only given to equals and superiors and the giving of a woman to 
the socially most inferior and least prestigious group in Afghanistan 
indicates the degree to which Pakhtun ideals and values have 
deteriorated in Afghaniya. The consequences of such an action do not, 
of course, stop there but have repercussions for the community as a 
whole. How was, for example, the Safi mother's brother going to be 
integrated into the barber's rites de passage, or, could economic 
cooperation take place even though all other Safi rejected such 
activities with the barbers, etc., etc. Part of the answer has been 
provided by the barber family itself because it has ceased doing 
barber's work and has attempted to change its identity (see above 
pp. 110 & 111 )- so far without success. However a precedent, i. e. 
the marriage itself, has been established and may lead to further 
marriages between the two groups especially if the economic situation 
in Afghaniya continues to deteriorate. 
Monetary interests may also be served, as we have seen above, by 
marrying sons to women for whom a lower bride-wealth will be 
accepted. This is most apparent in cases where Pakhtun men have 
married Parachi or Pashai women. Generally speaking the bride- 
wealth for non-Pakhtun women in the Pachoghan valley is, at the 
most, half that for Pakhtun women and there is, therefore, a 
considerable incentive for poorer men to marry their sons to such 
women. What prevents more men from following suit is the loss of 
face involved in marrying a woman purely for monetary gain and in 
taking a woman without ' nasb' , i. e. without a genealogy and, 
therefore, without a lineage, factors which are of so much importance 
to the descent conscious Pakhtuns. 
It is also possible by marrying an agnate for example the daughter 
of a father's brother to save money. The bride-wealth payment itself 
is the same or a little lower than average but the principal saving 
comes from the entertainment costs. These are much smaller when 
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both parties to the marriage are agnates because the number of 
people who attend the various ceremonies is much smaller than if 
they come from different hamlets. 
A third possibility for penurious fathers is to marry their sons to 
widows or divorced women. Widows who are not remarried by 
brothers and cousins of their dead husbands (the 'levirate' )- 
because, for example, these relatives already have wives or cannot 
support additional people or have no interest to marry again - 
generally return to their natal homes 
1). 
There unless they are still 
very young they enjoy, at least for women, a considerable degree of 
independence. This independence is expressed in the saying 'a widow 
is the 'wakil' (mandatory, envoy, or representative of one side in 
the marriage) of her own body or soul. ' This means that she is 
personally responsible for accepting or rejecting offers of marriage 
and is thus released from the judicial authority of her father or 
brothers at least in this matter. This independence together with the 
fact that she is older - important both for its influence on her beauty 
and her child-bearing capability - generally mean that she chooses 
out of inclination or is herself chosen out of parsimony. In both 
cases the bride-wealth is smaller than usual and may sometimes only 
2) 
be a nominal sum 
1) A widow may also refuse to marry a brother or other relative of her 
dead husband but this requires considerable courage and the support of 
her father and brothers if she is to be successful. If she succeeds her 
success only means that she must not marry certain people not that 
she can marry others. Her ex-husband's agnates having themselves 
been refused would then prevent her from marrying someone of her 
own choice. Generally speaking, however, widows in Afghaniya in 
comparison with other Pakhtun areas enjoy a considerable degree of 
freedom in the sense of being able to return to their natal homes and 
being allowed to remarry. This arises, as far as I can see, from the 
relatively low bride-wealth (in Uruzgan and Paktia the amount is ten 
times larger) paid and the perhaps less complete transference of 
authority and rights from the father to the husband on marriage. This 
however varies from family to family. 
2) The bride-wealth for a widow is given partly to the dead-husband' s 
relatives and partly to the girl' s father. 
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Divorced women may also be acquired for smaller bride-wealth 
payments than other categories of women. This is not because of some 
stigma attached to divorced women or some condemnation of adultery 
(adultery is responsible for some 90 % of all divorces) although this is 
condemned and was formerly punished by death when the culprit(s) 
could be caught but rather stems from the fact that these women, like 
widows, have been married before, are generally older than other 
marriageable women and are not expected to be as fecund as younger 
women. Their 'value' to put it crudely has deteriorated. This is not to 
say that they have difficulty in finding new spouses in fact the reverse 
is true. In Afghaniya there is very little prejudice against divorced 
women - apart of course from that emanating from the ex-husbands - 
and the general attitude towards divorce now is one of amusement and, 
where the individuals concerned are known to the observers, often of 
malicious pleasure. When blame is attached to anyone it is generally 
to the husband because he, through marriage, accepted the 
responsibility for such a fickle being, i. e. his wife, and it was up to 
him to control her movements and not up to her to protect his honour. 
It is, therefore, easy for divorced women to remarry but when they 
do so the bride-wealth is usually lower than average and sometimes 
there may be no bride-wealth paid at all. The latter is likely to 
happen when the women have no fathers or responsible males and/or 
when the men they marry were their partners in the charge of 
adultery and thus brought about the divorce. These women, therefore, 
also provide a source of marriageable partners who can be acquired 
for a lower bride-wealth. 
Finally fathers who have no possibility of raising sufficient money 
even for a minimal bride-wealth may, if they have daughters, 
exchange them for wives for their sons. This system 'badlun' or 
' badlun' with 'sar' which will be explained below (p. 221) is not 
widely practised but nevertheless provides an outlet for those 
fathers who are obliged to find wives for their sons but have not 
sufficient capital to pay for the bride-wealth. 
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With one exception, i. e. lower costs from parallel cousin marriages, 
all these methods of obtaining larger bride-wealth payments or of 
acquiring women cheaply involve exogamous marriages. This is because 
the pecuniary situation of a family is generally well known in their own 
hamlet and the chances of succeeding in obtaining more money or a woman 
more cheaply there are thus very small. Also such manoeuvres elicit 
considerable criticism from other members of the hamlet and damage the 
status of the family so that they prefer to pursue these activities with 
other hamlets where a certain secrecy can be preserved and the result is 
hamlet exogamy. 
I have sought so far to answer the question if senior males have the legal 
and socially accepted right to choose marriage partners for their sons 
and daughters and if hamlet endogamy is the summation of their 
preferences why hamlet exogamy should in practice result. No single 
answer or explanation could be found in the discussion which probably was 
not surprising. However a number of half answers emerged - lack of 
suitable partners in the hamlets, the relative unimportance of endogamy 
for the structure and organization, the adequacy of hamlet exogamy for 
economic needs, and the superiority of hamlet exogamous alliances for 
those men seeking monetary benefits. Added to this are the new, but 
difficult to estimate, elements of declining patriarchal power and 
increasing economic independence of those sons who work outside the 
community. Both are forcing the senior males to give greater attention to 
the marriage wishes of their sons and therefore increasing the frequency 
of hamlet exogamy. Also the rising importance and influence within the 
society of political organizations not based on descent, i. e. para, maliks 
and the local government authorities, have brought a decrease in the need 
for koranai, and thus for hamlet endogamous marriages. Taken together 
these factors have obviously been sufficient to give rise to the present 
preponderant hamlet exogamy and to overcome the preferences of the 
senior males which may now, because of the rapidity of economic change, 
just represent an anachronistic vestige of other needs and times. 
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Marriage Procedure 
Initial Steps 
Whatever the reasons for the difference between the preferences of 
the senior males and the actual marriages made, when a boy is to 
be married then the person responsible for him, the ' wali' , usually 
his father, looks around for what he considers to be an eligible and 
desirable partner. Some of the factors involved have been already 
mentioned but the beauty, wit, wealth and status of the girl also play 
a role. The question whether the mother of the girl is alive or not 
is also of importance. This is relevant because if she is not it could 
indicate that the girl has been treated badly in her household and/or 
not trained well in the duties and tasks of a woman. In the light of 
the information which the boy's wali collects he chooses a particular 
girl. He then consults the rest of the family and asks for the boy' s 
consent. The latter is usually conveyed through the mother who 
speaks for the boy in family consultations because if he is young he 
is normally too 'ashamed' to speak about the choice of a wife 
himself. 
Having received the general approval of the family the father or wali 
makes contact with a friend or relative of the girl's father. This 
person must be someone who has always had close contact with the 
father of the girl and whom he respects, whose decisions he often 
follows and with whom he often has secret consultations, i. e. a 
brother, paternal or maternal uncle, or a very close friend. This 
person who is to become the go-between between the two families is 
called the ' ruibar' . It is not possible for the boy's father to go to 
the girl's house himself because of the 'shame' which would be 
attached to such an action 
1). After contact has been made the boy' s 
wali informs the rufbar of his desire to 'have or make xekhi' ,a 
1) An adult male on the other hand wishing to marry may and usually 
does go to the girl's father without a' ruibar' . 
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marriage relationship, between the two families. He then gives the 
boy's name to the ruibar and if the girl's father has more than 
one daughter he specifies which one 
1) 
It is now up to the ruibar to find some occasion to speak to the 
father of the girl and to convey the boy's father's wish to make a 
marriage relationship. The girl's wali if the girl has not already been 
promised, or is engaged, generally agrees in principle but asks for 
time for thought and consultation. This time is not used to persuade the 
girl because, providing she is young and has not been married before, 
she generally agrees to her wali' s decision. It is the father and the 
other males of the household who need the time to consider the advant- 
ages and disadvantages of the proposed marriage. The ruibar, who by 
his acceptance of the boy's father's wish to act as a go-between 
demonstrates his approval of the match, uses his influence to bring 
about a positive outcome in the consultations. Once a decision is 
reached this is conveyed to the boy' s father by the ruibar. They, the 
ruibar and the boy's father, then choose a certain day for a face to 
face meeting between the respective walis when the final decision or 
' prekruh' will be made. It is at this stage in the proceedings that the 
boy tries, should his prospective bride live at some distance from 
him, to see her unobserved e. g. when she goes to collect water, or is 
near the river. Alternatively two or three women, including the 
boy's mother, may go to her house and there make sure that she 
has no physical disabilities, is well mannered, works well etc. If 
the two families are neighbours there is of course no need for this 
because the boy and the girl will, in all probability, have spent a 
number of years of their childhood together. 
On the day of the final decision or 'prekruh' the boy's father 
1) Whereas sons are married according to age i. e. the eldest first and 
the youngest last - unless of course some physical disability 
precludes the marriage of an elder son - among sisters there is no 
preferred sequence of choice and the one who is asked for first is 
married first. 
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together with two or three other senior males go to the girl's father' s 
house. The girl's wali, some males of the household and the ruibar 
are there. Food has been prepared and after this has been eaten the 
discussion starts. It is opened by the ruibar who says (roughly trans- 
lated): "these people who have come, come for a purpose, namely for 
the purpose of xekhi and ' dosti' . Now you (the father/wali) should talk 
to them and decide directly what you wish". The father says, when he 
is willing to accept the suit: "God brought them and I am happy that 
they have come. I will give my daughter to them according to our 
custom". Then with special emphasis he says: "when I am leaving 
(i. e. giving) a person he should leave property" (i. e. the marriage 
payment). The boy' s father then replies: "I am yours and my 
property is yours". 
The discussion then begins as to the actual amount of bridewealth or 
' waiwar' to be paid 
1) 
. As it is considered shameful for the father 
of the boy to bargain he does not participate but is nevertheless 
interested because he usually brings half of an estimated total with 
him which must be paid to the girl' s father should he demand it. The 
men who came with the boy's father and the ruibar do the bargaining 
for him and try to keep the payment low. Both sides know more or 
less what the amount of the bride-wealth should be (1970 ca. 
16,000 Afs. ) and it is largely a matter of custom which does not 
allow the father to agree quickly and prestige which forces him into 
trying to persuade the other side to go above that sum which both 
know would be reasonable. The discussion tends to be endless but 
finally agreement is reached 
2) 
and the girl's father is asked when 
he wishes the first payment to be made. At this point there is no 
bargaining and should the father so require then the boy' s father will 
place the amount which he has brought with him in front of the 
girl's father's group. Otherwise payments are made at the marriage 
and before the wedding. 
1) ' Walwar' corresponds to the arabic 'mater'. 
2) It is possible that both fathers agree to keep the real amount of the 
marriage payment secret and to make public an artificially high one. 
In this way both families will gain prestige. 
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The discussion does not end there but turns to the amount, the 
xal' at 
1) ', which the girl's mother's brother will receive and to the 
' tikri' 
2) 
which the girl's father' s sister, mother's sister and the 
girl's sisters will be given 
3). 
The date of the marriage and the 
question of whether the prospective bridegroom will be allowed to come 
to the marriage ceremony or not is also agreed upon. The absence of 
the groom normally occurs when the bride has not reached puberty 
because the marriage is generally consummated after the marriage 
ceremony. At the conclusion of the prekruh the girl's group gives a 
blessing: "we hope that she will bring grace for you and your family 
and that your relations will be good, and long and full of luck. " 
Good wishes are then expressed by both sides. 
The initial steps taken in acquiring a wife have been described in 
some detail above because I felt that they gave some idea of the 
processes which are involved and show with what care the marriage 
relationship is embarked upon. The marriage, ' kozda' , and wedding, 
' wada', ceremonies 
4) 
because of their relative complexity and the 
period of time which elapses between them similarly indicate that 
the relationship is slowly being formed and that the 'two groups are 
frequently provided with opportunities in which the suspicions and 
barriers to intercourse are broken down. It is perhaps not 
necessary to relate these activities, i. e. the marriage and the 
wedding, in detail here because they will be generally familiar to 
those who have read about or witnessed muslim marriages and 
weddings elsewhere. In order, however, to show the whole as a 
process of establishing a relationship which can be of considerable 
importance for the group involved a short outline of the ceremonies 
will be given. 
1) Also spelt ' xalat' , and means dress of honour, award, present. 
2) These payments are called 'tikri' after the woman's headcloth and 
used to be the conventional or traditional gift. Now this has been 
replaced by a sum equal to the price of a tikri. 
3) It is not an invariable practice to give all these women a payment. 
4) The translations 'marriage' for kozda and 'wedding' for wada have 
been used in the absence of better ones. Neither is ideal. 
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Marriage 
The marriage, kozda, begins with a meal for the groom and his 
agnates after which the various payments, xal' at and tikri, are made 
to the girl's relatives. Then follows the marriage ceremony itself, 
'the asking and answering' 
1 ), 
in which both the bride and the 
groom 
2) 
establish their identities and agree formally and publicly 
to the choices which were made for them. The groom stays 
overnight and on the following day consummates the marriage 
3). 
A week later he returns to his father's house accompanied by some 
of his new affines with gifts (the kajawa 
4) 
consisting of chicken and 
bread) from his father-in-law. After a week spent at his home he 
goes back to his father-in-law's house this time accompanied by his 
father, mother and other relatives and a' kajawa' . From this time 
onwards he can visit his wife openly and freely without an escort 
and without gifts i. e. normal (insider) relations have been establish- 
ed and he has been integrated into his wife' s family. 
Wedding and Transfer of the Bride to her Conjugal Home 
The wedding, ' wada' , follows some months or even a couple of years 
after: the engagement depending on when the boy's father is in a 
position to complete the marriage payment. On the day of the 
wedding the boy's agnates come, shooting into the air, to the bride' s 
house and there together with the girl's agnates have a meal. 
Afterwards the 'asking and answering' ceremony is repeated. The 
girl is then taken with an escort and with much shooting and shout- 
ing to her new conjugal home. 
1) Generally translated in law books as the 'offer' (ijab) and the 
' acceptance' (qubul). 
2) If they are young then they will have representatives who will answer 
for them: 'The declaration and acceptance may be made by the 
parties, or by their agents, if both are competent. In case of legal 
incompetency, like minority or unsoundness of mind, the guardians 
may validly enter into a contract of marriage on behalf of their 
wards. ' Fyzee. 1949. Op. cit. p. 75. 
3) Of course only when both subjects have reached puberty. 'kozda' thus 
corresponds to the arabic ' nikaH' . 
4) Literally a camel litter. 
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'Freeing of the legs' 
The final act of the marriage, if marriage is seen as the creation of 
a relationship between two previously strange and potentially hostile 
groups, is the "freeing of the legs", i. e. the return of the girl to 
her natal home. Before she can do this the girl must obtain her 
husband's permission because the transference of the girl to her 
conjugal home has also marked and involved the transference of 
authority from her father to her husband. She then goes with gifts 
to her father's house and after a stay of some days or weeks 
returns to her new home again bringing with her gifts 
1) 
this time 
from her father. After this ceremony she may return to her 
parents' and natal home whenever she has received her husband' s 
permission to do so but without the ceremony and gift giving which 
accompanied it previously. Thus she too has normalised her 
relations with her husband's family and has been at least outwardly 
accepted. 
Alternative or Aberrant Forms of Marriage 
The marriage, consisting of prekruh, kozda, wada and the 'freeing 
of the legs' ceremonies, which I have briefly described above, may 
be seen as the standard form of marriage occurring among the 
Safi of Afghaniya. Not all marriages, however, follow these lines 
and some vary quite considerably from the 'typical' form. Four 
forms are interesting because of the influence which they may and 
sometimes do have on the relationships which are supposed to be 
established through marriage. The first two differ principally from 
the norm because the marriage payment instead of being a sum of 
money consists of the woman herself or of groom service. The 
other two are different because they come about, at least initially, 
NiIAou - the c, Nreth of i%e wm4S. 
1) These gifts are a cow and a 'dostar xan' or bread cloth. The 
symbolism of these gifts is interesting. As milk is vital for young 
children the girl's father is indicating his interest in them as well 
as ensuring their survival. The 'dostar xan' is linked with bread, 
a woman's activity, and is a symbol of commensuality the family 
gathering around it for meals. 
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Exchange Marriage 
The first form is the ' badlun' 
1) 
or exchange marriage. Here a 
marriage is contracted by the walis of the women coming to an 
agreement whereby their daughters or sisters are exchanged without 
bride-wealth changing hands. The persons of the women themselves 
are regarded as the 'walwar' or bride-wealth. This system has the 
practical advantage of enabling an impecunious father to marry his 
son through the exchange of his (son's) sister for another woman. 
It is of course necessary to find a man in a similar position and 
with a daughter of marriageable age but this latter difficulty may 
be overcome. In the case of one girl in the exchange being too 
young to consummate the marriage an exchange called 'badlun' with 
' sar' is arranged. The guardian of the immature girl will give an 
agreed sum of money 
2), 
the 'sar' or head, to the other wali. This 
is then held as a form of surety that the girl will in fact be given. 
When the girl reaches puberty and the arrangements are being made 
for the wedding the other girl's wali must return the sar payment. 
Generally this form of marriage whether badlun or badlun with sar 
is disliked especially by the women concerned and their mothers 
because if one girl is treated badly then the family of the other feels 
forced to reciprocate. Even where the woman may be a good wife 
and dutiful daughter-in-law the bad treatment of one leads inexorably 
to the bad treatment of the other. 
According to the law books this form of marriage, called ' shighar' 
in arabic, is illegal. This is because of the absence of the bride- 
3) 
wealth payment . In Islam the most important clause of the 
1) ' Badlun' means literally exchange. It also means 'revenge' or 
retaliation' which is, of course, also an exchange. The association 
of badlun with exchange marriages and with revenge may, however, 
also be the result of the earlier practice of using women as blood 
money to prevent retaliation or to bring a feud to an end. 
2) This sum is usually between 2,000 and 5,000 Afs. It may, however, 
be as high as 10,000 Afs. 
3) See Levy, R. 1969. The Social Structure of Islam. p. 105. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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marriage contract is that concerning the value and character of the 
'mater' or bridewealth. Where the person of the woman is the 
bridewealth then the marriage is regarded as invalid. However as the 
' mahr' is also regarded by the legal schools of Islam as a payment 
to the bride and not, as in pre-Islamic times and in Afghaniya, to the 
father or kinsmen of the bride the ' walwar' payment practised among 
the Safi is also illegal 
1). The point is perhaps that as in other 
matters concerning Islam deviations do occur and the demands of the 
law books are either ignored or are contravened in innocence of the 
existence of such laws. 
A similar situation arises when a wife is acquired through groom 
service (pa xidmat for war kawal). Here again the marriage payment, 
mahr, does not consist of a fixed sum but is the service (xidmat) 
carried out by the potential groom for his father-in-law. The length 
of this service can be from two to eight or even ten years and 
involves working the land of the father-in-law free of charge until 
the agreed number of years has been fulfilled. 
Sometimes, in the past, a future son-in-law would do his father-in- 
law' s military service for him and afterwards receive his daughter 
in return. Such service no longer occurs and seems to have been 
replaced by work as a landless labourer, often together with the 
girl's father, in Afghan Turkestan. This, because of the higher 
wages paid, can mean that a fatherless and/or penniless or 
propertyless man can acquire a wife after two years work. 
As may be imagined the relations between son-in-law and father-in- 
law are generally not the same when a wife has been obtained through 
work rather than through a normal walwar payment. The prestige of 
the son-in-law is from the beginning lower and the father's right to 
1) In pre-Islamic times the bridewealth payment consisted of two parts: 
the 'mater' paid to the father or nearest kinsman of the girl and the 
' sadaq' paid to the girl herself. At the time of the Prophet the 
payments were to the girl alone and 'mehr' and ' sadäq' became inter- 
changeable terms. See Levy, 1969. Op. cit. p. 95: 
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give orders to his future son-in-law does not produce the best of 
relationships and often causes strain. However this is tempered by 
the fact that the father-in-law is usually of low status himself, i. e. 
has little economic and political power, otherwise he would not accept 
groom service as a substitute for the walwar. Whatever the subse- 
quent relationships both groom service and ' badlun' marriage fulfil 
the important function of enabling men without fathers and/or 
property to marry and to have children processes which otherwise 
would be closed to them. 
Marriage without the Consent of the walis 
The other two forms of marriage or of making marriage contracts 
may be classified as those occurring without the consent of the 
walis or guardians of the principals. Both forms are motivated by 
a hinderance or hinderances to the marriage of a boy and girl who 
are mutually attracted to one another. The hinderance may be 
caused by the poverty of the boy's family, the desire by the girl' s 
father to give her to someone else, or the lack of interest or 
lethargy on the part of the boy's father. Whatever the reason the 
boy and girl determine to take matters into their own hands. 
In one form the girl, on a pre-arranged night, leaves her father' s 
house taking her clothes and jewelry with her and goes, accompanied 
by the boy, to his father's house where she remains until the 
marriage. This is called 'posi takhtedal' or to ' fly out after' 
because when it becomes known that the girl has left her own home 
then the people say "that girl flew out after such and such a person". 
The girl may also, if she has the opportunity, go during the day- 
time to the boy's house and, once there, say that the boy is her 
husband. 
The second form called ' narah' (proclamation or announcement) 
although achieving the same end is in one respect fundamentally 
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different from the one mentioned above. The girl in this case does 
not leave her own home but says to all and sundry that such and 
such a person is her husband and that all other men are like brothers 
to her, i. e. as she cannot marry her brothers she cannot marry 
them either. 
In both these cases, although the girl' s father is obliged to give his 
daughter to the boy, a' maraka' , or conciliatory delegation, 
consisting of the boy's father, elders of the hamlet and a malik, is 
sent to his house. The maraka is, or may be, seen as a substitute 
for the ruibar in the normal marriage and also it is there, especially 
when the 'posi takhtedal' form has occurred, to save the father' s 
honour 
1). 
This is clearly indicated when the maraka on meeting the 
father says: 'We become (or, are) your face", i. e. their presence 
retrieves the father's lost honour by giving the impending marriage 
a more official and normal character. They then decide with the 
father on the amount of the marriage payment. This is usually in 
2) 
such cases half the normal sum but always less than the full price 
After the maraka and the father have come to a decision about the 
amount of brim wealth to be paid the next stages of the marriage get 
under way. These are, however, different for the ' narah' and 'posi 
takhtedal' forms. In the case where the girl has already left her 
father's or guardian's house, i. e. in the ' posi takhtedal' form only 
the ' kozda' , or marriage ceremony is performed because the 
wedding ceremony, involving as it does the transference of the bride 
from her natal to her conjugal home and the transference of 
authority from the father to the husband has lost its function. In the 
narah form the girl has remained within her own home and the 
1) It is also in the best interests of the boy's father to assemble a maraka 
otherwise the girl's father could complain to the government that his 
daughter had been removed forcibly from his house. 
2) The situation among the Atsakzai Durrani nomads would seem to be 
very different (see Glatzer. 1977. Op. cit. p. 140). There the bride- 
wealth, at least in the narah case, can be as high as the family of the 
girl wish to demand and the family of the boy must pay it. As a result 
as soon as the boy's family become aware of the possibility of such 
an action they do all they can to prevent it. 
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marriage and wedding can proceed in the usual manner. 
Such marriages contracted as they are through coercion cannot lead 
to the sort of relationships which should exist between families after 
a marriage. In the case of the 'posi takhtedal' marriage the 
removal of the girl from her father's qala, even if this was achiev- 
ed through the daughter's flight, represents, because it could only 
be made with the boy's and the boy's father's concurrence, both a 
violation of the sanctity of the gala and of the girl's father's honour. 
This is the rape of the centre and arouses the strongest possible 
feelings. In the ' narah+ case the situation is not quite so extreme 
because the girl at least remains within her own gala and the 
father is not subjected, to the same extent, to the sarcasm and 
schadenfreude of neighbours and villagers. Nevertheless narah 
represents initially a challenge to, and because it is successful, the 
temporary destruction of the father's authority within his family and 
assures a loss of face within the hamlet. 
In both cases then the logical order of the society has been over- 
thrown, boundaries have been ignored and barriers breached. The 
order needs to be reestablished and the effectiveness of the boundaries 
reaffirmed. In Afghaniya, however, after the initial shock and anger 
the reaction of the girl's family is rather one of disappointment. 
They feel that they have been black-mailed by the girl and outwitted 
and treated badly by their prospective son-in-law. The boy's father, 
they argue, although he must have known what his son was proposing 
to do did not interfere obviously placing monetary advantage, i. e. a 
smaller bride-wealth payment, above the girl's father' s honour. This 
rather 'tame' reaction from members of an ethnic group famed for 
their explosive, uncompromising and bloody temperament is rather 
surprising but is explainable because of the poverty and decline in 
authority of some patriarchs in Afghaniya and increasingly because 
of the government's presence in Nijrao. In the four cases of such 
marriages. which I recorded (from a total of 406 marriages) all the 
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fathers of the girls were poor and it was generally agreed in the 
community that ' posi takhtedal' or ' narah' marriages would be un- 
thinkable in economically and politically powerful families. The 
daughters of such men just did not run off or attempt to challenge 
their fathers' authority. 
In other families, then, where it is possible, and these would seem 
to be on the increase, the girl's action involves the father in 
considerable loss of honour and prestige. It is true that during the 
marriage and, where this takes place, the wedding, the two families 
become relatives and the father's honour and the order of society 
are to some extent restored nevertheless only the passage of time 
can put this loss to rights. What, however, sometimes happens is 
that where relations are proving to be satisfactory between the two 
families a further marriage with a woman going in the other 
direction will be made to finally reestablish the disturbed balance. 
After a normal marriage where the procedure is dominated by the 
respect for social boundaries, by the ritual removal of barriers 
and by the maintenance and substantiation of the order of the 
society no such reestablishment is necessary. 
At the beginning of these procedures it is true that the formality is 
so considerable that a go-between, the ruibar; is required but then 
later the senior agnates of both sides meet to decide upon the 
amount of bride-wealth to be paid. It is interesting here that although 
the boy's father is present he does not bargain because it is 
considered shameful to do so. It would also lead, although this is 
never expressed, to a head on collision between the two fathers 
over the bride-wealth payment which would not be conducive to the 
establishment of good relations. Later the agnates meet less 
formally at the marriage when the girl's agnates act as the hosts 
and at the various bride-wealth payments prior to the wedding. 
Finally, at the wedding itself, they sit and eat out of the same bowls 
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thus proclaiming their compatability and friendship. During this whole 
period gifts, the ' kajäwas' , and people are going backwards and forwards 
between the two houses. The path between them is literally worn smooth 
by the passage of people and, as the boy's 'legs are untied' and then 
later those of the girl, a degree of informality enters into the 
relationship which is characteristic of affinity. After the marriage, 
i. e. both kozda and wada, these visits continue as we have seen and 
form the basis of the relationship between both families. 
adic Relations 
Of central importance, of course, to the ultimate success of a 
marriage relationship between the two affinally linked groups is the 
degree of compatibility between the two principals, the husband and 
wife. No matter how good the relations, for example, between the 
two fathers (of the bride and groom) may be, should the couple be 
antipathetic and should this lead to incessant quarrelling and fighting, 
then the whole relationship will be affected 
1) 
and may finally be 
destroyed. 
The husband because of his social and legal majority - he is generally 
responsible for his wife, for the formation of her character and for the 
consequences of her actions - as well as the latitude allowed him by 
the society, is the one primarily responsible for any discord which 
occurs in the marriage. The wife is younger, economically dependent, 
physically and normatively constrained and is brought up to have much 
greater tolerance for her husband's actions than he has for hers. 
Nevertheless should this tolerance level be reached then she can make 
life very unpleasant for him. Such a situation can arise if the husband 
1) The conflict is removed outside the limits of a marital squabble once 
the girl appeals for support to her father and/or brothers. The extent 
of their response depends on the importance of the tie and the justice 
of the girl's complaint. Should the link be important then they usually 
reject her appeal. They cannot, however, and do not remain 
continually indifferent to her needs and if the conflict continues and 
the girl's complaint is justified then they intervene more rigorously 
and take her part. 
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constantly ill-treats her - i. e. goes beyond the limits of his socially 
recognised rights to scold or beat her should she cook his food 
badly, disregard his orders, fight with his brothers' wives or neigh- 
bours' wives etc. etc. - or has a girl friend elsewhere. In these 
cases the wife has a range of possibilities open to her to show her 
displeasure. She can work badly, secretly use her husband's grain 
to buy jewelry and cloth from travelling salesmen 
1), 
sell other 
household objects, spend her husband's money without necessity, 
struggle, quarrel and fight with him and in the last resort take a 
lover herself. Such drastic action is, however, not always necessary 
and in the case of her husband's adultery she can often receive the 
help of her father and brothers who put pressure on the husband to 
alter his ways or set his wife free. Of course in spite of the 
husband's absolute authority over his wife, there are hen-pecked 
husbands and dominant wives but such cases rarely lead to the 
break up of the marriage and the destruction of the relationship. 
Generally speaking although discord, cases of adultery and divorce 
would seem to occur more frequently in Afghaniya than in other 
Pakhtun areas 
2) 
the vast majority of marriages would seem, at 
least outwardly, to be satisfactory for both parties and, therefore, 
to be conducive to the furtherance of the relationship between the 
two groups. This is due in part to the husband's absolute authority 
but it is also due to the modesty of the girl's wishes as regards 
her future husband's character and the ease with which the 
husband's ideals concerning his future wife may be met. 
In the former case the wife hopes that her husband will grow fond 
of her, not beat her without reason, not be quarrelsome with 
1) All women secrete a certain amount of grain, in order to purchase 
hair pins or jewelry for themselves, but this is grain which they 
have gathered from among the stubble after the harvest. To sell the 
husband's grain for this purpose is considered a grave misdeed. 
2) 'Divorce, though legally simple for the man, is regarded as very 
shameful and in fact extremely rare. Barth. 1965. Op. cit. pp. 39 
& 40. 
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others, do his work, and concern himself with his own affairs, i. e. 
with the running of the household and the proper cultivation of his 
land holding. Were she to be given a choice then she would prefer in 
addition a young and handsome husband but as the girl's father is 
often primarily interested in the size of the marriage payment a 
wealthier but older man is usually her lot. A wealthy man, however, 
also has positive attributes because the girl will generally have an 
easier life in his household with less work, better food and more 
expensive clothes. 
In the case of the boy's wishes as to the character of his future 
bride these are usually taken into consideration, - especially if the 
father is wealthy and the prospective father-in-law has more than 
one daughter - because they represent norms accepted by all the 
men and as it is the men who do the choosing then the chances of 
them being fulfilled are considerable. These characteristics are 
beauty 
1), fidelity, gentleness and tractability, she should also be 
good at her work and treat her husband with honour. If these 
characteristics are present and the husband treats his wife 
considerately then there is every chance of the marriage being a 
stable and even perhaps a happy one. Such a marriage link based 
on stable ties between the principals waits to be used and can be of 
considerable importance to the groups thus joined. 
This is, of course, not the only relationship established by marriage. 
Sets of dyadic relations are brought into being some of which can 
and often do prove to be valuable and others, when they are 
satisfactory, ensure that at the very least relations are maintained. 
One such set are the relations between the married couple and the 
respective ' xusarGani' , the father-in-law's side or relatives. This 
term distinguished these relatives from the bride's or grooms 
' plarGani' (father's relatives, or agnates) and ' xpulwan' (own 
1) Whereas men with physical or mental disabilities are able to 
acquire wives without difficulty women who are ugly usually go 
unmarried. 
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relatives 
1) 2) (see diag. 28 p. 231). 
Woman' s xusarGani 
The amount of contact which a woman has with her 'xusarGani' (see 
diag. 29 p. 231) depends on whether she lives in an extended family 
household or an elementary family one. In both cases, however, 
because of the proximity of agnatic households her principal contacts 
through her daily activities are with her mother-in-law, sisters-in- 
law and where present co-wives, rather than with the males of her 
xusarGani' 
3). 
Her relations with her husband's mother are of 
primary importance, because she is the most influential person in 
the women's domain and with her son and the one who can be most 
critical and, therefore, most damaging to the girl's reputation as 
wife and mother. The girl usually seeks to gain her mother-in-law' s 
favour by being helpful and pleasant and by deferring in all things to 
her. However the husband's mother cannot be too hard or too 
dictatorial because she knows that a time may come - on the death 
of her husband - when she will have to take up residence in her 
daughter-in-law/son' s house where past ills can be repaid with 
4) 
interest . Relations, therefore, are generally equable. 
Similarly relations between co-wives, at least initially, would seem 
to be satisfactory. This occurs because husbands usually seek the 
permission of their wives before marrying again and also because 
the presence of another woman means less work for the first wife. 
1) This is a broad term which seems to include agnates and cognates, 
(although there is an extra term for mother's male relatives, 
' mamaGan' ), as well as fellow villagers. 
2) The boundaries of these groups, especially in cases of village 
endogamy, are very difficult to establish with any accuracy and 
members can and do belong to all three. 
3) The girl behaves to her husband's father as she would to her own 
father, i. e. with respect and deference and to her brothers-in-law 
as she would to her brothers even addressing them, i. e. in the 
vocative form, in the same way. 
4) The wife is responsible for the division of food after the men have 
eaten and the amount and quality which the mother-in-law receives 
depends on the warmth of the relations between them. 
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Trouble, however, often arises when the new wife, referred to by 
the first wife as ' nawakai' (bride), has a son and the mothers begin 
to direct their attentions to promoting the interests of their respective 
sons 
1). 
Under such circumstances relations can be strained and even 
the actions of a strong and authoritarian husband only mean that the 
hostilities are suspended in front of him but are otherwise carried on 
behind his back. 
No such tension exists between a girl and her husband's sisters 
because there are no grounds for tension. They are not competitors 
in any way and the sisters are not permanent residents in the house- 
holds but the future founders of families elsewhere. Their relations, 
therefore, are similar to those between real sisters, warm but short. 
Man's xusarGani 
The relations of the man with his xusarGani (see diag. 30 p. 233) also 
vary but whereas the girl as an 'outsider' is dependent and must 
accomodate herself to the wishes of her new relatives in her 
conjugal home the boy initially remains within his natal home and 
can, therefore, regulate his relations with his affines as he or his 
father sees fit. The two principal sets of relations for him are 
those with his father-in-law and with his brother(s)-in-law. 
In the former case their first official contact is at the engagement 
and here they have little to say to each other 
2). Afterwards when 
the boy visits his wife there is a degree of formality which may 
never really disappear. This is indicated by the fact that the son- 
in-law always addresses his father-in-law as ' xusar' (father-in- 
law) whereas the girl calls her husband's father 'aka' 
3) 
(father' s 
1) Afghan history, but especially that of the royal family is full of the 
intrigues and struggles between co-wives and half-brothers. 
2) I am not referring here to the marriages of adult males but to the 
first marriages of dependent youths. 
3) p. t. o. to p. 2 34. 
i 
tº 
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Diag. 30. A man's xusarGani 
barGatai barGati 
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brother) showing respect but also a greater warmth of relationship. 
In some cases where, for example, the girl's father has no sons 
of his own the relationship may be very different. Generally, how- 
ever, the boy and his father-in-law can and do help each other 
economically and practically as we have seen above at least during 
the period, which may be some years, between the marriage and 
the transference of the girl to her conjugal home. Generally the 
strength of the relationship between the two is dependent on the 
needs of the participants, on the distance which separates their 
houses, and on the extent to which the father-in-law exploits his 
son-in-law in the initial stages of marriage. The saying "when a 
person finds a son-in-law he sells his donkey" is perhaps 
significant. 
As far as needs and propinquity are concerned much the same may 
be said for the relations between the husband and his brother(s)-in- 
law. If both require help and live close to one another then the 
affinal tie will be of use to them. There is usually no formality 
between them although if one is older than the other then he will 
be called ' dada' a term used otherwise for elder brother. At its 
best this relationship is characterised by reciprocal help, at its 
worst by absence of intercourse. 
Probably the most unusual relationship between the boy and a 
member of his xusarGani, at least seen from the viewpoint of our 
culture, is that between the son-in-law and his mother-in-law. I have 
mentioned above that boys prefer to marry girls from other hamlets 
because in these cases the mothers-in-law are kinder and more 
thoughtful in their treatment of their sons-in-law than those who are 
physically and structurally close. As the majority of marriages are 
3) Pakhto has both descriptive kinship terms and terms which are used 
when addressing these kin. The girl's father-in-law, for example, is 
also her kusar' but she addresses him as 'aka' , father' s brother. 
This form of address is particularly interesting in terms of the dis- 
cussion above about the preference for the Fa. Br. Da. marriage. Its 
usage by the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law may reflect this 
ideal. 
1 .. ý 
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hamlet exogamous then the mother-in-law/son-in-law relationship is 
usually good and one which is remembered, especially by the men, 
with pleasure and has important repercussions for the relations 
between husband and wife. The reasons for this were mentioned 
briefly above but I would like here to go into a little more detail. 
After the marriage ceremony is over the groom consummates the 
marriage in his bride's house and remains there for some three 
to seven days. It is during this time that the mother-in-law 
endears herself to the son-in-law. The bride's house is generally 
full of curious younger children and possesses no special bridal 
suite. Normally one or two rooms serve as the sleeping quarters 
for a family. The consummation of a marriage with a young, shy 
and often frightened girl by an insure and embarrassed boy is 
under these circumstances rather difficult. It is the mother-in-law 
who keeps the brothers and sisters away, calms the wife, looks 
after the lamp so necessary for finding the way, brings the girl to 
her husband's bed when the others are asleep, wakes them up 
before dawn, provides them with water and privacy for washing 
after intercourse and before prayers etc., etc., in fact she makes 
most things possible and generally smooths out all the problems 
which arise. This she continues to do during the period which 
elapses from the 'untying of the boy's legs' until the wedding and 
the transfer of the bride. 
It is also the mother-in-law who tries to reduce her husband' s 
demands over the matter of the bridewealth. This is particularly 
important in the later stages of the payment when the funds of the 
boy's father are running low and when there is much debate and 
discussion over the estimated and real value of an ox, radio, gun 
etc. In the family consultations which precede payments it is the 
mother-in-law who temporizes the wishes of her husband and 
sometimes manages to get the price of the animals or objects in 
question set well above the bazaar price, i. e. so that the payment 
iS 
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is more easily fulfilled 
1 ). 
Her main argument and that which often 
tends to be successful is that if her husband takes so much property 
and money from the boy's father then their daughter will only be able 
to look at the four bare walls of her new home 
2). 
Although the 
mother is principally concerned for the welfare of her daughter this 
concern also works to the advantage of the son-in-law. Whatever the 
amount the mother-in-law manages to get reduced from the marriage 
payment the mother-in-law/son-in-law relationship is certainly the 
warmest and least selfish relationship which emerges from an affinal 
connection. It is, however, of short duration because although it is 
never forgotten it is difficult to put to use once the girl has left her 
natal home. 
All dyadic relationships established through marriage will be 
impermanent if they are neglected. A weak tie, however, may be 
revived on the birth of children because through such births UP two 
groups come together again not only for celebrating the birth but, in 
the case of a male child, for the later circumcision as well. The 
family which gave a daughter may also use the occasion to claim a 
daughter in return thus strengthening the bond. Of course such an 
action is only taken when the previous affinal bond is considered 
worthy of continued cultivation. 
The opposite effect is achieved by divorce. The majority of divorces 
in Afghaniya result from adultery (see above p. 213) and this leads 
not only to the break up of the family but also to the destruction of 
the relationship between the girl giving and girl taking groups. 
1) If, for example, the bazaar price of a good ploughing ox is 5,000 Afs. 
and of a sheep 1,500 Afs. then those may together be considered as 
having a bride price value of 8,000 Afs. although in reality their 
worth is only 6,500 Afs. Thus the boy' s father is saved 1,500 Afs. 
marriage payment when he hands over the ox and the sheep to the 
girl' s father. 
2) In Afghaniya unlike other Pakhtun areas the bride receives no dowry 
from her father. The carpets, bedding, pots etc. must also be 
purchased or provided by the boy's father. It must be noted, however, 
that the marriage payment in Afghaniya is very much smaller than 
that, for example, among the Atsakzai in Uruzgan where the father 
may be on the verge of poverty after completing bride-wealth payments. 
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Conelucinn 
In general it would seem that the strength and utility of an affinal 
link depends upon the willingness of the families or individuals 
concerned to foster that link. The marriage itself can only bring the 
members of the two families together, eliminate formality, and 
establish relations, it cannot force the affines to utilise the bond. 
If they do use it, and this is usually what they intend to do otherwise 
they would not have made it, it can be of considerable importance 
both for mutual help in the economic and social fields and for 
providing alternatives to agnation in the political field. Paradoxically 
just because it is so strong and is of such value the men are wary 
of it because they feel that it may strike at, what they consider to be 
the very roots, the essential support and ordering element of their 
society - agnation. This is why they generally allow the affinal links 
to weaken over the years by neglecting the obligations of visiting and 
prestations, why they put forward the excuse that these obligations 
are oppressive and burdensome and why they also say about marriage: 
' xekhi is the way of a thousand years, i. e. it takes a thousand 
years of visiting to establish the relationship. 
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10. POLITICAL GROUPS AND COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES 
If the relationship established by marriage is as difficult and 
arduous to maintain as Safi males suggest and if agnation constitutes 
the central element of their society then political groups founded on 
the common descent of members from one ancestor should be the 
dominant political groups in the community. Whilst this may have 
been the case in the past (see above p. 139 ) the political aspects of 
descent groups are now only represented by the minor lineage and 
the local descent group, the koranai. Other groups created by 
individual interests, proximity of residence and marriage ties, the 
' para' , and those formed by and surrounding the leaders of the 
community, the maliks, have become just as important and are 
usurping some of those functions which used to be the prerogatives of 
descent. Whether these new groups will ultimately replace the old 
ones it is impossible to say, but certainly the senior males' ideal of 
political groups formed only by the ties of agnation is faced now by 
a reality in which groups are brought into being not only by common 
descent but also by the ties and obligations of marriage, spatial 
proximity and personal interest. 
This does not mean that the political structure of Safi society is only 
now in the process of change. The Safi have never really been 
politically isolated from the 'wider society' but have been influenced 
by it and have on occasion influenced it themselves. However the 
present governmental penetration into, and administration of, the 
area must represent the most direct and most profound political 
change so far experienced and this has brought a loss of political 
autonomy and a period of political instability reflected in the 
proliferation and impermanence of political groups. It is, therefore, 
impossible to talk about a political 'system' in the sense of a 
harmonious, homogenous and timeless entity but only of a system 
characterised by fluidity and ambiguity. 
In this chapter I will look at the political groups in Afghaniya, - the 
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descent group or koranai, the faction or para, and the hamlet - and 
omit for the next chapter the groups formed by and around maliks. 
Then I will turn to the causes and cases of conflict and through these 
case studies convey the functions and something of the essentially 
dynamic nature of the political system. 
Political Groups 
The koranai 
The koranäi has been discussed in some detail in chapter 7 and to 
some extent in chapter 9 and although the aspects analysed were 
mainly non-political they also have relevance here because it is 
through them that the koranai acquires the cohesion and solidarity 
necessary for political action. 
The first and most evident aspect creating cohesion in the koranai is 
common descent from a founding ancestor. This ancestor is at some 
two to five generations from the living members and gives his name 
to the group. As a result of the different generational depths koranai 
vary considerably in size and in power, those with the most 
members generally being the most powerful, although there is now 
a tendency for the largest koranai to be particularly susceptible to 
fragmentation. Such powerful koranai are usually to be found in 
hamlets where the vast majority of the inhabitants are members of 
one minor lineage and where the non-lineage members consist of 
only one or two families. Where there are a number of minor 
lineages or large stranger groups the numbers of koranai are large 
and their membership consequently small. Nevertheless in all 
hamlets if a koranai is small but united and determined it can 
generally achieve just as much as a larger but less well-knit group. 
The second factor furthering solidarity among koranai members is 
proximity of residence. Most members, as we have seen above, 
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live in the same qala, in adjoining qalas or neighbouring ones 
(see map VIII p. 136 and map IX p. 242). In this way agnates are 
also neighbours and the ties binding neighbours, i. e. lending and 
borrowing, visiting, attending marriages and funerals, and religious 
festivities also bind them. 
Thirdly as the land-holdings of members are contiguous (see map 
IX p. 242) solidarity is also promoted by a common place of work. 
When working their fields or irrigating their crops members are 
usually in sight and sound of one another and consequently gossip 
and occasionally eat together. Proximity also means that if 
disputes occur with members of other koranai about times and 
turns for irrigation water members are near at hand and ready to 
support their party. Also when ashar are to be held it is the agnates/ 
neighbours who constitute the most reliable and most consistently 
used asharGuri 
1). 
Finally koranai are held together by their members' respect for 
agnatic/Pakhtun ideals and values. The 'real' relationship (as 
opposed to that of affinity), they say, is the ' relation of the bone', 
i. e. agnation. A person who has honour (nanG) and courage (Iherat) 
and wishes to be a good muslim and a good Pakhtun must whole- 
heartedly support the principle and fact of agnation. If he does so 
then he receives all the accolades and approbation of the society, 
if he does not, then criticism and censure are his part. Whilst this 
may have been the case in the past it now represents an ideal which 
few follow. Most men admit this freely and see it as a reaction to 
the changed economic circumstances, the presence of the central 
government in Nijrao and, in their opinion, the increasing 
persuasiveness and effectiveness of affinal connections. All, however, 
say that when blood is flowing and there is killing then all those who 
' share the bone must follow the bone' . There is then no excuse or 
reason strong enough to absolve members from this responsibility. 
1) See above chap. 6 pp. 86-88. 
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Koranai groups, therefore, are principally united by common descent, 
by proximity of residence, by place of work and by Pakhtun/agnatic 
ideals. Nevertheless these are not always sufficient to hold the group 
together or to ensure total support in all political activities. This is 
because the very forces which bring cohesion - agnatic and spatial 
proximity - also cause division in daily life. Those with whom one 
is continually in contact, for example, are the ones with whom one has 
the most frequent opportunities for quarreling. Also problems of 
inheritance principally arise between those who are agnatically related. 
Finally members are more interested in acquiring the adjoining fields 
of agnates than the fields of members of other hamlets because the 
former are easier to work and irrigate and are a natural extension 
of their own fields (see map IX p. 242 ). For these and other reasons 
members who feel that greater cohesion and solidarity are necessary 
will marry their daughters into their koranai. The numbers of such 
ties is not great, as we have seen, but they would seem to have an 
effect, at least initially, out of all proportion to their frequency 
binding members together in a way which does not seem possible 
merely through bonds of descent. It is, therefore, surprising that 
they are not more frequently initiated. Part of the reason may be 
that just because they are so strong they do not need to be created 
to excess. Also, of course, koranai and village exogamy, as we have 
seen, would seem to offer more than koranai endogamy to the senior 
males. Another reason is undoubtedly the unwillingness of many 
patriarchs to strengthen the links to people with whom they most 
frequently quarrel which is the case with agnates. Finally many 
members argue that the koranai functions adequately without additional 
connections and that these can be better used to create relationships 
elsewhere. Nevertheless when marriages are made within koranai 
they can be of considerable importance for the cohesion and political 
effectiveness of these groups. 
Such solidarity was of major importance in the past when the 
koranai' s principal functions were to revenge the death of 
- 242 -5 
EW 
N 
P 
0 
® taj maHmsd 
Hat, nawab 
® 
stranger 
I 
horawl 
River 
fields loot to scale) 
Map IX. The Relations between koranai Membership 
and the Location of galas and Fields. 
PAGE 
MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
- 244 - 
members 
1), 
to defend the group' s honour and to provide support in 
struggles over land, women and money. Today the presence of the 
local government in Nijrao has inhibited killings and when they 
nevertheless occur the tendency now is, in spite of Pakhtun ideals 
exhorting koranai solidarity and vengeance, not to take revenge but 
to place the case in the hands of the waluswal. As a result the 
revenge aspect of the koranai has atrophied but assistance when 
members are involved in dissension and conflict is still forthcoming. 
It would seem, however, in the largest koranai that the elimination 
of revenge as the most demanding function of the koranai has 
weakened its whole structure because the ties between more distant 
members are no longer as imperative as they were. Help is, in these 
cases, no longer automatic and wholehearted, although there are 
exceptions, and the koranai' s internecine struggles are often allowed 
to reach a destructive level which inhibits any unity of action against 
outside forces. Members, therefore, tend increasingly to turn to 
other groups where support is exchanged for the achievement of 
particular interests and goals, or where members are bound through 
marriage alone. 
The para 
Such groups are generally called 'para' although the term ' junba' 
may also be used on occasion. Both terms mean group, grouping or 
faction and refer to groups which have a purely political function. 
Para are to be found within all hamlets in the community and like 
koranai they vary considerably in size. They nevertheless have 
structural and functional equivalence. Membership in para is not 
acquired by birth but results from participation in political action. 
Once, for example, a dispute or struggle occurs within a hamlet 
then those members who are not automatically involved, such as 
the minimal koranai (father, son(s) and brothers) of the disputants, 
1) This still continues to be the koranai' s principal function in other 
Pakhtun areas notably Paktia. ' ... man kann jedoch mit Sicherheit 
sagen, daß der Kreis der Blutrachepflichtigen auf jeden Fall inner- 
halb der joined family (koraney) zu suchen ist. Fa, So, Br und 
FaBr und BrSo gehören dazu, obwohl die vorzügliche Fehdeeinheit 
Fa, So, Br sind. ' Sigrist. 1970. Op. cit. p. 8. 
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may take sides. It is this process of taking sides which creates the 
para. 
The reasons why fellow villagers should participate are multiple and 
vary from case to case but there would seem to be five principal 
ones. Firstly there are the concrete gains members hope will accrue 
from their support. As most struggles involve land, i. e. the control 
over resources, the successful conclusion of such conflict brings 
rewards and villagers who take part are usually promised some 
monetary recompense. Whether they receive it or not is another 
matter but the chance of acquiring something is in most cases 
sufficient incentive. Also when support is given but the promised 
reward withheld the supporters nevertheless have a claim to reciproc- 
ation which they can utilise on some other occasion. 
Secondly assistance will be given if it is considered by potential 
supporters that participation will serve their own interests best. If, 
for example, they can thus secure a powerful ally or a person who 
is in a key position or what they consider to be a key position i. e. 
clerk, policeman, etc. then they will see their support as furthering 
these interests and as a sort of investment for the future. 
Thus and thirdly support in general creates an obligation in those 
who are supported. At some future date when their supporters are 
themselves involved in strife then this backing must or should be 
reciprocated. It is therefore a kind of insurance which families, 
whose alternative political support is weak, can take out. 
Fourthly participation in a para can be used as a means of opposing, 
weakening or diminishing the political importance of a particularly 
powerful man or group. It is also a method whereby disatisfaction 
can be expressed with one's own leadership or koranai by opposing 
them, when occasion arises, in a para. As will be shown below 
in chap. 11 on leadership this is a method commonly used for 
checking the power of maliks and it can be very effective. 
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Of course the reverse can happen i. e. should people's interests be 
coupled with the social or political advance of a particular person 
then when he is involved in disputes they will bolster his following 
in order that his success will also ultimately be theirs. 
Finally and probably the strongest cause for participation are marriage 
links between members. This may be most clearly seen in the case of 
outsiders. The majority of strangers who settle down in a hamlet feel 
themselves obliged, if a marriage was not the original cause of 
settlement, to marry into the hamlet. Such ties usually ensure that 
when one family is under pressure support will be given by the other. 
Thus a para may be created by marriage. Marriage may on the other 
hand strengthen and make more permanent relations between groups of 
families which have on other occasions joined in the pursuit of 
particular goals. They thus imbue what we shall see as the impermanent 
para with some degree of stability. 
The degree of permanence exhibited by para varies considerably. 
Generally once the conflict is past then the para having served their 
purpose break up. This is because the para normally has no non- 
political functions and because members make choices in time and 
according to specific gains to be made and to the constellation of 
opponents. Other conflicts usually occur at other times, over other 
interests and between different disputants. The para should reflect this 
impermanence in its own transience and to a lange extent it does but 
there are exceptions and not only those caused by ties of marriage. 
The para is rather like a nut, i. e. a kernel surrounded by an outer 
shell. The outer shell is represented by the supporters who make 
choices about participation only when confrontation has arisen. They 
respond to rather than initiate action. The kernel on the other hand is 
made up of the initiators of the action to which the others respond. 
Whilst it is true that conflict can occur between any individuals or 
groups case studies of disputes showed that confrontation happened 
more frequently between certain individuals and groups than between 
others and that some groups rarely if ever involved themselves as 
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initiators or supporters in confrontation 
1 ). 
There are therefore specific 
individuals or groups - usually the larger landowners - who are more 
involved in competition for resources and power than are the others and 
who, as a result, require support more often than do the others. 
Whether the support comes as the result of hoped for gains, or of self- 
interest, an obligation, as I have indicated above, is nearly always 
created. Thus when confrontation reoccurs there is a tendency to support 
the sarn. 'e core individual or group again whether the obligation was 
reciprocated or not rather than to cancel the debt or the new relationship 
by supporting one's previous opponents. In this way, but especially if 
ties of marriage also exist, some para in some villages achieve a high 
degree of stability. 
The majority, however, continue to be impermanent which is both 
the weakness and the strength of the para. It is its weakness 
because it results in uncertainty of support. Whereas koranai 
members are obliged by agnatic ideals to assist their fellow members 
- whether they do or not is another matter - para members may 
chose to give aid. It is its strength because of the resulting 
flexibility, the ability to adjust to situations and events and to 
combat the ambitions of individuals or groups which have become 
too powerful. Also it is this flexibility which enables para to cope 
so successfully with the present rapid change and as a result to 
provide feasible and realistic alternatives to the koranai 
2). 
They 
would, therefore, seem to be, at least within hamlets, the political 
group of the future although the ' minimal' koranai - father, son and 
brothers - will continue to provide in the majority of cases the hard 
core around which, should more supporters be neccessary, the para 
will be formed. 
1) This is also the case with koranai, see below p. 249. 
2) ' In situations of rapid social change, factions frequently arise - or 
become more clearly defined - because factional organization is 
better adapted to competition in changing situations than are the 
political groups that are characteristic of stable societies. Nicholas, 
R. 1966. Segmentary factional political systems. p. 55. In: Political 
Anthropology. Eds. Swartz, Turner, and Tuden. Aldine Publishing 
Co. Chicago. 
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Mechanics of Amalgamation and Division 
At the moment para and koranai exist side by side and are utilised 
or called into being by members at need. There is no division 
whereby koranai only compete with koranai or para with para. 
Groups form, combine with others, i. e. para with koranai or vice 
versa, and divide and disintegrate at will. The latter situation when 
it involves a koranai is generally registered with dismay at least 
by those not directly profiting in political terms from the division. 
This is because it points, especially when its cause is the opposition 
of brothers, to a further decline in agnatic and Pakhtun ideals. The 
splintering of a para, or of combinations of Para and koranai, elicits 
no such response because it is expected. As a result of the fluidity 
and impermanence of the para and combinations of para and koranai 
one would think that political groupings within hamlets, apart of 
course from the pure koranai, would be difficult to educe. In fact 
most hamlet elders in the community are able to outline, with varying 
degrees of accuracy depending on their own interests, their physical 
proximity to the hamlets in question and the existence of affinal 
connections with these hamlets, the possible political groups and 
combinations of groups which should form in any of the hamlets 
should dissent and/or conflict arise. This results from their know- 
ledge of koranai membership, their cognisance of ties and obligations 
between members of hamlets - the result of the public nature of 
marriages, debts, transactions etc. - and their familiarity with the 
history of past competitions. But it also results from political 
necessity. A knowledge of political groups and possible alliances 
especially, of course, in neighbouring hamlets, is essential for the 
competition for resources and power. Nevertheless villagers' 
assumptions and assessments about group formation may sometimes 
be incorrect because factors are constantly arising which affect 
membership in groups and alliances. Before, however, I come to 
this topic I will illustrate the general mechanics of amalgamations 
and divisions of groups by reference to one of the hamlets. 
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In this hamlet, manap xel, there is no single lineage encompassing 
all the villagers but instead a relatively large number (seven) of 
distinct koranai. Not all of these koranai, however, participate in 
the internal struggles of the hamlet. This is because two of them, 
the koranai BK and K, feel that involvement would negatively 
influence their economic activities - BK are ' alaf' , i. e. wheat and 
flour salesmen and 'strangers', and K are carpenters. Their 
abstinence is also, however, the result of the covert pressure 
exerted by the Pakhtuns of the hamlet to prevent their participation 
in political activities -a field considered the prerogative of the 
Pakhtuns alone 
1). 
Whilst this situation will change through the 
influence of external forces, at the moment the political aspect of 
these two koranai is in abeyance. 
Apart from the five politically active koranai there were (1970-71) 
also three para discernible in the hamlet. The members of these 
groups were drawn from sections of one koranai and not, as is 
more usual, from a number of different koranai. These men were 
generally more involved in conflict than other members of their 
koranai because, as in one case, they were the inheritors of a very 
large land-holding which needed to be defended or because, as in 
the other two cases, they were men who wished to expand both 
their land-holdings and their fields of influence. As might be 
expected in all three cases their principal rivals and competitors 
and those most affected by their ambitions were the other members 
of their own koranai. It is, therefore, not surprising that since the 
almost complete cessation of revenge killings these koranai rarely 
act as units. 
Such a situation forces these para into alliances with other groups 
1) This is comparable with the situation of the barbers (see above chap. 
6 pp. 105-111). Some carpenters, however, i. e. those in the hamlet 
of naj., aran, have a degree of political autonomy obtained through 
their relative wealth and the absence in their hamlet of Pakhtun 
fellow villagers. 
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should conflict or dissent arise for example over land. Para AK, for 
example, allied itself principally in the past with koranai M and 
acquired a steadfast ally because M is neither competing for power - 
it is too small - nor pressing a claim to AK's fields - it neither 
has agnatic connections with AK nor adjacent fields. M after whom 
the hamlet is named has become small and unimportant both in 
numbers and land. The unqualified support which M extends to AK 
created an obligation which is repaid through assistance given to M 
when the koranai is involved in dispute and by access to fields for 
share-cropping and thus is not a one-sided agreement but is also of 
value to M. The ties between the two groups, however, are not only 
of an economic and political nature but have been strengthened, if 
not to a large extent been formed, by three marriages in the present 
generation. (See diag. 31 p 253) 
Marriages in general play a very important role both in holding 
individual groups together and in creating and cementing alliances- 
between groups. They are, however, not all given the same value. 
Newly created bonds tend to take precedence over older ones in the 
sense that the latter lose on 'actuality' or more numerous ties are 
given preeminence over less numerous ones. Something of this 
process may be shown by reference again to koranai M. When para 
AK was in conflict with para T then M, as I have already indicated, 
supported AK with whom it had and has three marriage connections 
rather than T with whom it only has one. But when AK was involved 
in a struggle with koranai R, M who also has two affinal links with 
R remained neutral neither supporting AK nor R and tried to bring 
about a reconciliation between the two groups. However when AK 
was in conflict with koranai MK with whom M has no relations of 
marriage and koranai R joined sides with MK, M supported AK with- 
out hesitation. Although a certain consistency of intent may be dis- 
cerned it would be too easy and incorrect to presume that marriage 
links were the only factors determining allegiance. Apart from the 
weakening of affinal ties with time there are also many short term 
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factors such as shortages of money or crops and the possibility of 
share-cropping agreements which influence the choices of koranai 
and para. Nevertheless it is still possible, with exceptions which 
will be outlined below, to say which koranai will act as units, 
which will divide, which people will form a para under whom and 
which groups will make alliances with others. 
The exceptions result from a number of factors some of which 
have already been touched upon above and others that have not 
been mentioned so far. In the former case the lack of continuity 
of para and the weakening of koranai through the atrophy of the 
revenge/feud aspects of their activities continue to make prognoses 
about group formation uncertain. In the latter case i. e. of factors 
not mentioned, one factor responsible is the break up of a koranai 
through the opposition of brothers. Such opposition is sometimes 
discernible as, for example, in the case of the brothers, mullahs 
AandT. 
Mullah T (a Safi mullah) had been able to obtain extra spring water 
from the hamlet of wali xan xel. He was able to make a claim to 
the water because his son was married to a woman from that 
hamlet but decisive in its acquisition was his willingness to provide 
the cultivator from wali xan xel, whose water share he utilised, 
with a third of the crop. His brother, mullah A, could also have 
purchased water from the hamlet of wali xan xel. In order to 
irrigate his fields, however, he would have had to have lead the 
water along mullah T's ditches because mullah T's fields lay 
between his, i. e. mullah A's, fields and wali xan xel' s water. As 
mullah T would not allow this, mullah A's fields became burnt and 
bare whereas those of mullah T were luxuriant with rice shoots. 
The difference and the opposition were clear to all. 
This was an extreme case and generally opposition between 
brothers is kept secret as long as possible because of the social 
and political repercussions which result from its being made public 
(see above p. 160) and also because of the criticism and censure 
Wich follow. 
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Also incalculable in assessments of political groupings are the secret 
agreements of individuals and parties. All contracts and agreements 
in Afghaniya are made in public or made public. This is a situation 
which results no doubt in part from the difficulty of making trans- 
actions and agreements away from the interested eyes and ears of 
relatives and neighbours. Outside the gala it is more or less 
impossible for two men to talk together without being seen or being 
joined by a third. Indoors there is a total lack of privacy of word 
and action although this does not mean that everything said and done 
will percolate to the outside, at least not immediately. As a result 
men only utter comments publicly which are for public consumption 
and make public agreements which are 'fair' and 'just' and 
generally in accord with Pakhtun ideals. Their true intentions and 
the essence of agreements are the subject of 'secret' meetings and 
clauses held and drawn up in spite of the difficulty of maintaining 
their secrecy. Initial secrecy is achieved by taking an opportunity 
for a private aside or by walking away for a few minutes from the 
group of witnesses and interested onlookers. As secret clauses are 
always suspected by and usually with time known to others in the 
hamlet they are an accepted element of behaviour especially as they 
also make agreements possible whilst preserving the illusion of 
having acted in accordance with Pakhtun ideals. In terms of political 
behaviour where the principal ideal is the unquestioning support of 
closest agnates secret clauses and agreements create uncertainty 
both in the parties and onlookers. People who have promised help 
may in fact suddenly be found to be supporting the opposing side. 
One elder, OK, for example, chosen by one party to act on their 
behalf at a settlement did his uttermost to bring about a resolution 
in favour of the opposition. Later it was found out that he had 
been offered a substantial part of the money which was in dispute 
if he would change sides. Such cases occur with sufficient 
frequency to make forecasts uncertain. They do not, of course, 
make them superfluous because much political activity is based on 
a prior knowledge of potential political strength and the possibility 
of groupings and combinations. Such intelligence can be vital, 
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even if on some occasions it is incorrect and it is not surprising 
that hamlet elders should be cognisant not only of the different 
koranai and possible para groups in their own hamlets but also 
those of most of the hamlets in the community. 
The Hamlet as the Limit of Political Solidarity 
I have shown so far that the internal politics of hamlets are 
dominated by the struggles of the koranai and para or combinations 
of such groups. No hamlet in Afghaniya is exempt from such 
altercation or disputes. One reason for this is that like kor al 
members the people with whom villagers most frequently have 
contact and, therefore, occasion for conflict are fellow villagers. 
Another reason is that the principal object of contention, land, is 
only of interest when it is adjoining or near to a villager's own 
fields which is mainly the case with fellow villagers' fields 
1 ). 
In 
spite of such internal divisions, often pursued with considerable 
bitterness and over long periods of time, hamlets in Afghaniya do 
not disintegrate into un-unifiable factions. This is because they are 
held together by numerous bonds which make hamlets in a number 
of areas the focus of their inhabitants' attentions and loyalties and 
enable hamlets to act as units when faced by external opposition. 
The devisive tendencies are therefore counterbalanced by cohesive 
ones. 
One such cohesive factor is common descent which in a society 
pervaded by a patrilineal ideology such as Afghaniya is inevitably 
seen by the members as being of primary importance. This ideal 
picture of their society is retained in spite of the fact that only 
1) It is of course true that a hamlet's fields will be surrounded or 
bordered by the fields of other hamlets and therefore there must be 
opportunity and cause for conflict there as well. Competition for 
land does occur in these border areas but it is, by comparison, 
infrequent because the working of fields obtained from other hamlets 
is more problematical in terms of the different irrigation systems 
and the distance to the fields. 
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three of the thirty-four hamlets in the community are exclusively 
united in this way. In the other hamlets groups of varying sizes 
and families which are not patrilineally related to the majority of 
the hamlet's population testify to the inexactitude of the Safi' s 
views. Nevertheless the significance of patrilineality for hamlet 
solidarity has not been reduced. This is partly because these 
stranger groups also have their babas (patronymic founders) and 
are termed koranai so that they appear to be and are considered 
as being, in general terms, identical with the other koranai and 
like them to have founders who are also the descendants of the 
founding ancestor of the hamlet. It is also the result, as I have 
shown above, of the binding forces of neighbourliness and common 
residence - both very important in their own right for producing 
solidarity among villagers - which utilise agnatic and descent 
concepts or terms to explain the bonds created with the stranger 
groups. 
Another factor or factors furthering cohesion are the rights and 
obligations which are concomitant with being neighbours or fellow 
villagers. One such obligation is helping or sharing. Neighbours 
when they have guests may be short of cushions, flour, cups, 
utensils etc., and it is expected that such commodities will be 
freely provided by those living close to them. Or when a new qala 
is being built, and ashar being planned, or oxen are ill then neigh- 
bours are obliged to help or to provide animals or implements. In 
nearly all cases such help is given without question because these 
are obligations which will be reciprocated when the donor or his 
family are themselves in need. People, therefore, only demand as 
much as they can, at some future date, afford to repay and the 
relationship in general remains unencumbered and thus of 
importance. 
Difficulties can, however, arise when, as at the time of my field 
work, the economic situation is bad. In 1970-71 the villagers, 
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because of the continued drought, were confronted with the dilemma 
of wanting to share for social reasons and for purposes of 
prestige 
1) 
but at the same time of needing to be personally 
acquisitive in order to survive. They needed to appear as if they 
were acting generously but could not afford to share too lavishly. 
As a result everybody hoarded secretly - my neighbour used my 
empty storerooms to hide part of his crop - whilst pretending in 
public to share with as much liberality as his limited means would 
allow 
2). 
This situation was unusual and my informants said that 
in normal times the ideals of sharing and helping were upheld. I 
am, however, a little sceptical and believe that the drought had 
merely made a situation which was already deteriorating through 
overpopulation and land shortage etc., worse. Nevertheless the 
situation can now after the reportedly 
3) 
good harvests only be 
better than it was then and, therefore, sharing and helping, even 
on a reduced scale, continue to strengthen solidarity among villagers. 
A further obligation emanating from common residence is visiting. 
Whilst such visits are particularly important for families which are 
affinally linked (see above pp. 203 & 204 ) they are also important 
for those who live close to one another, and, as hamlets in 
Afghaniya are very small (av. pop. 85), such visits usually involve 
all the inhabitants. This is especially the case when men return 
from military service, when they have bought something -a watch 
or a radio means a tour of honour -, on religious holidays, and on 
the occasion of all rites de passage. It is true that the hospitality 
offered has also suffered from the drought but the visiting still 
continues and its role as a binding force for villagers is still of 
considerable importance. 
1) Generous giving brings the donor standing in the community. 
2) See also Canfield (R. L. Faction and conversion in a plural society. 
Religious alignments in the Hindu Kush. Anthropological Papers. 
Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan. No. 50 1973 
p. 77 f. ) who gives a very similar account for conditions prevailing 
among the Hazara of Bamian. 
3) From private correspondence. 
- 257 - 
All these factors i. e. agnation, neighbourliness, and common 
residence with, of course, the bonds formed by hamlet marriages 
mean that every villager sees himself ideally 
1) 
at the centre of 
increasingly comprehensive circles of relationships until the boundary 
of the hamlet is reached (see diag. 32 p. 258). Those relationships 
which are closest to 'ego' are, of course, the most intense never- 
theless those which are at the periphery of his interest, i. e. hamlet 
members, are sufficiently strong for combined action to be taken by the 
hamlet when, for example, its water rights are threatened, or when 
hamlet members are involved in disputes on neutral territory. In the 
latter case this occurs at the time of the two big islamic festivals, i. e. 
after Ramadan and the Prophet' s birthday. These festivals are held on 
the territory of Baba Zangu' s shrine which is not only a place of 
pilgrimage for the members of Afghaniya but also for people from 
Nijrao and Tagao. The gambling which is an accompaniment of the 
festivities can and often does lead to conflict and on such occasions 
hamlet members present a united front. 
There are, however, also occasions when responsibility is felt for 
people who do not live in the hamlet. This occurs when fellow villagers 
take up residence in another, neighbouring, hamlet either because of 
land inherited there or because of marriage to a landed woman from 
that hamlet, or when people who are resident elsewhere are considered 
to be 'tribal' members and to belong to what they refer to as a 
g 
). 
In both these cases support, mainly of a moral rather separate leg 
2) 
than a physical nature, will be extended should these people be in conflict 
1) I questioned ten male villagers about relationships asking them for 
whom they felt the most affection, to whom they felt most close in 
kinship terms, and to whom they were most obliged. The result was, 
in every case, one which favoured agnates rather than affines or 
matrilateral relatives. In practice, however, they often favoured 
the latter to the former. 
_ 2) It is written 'jola pukha' but pronounced 'jola kph a' . Pakhtuns 
compare the tribal genealogy to a man and the legs represent the 
dividing point(s) of sons, i. e. brothers. Members referred to as 
belonging to a separate leg in Afghaniya would be members of the 
major lineages, the khels. 
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but only when their opponents are not fellow villagers. The significance 
of these extra-hamlet ties, however, has also decreased with the 
general decline in importance of the larger patrilineally organised 
groups and now they have an ideal rather than a real value. Thus 
the effective boundary of political solidarity is provided by the hamlet. 
In the absence of external pressure this solidarity is indicated and 
reinforced by the presence of the hamlet imam, of one meeting place 
- in winter the petawi and in summer the surf - and of hamlet 
representatives - the 'de kuli mashr' or hamlet elder. 
The hamlet imam is significant, as has been seen in detail above 
(pp. 112 -117 ), because he can only be appointed when all the hamlet 
elders and thus all the various factions in the hamlet are agreed upon 
his appointment. When they are not unanimous then he cannot be 
installed. At the time of my field work there was only one hamlet 
without an imam the result of a bitter conflict between the two major 
koranai. No appointment could be made because no agreement could 
be reached. As a result the mosque had fallen into disrepair and all 
the males prayed separately in their fields or houses. This struggle 
also completely paralysed all political activities on the hamlet level 
and the hamlet became the much quoted example of the debilitating 
effects of internal struggle. This is not to say that where there are 
imams there is an absence of strife but the situation is different. 
The mosque functions as a social centre and it is a place where all 
the men assemble for r riday prayers. Hamlet solidarity is thus 
concretely indicated. 
This does not mean that the places of assembly, the petawi and surf, 
are neglected. Here men gather daily, as we have seen, to exchange 
gossip, to discuss prices, to sell animals or products etc., and on 
occasion to judge issues in the jirga. The presence or absence of 
certain men does, of course, indicate the existence of tensions, never- 
theless the petawi and surf function as centres of contact where 
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hamlet unity can be corroborated. 
The existence of one hamlet representative or elder, the ' de kuli 
mashr, also expresses internal unity because if the members are 
willing to allow one person to represent them they are either not 
involved in dispute or are prepared to subordinate their internal 
dissensions to the need of presenting a united front. Not all hamlets 
are willing to do so and, therefore, send more than one elder so 
that the factions or descent groups are equally represented. The 
occasions when such hamlet representatives are needed are few, for 
example, for the organization of communal activities after floods, 
or for buildings and roads, etc., or for the clearing and cleaning 
of irrigation ditches at the beginning of spring. Nevertheless these 
are occasions when the hamlet can be represented by one or two 
men and serve to show its compatibility and unanimity. 
Situations when the hamlet can act politically as a corporate group 
are few and involve, as mentioned above, either disputes over water 
or struggles occurring at the shrine of Baba Zangu. As the festivities 
at the shrine only occur twice a year occasions for violence there 
are rare. In the case of water disputes, trouble occurs throughout 
the community when there is a water shortage. Otherwise it is 
confined to those hamlets which are either at the end of an irrigation 
ditch which serves a number of hamlets - there the people have to 
wait the longest for the water to descend to them - or to hamlets 
whose springs are close. Charges of using the water too long, of 
diverting the water of another hamlet's springs, or letting the main 
ditch become clogged so that water intended elsewhere overflows 
onto the fields of a hamlet whose turn has already passed, bring 
conflict and hamlet solidarity. Whereas previously such fights would 
have been pursued with firearms they are now generally confined to 
fists, stones, and sticks and if protracted and bitter finally placed 
in the hands of the waluswal and local government. Presumably this 
trend of accepting an outside authority's decision will become in 
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time the accepted procedure in spite of the elders' and maliks' 
injunctions (see below p. 291 ) that strife should be resolved in the 
community and by its members. At the moment, however, conflict 
is still carried out on a hamlet level and the hamlet is thus the 
largest political group in Afghaniya. 
Causes and Cases of Conflict 
I have described so far those three groups - excluding those formed 
by maliks - which still have political significance in Afghaniya, i. e. 
koranai, para and the hamlet and have sought through the use of one 
hamlet, MK, to illustrate the mechanisms of confrontation and of 
alliance formation. It remains now to look at the causes and cases 
of conflict. 
The traditional objects of conflict in Pakhtun society are 'zan, zar, 
and zamin' i. e. women, gold, and land. In Afghaniya the small size 
of the bride-wealth 
1), 
the relative ease and frequency of divorce 
Z), 
the relative commoness and acceptability of adultery 
3) 
all point to a 
relative decline in the capability of women through their actions to 
damage the honour of their husbands' families or male relatives 
4) 
and therefore to a decline of women as a primary object of strife. 
They are, however, still the subject of central interest when they 
inherit land or when there is the possibility that they will inherit it. 
The second object ' zar' , or gold is now used to denote movable 
property and money. Both are important and the subject of conflict 
but they are of secondary significance in themselves and often only 
have real value, in the eyes of the people, when used to acquire 
land. 
1) See above chap 9. p. 217. 
2) See diags. 16-25 pp. 179 188. 
3) Common and acceptable only by comparison to Pakhtun society as a 
whole where its occurrence is very rare or at least considered to be so. 
4) It also indicates of course a general decline in ideals per se. 
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It is, therefore, the third element of contention, ' zamin' , land which 
has by contrast lost none of its explosive nature but has remained or 
become the primary cause of dispute and conflict in Afghaniya. There 
are two reasons for this. One is that, as we have seen, some 25 % 
of the population are not able to support themselves and their 
families from their land alone but must also share-crop the land of 
other larger landowners to acquire sufficient for subsistence. Those 
who have sufficient land, i. e. 60 % of the population (15 % are land- 
less), nevertheless live, with the exception of perhaps 5% of the 
cultivators, at a subsistence level. Thus some 80 % of the Safi must 
participate, in the absence of large scale employment outside the 
community and with the pressure of overpopulation in the valley 
itself, in a debilitating struggle to increase that amount of land which 
they possess. Of course if all participated there would be chaos. In 
fact many just try to keep that which they have intact, whilst others 
do not possess the financial resources or political support necessary 
for competition, and some leave the problem to be solved by their 
sons or by fate. Nevertheless sufficient cultivators remain to pursue 
a bitter struggle for the acquisition of additional land. 
The second reason is that through the possession of land nearly all 
those things which are considered socially desirable, i. e. status, 
prestige and power, are achievable. Without land the villager has 
little standing in the community, no say in the jirga, difficulty in 
finding a marriage partner, a smaller chance of successors, and 
less honour in death 
1 ý. 
Very considerable social pressures are, 
therefore, at hand which force members of the community into 
competing for land or at least defending that which they have. 
Methods of Acquiring Land 
Generally speaking additional land may be acquired in four ways - 
1) The richness of burial clothes and the amount of money distributed 
to those attending the funeral are subjects of comment and expressions 
of status. The poor man has little to show and little to distribute. See 
also below p. 269. 
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by inheritance, purchase, marriage and force. Whilst force would 
appear to be the only method of the four which directly requires 
the formation of political groups in practice, because of the in- 
tense competition for land, attempts to obtain fields by inheritance, 
purchase and marriage can often only be successful if they are 
also backed up by strong political support. Similarly the maintenance 
of a land-holding in the face of external pressure is only possible 
with agnatic or other forms of backing. Such factors must not mean, 
and usually do not mean, that actual conflict is necessary, often the 
threat of the use of force, or the knowledge that one party has very 
strong backing is sufficient for the competitor to abandon his bid 
for the fields. To a certain and increasing extent such force may be 
counteracted by an appeal on the part of the weaker party to the 
local government. In cases where the legal situation is clear, for 
example, in inheritance then a decision favouring the politically 
weak group may be given. Generally, however, such decisions are 
difficult to reach, because of the complexity of the cases, and often 
of long duration and expensive so that parties utilise the 
administration' s facilities only in the last resort and political 
groups, i. e. para and koranai within the community continue to be 
decisive. 
Trý1ýe r'i F-n to 
In the case of inheritance the general principles followed in 
Afghaniya are still similar to those of pre-islamic customary law, 
i. e. land should only be inherited by the nearest male agnate or 
agnates, females or cognates are excluded, descendants are 
preferred to ascendants, and ascendants to collaterals 
1 ). 
Thus 
most males in Afghaniya inherit land from their fathers the amount 
varying with the size of the original holding and the number of male 
siblings. It is this land which forms the working capital with 
1) See Fyzee. 1964. (3rd Ed. ) Op. cit. p. 333. Fyzee also writes 
(p. 333) that ' Hanafi law (the official school for Afghanistan) to a 
certain extent, retains the principles of ancient tribal law' , i. e. 
custom and law would seem to be complementary. 
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which the competitive landowner starts and to which he hopes to add 
extra fields. 
One means of acquisition and one which has the advantage of not 
involving political confrontation, at least not initially, is when the 
land which is inherited is not divided among the brothers but is 
maintained as a single unit. In this way the full potential of the 
land-holding can be used and the extra products set aside for buying 
land. Such a method is especially effective when one brother is 
much older than the others because then the marriages of the 
younger and dependent brothers can be postponed - saving bridewealth 
payments - as can the division of the land so that maximum returns 
may be achieved for as long as possible. However once the other 
brothers have reached maturity it is increasingly difficult to deny 
them both wives and their shares of the land. Land can also, of 
course, be inherited from brothers should they die without issue. 
Even if they have children the land which these children inherit can 
be worked by their uncles or guardians during their minority and 
the capital gained invested in the purchase of new fields 
1 ). 
Utilisation of these fields, however, rarely remains unopposed 
because many people feel that they have a claim to them - most 
people in a hamlet are related in one way or another - and some- 
times the most legitimate claimants are ousted by those with fewer 
rights but with more powerful support. 
0 
A further possibility of obtaining inherited fields but one which has 
only recently begun to play a part in the competition for land is the 
realisation of women's claims. The right of women to inherit was 
one of the major reforms introduced by Islam 
2). 
This was 
conveniently forgotten, or ignored in Afghaniya in the past at least 
as far as the inheritance of land was concerned. However since the 
1) The social and legal position of fatherless children is very weak and 
should the land not have been divided among the brothers prior to the 
father's death then the children generally do not inherit. 
2) Fyzee. 1964. Op. cit. p. 333. 
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central government has been able to extend its effective control into 
the Pachoghan valley and people have begun to use the facilities 
offered the situation has changed 
1 ). 
Now women who make a claim 
to a share of their father's land or that of their dead husband will 
receive the support and backing of the local government' s 
authorities. Nevertheless many make no such claim because firstly 
women are not made aware of their rights unless it is to the men' s 
advantage, and secondly even if they are cognisant of the laws it is 
very difficult for a woman secluded and restricted in her movements 
as she is to approach the authorities in Nijrao 
2). 
Most women, 
therefore, if they are alone, i. e. without a husband or sons forego 
their right to inherit and brothers or other collateral males, i. e. 
half-brothers or cousins appropriate the women's shares. Thirdly 
even if the women are married they may not make a claim to their 
shares if they either live at some distance from their natal hamlets 
so that the utilisation of the land claimed would be difficult if not 
impossible or, if they have affines who are politically weak. If, 
however, the women are supported by husbands who are either 
politically strong or confident enough to appeal directly to the local 
government judge then they can and will inherit. The result is that 
now those men who are able to command sufficient political support 
within the community prevent their sisters from inheriting but press 
the claims of their mothers and/or wives. Those who have 
insufficient support but who are nevertheless willing to face the 
dissatisfaction of the other interested party can carry their wives', 
1) A change not only confined to Afghanistan. Stirling (1965. Op. cit. 
p. 131) writing about a Turkish village describes a situation which 
mirrors that of Afghaniya: 'Decreasing village autonomy, the 
decline in the power and importance of lineages, and the increase of 
administrative control and interference have increased the chances 
of establishing and enforcing a claim to female inheritance. ... Moreover, the motives for claiming female inheritance grow 
stronger as land grows scarcer. ' 
2) The only exceptions are older women whose social asexuality allows 
them a greater degree of freedom. I have myself witnessed such 
women making appeals directly to the waluswal. 
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mothers', or widowed sister's claims to the local government centre 
where if these are legitimate they will be established and enforced. 
Such a situation and one which is very illustrative of some of the 
processes outlined above occurred when T of the hamlet of MK made 
a claim to his wife' s, ahl' s, share of her father, AH' s, inheritance 
(see diag. 33 p. 267). AH had died more or less at the same time 
as his two sons AHl and AH2. Some months later AH' s brother, R, 
also died so that the only inheritors remaining for AH' s property 
and land were his four daughters ahi, ah2, ah3 and ah4 (see diag. 
33). ahl was, as we have seen, married to T from the neighbouring 
hamlet of MK. T who had very little land himself and no agnatic 
support was nevertheless self-assured and ambitious enough to press 
his wife's claim for a share of both the moveable property and the 
land. His principal opponent was the equally ambitious R1 who was, 
apart from being the husband of ah2, the son of R and the brother' s 
son of AH. R1 had further strengthened his position, in terms of the 
inheritance, by marrying his son RR to the youngest daughter of AH, 
ah4. After the death of R, R1 felt that his position had become 
unassailable because apart from his and his son's marriages to two 
of AH' s four daughters, ah3, the fourth daughter of AH, was married 
to a Safi in Tagao. This meant that because of the Tagao Safi' s 
geographical position he could, at the most, make some claim to 
AH' s property but certainly not to the land - in fact he did neither. 
Also R1' s opponent T had no agnatic or other support from his own 
hamlet whereas he, R1, could, should the utilisation of force 
become necessary, count on the help of his three brothers R2, R3, 
and R4, and his son RR. When, therefore, T placed his claim to his 
wife's share R1 rejected it and said that 'it was not their custom to 
allow women to take land from the father's family'. Instead, however, 
of giving up or of bowing before R1' s superior force T presented his 
case to the judge at Nijrao. After much litigation T won because the 
judge said that the shari'at permitted women to inherit. 
In spite, however, of T' s success merely obtaining the ownership of 
the land does not guarantee its use especially when the fields are in 
another hamlet's territory. T' s lack of political support meant that 
he could not work his newly acquired fields himself and, as R1 would 
not allow anyone else from his (Ri' s) hamlet to share-crop them, T 
ultimately had to allow R1 to do this. T, of course, gained the 
landowner's share of the crop but, as we shall see below in the 
section on force as a method of land acquisition, all the elements 
were present for further competition between R1 and T. Also as a 
general principle men such as T, i. e. without political support, lose 
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through their sisters - because they cannot impede their claims - 
what they have gained through their wives and mothers. It is, 
therefore, usually more ' expedient to have backing within one's own 
hamlet than to rely solely on the judge when claims are made to 
women's inheritances. 
Purchase 
The second method of acquiring additional land, purchase, is also 
most successful when the purchaser is supported by his koranai or 
achieves the backing of a para. Such support is not necessary to 
force the seller to lower his price, although this may also be 
attempted, but to counter the activities of other interested people 
and to overcome the objections and obstructive actions of the 
' shaf' a' , the pre-emptor, i. e. those who have adjoining fields and 
who must according to islamic law be given the first opportunity to 
buy the field or fields offered for sale 
1 ý. 
Fields in Afghaniya come up for sale for four main reasons. First- 
ly landowners here like those everywhere in Afghanistan run up 
debts 
2) 
with shop-keepers, specialists, neighbours, money-lenders, 
etc. They generally manage to avoid paying them at least in their 
entirety so that the debt is passed on to their children but the land 
is saved. Some men, however, are forced to sell their fields 
because the amount of their debts is so large that no other way is 
1) Fyzee writes that: ' (i) the pre-emptor must be the owner of immoveabje 
property; (ii) there must be a sale of certain property, not his own; 
(iii) the pre-emptor must stand in a certain relationship to the vendor 
in respect of the property sold. ' The ' relationship' to which Fyzee 
refers gives three classes of persons the right of pre-emption: ' (i) Safi' 
-i Sharik, i. e. a co-sharer in the property' (brothers etc. ), ' (ii) 
Shafi' -i Khalit, ... a person who is entitled to such easement as a 
right of way, or discharge of water', ' (iii) Shafi-i jar, i. e. the 
neighbour, the owner of an adjoining property. ' ' If these conditions 
are satisfied, he (the pre-emptor) has the right to be substituted for 
the purchaser. ' Fyzee, 1949. Op. cit. pp. 282,288, and 289. See also 
above chap. 6. 
2) ' In den untersuchten Dörfern waren 57 % aller Familien verschuldet. ' i 
Hahn. 1972. Op. cit. p. 230. See also footnote 1 p. 99. 
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open to them and no more credit is available. In Afghaniya most of 
these men are secret gamblers who after loosing large sums of 
money in Tagao or Nijrao first ' gerao' , i. e. sell the usufruct rights 
of their fields and then, because the reduced returns from the 
smaller holdings lead to further debts and/or because they become 
compulsive gamblers, they sell their fields. Many seek to avert the 
inevitable by taking up other activities such as meat or flour 
salesmen but usually this is only an intermediary stage prior to the 
complete loss of all their land (see diag. 6 p. 93 ). Secondly as men 
are morally obliged to find wives for their sons when no other 
source of income is available and no daughters are at hand then 
fields are ' geraoed' or sold to provide money for the bride-wealth 
payments. In this way fields also become available. 
Similarly and thirdly the pomp demanded by and the distribution of 
money necessary at a funeral often force sons to sell land so that 
the expectations of status may be fulfilled. This comes about 
because sons who remain with their fathers to provide for them 
and to look after them in old age are required by custom to utilise, 
when the division of land and property has taken place before the 
father' s death (see above pp. 157 & 158), a third of the father' s 
share for the ' kafan' , the shroud or winding sheet, and for the 
' isgat ', the monetary distribution. In some cases sufficient money 
is not available nevertheless as the body is displayed publicly at a 
special place in the hamlet and as relatives and friends from the 
hamlet gather in concentric circles around the body - the closer the 
relationship the closer the physical proximity - for the distribution 
of the money, considerable social pressure is brought to bear on 
the sons of the dead man to provide if not a resplendent then at 
least an 'adequate' funeral commensurate with the dead man' s 
considered standing and status. The subjectivity of the estimate 
demands that more is spent than can often be afforded and fields 
have to be sold. 
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Finally land is sold by women i. e. unmarried daughters or childless 
widows who are the sole heirs of their dead fathers or husbands. 
They have to sell their fields because without males they cannot 
work them. In these ways then fields become available for those 
who have the money to buy them. 
Money, however, is not easy to acquire in Afghaniya because very 
few owner-cultivators, as we have seen, produce a surplus above 
and beyond that necessary for subsistence which can then be sold in 
the markets of the area. Those who can and can also live on an 
absolute minimum are able to accumulate capital for the purchase of 
fields. Others lend money or products and with the very high 
interest rates (often 50 to 100 %) which are usual in Afghaniya 
either acquire sufficient money to buy or are able, with the backing 
of their agnates, to take possession of fields or gardens. Finally 
some cultivators use the money sent by sons working in other areas 
of Afghanistan to purchase extra land but this form of capital 
accumulation is still rare because of the scarcity of work 
opportunities and because only the sons of very poor Safi do such 
work and their earnings are required principally to ensure 
subsistence and not to buy fields. 
Once sufficient money is saved then the occasion must arise when 
others wish to sell. This occurs, as I have shown, as the result 
of debts, bride-wealth payments, funerals, and unsupported female 
inheritance. Generally that person who has the largest portion of 
his offer in cash will be the one to succeed. The reason being 
that oxen, guns, radios etc., which are also used as part payments 
are not readily accepted by the vendor because of the subjectivity 
surrounding their real values, the long and bitter haggling which 
goes on to ascertain their price and the uncertainty surrounding 
the date of their addition to the payment. The deposit, however, of 
a certain amount of cash may not alone resolve all problems 
connected with the purchase because, as I have indicated above, the 
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shaf' a also must be given the opportunity to buy the field or fields 
for sale. Of course had these pre-emptors been in a position to 
purchase them they would have done so. As they often cannot, but 
would like to, they either try to persuade their cousin, relative 
or neighbour to sell the fields to them especially cheaply, to 
dissuade the purchaser fem his purpose, or to block the whole 
procedure by officially stating their intention to buy. Such procedures 
lead to confrontation and occasionally to conflict, and the purchase of 
land like its inheritance is often only possible through the threat of, 
1) 
or the use of, force 
Marriage 
The third method of obtaining land, marriage, has been touched upon 
above in terms of inheritance and elsewhere (chap. 9) and therefore only 
requires brief mention here. In order to acquire fields by marriage 
participants need both above average abilities and more than average 
standing in the community. The abilities necessary are principally 
foresight to plan sufficiently far ahead, the intelligence and capacity 
to outmanoeuvre competing agnates and other competitors and the 
self-assurance to marry what may be less-attractive and older 
spinsters or widows 
2). 
Standing in terms of wealth or position 
(malik, mullah, teacher, clerk etc. ) are important because such 
men will be preferred as suitors by the walis of the women and 
further have the advantage that bride-wealth payments may be 
smaller because the girl's relatives hope for benefits from such 
favourable connections. It is also necessary to have sufficient sons 
1) Sometimes a stalemate occurs when neither side can achieve an 
advantage. In such situations the land may be bought by strangers 
who because of their neutrality and lack of power are acceptable 
to the disputants and do not arouse the hostility of the other villagers. 
2) The youth and beauty of a woman are considered indispensable 
qualities for a marriage (see also above p. 229) and it is, therefore, 
an exceptional or a very poor man who chooses primarily because of 
the land involved. 
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and daughters - the latter to balance the bride-wealth payments for 
the sons - and to utilise to the full the four possible marriages 
open to all males. 
One malik, M, for example, married the widow b and the daughter al 
- by another wife - of the landowner K (see diag. 34 p. 273). He also 
married his son, Ml, to the daughter, bl, of the widow b whom he 
had himself married. In this way, with the exception of K' s daughter' s 
(a2' s) inheritance, he obtained all of K' s land because K' s son and 
grandson had died and al's son, N, was persuaded by the malik to 
desist from making a claim by the promise of help in his difficulties 
with the government. The land thus 'married' represented a one 
hundred percent increase in the malik' s own landholding and no drain 
upon his own resources because he managed to acquire all three women 
without paying bride -wealth for any of them. 
Of course, there is often considerable uncertainty surrounding 
marriage aimed at the acquisition of land - the women may die in 
child birth 
1), 
or the girl's father may, even at an advanced age, 
marry again - but with sufficient support to ensure that wives and 
daughters-in-law gain their inheritances and daughters and sons-in- 
law do not then marriage can be extremely lucrative. 
Force 
Force, the final method of obtaining land, apart from backing up 
legitimate claims to fields can be used to obtain land where claims 
are much less legitimate. A debt, for example, which has not been 
honoured may lead to the forceful occupation and utilisation of the 
debtor's fields. Land may also be appropriated merely on the 
basis of the weakness of the owner's position i. e. he is without 
agnatic or other support. Sometimes force may be used to 
' readjust' the positions of fields so that the more powe rful landowner 
can have all his fields adjoining one another. The form of land 
aggrandisement which, however, is now most widely utilised in 
Afghaniya is the calling into question of agreements made about land. 
In Afghaniya land is pawned (gerao) or sold generally in accordance 
1) The mortality rate among women is because of their ignorance of the 
relationship between hygiene and infection especially high. 
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with customary law which means that a contract, called the "arfi 
gabala', is drawn up by a mullah or malik and is witnessed both 
by them and by friends or relatives of both parties. Whilst such 
agreements used to go unchallenged in the past they are now 
coming more and more into disrepute principally because the 
competition for land is causing participants and witnesses to 
increasingly disavow the true content of the contract in the hope 
of gain of one kind or another. This is particularly prevalent 
with those contracts made by people who leave Afghaniya to work 
elsewhere. Prior to departure, if they have any land left, they 
' gerao' or sell it. When they return after one, or a number of 
years, they either insist that the land which they sold was only 
pawned or they are confronted by people who assert, because they 
have come in the meantime to regard the fields as their own, 
that the pawned land was in reality sold to them. 
Such a case arose when Q prior to leaving for Afghan Turkestan 
sold his land and gala to his paternal cousin AW by " arfi gabala' 
i. e. customary law. AW worked the fields and improved the gala 
by putting in new windows and building extra rooms to accomodate 
his larger harvests and his family. Five years later Q returned 
to Afghaniya and demanded the return of his house and fields 
which he said he not only did not sell. to AW but to whom he did 
not even sell the usufruct rights of the fields. AW, he insisted, 
had merely had the right to use them as long as he, Q, was away 
in Turkestan. AW denied this and there was such a heated 
argument that Q and AW came to blows and had to be separated 
by other members of the hamlet. Support was then extended by 
both men' s koranai and there the matter remained until Q 
acquired, through the promise of monetary reward, the support 
of malik N. The disturbed balance was restored when malik M 
who is affinally related to one of AW' s supporters agreed to 
bolster their forces with his political weight. This final stalemate 
was broken when Q after another fight with AW made a complaint 
('arz ) to the government in Nijrao. There the matter stood at 
the completion of my field work. 
Some of the struggles which thus arise are solved by a show of 
force on the part of the stronger party but most remain unresolv- 
ed as we have seen in the case of Q and AW because the parties 
are equally balanced or because a resolution which might in the 
past have been achieved through outright conflict is now, because 
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of the government's presence in Nijrao, avoided. Appeals to the 
local government also do not bring solutions but tend to complicate 
matters. The waluswal and/or judge can generally only recognise 
those contracts drawn up in accordance with shari'at law 
1) 
and 
these are usually avoided by the Safi because of the tax involved 
and because they feel that the authorities would gain too much 
insight into their affairs in this way. Nevertheless an increasing 
number of people are using the government's facilities for the sale 
of land and for the sale of the usufruct rights to fields because 
they have seen that in this way many of the complications which 
are now concomitant with customary law contracts can be avoided. 
Force or at least overt force, therefore, as a means of acquiring land 
is gradually losing ground in the face of goven rent power and 
governmental facilities. Competition for land in the future will tend to 
be concentrated around inheritance, purchase and marriage with 
covert force being used where possible and to lend weight to claims. 
I have concentrated above on land because it is the principal cause 
of conflict and sought by looking at it as a problem of acquiring 
extra fields to show the background of political confrontation, the 
strategies which are followed and how political groups can play a 
decisive role. The division into specific areas of conflict, i. e. 
inheritance, purchase, marriage and force, was only for purposes 
of clarity and is rather artificial because in reality disputes over 
land are very complex and may well involve all the four elements 
of acquisition. This arises because it is but a minority of disputes 
which find rapid solutions. Generally they drag on and in the 
process of dissension new elements arise and are woven into the 
fabric of the struggle. 
One dispute, for example, started as the result of the claims of 
two husbands, Q and N, of sisters to a garden, the inheritance 
from the sisters' father. One of the husbands, Q, then left for 
Turkestan leaving the garden and a debt behind him. When the 
other husband, N, with his koranai tried to claim the whole garden 
1) This means that they are drafted and witnessed by a judge in Nijrao. 
- 276 - 
he was stopped by Q' s creditor, the malik R, with his koranai who 
claimed half the garden as security for the debt. The garden was 
then sold to the wealthy G. The husband N and the creditor R 
divided the money secretly so that no one knew that the creditor R 
had received his money. The ex-creditor, malik R, then asked the 
purchaser of the garden, G, for the money saying that he, G, as 
the new owner of the garden was responsible for the debt of the 
old owner, Q. G denied responsibility and refused to pay. Malik R 
then on the pretext of needing extra carpets and a radio to entertain 
a particularly large group of guests borrowed these from G. When 
G asked for them to be returned R refused saying that he would 
only do so when G paid the debt. In the confrontation that followed 
R' s koranai split because they had in the meantime discovered R' s 
duplicity and the majority joined G and his koranai in a coalition 
against malik R. 
Although this example is very condensed it is nevertheless possible 
to see many of the elements which have been discussed above, i. e. 
inheritance, debt, force, the use of koranai, a secret agreement 
and the creation of an alliance and to be aware of the complexity 
of disputes. 
The principal actor was R, a large landowner and a malik. It is 
clear, from other case studies, that maliks in proportion to their 
numbers play an unproportionately large role in the politics of 
Afghaniya the result partially of them combining the roles of large 
landowner with that of malik. It is also, however, the result of 
the new powers given to maliks by the central government and of 
the maliks' use of these powers to escape the controls of their 
electors and supporters. These factors combined have given rise 
to a new political element in Afghaniya without which an understand- 
ing of the political organization as a whole is impossible. This new 
element is the malik. 
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11. LEADERSHIP - THE MALIK 
The anthropologist' s conception of Pakhtun leadership has inevitably 
been formed by Barth' s book on 'Political Leadership among Swat 
Pathans' 
. 
It is inevitable because of the excellence of Barth' s 
portrayal which makes it ideal for purposes of example and cross- 
cultural comparison and because of the absence of comparable 
material on other Pakhtun tribes. Nevertheless it must be remembered; 
that Barth' s monograph is an analysis not of Pakhtun leadership but 
of leadership among the Yusufzai Pakhtuns of Swat and must not, 
therefore, be typical of leadership among the Pakhtuns as a 
whole 
1 ý. 
The contrary would in fact seem to be indicated by the 
evidence because, although there is a dearth of anthropological 
material about the Pakhtuns, there is a wealth of non-anthropological 
literature which testifies to the multiform and multifunctional nature 
of Pakhtun leadership. 
Probably the most comprehensive information on this subject is 
provided by Elphinstone's 'An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul' . 
Although the information about leadership is unsystematically 
presented - it appears as part of general ethnographic accounts of 
the individual tribes 
2) 
- it covers most of the Pakhtuns and all the 
named forms of leadership. It also has the advantage of giving a 
picture of Pakhtun leadership at a time (1809) when the central 
government was involved in internecine struggle and was, therefore, 
3) in no position to alter the forms and functions of this leadership . 
1) Barth himself, of course, never implied that his picture of Yusufzai 
leadership had general validity for all Pakhtuns. 
2) Elphinstone. 1972 (reprint from 1815). Op. cit. vol 2 pp. 1-174. 
3) From the creation of the Afghan state under Ahmad Shah Durrani 
until the present day the central government has always tried to 
influence, control and later rule the tribes through their leaders. 
One cannot, therefore, speak about an unadulterated form of Pakhtun 
leadership - probably no such thing ever existed - but during periods 
of governmental weakness the autonomy of the Pakhtun tribes was at 
its greatest and at such times the leadership would conform more to 
a Pakhtun ideal than to a central government one. 
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Elphinstone distinguished four types of leaders: khan, malik, kandidar, 
and spingirae. These he tentatively equated with variably sized, 
patrilineally organized, named groups. For example the khan would be 
the head of a tribe or ' ulus' and the malik leader of a sub-division 
of a tribe or 'khel' . 
In this way he suggested that a hierarchy, 
according to importance of leaders and size of groups, could be 
created which would be a 'model on which the governments of all the 
tribes are formed' . 
He, however, had to admit that this ' system of 
government ... 
is so often deranged by circumstances' that it cannot 
be 'a correct description of any one of them' 
1 ý. 
The 'system of 
government' was, therefore, an abstraction which served only as a 
point of orientation or, and as we would now probably designate it, a 
model of Pakhtun leadership. The actual organization was very 
different and it becomes clear from Elphinstone' s account how 
complex and variable Pakhtun leadership was. Methods of selection 
varied not only from tribe to tribe but also within the tribe; clans of 
the same tribe had different forms of leadership; leaders' functions 
were dissimilar; their power and authority differed and some tribes 
had types of leaders - the 'tsalwechti' - which could not be 
comprehended by Elphinstone' s model. 
In spite of the fact that Elphinstone' s material was collected at the 
beginning of the 19th. century the diversity of form and function 
which he described would still seem to exist today largely because 
the Pakhtun tribes in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and on the Afghan 
borders with these tribal areas have been able to maintain their 
autonomy. Other Pakhtun tribes, however, have been and are 
increasingly being affected by the activities and institutions of the 
central government. The principles of 'find the chief' and deal with 
2 persons of authority' 
2) 
although always present in, Afghanistan have 
1) Elphinstone. 1972. Op. cit. vol 1. p. 215. 
2) See Barth. 1962. Nomadism in the Mountain and Plateau Areas of 
South West Asia. p. 349 In: Problems of the Arid Zone. Arid Zone 
Research. vol XVIII. UNESCO. 
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now lead to a certain uniformity of function, a certain 
institutionalization of office and a certain centralization of political 
organization at least at the level of village leadership. 
In this chapter on leadership I will be dealing with this form of 
leadership, i. e. government influenced, and this may well 
constitute the type of leadership which will become standardised 
and therefore also representative in other Pakhtun areas. Neverthe- 
less it is very important to remain cognisant of the variety of 
leadership which still is to be found among Pakhtun tribes. 
The Malik - Origins and History 
In Afghaniya there is only one form of leadership that of the'malik' . 
When and why this term was applied to this form of leadership it is 
impossible to say but like 'khan' it is obviously of foreign origin. 
Bellew relates the story that the Pakhtuns who originally embraced 
and fought for Islam in the Arabian peninsular were rewarded by 
the Prophet with the promise that ' the title of malik = 'king', which 
they had inherited from their great progenitor, Sarul Malik Talut 
(Saul king of Israel, "Prince of great stature") should never depart 
from their nation, but should be the title of their chiefs and 
princes to the end of time' 
1). 
Caroe, somewhat more realistically, 
suggests that as ' malik' was an honorific used widely throughout the 
khorasani world it was merely picked up and utilised by the Pakhtuns 
in the same way that 'khan' has now 'been usurped by all and 
2) 
sundry' . 
Whatever its origins what is interesting is that 'malik' is an arabic 
rather than a Pakhto word which would seem to suggest that the 
original Pakhtun tribal organization did not possess a leader with the 
functions which came to be associated with the malik. This office 
1) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 20. 
2) Caroe, 1965. Op. Cit. P. 8 and p. 440 note 11. 
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would, therefore, seem to be a later development possibly in 
response to pupulation increases, greater complexity of social and 
political organization or to wars and expansion. 
If its origins are obscure its historical functions, at least those 
based on Elphinstone' s report, are not. The malik of Elphinstone' s 
account was generally speaking elected to office either by the 
elders, or the people of his lineage or clan. Once in power he 
usually retained his office until his death when it was passed on to 
the most able of his sons. There was, therefore, a tendendy 
towards hereditary office but not primogeniture. His powers varied 
from tribe to tribe but usually, because he worked in conjunction 
with the jirga, these were very limited and he was considered as a 
' primus inter pares. He might, however, be responsible directly 
or indirectly with the jirga and/or elders for settling disputes and 
inflicting punishment, and in some tribes he acted as a counterbalance 
and broaketo the khan's power. In the last case Elphinstone recorded 
accounts of maliks who opposed and deposed khans who were 
considered as endangering the autonomy of individuals and groups by 
seeking autarchy. The malik, of Elphinstone' s time, therefore was 
an elected leader of variously sized descent groups whose office might 
become hereditary and whose powers varied from representative of 
groups to remover of khans. In all cases his support came from the 
people, as elders or as a jirga, and not from independent non-kin or 
non-tribal supporters so that he himself was never in a position to 
seek or obtain absolute power and was thus the instrument for 
maintaining an anarchic, acephalic political organization. 
The Malik of Afghaniya 
Necessary Characteristics or Requirements 
The present maliks of Afghaniya 
1) 
are elected into office by the 
1) There are nine altogether: three in mahdud khel, two in pirozai, 
two in audel khel and two in Haidar khel. säliH khel has none. 
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elders or household heads of the community. In order to be selected 
in the first place potential candidates must possess certain qualities. 
Firstly they must be wealthy or at least be able to support them- 
selves and their families without difficulty. This is an important 
point for potential supporters because they want to have a malik who 
is ideally independent of, or at least not too dependent on, bribes. 
Secondly maliks should be able to talk confidently and to present 
their arguments clearly in front of other maliks, khans, clerks, the 
district governor, etc.: attributes desirable because of the 
representative capacity of the malik. Thirdly potential candidates 
should be ' drund' , that is heavy or weighty, characteristics which 
do not necessarily refer to bodily build, although this is often also 
the case among Pakhtun leaders 
1), 
but rather to their manner and 
the presentation of themselves before others. Fourthly maliks 
should and usually do come from 'good' families, i. e. those with 
long patrilineages containing men who distinguished themselves and 
were influential in the affairs of the group in the past. Finally 
maliks should not be authoritarian nor impinge upon the personal 
freedom of their supporters - they should be leaders but not 
2) 
rulers 
Government Requirements and Standardisation 
These characteristics which candidates for the post of malik must 
possess show the continuity of basic ideas and ideals about leader- 
ship from the Pakhtun past, as portrayed by Elphinstone, to the 
Safi present, i. e. independent in temperament and egalitarian in 
principle. This continuity has been seriously disturbed by a factor, 
i. e. government influence, which although present in Elphinstone' s 
1) Jamroz Khan was 'an enormous man, powerful, with a bristling 
moustache. He used to eat a whole ox-liver for breakfast' . Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 82. 
2) An attitude which would seem always to have had validity among 
Pakhtuns although varying in intensity from tribe to tribe. ' We are 
content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content 
with blood, but we will never be content with a master' . 
Elphinstone. 1972. Op. cit. vol 1 p. 231. 
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time was not formative to the degree which it is now. Now the 
central government, in the pursuit of greater influence and authority 
in tribal areas, has incorporated the malik into its system of 
administration 
1 ). 
However, because Pakhtun leadership differed from 
locality to locality and because the government wished to have 
officials whose functions did not vary from area to area they 
standardised certain elements of the office and these changes whilst 
maintaining the outward form of the office have altered its content. 
One such change has been to make it obligatory for all members of 
a community to come under the auspices of a malik. Voluntary 
representation has thus been replaced by a compulsory form and 
the individual freedom of the tribesman has been reduced. 
Another change has been that maliks may now draw their supporters 
or electors from the whole community and not, as was the practice 
before, just from their lineages or hamlets. Although in Afghaniya 
the majority of a malik' s supporters still come from his lineage or 
khel - largely for reasons of convenience but also because of 
accessability and a lineage malik' s better 'local' knowledge - this 
measure has extended the limits of choice for potential electors 
beyond the boundaries of the lineage. It has also, however, had the 
result of weakening the patrilineal organization of the society 
because now choices are being made, or may be made, when all 
other factors, e. g. the attributes mentioned above, are equal, on 
other than purely lineage, i. e. descent principles. Maliks are now 
chosen not out of lineage solidarity but for reasons of individual or 
faction advantage. 
A further change has been instigated by the regulation that a malik' s 
supporters must number at least fifty except in those areas where 
1) ' At the lowest administrative level are the villages and settlements 
(called 'qaria' in Persian). Each village and settlement elects a 
' malik' as go-between for the administration. ' Hahn. 1972. Op. cit. 
p. 285. (My translation). 
- 283 - 
the population is below that figure. Although this is not the case in 
Afghaniya it has nevertheless effectively reduced the number of 
maliks and the range of choice in the community. It has also inhibit- 
ed expressions of dissatisfaction with the established leadership which 
earlier took the form of splinter groups under new maliks. Now these 
groups can only be formed with titleless leaders who cannot obtain 
the aura and kudos associated with the title 'malik' and as a result 
are weak and ineffective. 
Finally change has been caused by the need to have the malik 
confirmed in office and his supporters registered by the waluswal 
and the judge. This ratification of nominations has meant that the 
control over the choice of leaders has passed from the people to the 
government. So far this power has not been misused in the sense of 
nominations being rejected or maliks being proposed by the govern- 
ment but this has been the result rather of inability - the replacement 
of waluswals every four years gives them insufficient time for exact 
local knowledge and for the judgement of candidates - than of intent. 
However waluswals can and do support 'strong' or 'effective' maliks, 
i. e. those who ensure that peace and quiet are maintained and that 
the dictates of the government are carried out punctually and without 
disturbance. Once the government's control in Afghaniya is complete 
then the maliks may well cease to be the representatives of the 
people and become the instruments of the government through which 
the community is ruled. 
In spite of these changes maliks are still elected 
1) by the elders of 
the community to office 
2) 
and the majority of a malik' s electors 
still come, as I have indicated, from his major lineage or khel. But 
if the changes introduced by the central government have not 
diminished the democratic rights of election they have altered or 
extended the procedure for election because now the elders and heads 
1) They are not elected by a process of secret ballot but candidates 
emerge in informal meetings and discussions and are then put forward 
for office or supported in their pretensions. 
2) In Swat the office and situation would seem to have changed. See 
Barth, F. 1965. Op. cit. p. 82. 
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of households who have chosen a particular malik have to go with 
him to Nijrao. There they present the waluswal with a paper bearing 
their names and that of their candidate and ask that their choice of 
malik should be authorised. Usually, as I have mentioned above, the 
district governor accepts their choice and ratifies the candidacy. He 
then sends them to the judge who asks each elector separately 
whether he really wishes the candidate to be his malik or whether 
he was forced to elect him. If the proposed man has been freely 
elected then the judge enters the names of the supporters and the 
numbers of their identity cards on to a list and the malik is finally 
installed. 
The Malik' s Duties 
On taking office the malik is confronted by duties, functions and 
obligations which have increased in number and in complexity since 
the time when a malik was mainly a spokesman of his group and 
occasionally an opponent of khans. The principal reason for this is 
the incorporation of the malik' s office into the central government' s 
system of administration. Whereas in the past he only had to cope 
with the needs and expectations of his supporters he now not only 
has to fulfil these functions but also has to deal with the duties 
imposed upon him by the local government 
1) 
as well as to act as 
an intermediary between the government and his electors. His roles, 
therefore, have become multiple and are often conflicting largely 
because he is expected to serve the best interests of both groups 
i. e. the local government and his electors although these are often 
opposed. Under these circumstances and as the malik' s functions or 
duties are nowhere defined or regulated it is difficult to delimit his 
official activities. However both parties I. e. local government and 
electors are able to list their expectations with varying degrees of 
precision and I have, therefore, separated the malik' s duties into 
two parts: the expectations of the local government and those of his 
electors and illustrated in both the malik' s responses to them. 
{ 
1) A situation which has many parallels with other areas. See Mair. 1971, 
Op. cit. p. 65 ff. 
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Expectations of the Local Government 
The local government's expectations revolve principally around the 
assistance which the maliks give to the various departments in the 
waluswali. Maliks, for example, are used by the department of 
Taxation and Revenue to assist their clerks in the collection of 
taxes. Their guest rooms become collecting centres 
1) 
and their 
knowledge and expertise are used to ensure that all heads of 
households appear and pay the amounts assessed 
2) 
It is also through maliks that statistical information for the various 
departments is gathered. The malik is responsible for reporting 
all cases of male births among his electors to the department of 
Actuarial Statistics. This information, as we have seen (p. 64), 
is of considerable importance both for the government and the people 
concerned because it governs the issue of identity cards, 
compulsory schoolimg and military service. Maliks also report and 
register marriages, sales of land, and those complaints which are 
to be brought to the waluswal or qazi (judge). In the last case, 
i. e. of complaints, it is of course possible for complainants to 
bypass the malik and appeal directly to the waluswal which is what 
the majority do. Some, however, feel. that they are not capable of 
presenting themselves and their case well in front of the waluswal 
and place the case in the malik' s hands. 
Maliks are also empowered to recommend exemption from military 
service. When the call-up papers arrive conscripts may appeal to the 
local government for exemption on the grounds of being the only 
adult male in the family, of being ill or of being physically disabled. 
It may also happen that conscripts 'disappear' or are 'not to be 
1) This is not the practice all over Afghanistan and in some areas the 
people go themselves to the nearest local government centre to pay 
their taxes. 
2) In spite of the malik' s help the correct amounts are not always paid. 
The initial government assessment, for example, is very difficult 
to make because of the people's understandable reluctance to 
cooperate. Also some maliks and clerks receive shares in unpaid 
taxes and, therefore, have a vested interest in evasions. 
- 286 - 
found' i. e. they either leave to avoid conscription or they go for 
work elsewhere prior to the call-up. When nothing is heard from 
or about them they are presumed to be in Pakistan or to be dead. 
In all these cases the malik is the one who establishes the 
validity of the appeal or the absence of the conscript and his decision 
is then accepted by the government. 
Maliks further have the duty of organizing the labour and providing 
the raw materials, as far as this is possible, for government 
projects such as the building of roads, schools, bridges etc. Such 
community tasks used to be the responsibility of the communal 
' ashar' but now this traditional form of cooperative work has been 
absorbed into the machinery of government and has assumed the 
nature of a duty which members must fulfil whether they regard the 
project as relevant or not. The maliks inform the heads of 
households and ensure that each household provides labour or 
materials in quantities which are appropriate to the numbers of 
members or to the wealth of the household. 
Finally the maliks have been given the duty of informants. They both 
provide the government with information and convey the 
government's wishes and directives to their electors. The former 
duty may stem from the time of Abd-ar-Rahman (1880-1901) when 
a dense information network was established and was used both to 
receive warning of discontent and to control the country. Now the 
maliks are still expected to supply information about political unrest 
but they are mainly concerned with reporting disturbances, fights, 
theft and cases of murder to the local government. 
In the case of the government's wishes and directives which the 
maliks convey to their electors these usually concern the whole 
community. The maliks are told to report to the local government 
centre in Nijrao where the viewpoint and ultimately the commands of 
the government are put to them. When confronted by the waluswal 
there is general acquiescence from those maliks who attend but once 
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in the Pachoghan valley they vie with one another to disclaim such 
acquiescence. In the end the majority of the government's wishes 
are carried out albeit after considerable lapses of time and often 
in much weakened and watered down forms. 
Many of the malik' s governmental duties outlined above are 
considered by the people of Afghaniya to be impositions which 
invade their privacy, disturb the routine of their lives and diminish 
their autonomy. Unfortunately, as they see it, there is very little 
which they can do to alter the situation apart from protests and 
disturbances and the manipulation of the maliks. 
In the former case such measures were successful in opposing the 
introduction of female education largely because of the general 
discontent in most Pakhtun areas and the support of the mullahs. 
Such tactics, however, used against, for example, taxation and 
schooling in general, would bring little external sympathy because 
these aspects of governmental control and administration have 
become widely accepted and are generally regarded as the minimum 
of administrative interference. Such attitudes in areas outside 
Afghaniya arise among other reasons from habituation and the 
realisation that the negative aspects of governmental administration 
are at least balanced by positive aspects. In Afghaniya the process 
of becoming accustomed to a non-tribal administration has obviously 
not gone as far as in these other areas and the Safi have not as 
yet discovered the positive aspects of the administration. What they 
have, however, realised is that if they cannot influence the local 
government's administrative measures they can at least try to 
dilute or avoid them through the good offices of the malik. 
Maliks are not paid for their duties either by the government or by 
the people who elect them to office 
1) 
although the latter bring them 
1) This is not the case everywhere. In Uruzgan, for example, maliks 
receive as payment one ' man' of wheat for every three 'jerib' of 
land owned by their electors. 
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presents when they return from work outside Afghaniya and provide 
them with 'lungi' or turbans 
1) 
at festivities, and money on the 
successful conclusion of struggles or at the signing of contracts 
when maliks have played a major part. These payments, however, 
are usually small and only cover in a symbolic manner the malik' s 
traditional duties and not the extra ones acquired through the govern- 
ment. Maliks are, therefore, in spite of their wealth - we have seen 
that they are preferably chosen from among wealthy families - open 
to bribery or at least not indifferent to additional sources of income. 
The people themselves are aware that very little can be achieved 
without some pecuniary incentive and are, as a result, prepared 
and pleased to pay or to promise to pay the malik some sum of 
money so that, for example, births are not reported, schooling is 
avoided, marriages and the sale of land are not registered and 
military service is evaded. Whilst this system has very definite 
advantages for some people and the majority feel that they have 
regained some of their lost independence and outwitted the govern- 
ment through these actions it has had the considerable disadvantage 
of investing the malik with powers over his supporters which are 
incommensurate with the role he was originally assigned. It has, 
therefore, altered the traditional conception of leadership and lead 
to dissymmetry in social relations between leaders and lead. 
It was, of course, not only the needs of the malik' s supporters 
which brought about this dissymmetry but the use or misuse which 
the maliks or some maliks have made of a situation whose source 
was the extra duties and thus powers given to the maliks by the 
government. Now irrespective of the initial causation it is the 
maliks who benefit most and who know how best to utilise their newly 
acquired powers. 
I have already mentioned above how maliks may enrich themselves 
1) This is the general term for an honourable gift and must not of 
necessity be a turban. Most such gifts now usually consist of money. 
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by accepting money so that births will not be reported, military 
service avoided etc. These, however, do not exhaust the possibilities 
open to maliks for acquiring money and extending their power. 
Another opportunity, for example, is provided by the organisation 
of labour and of contributions for government projects. Perhaps 
the best way to illustrate this is through a case history. 
The malik who was responsible for the transport of my belongings 
from Nijrao to my gala in Afghaniya ordered a settled nomad, one 
of his supporters, to carry out the transport with his camels. This 
he did. The malik then asked me for the camel-driver's pay saying 
that I should be especially generous as the nomad was a poor man 
with a large family to support. After I had given the malik the 
_ money I met the camel-driver by chance outside the malik' s gala. 
When I asked him whether he was satisfied with the amount of money 
I had given him he replied: 'well, no. ' Before, however, he could 
say anything more he became aware of the malik' s son who was 
working within hearing distance on the roof of the qala. He then 
completed his reply by saying: 'of course one is always happy with 
more but you were very generous. ' Later I met him alone near 
Nijrao and wished to engage him for transport again. I then 
discovered that he had in fact received nothing from the malik but 
had been afraid to tell me when I asked him because he had seen 
the malik' s son and knew that he would report our conversation to 
his father. The malik had told the camel-driver that the transport 
of my belongings had been a government task (which it was not) for 
which there was no payment. He, the malik, however, would ensure 
that as compensation for the use of the camels for government 
purposes the camel-driver would be relieved at some future date 
of work on a government project. 
This was not an isolated incident but is indicative of the general 
situation where the poorest families and those without political 
1) 
support are constantly misused 
Another opportunity is the non-reporting of fights, theft, murder 
etc. to the waluswal or qazi. Such services represent supplementary 
wealth and increased power over certain members among the 
malik' a electorate. 
1) This situation is not only confined to Afghaniya. Gregorian (V. 
1969. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform 
and Modernization. 1880-1946. p. 271. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford) writes about military service in Afghanistan as a whole 
that the rich were exempted by the maliks and the poor and those with 
whom they were at feud were recruited. 
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Finally maliks often use the government's directives as a means for 
furthering their own ends. As it is not always clear to the malik' s 
electors which orders emanate from the local government centre and 
which do not (see also the case history above) maliks can utilise the 
waluswal' s authority by implying that the action they take or the 
misuse they make of their power is dictated and supported by the 
coercive power of the local government. To a certain extent this is 
true because the government is most willing to support what it terms 
' effective' leaders and these are usually the ones who are authoritarian 
and dictatorial and most consistently overstep the limits of traditional 
leadership. However, in many cases, as for example in that of the 
camel-herder and the malik, no such governmental sanction or 
support exists nevertheless maliks act as if it did and thus are able 
to manipulate men and situations to their advantages. 
Expectations of the Electors 
Settlement of Disputes 
One of the major expectations of the electors is that their malik 
should settle disputes. Disputes in Afghaniya are, as we have seen 
in chap. 10, principally concerned with land, money, and women 
and arise because of the competition for resources among the 
members of the community. Not all of these disputes require the 
duties of the malik as arbiter because solutions may be achieved in 
other ways. Where, for example, one party either koranai, para or 
combination of both is obviously dominant in political and economic 
terms - they are usually concomitant - then the result is predictable 
i. e. the stronger is successful. 
A solution may also be reached when one or both disputants appeal 
to the local government for support. This is a tactic often used by 
the weaker group and whilst it usually has success in straightfbrward, 
legally uncomplicated cases such as T against R1 (see above p. 266) 
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in more complex ones it prolongs the case so that the result is 
dependent more on the resources and stamina of the parties than on 
any objective criteria. 
As a result and where one party is not overly dominant the dispute 
is usually laid in the malik' s hands for arbitration. This can, 
however, only occur when both parties in the dispute are interested 
in peace and are willing to accept an arbitrated decision; and/or 
where the situation is affecting the daily lives of neutrals to such an 
extent that intervention is thought necessary and public opinion 
forces the parties to bring their problem before the malik. Such a 
reaction on the part of interested neutrals may also occur when 
they think that the ripples of conflict will come to the attention 
of the local government and bring about its intercession. Apart 
from the inconvenience which this would incur for all the inhabitants 
- i. e. the presence of officials in Afghaniya for weeks on end - it 
is generally felt as a principle, at least by those not directly involv- 
ed, that problems, disputes and conflicts should both be kept within 
the community and solved by the community i. e. through the offices 
of the malik and where necessary the jirga. Traditional mechanisms 
for conflict settlement are therefore nearly always preferred to those 
which would involve the intervention of strangers 
1 ). 
Whatever the 
case when a dispute is placed in the malik' s hands for settlement 
then his electors expect a solution satisfactory to both sides to 
result and not a prolongation of the struggle for the malik' s benefit 
or monetary gain. 
The actual procedures for achieving any solution vary considerably 
with, among other things, the group membership and political and 
economic strength of the parties involved, with the nature of the 
dispute itself and with the role which the malik plays i. e. whether 
1) It was largely the fear of outside, i. e. government, interference 
which disunited the groups who were opposed to my work in Afghaniya. 
They knew that any action on their part would bring in the 
government and a sort of 'occupation' would result. My continued 
presence was, therefore, the lesser of two evils. 
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he genuinely seeks a solution or whether he is only concerned with 
his personal gain 
1ý. 
The normal procedure in cases where the parties come from the 
same 'maliki' (that area and those people under one malik) is for 
the malik to act as a mediator in the real sense of one who 
interposes between the parties as a friend of both. He alternately 
visits the house of the disputants relating the suggestions and 
condition of one side to the other and hopes that some compromise 
will be reached. When both parties are evenly balanced in terms 
of resources and political support there is little else that the malik 
can do because he has no real coercive power. He can threaten 
to withdraw his good offices should in the future one or both sides 
have difficulties with the local government but this situation as far 
as the parties are concerned can always be coped with when it 
arises. He can also arrange for a jirga to be called and bring 
together the disputants, interested people, people concerned to 
settle the matter, and those who are known for their expertise. 
But even the jirga cannot enforce a settlement because the only 
sanction it can exercise is the pressure of public opinion otherwise 
it can only appeal to the common sense and community feeling of 
the disputants and stress that the alternative -an appeal to the local 
government - is costly both in time and money. Only in cases 
where on side is somewhat weaker is it possible for the malik to 
influence the proceedings to some extent and then only because the 
weaker group does not wish in addition to being weak to lose his 
support. Of course some maliks do have considerable power over 
some individuals, when for example they have avoided conscription 
or committed murder, but this happens rarely and these individuals 
are not always the ones involved in disputes. Should therefore the 
parties really desire an end to the dispute then this will be 
achieved but more often only a cessation of hostilities can be agreed 
1) A malik who has been involved in the settlement of a dispute will of 
course always receive something. It is the size of this something 
which has repercussions for the settlement. 
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upon and a state of ' uran' , of destroyed relations, i. e. of no 
intercourse, takes its place. 
A different procedure is followed when a solution is required rapidly. 
When, for example, a young girl leaves her father's house without 
his permission and takes up residence in that of the boy whom she 
proposes to marry (see chap. 9 pp. 223-226 ) the malik is 
expected to act quickly and effectively. Usually he does so by 
calling together a 'maraka' or conciliatory group which consists of 
elders, mullahs, Hajis etc., and the boy' s father. These men then 
proceed to the girl' s father's house and there seek to pacify the 
enraged father and bring about a settlement. 
Marakas, however, are not called together only for the purpose of 
reaching a rapid settlement. Sometimes they are constituted by the 
need to break a continual deadlock in a dispute of long standing and 
complexity. When the normal procedures have been tried, when 
government officials have been called in without success and when 
Holy Men have been suggested and rejected a maraka is often formed 
on the initiative of the malik and includes the notables of the whole 
community as well as sometimes Holy Men from neighbouring areas. 
In spite of the obvious qualities of such a group, settlements are 
not always achieved largely because the members are rarely 
disinterested - they are open to and willing to accept bribes - and 
also because when faced by politically strong or equally balanced 
opponents there is little coercive power which they can exercise 
which will force the disputants to agree to some sort of compromise. 
If a settlement, called a 'fora' (peace, amity, concord), is reached 
then this is because, as has. been indicated above, one or both 
parties are ready for an agreement 
1) 
1) In spite of the maraka' s inability to force or impose a settlement on 
the disputing parties its usefulness is not in question. In fact the 
maraka is tending to replace the jirga. This is probably because the 
jirga is too large, too ponderous and more representative of lineage 
interests than of those resulting from affinity and common residence. 
(P. t. o. ) 
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This is also the situation in all those disputes and conflicts which have 
become complicated by the bitterness with which they are pursued and 
where the membership of the parties in different malilos necessitates 
the services of two maliks. In these cases the malik instead of being 
required to achieve a 'just' settlement is expected to support the 
cause of his own electors and to try to effect a solution which is 
advantageous for them. A malik who has considerable experience in 
the settlement of disputes may well, if he knows that he will also be 
well rewarded for his efforts, be able to reach an agreement which 
is more remunerative for his group than for the other. This is 
naturally easier when the other malik is not so capable and/or does 
not possess sufficient experience. In all these cases, however, much 
depends on the subjective assessment or interpretation of the solution 
by the parties concerned and clever maliks can and will present 
agreements in such a way that they are seen to be more satisfactory 
for their respective groups than for the others and thus filfil their 
electors' expectations. 
If all these traditional means of settlement fail then one or both 
parties appeal to the local government for a solution. In the simple 
straightforward cases there is a real chance of a solution being 
found even if this is a dictated one rather than a solution based on 
compromise. In other, more complex, cases however this appeal 
just adds an extra element or dimension to the already labyrinthine 
nature of the dispute itself. Nevertheless this process even in 
these cases has its positive aspects because firstly for those who 
are politically and economically weak it is often the only way to 
obtain justice. Secondly the procedure involved in bringing the case 
before the magistrate or responsible department is often so ex- 
The maraka is certainly smaller, more flexible, potentially more 
representative and more readily brought together. It, the maraka, 
would seem to be more in tune with 'modern' times. Afghaniya is not 
the only Pakhtun area where such an attitude is discernible. Janata 
and Hassas report for Paktia that there the word 'maraka' is also 
now being used for 'jirga' and that the maraka is really a small jirga 
which deals with the less complex problems. (Janata & Hassas. 1975. 
Op. cit. pp. 93 & 95. ) 
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haunting and debilitiating that both parties are happy to have their 
complaints withdrawn and to seek a solution through the traditional 
methods. In this latter case the malik plays an all important role 
and one which has only emerged since the Safi have started increas- 
ingly to use the local government's facilities and institutions. 
When the initial complaint is made it is put directly to the waluswal 
because it both allows the disputants to give public vent to their dis- 
satisfaction - there are usually other interested complainants in the 
waluswal' s office - and to feel that they have the 'ear, I. e. the 
personal attention and interest, of the highest possible official in the 
waluswali. If, as is usually the case, the waluswal cannot resolve 
the problem there and then, then he passes it on to the appropriate 
department or departments. Once there and having been noted down 
it soon disappears among the piles of similar complaints from 
which it can only be extracted for processing on the payment of 
money to the clerk or clerks responsible. Then witnesses need to 
be called and evidence collected. During these necessary 
procedures weeks and months may pass and the disputants become 
weary from walking to and from Nijrao and poor from handing out 
bribes. Gradually the ardour of the parties dwindles and they begin 
to regret having not heeded the advice of friends and relatives to 
keep the dispute within the hamlet or community. Finally this regret 
gives way to despair that the case will ever be resolved and the 
contrite disputants ask the malik to intervene on their behalf at the 
local government centre. 
Most maliks through their years in office have had considerable 
contact with the different departments in the local government and 
know how best to proceed. Usually they seek out the clerk or clerks 
responsible for handling the dispute and see what can be done to 
stop the proceedings. Normally these cannot be stopped, at least 
according to the clerks, because the complaint having been recorded 
has set the administrative machinery in motion and nothing, they say, 
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can now impede it in its inexorable progress. The case can, however, 
under certain circumstances be 'removed from the books' i. e. 
deleted from the official documents. This task is much easier than 
the clerks would have the villagers believe because complaints are 
entered onto separate sheets of paper which are easily destroyed. 
However as the clerks have much more to gain by implying that the 
difficulties and risk involved are much greater than they in fact are 
these sheets are referred to as 'books' and thus comparable in the 
minds of the villagers, with THE book, the koran. The malik who is 
an accomplice to this deceit because of what he himself hopes to 
acquire does not disillusion the disputants. It is then only a question 
of how much money needs to change hands before the desired object 
is achieved. If the case was particularly complex then it might well 
have been recorded in a number of 'books' and each has its price 
for removal. Whatever the situation the villagers are usually pleased 
to pay and both the malik and the clerks receive their share. The 
papers are ripped up and the case is finally removed from the 
'books' . The malik then 
tries to reconcile the two disputing parties 
himself and because of their disenchantment with the government' s 
efforts and their gratefulness to the malik for his intervention a 
settlement is often reached. Such a settlement apart from bringing 
the malik a further payment, the traditional ' lungi', also demonstrates 
his skill and strengthens his authority among his electors. 
This role as intermediary is not the only occasion when the malik 
acts as a go-between between the members of hamlets and the local 
government. As the administrative control increases so too does the 
villagers' involvement with the various departments (military 
service, taxation, schoding, etc. ) in Nijrao. Generally villagers 
cannot cope with the situation and feel helpless when confronted by 
the clerks and the latter do nothing to diminish this feeling. As a 
result the villagers now expect the malik to represent them when 
they have difficulties and to do all he can to further their interests. 
In return they demonstrate their gratitude not only with gifts but 
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also with increased personal support of the malik in situations which 
both concern the malik as malik and those which involve him as a 
normal member of the community. 
Witnessing of Transactions 
Apart from seeking settlements and acting as the representative of 
his electors the malik' s duties for his electors also include the 
witnessing of various transactions. Although in Afghaniya, as I have 
indicated above, the sale of land, the 'geraoing' of fields, the 
borrowing of money etc., should normally be witnessed by the judge 
in Nijrao this may be and often is just witnessed by the malik and 
one or two elders. This was presumably a pre-Administration, 
customary law activity essential both for the authorisation and 
validation of important contracts. Now the villagers' reasons for 
continuing to utilise the malik' s services in preference to those of 
the judge are the following: Firstly when a document of whatever 
kind is witnessed by a judge in Nijrao then there is a tax to be paid 
on the document itself as well as a charge for the judge's work and 
time. No such official tax or charge is made by the malik although 
it is customary to give a small payment, the ' shirini' (sweetener). 
Secondly when money is lent by one individual to another a tax of so 
many Afs. per 100 Afs. lent is charged when the transaction is witness- 
ed by the judge and the Safi see this as an extra, unwarranted, 
burden. Thirdly when land or property are to be sold or the usufruct 
rights to fields given for a certain sum of money the public nature 
of the transaction in Nijrao could mean that other interested parties 
could object or impede the procedure. Also when such agreements 
are undertaken, as is sometimes the case, even though the fields 
have already been sold or geraoed to someone else, there is a need 
for secrecy which can only be assured when the malik's good offices 
are utilised. Finally all transactions and agreements which have to 
be witnessed or documented in Nijrao take more time and effort than 
do those carried out in Afghaniya itself. There are, therefore, 
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considerable incentives to continue to use the malik' s powers as 
witness and guarantor. 
In spite of these advantages such transactions often lead to trouble 
because they can be, and are, disputed easily as I have shown 
above pp. 273 & 274 . Decisive in auch disputes are the 
political support which can be rallied and the attitude of the malik. 
Were the malik to remain impartial in these disputes and to support 
the justice of the case and not the person promising the greatest 
reward then this traditional system of legalization would have been 
able to withstand the encroachment of alternatives offered by the 
local government. But he has not. As a result although many 
customary law contracts remain unchallenged and others fulfil their 
functions completely the percentage which do not is increasing and 
will continue to increase until the traditional system ceases to have 
any value. 
Representation 
Finally the malik' s supporters expect him to be the representative 
of the ' maliki' when contact is necessary with other groups and with 
the local government; and to entertain outsiders who visit the 
' maliki' for various reasons. In the former case the malik 
represents the group when, for example, measures for coping with 
floods or drought are to be coordinated or when objections to the 
local government's activities are to be presented. As such situations 
arise relatively rarely they do not constitute more than a minor part 
of the malik' s functions. 
Hospitality on the other hand takes up more of the malik' s time 
both because it is a Pakhtun ideal which can only be avoided with 
difficulty and because it is necessary to entertain the members of 
marakas, visiting sheikhans 
1) 
and the government officials who have 
1) The representatives of Holy Men and Pirs. See above p. 111. 
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business in the ' maliki' . This hospitality might not seem like 
representation because it is carried out by the malik in his guest 
room but that it is representation is clearly demonstrated by the 
contributions which other members of the ' maliki' make to the food 
which is prepared for the guests. In spite of these contributions the 
general poverty of the area has caused the content of the hospitality 
to be considerably diminished whilst the outward form has been 
preserved. For those Pakhtuns, for example, members of marakas 
and sheikhans who come from the surrounding areas such treatment 
is usually understandable because they themselves have to act in a 
similar way. The officials on the other hand expect something better 
and generally receive something worse. 
All officials but especially those on the lower levels of the hierarchy, 
clerks and gendarmes for example, like to spend some time in the 
'countryside' because it frees them from the restraints and demands 
of their superiors, gives them a feeling of power and enables them 
to eat food which they otherwise would only eat at festivals and on 
religious holidays. The maliks of Afghaniya are aware of this and 
view the visits of officials with some antipathy because of the 
inconvenience they cause and the resources which the maliks 
consider are squandered in entertaining them. The maliks, therefore, 
try to dispose of the motive for the visit prior to the officials' 
arrival, e. g. by bringing about a settlement, or, if that in not 
possible, by inducing the parties concerned to reach some compromise 
at least before it is necessary to provide food for the officials. If 
all these measures fail then the hospitality which the malik eventually 
offers the officials is of such a poor quality that it borders on an 
affront and discourages any prolongation of their stay. The officials 
themselves are, of course, cognisant of the mixed feelings aroused 
by their visits and often consciously use them to put pressure on the 
maliks by implying that they might extend their visit so that a, for 
them, advantageous agreement or regulation of affairs emerges. 
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Sources of and Checks to the Malik' s Power 
So far I have outlined the malik' s duties in terms of the expectations 
of the local government and those of the malik' s electors. At the 
same time the malik' s response to or manipulation of these duties 
has emerged. This indicated that he was using them, wherever 
possible, to obtain material benefit and to increase his own powers 
in ways that were contrary to the egalitarian principles which 
formerly, according to Elphinstone, constituted the basis of the 
malik' s office. I would like now to look at the sources of and checks 
to the maiik' s power, his motivation for seeking office and finally 
to try to define this new form of leadership which has arisen 
principally through the change brought about by the influence of the 
central government. 
The sources of a malik' s power vary from individual to individual 
principally because a malik does not have powers ascribed to him 
but has to achieve them. Nevertheless it is possible to list the 
malik' s potential sources of power even though it is probable that 
no one malik will have the use, or control, of all of them at any 
one time. 
Wealth, as I have mentioned above, is a prerequisite to the 
acquisition of office and all maliks in Afghaniya are wealthier than 
the average farmer. It is, however, not so much the wealth itself 
which is a source of power but what it represents and can be used 
to acquire, i. e., land, and the control of resources. Land, as we 
have seen, is very scarce in Afghaniya and a large proportion of 
the population is either landless or has insufficient land for its 
needs. As a result those people who have excess land such as the 
maliks can acquire power over others by accepting or refusing 
requests to share-crop their surplus fields. The malik used to be 
very circumspect in his dealings with would-be share-croppers 
because solicitations came principally from those men who had 
adjoining fields and these were usually cousins and members of the 
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hamlet. Such men did not, once they had been given permission to 
share-crop the fields, accept commands easily even though they were 
dependent and any display of authority by the malik resulted in the dis- 
solution of the contract by the share-cropper and enmity or uran 
between them. Now, however, the necessity for agnatic support is 
decreasing and the competition for land increasing so that agnates 
cannot afford to be quite so proud as they used to be, although they 
are in no way subordinate, or they are replaced by men from neigh- 
bouring hamlets who because of their agnatic and physical distance are 
more able and willing to accept orders. Once this subordination has 
been established and the share-cropper' s economy has become dependent 
on the share from the malik' s fields the malik has acquired a source of 
power which can be used for many purposes. Up to the present time 
(1970-1971), however, no malik had so much land that he could 
assemble around him a body of supporters strong enough by itself to 
coerce other groups and to make him totally independent of kin support. 
Also demographic factors such as polygyny among wealthy men, the 
resulting large number of sons and inheritance mean that the ownership 
of a large area of land only represents temporary power which in the 
next generation disappears 
1). 
Nevertheless, although the land itself is 
fragmented, some hereditary maliks seem to survive this process 
and the concomitant loss of power and support. One of my case 
histories shows that such a malik starting with an average land- 
holding was able through his expertise, intelligence and office to 
re-establish himself over a number of years as a larger landowner 
so that the size of initial land-holdings does not seem to be always 
of crucial significance for the acquisition of power. Nevertheless 
dependent share-croppers represent a source of power which within 
certain limits and when combined with other sources can be decisive. 
Cousins and fellow-members of hamlets although in no way subordi- 
nate to the malik can also under certain circumstances provide 
1) There is no ' pargai sirs' in Afghaniya as there is in Swat, i. e. land 
which a leader #eceives for his services, and which is not divided 
on his death but passes, as a unit, to his successor. See Barth. 1965. 
Op. cit. p. 75. 
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additional support and thus a source of power. One such circumstance 
would be when they are also share-croppers on the malik' s land and 
he is, for example, engaged in a struggle for the purchase of a field 
which although adjacent to his own is on the land of another hamlet. 
If his protagonist is an outsider then the malik' s cousins are 
generally prepared to help. This is not so much because they are 
cousins, although this might play a part. but because their interests 
are often better served by the assistance and backing which they 
give to the malik than they would be by abstaining from the struggle. 
For, should the malik acquire the field then they may well have the 
opportunity to sharecrop it later. Another circumstance which leads 
to physical support for the malik is that he as the most powerful 
man in the hamlet has generally more to offer than other members 
and can further members' interests better. As a result villagers 
will support him even in conflicts with their closest relatives if it 
is clear that their needs and requirements will be optimally served 
in this way. Although such support is, as I have indicated above. 
usually not sufficient to bring about settlements in disputes where 
both parties are intransigent it can turn the balance when the malik 
is personally involved, i. e. is one of the parties himself. Then the 
imbalance is often so great that the other party has no alternative 
but to capitulate. 
Most struggles with the malik, or at least with the more powerful 
maliks, do not reach the stage of a confrontation of forces because 
the malik is able, either by his influence with the local government 
or through the government's support of him as an 'effective' malik 
and by his manipulation of his numerous duties, to overcome the 
opposition at an early stage. Not all maliks are, of course, able 
to draw upon all these sources of potential power but their duties 
alone, as we have seen above, provide sufficient scope for most 
maliks to at least influence and often manipulate their supporters 
and fellow villagers. The difficulties, for example, which one 
fatherless boy in his late teens had with the local government 
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enabled a malik to force him into exchanging one of his fields which 
bordered on the malik' s land for a less valuable one of the malik' s 
which in addition was on the edge of the hamlet's lands and thus 
troublesome to work and to irrigate. (The promise to solve the 
boy' s difficulties had not been fulfilled at the time I left the area. 
Once such tactics succeed and when the cnalik has success in other 
areas as well as support and wealth he can, unless faced by very 
strong opposition, exercise real power over others. It would seem 
probable that the numbers of such powerful maliks will increase 
because the traditional mechanisms such as loss of support and 
removal from office which previously could have weakened and 
deposed an overly strong malik can now be safely ignored when the 
malik has the local government's approval and support. Also the 
government which gave him these additional powers has provided, 
as yet, no mechanisms for inhibiting their misuse and death and 
the segmentation of the malik' s estate by his sons would seem to 
be the only answers for the future. 
Present Checks to the Malik' s Power 
At the moment, however, the traditional checks to the malik' s powers 
would still seem to be sufficient for all but the most powerful of 
hereditary maliks. In Afghaniya where four of the nine maliks are 
hereditary only one may be put into the category of most powerful 
and the other three although possessing permanence in office would 
share the middle of a power continuum along with some of their non- 
hereditary colleagues. The reasons for this diversity of power among 
the malik' s are as has become clear firstly differing amounts of 
wealth and land, secondly variable degrees of support from fellow 
villagers, electors and the government, thirdly differing possibilities 
for the utilisation of duties, and finally varying age. experience and 
expertise. Concomitant with these variables are, of courage, the 
sanctions which the electors can use against the maliks for what they 
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consider misuses of power. Such sanctions or checks also vary in 
efficacy according to the acquired powers of the individual malik. 
Social criticism, for example, is not sufficient to inhibit a strong 
malik from pursuing his objectives whereas it might be adequate 
to counteract the activities of a weaker one. The checks. therefore, 
to power, which will be outlined below, must be judged in the light 
of the differing potential among the maliks to ignore or resist them 
and not in terms of any absolute power which perhaps one or two 
maliks may possess under certain circumstances. 
('. riticiam 
Social criticism constitutes one of the principal, in the sense of most 
commonly used, checks on the malik' s power. It takes the two 
forms of negative and positive criticism and is usually informally 
expressed by individuals rather than by groups and is thus similar 
to what Radcliffe-Brown 
1) 
has called a 'diffuse sanction' . The 
yardsticks which the malik' s electors use for justifying their approval 
or disapproval and for judging the malik' s actions are Islam, Pakhtun 
ideals, and traditional conceptions about a malik' s function. When, 
therefore, a malik is seen to violate these ideals or misuse his 
power then he can face very considerable negative criticism. The 
extent to which he reacts depends, of course. on the security of his 
position. Most maliks, however, cannot completely ignore such 
criticism and it is obviously more pleasant for them to live among 
people who approve rather than disapprove of what they do. They, 
therefore, try where possible to harvest favourable comment and 
this of necessity influences their actions as well. Unfortunately the 
poverty of the area made acute by the drought and poor harvests of 
the last years has produced a certain indifference towards all ideals 
of behaviour on the part of the people. Men are principally interest- 
ed in becoming 'mir sari' (satisfied men) rather than remaining 
1) Radcliffe-Brown, A. 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive 
Society. p. 205. Cohen & West Ltd., London. 
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' wuge sari' (hungry men) and, as they themselves are willing to do 
more or less anything to achieve this condition, they cannot criticise 
the malik too much for utilising his position to reach what are in 
reality the same ends even if these are on a grander scale. This 
catastrophic economic condition should, however, as a result of the 
more favourable weather conditions have now changed to some extent 
so that the old ideals are once again playing a significant role in 
people's assessment of behaviour. 
Ost ra ei am 
Should social criticism prove to be of little value in bringing to an 
end a malik' s misuse of power then the next step in the 
confrontation is a form of boycott or ostracism. The lengths or 
extremes to which this is carried depends on the cause but when 
the provocation is sufficient then the most extreme form of ostracism 
will be practised. This means that all forms of communication with 
the malik cease and followers do not attend his ' rites de passage' or 
his religious festivities or entertainments. This total boycott 
generally proves to be effective even when the malik concerned is a 
powerful one. In other cases a less extreme approach can also be 
successful depending upon the relative power of the malik and the 
amount of support which still remains after his opponents have 
boycotted him. 
A conditional and therefore temporary withdrawal of support which 
would result from a boycott can also be a very potent check to a 
malik' s power. This is especially effective in those cases where 
maliks are more or less dependent on the support of relatives and 
electors rather than on share-croppers to accomplish personal goals. 
When such support is withdrawn as a result of a malik' s actions 
then he is unable to achieve anything and must pacify his supporters 
through actions which further their interests or which counteract 
the initial misuse of power or violation of ideals. 
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Loss of Followers 
Should a malik, however, fail to react to a temporary renunciation 
of support or should he continue to abuse his power then he may 
ultimately lose his supporters to another malik. Before this can 
happen the discontented supporters have to find another malik who is 
willing to accept them and this is not always so easy because maliks 
do not wish to be accused of 'stealing' another malik' s supporters. 
They are interested in stability of support and should electors be 
able to chop and change too easily it would be detrimental to their 
own interests because no malik, if he is to extend his field of 
power, can be constantly popular with everyone and today's new 
supporters can be tomorrow's defectors. Also maliks are not always 
willing or in a strong enough position to disturb their relations with 
other maliks by accepting their supporters at least when these are 
only one or two persons. It is, therefore, easier for groups to 
change their allegiance than for individuals because the former re- 
present a worthwhile addition to the new malik' a supporters and are 
adequate compensation for the inevitable hostility which will arise 
with the old malik. Obviously the more powerful maliks are more 
willing and able to accept changelings than less powerful ones 
although it is the latter who are most in need of additional support. 
It is certainly true to say among Safi maliks that success breeds 
success. 
Once the supporters have found a malik then they need to go with 
him to the judge, have their names deleted from the list of 
followers of the old malik and have them added to the list of 
supporters of the new one. Sometimes the group can be so large 
that the withdrawal of their support leads to the deposal of the 
malik because the number of his supporters drops below fifty. This 
is then the ultimate check to a malik' s power. Interestingly enough, 
as I think has become clear, it is not the most powerful maliks 
who are thus deposed or threatened but those who are in the initial 
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stages of establishing and extending their powers. These are the ones 
who are vulnerable because they have a small number of followers 
and also have little to offer them. Consequently they are often 
deposed after only a few months. The more powerful maliks on the 
other hand who would be less effected by losses of supporters are 
less troubled by such changes of allegiance because they have more 
to offer. Beyond a certain point, therefore, a malik' s powers begin 
to have a snowball effect the ultimate size and extent of which is only 
limited by death and the division of his land or by jirgas / marakas 
which minimise the malik' s power by transferring problems from his 
private sphere of influence to that of the hamlet, the lineage or the 
maliki. To reach and cross this threshold of power, however, 
requires considerable ability and expertise and many fail before they 
have reached it. Those who succeed find further progress relatively 
easy and come to enjoy all the fruits of power. 
Motives and Rewards 
These fruits represent the motivating forces which cause individual 
Safi to seek office as maliks and consist, as I think has become 
clear, of power, prestige, political support, wealth and land. They, 
of course, also constitute the goals of all political activity in 
Afghaniya but the realisation of such ends to generally more possible 
from the position of malik than it is from that of a landowner with 
an average holding. Most malika, therefore, once they have achieved 
office utilise their duties to acquire payments and bribes which can 
in turn be used to acquire land. Through their wealth and land they 
can increasingly acquire political support and with this support they 
can aggrandise that land which is adjacent to their own. Using all 
the possibilities open to him, one malik, for example, although 
starting as a small landowner has managed to procure a third of his 
hamlet' a total land and there would seem to be no reason why he 
should not continue to extend his ownership further. Such a malik 
has achieved real power and he can more or less dictate events 
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within his maliki as well as impinge upon the power fields of other 
less powerful maliks. The special position of this particular malik 
is also reflected in the imputation that he has supernatural powers 
over women. He is believed to possess a 'de kage kus', a lupine 
vulva, which when shown to young girls at sunrise and sunset of the 
same day is supposed to make him irresistable to them lie has, 
in other words, become a 'maximal male'. Although men who commit 
adultery or who seduce unmarried girls should, according to the 
norms of the society, be killed those who disregard or are 
contemptuous of the danger elicit admiration because their actions, 
whilst striking at the order of the society, also uphold another 
Pakhtun ideal that of potent manhood. One of the most famous 
Pakhtuns, Khushkhal Khan Khattak, was not only a renowrrd warrior 
and the most illustrious Pakhto poet but also a person who took his 
pleasures where he could with little regard for danger or local 
feeling as is shown in one of his poems: 
When does a hungry man pay heed 
To whether what he eats is lawful? 
Take her mouth, Khushal, in secret; 
The falcon steals flesh from the game. ' 
2) 
Thus this Safi malik in Afghaniya has not sullied his reputation as 
one might expect through his illicit amorous activities but has 
rather added lustre to his already high-status image. 
With such a malik before their eyes and with the realisation that the 
traditional checks to a malik' s power are, beyond a certain point, 
largely inadequate it is hardly surprising that others should see in 
the abuse of power and office the best way to obtain real power. 
1) A sort of cestus of Aphrodite. 
2) Leka badzen the halwa khwri. Translated by D. Mackenzie. 1965. 
Poems from the Divan of Khushal Khan Khattak. In: Dupree. 1973. 
Op. cit. P. 89. 
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Thus the malik in Afghaniya instead of being the support and symbol 
of an egalitarian and anarchic system has become the instrument 
through which inequality and centralisation will be implemented. 
Conclusion 
At the moment, however, the malik' s position in general lied some- 
where between these two extremes. Elements of what may be called 
the traditional form of leadership when seen in terms of 
Elphinstone' a account still remain in the duties which the malik 
performs for his electors and the reciprocal support which these 
electors give to the malik. Also the traditional checks to the 
malik' s power continue to be operative and effective up to a certain 
threshold of power beyond which they cease to have much influence. 
At the same time changes have been taking place which have 
fundamentally altered the traditional conception of the office of 
malik. Firstly drought, poor harvests, and overpopulation have lead 
to a general scepticism about the value and importance of ideals 
and standards of behaviour and this has been reflected in the malik' s 
abuse of power. Secondly the government, although trying to steer a 
middle course and to preserve certain elements of traditional leader- 
ship - at least at the level of the malik - whilst adapting it to 
modern requirements, has, as Lucy Mair writes about Africa, 
'altered by its mere presence both the nature and the basis of the 
chief' s authority' 
1). 
In addition, although most certainly at an 
unconscious level, the government has largely removed the malik out 
of reach of the traditional sanctions which he would have faced for 
the abuse of power in his community. And it has given him extra 
duties and powers which when misused as they are by the more 
expert and charismatic of maliks to achieve personal political goals 
have brought about a dysymmetry in social relations and an 
accentuation of inequalities 
2) 
1) Mair, L. 1969. Op. cit. p. 65. 
2) Compare Gluckman, M. 1965. Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal 
Society. Oxford. p. 119. " Big men' are more liable to become bullies 
where the imposition of colonial rule has given them powers which 
were not inherent in their offices traditionally' . 
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The type of leadership which has thus emerged is, therefore, neither 
wholely traditional nor charismatic but something of both. It is no 
longer lineally based because present membership cuts across lineage 
boundaries but agnates may provide a core of support in political 
confrontation if their interests are best served in this way. It is not 
comparable with leadership in Swat because in Afghaniya there is no 
non-Pakhtun, subordinate, indigenous population which can be used 
for achieving power and no men's houses (hujra) where political 
strength can be demonstrated and largesse distributed. It is not 
institutionalised leadership 1) although the attributes necessary for 
office, the procedure for election, the authorisation of power and 
the duties to be performed are all generally known and to a certain 
extent standardised. The Safi malik would, therefore, seem to be in 
summary a form of leadership possessing both traditional and 
charismatic attributes and moving in the direction of increasing 
authority, independence from electors, and institutionalisation. As a 
result if no adequate sanctions arise in the future then the most 
powerful maliks may well be able to assemble around them dependent, 
unrelated, share-croppers who would provide the backbone for 
independent, leader orientated, political groups and these would 
bring about major social change in the community. 
1) See Gluckman' s quotation from Maine: 'The capacity or office is here 
considered apart from the particular person who from time to time 
may occupy it, and, this capacity being perpetual, the series of 
individuals who fill it are clothed with the leading attribute of 
Corporations - Perpetuity,. Gluckman. 1965. Op. cit. p. 118. 
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12. CONCLUSION 
The social structure and organization of the Safi of Afghaniya seemed 
initially to be lineally organised and segmentary. Almost half the 
population were united through their common descent from an apical 
ancestor, musawad, and the other half, the non-musawad Safi, ordered 
themselves in accordance with this dominant group; the territory of 
the community could be seen as being divided into four areas 
occupied by four major lineages or khels; and the hamlets constituted 
minor lineages within which were and are politically active local 
descent groups, the koranai. Leadership was non-institutionalised and 
apparently lineage based, i. e. the malik was the lineage head. Land, 
property and water, jural, political and social status were all 
attached to and transmitted by descent. Finally patrilineal ideals and 
a patrilineal ideology were used as the yardsticks for ideal behaviour. 
As a result it was tempting to see and utilise patrilineality as the 
basis for social relations and activities especially as so much of 
Afghaniya' s society could be explained in this way. On closer 
examination, however, it became clear that this was a patrilineal 
system in decline in an, or some, intermediary stage between a 
segmentary system, described by Freedman as ' the purest form of 
unilineal descent group' 
1), 
and a village/family organised system 
whose members were united through agnation but also and equally 
through affinity, propinquity and common residence; and whose actions 
were governed by individual interests or at the most by those of the 
family/household. 
The symptoms or symbols of this decline became apparent as the 
thesis progressed. The larger descent organised groups, the minor 
division and major lineage, had no corporate function and the smaller 
ones, the minor lineage and koranai, whilst constituting the most 
important groups in the society were held together almost as much 
1) Freedman, M. 1958. Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. 
p. 138. Athlone Press, London. 
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by marriage, common residence, neighbourliness, etc., as by agnation. 
It is, of course, very difficult to say how much political support is 
the result of ties of descent or of ties of proximity of residence 
when close agnates also live contiguously. Certainly the links of 
descent have chronological precedence over those of closeness thus 
making the ties of propinquity a result of agnation rather than a 
separate cause of solidarity. Nevertheless it became clear that 
koranai, especially the larger ones, were not being used or brought 
together when situations arose which in the past would have 
necessitated their functioning. This is certainly a consequence of the 
almost complete disappearance of what used to be the koranai' s 
primary purpose, revenge killings - the result of the local 
government's activities in Nijrao. Now ties between members are 
being neglected, obligations are being disregarded, a minimum of 
new marriage links are being made, the para, the alternative 
political group, is being preferred and the present young men, the 
future elders, are talking about agnation as having, in their opinion, 
a negative influence on the more favoured affinity. 
The reasons for this disenchantment with agnatic ties and relations 
did not alone lie in the alternatives offered to the principles of 
revenge and self-help by the local government in Nijrao. They also 
came from over-population, land shortage and, in the short term, 
drought, i. e. economic and demographic factors. 
There has been relative over-population in this area for at least 
the last fifty years -a situation indicated by the occupational 
diversity in Afghaniya, the disappearance of families from the 
genealogies through migration, and the contacts of the present 
migrants with earlier ones in the areas to the north of the Hindu 
Kush. The over-population and the resulting division of many 
holdings into unworkably small units observable at the time of my 
field work was, however, not just the further advance of a process 
which had been under way for years but was the dramatic 
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aggravation of the situation. This was caused by a series of years 
of drought. The relative suddenness and extreme nature of the 
water shortage caught the people or at least the elders unprepared. 
Whilst cultivators can always cope with one or two years of below 
average precipitation a series of such years, especially in areas 
where reserves are minimal, bring and, in the case of Afghaniya, 
brought catastrophe and sudden change. Those who could or had 
been able to survive on a minimum became destitute first. Then 
as the drought continued other problems arose among those initially 
better situated. The absolute powers and authority of the fathers 
based as they were on their control of resources crumbled once 
these resources failed. Sons could not be married at the usual age 
and holdings could only be passed on which were totally inadequate. 
The number of sons of destitute fathers migrating for work 
increased and these became economically independent or brought 
back sums of money to the community which placed them in a 
position to make a claim to some of their fathers' authority and to 
be responsible for their own marriages and futures. Interests 
became individual or at the most family orientated. The splintering 
of families and households became, and have become, common and 
the elementary family household has replaced the extended family 
one as the most common form. 
In households where the land situation was not so acute but certain- 
ly not optimal latent tensions between brothers became manifest and 
paternal authority, social pressures and criticism increasingly 
proved not to be sufficient to suppress them. Overt hostility 
between brothers arose and thus the unthinkable in Pakhtun terms - 
conflict within the agnatic core - became not only possible but 
practised. 
Admittedly this involved and involves only part (some 40 %) of the 
population but the process had begun. The other 60 % of the 
population remained relatively undisturbed by these difficulties 
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because even in the period of extreme drought they had sufficient land 
to survive. Their ideals and norms, their patrilineal ideology have 
been preserved, not untouched, but have remained relatively intact. 
Nevertheless the process of change was put in a higher gear and 
the high protective wall of patriarchal power and patrilineality, the 
logical order of Pakhtun society at large, had been cracked and 
partially breached. Thus the other symptoms of patrilineal decline - 
the acceptance of divorce and adultery, the marriage of a Pakhtun 
girl to a barber, the marriage of girls in the face of the opposition 
of their walis, the concentration of interests on the family and 
household, the pursuit of individual rather than group interests, the 
erosion of egalitarian principles, the increasing influence of the 
central government on the community's affairs, the increasing use 
by members of the community of the local government's facilities, 
and the acceptance and furtherance of an established and authoritarian 
form of leadership - were not only possible but inevitable. 
This has not, however, resulted in a vacuum. Adjustments have been 
made by some if not by all and alternative ideals and groups have 
been created or been given broader functions. Now material interests 
are uppermost in most men's minds, and the sphere of attention has 
been reduced to that of the family and the household. Larger 
groupings, the para etc., form where interests cannot successfully be 
pursued otherwise, but they are impermanent. Of the more 
permanent groupings, the koranai has become restricted in its 
functions but is in no danger of disappearing - Cohen' s experience 
shows how remarkably resilient descent groups are 
1) 
- and the 
hamlet and the hamlet boundary have become the absolute limit of 
obligations and more than superficial interests. 
In other words a structure and organization is emerging whose 
largest corporate unit is the hamlet, whose political functions are 
1) See Cohen. 1965. Op. cit. p. 2. 
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pursued by the para, koranai and increasingly by groups around 
maliks and whose minimal units are the nuclear family and 
elementary family household. Such an organization represents the 
norm for the non-Pakhtun groups in Afghan society, i. e., for the 
Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbeks, and only the Pakhtuns and the 
Turkmen still retain their lineally organised tribal society. As I 
have shown, in the chapter on the Pakhtuns, how diverse their 
social and cultural forms are, one might think that this development 
in Afghaniya represents but one more form. It seems to me, how- 
ever, that it is a development which may well presage the course 
to be taken by other Pakhtun tribes once similar factors initiating 
change are present. 
This decline of the patrilineal system of organization and its 
evolution towards one based on kinship and common residence also, 
of course, implies a failure on the part of the Safi to be Pakhtuns 
and perhaps will bring with it a change of identity. So far this has 
not happened even in those Safi villages in other areas (Jabal as- 
Saraj) where the process of change would seem to be most advanced, 
i. e. where they no longer speak Pakhto. This would seem to mean 
that, as Barth suggests 
1), 
where many choose to maintain their 
claim to Pakhtun identity in spite of their failure to live up to, for 
example, Pakhtun ideals, patrilineality and Pakhtunwali then the 
basic content of the Pakhtun identity itself and its characteristics 
start being modified. In the case of the Safi of Afghaniya no new 
metamorphosis may be necessary because they will remain Pakhtun 
by changing that which is considered Pakhtun. 
1) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 134. 
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